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Both traditional and contemporary approaches to psychic trauma begin with the 
basic assumption that trauma is a pathological disordering of the subject in response to 
“an event outside the range of human experience.” Such event-based approaches to 
trauma have failed to establish a unified understanding of the wide range of symptoms 
and experiences that accompany traumatic crisis. This study departs from these 
traditional assumptions, placing the range of existent discourse from fields such as 
psychology, ethics, social theory, cognitive science, and literary studies within the 
broader framework of semiotics and epistemology. 
This broader framework allows me to define the underlying problematic in trauma 






human experience not bound by the structure of symbolic meaning. Beginning with this 
basic opposition, I develop a dynamic model of semiosis and subjectivity, in which the 
contrasting cognitive objectives of delimiting and expanding meaning can be understood 
as a productive differential that induces a current of experience, cognition, discourse, and 
identity. This dynamic model utilizes the anomalous symptoms and responses of 
traumatic crisis to expand existing models of subjectivity, since I argue that what we call 
“trauma” is actually an attenuation of sub-processes integral to the successful functioning 
of signification. 
The dynamic model of signification and subjectivity defined in this study 
provides a comprehensive explanation for what has seemed a widely scattered and 
unpredictable array of traumatic symptoms, situating physical, ethical, emotional and 
social “conflicts” within a single contiguous process. More importantly, it makes it 
feasible to talk about fields of study as disparate as psychology, cognitive science, social 
science using parallel models that are based upon the same principles. This will allow one 
field to contribute to another in a way that has not yet been possible, and has implications 
for the active treatment of traumatic crisis. Finally, the model developed here founds an 
overarching interpretive approach to trauma narrative that is textually based, and hence 
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And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of 
men builded. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all 
one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained 
from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there 
confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech. 
(King James Bible, Genesis 11.5-7) 
 
 
In the twentieth century, psychological trauma has emerged as a dominant 
discourse both in popular culture and in scholarly debate. First understood in mid-
nineteenth-century medicine and experimental psychology as a physiological response to 
a physical trauma,1 the notion of psychic trauma has changed over the course of the last 
century and a half, transcending the field of medicine, and challenging basic assumptions 
about ethics, cognition, individual identity, and social identity. In the most general terms, 
psychic trauma constitutes a response to an event or experience that overwhelms the 
individual’s coping mechanisms. The traumatic response is characterized by a wide range 
of often paradoxical symptoms, some of which are somatic in nature, others of which are 
manifested as a disruption to cognition, identity, and even to the individual’s ability to 
formulate a narrative of the trauma.2 (For a more detailed examination of traumatic crisis 
and the symptoms that such crisis may engender, see section 1.0.2.) 
                                                 
1 Trauma has been variously defined. A standard overview of the origin of modern psychology can be 
found in: Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: the History and Evolution of Dynamic 
Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970). George Drinka’s The Birth of Neurosis is a standard work that 
examines hysteria, and more specifically, the social conditions out of which the diagnosis of hysteria 
emerged. George Frederick Drinka, The Birth of Neurosis: Myth, Malady, and the Victorians (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984). For a look at traditional psychiatric treatment of hysteria from a feminist 
perspective, see Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, And English Culture, 1830-1980 
(New York: Pantheon, 1985). 
2 Those symptoms are summarized in Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery, and include paradoxical 
alternations such as a sense either of total victimization, or of total culpability; contradictory manifestations 






While my initial interest in the subject of trauma was personal, largely driven by 
curiosity about the nature of my own traumatic experiences, that interest has been 
sustained by an abiding curiosity concerning the apparent fragmentation of the topic. 
Struck by the sheer inadequacy of available definitions for psychic trauma, I found it 
particularly remarkable how often trauma theorists fall back on teleological arguments, 
defining and delimiting traumatic crisis by an event presumed to have produced that 
crisis, while at the same time precluding that “event” from the scope of their inquiry. 
Equally puzzling is the tendency to reduce and fragment the topic of trauma such that 
repression precludes dissociation, the ethical treatment of trauma precludes the 
epistemological, and physiological explanations preclude psychological ones.3 
Researchers are divided as to whether trauma is chiefly an epistemological crisis or an 
                                                                                                                                                 
anger; and hypermnesia and amnesia. Judith L. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, rev. ed. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1997) 121. 
3 This former stance that trauma has a physiological basis has been perhaps most fully developed in the 
work of Bessel van der Kolk and his colleagues, and rests on a lineage that goes back to Pierre Janet and 
Freud (in his earliest work) and even earlier research. Bessel A. Van der Kolk, ed., Psychological Trauma. 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1987). Some theorists are skeptical of this approach, perhaps 
most vociferously, Ruth Leys, whose 2000 book, Trauma: A Genealogy examines the history of trauma and 
its psychiatric treatment as having evolved along a dichotomous path of mimesis and antimimesis. Ruth 
Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 8-9. Leys explicitly rejects van 
der Kolk’s view that “traumatic” memory is held apart from ordinary “narrative” memory. In particular, she 
rejects what she sees as van der Kolk’s claim that traumatic memory is held in an unaltered form: “[…] 
because the victim is unable to process the traumatic experience in a normal way, the event leaves a ‘reality 
imprint’ in the brain that, in its insistent literality, testifies to the existence of a pristine and timeless 
historical truth undistorted or uncontaminated by subjective meaning, personal cognitive schemes, 
psychosocial factors, or unconscious symbolic elaboration” (7). She is equally critical of Cathy Caruth, a 
literary critic whom Leys accuses of eliding the veridical with the literal, like van der Kolk, and of leaning 
too heavily on epistemological-ontological claims (229). See Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Leys also criticizes 
van der Kolk for offering what she characterizes as: “a causal analysis of trauma as fundamentally external 
to the subject that is not only poorly formulated but is haunted by the same problem of mimetic 
suggestibility that the theory is designed to forestall (16). I agree that van der Kolk does not overcome the 
inadequacy of current definitions of trauma, which tend to focus on the external event as the origin of the 
traumatic response. While I agree with Leys contention that traumatic memory cannot be understood as an 
absolutely literal and unaltered memory of an event (242), I disagree with her categorical rejection of the 







ethical crisis, whether it is the trauma/victim or society that can more authentically speak 
as to the true nature of a given trauma, and whether unmediated testimony or literary 
representation is better suited as a medium of expression for traumatic experience. There 
is similar disagreement as to whether the survivor and the witness can share knowledge 
of trauma, or even share an experience of such.4 
Although there is some merit in many of these seemingly contradictory theoretical 
stances such as Freud’s model of repression and Janet’s model of dissociation, none 
provides an explanation for traumatic crisis that is wholly adequate. This has led me to 
question the presumption that one theoretical stance must preclude the other. The 
mutually preclusive nature of various theoretical stances within the study of trauma is 
predicated upon certain assumptions about meaning, identity, and subjectivity. Those 
assumptions tend to be reductive, conceiving of subjectivity as monolithic, claiming that 
“truth” can be shared by the individual and the society to which s/he belongs, or that 
there is one true narrative to be produced in describing traumatic experience. 
Rather than attempting to force our understanding of psychic trauma into existing 
notions of meaning, identity, and cognition – (an effort that has yielded a plethora of 
inconsistencies and paradoxes) – it would seem to be more sensible to examine how 
trauma might inform our understanding of both subjectivity and of the way in which 
meaning comes into being. The theoretical approach to trauma that I develop in this study 
attempts to do just that – to allow trauma to expand existent theories as to how 
subjectivity and meaning come into being. When we are presented with a paradox such as 
                                                 






the seemingly paradoxical nature of the traumatic response, then common sense should 
tell us that our own assumptions and structural conceptualizations are falsely limited – 
assumptions that are so foundational that they escape the framework of our inquiry, and 
that therefore perplex us rather than prompting us to modify those assumptions. Trauma 
is not an anomalous or paradoxical condition. Rather, it presents us with the unique 
opportunity to understand dimensions of subjectivity and cognition that otherwise remain 
beneath the threshold of conscious, human awareness. In this sense, what I present here is 
as much a theory of subjectivity and of cognitive functioning as it is a theory of trauma. 
This study is the product of an abiding intellectual interest in the formation of 
meaning both at an individual, cognitive level, and at the social level, where our personal 
apprehension of meaning is either ratified or rejected. Throughout my academic career, I 
have been occupied with various theoretical approaches to the formation of meaning and 
of our apprehension of reality, beginning with a series of courses taken at the University 
of Hamburg in cognitive science and aphasia. Over time, this interest in the genesis of 
meaning and, more importantly, the failure of symbolized meaning to express certain 
experiences, led me to examine the way in which that subject is treated in philology, 
linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and finally, semiotics. In examining the role of 
language and symbolized meaning in human cognition, I was led to conclude that one of 
the most critical difficulties underlying traumatic crisis is the breadth of potential human 







In signifying experience, the individual is forced to fulfill what are often 
competing agendas. On the one hand, she is driven to signify unmediated somatosensory 
experience, and whenever such experience is novel, and therefore heterogeneous to 
symbolized meaning, these efforts lead per force to the alteration of existing meaning 
schemes and to the expansion of what can be expressed.5 At the same time, the individual 
must also fulfill the essential objective of preserving symbolized meaning that is shared 
by others in her social environment. The individual’s apprehension of meaning that is 
formed by her own unmediated experience must, in other words, remain mutually 
comprehensible in that social domain. In this way, she is not free to symbolize experience 
at will and without the constraint of what others may have experienced. 
In examining trauma via both primary and secondary sources, it became apparent 
that the inability to “speak” of trauma – that is, to fully signify traumatic experience – is 
derived not from the inability to find or create words to express that experience. Rather, it 
comes from the difficulty facing the traumatized individual who must challenge not only 
her own apprehension of meaning and identity, but who must challenge the social 
apprehension of these as well, overcoming social opposition to such change by those who 
do not share that same sensory experience, in order that she might find an adequate 
listener. If one stops to consider that meaning comes into being in the intersection of 
opposing forces – the reductive schemata of socially accepted, symbolized meaning 
                                                 
5 Throughout this study, I will use the pronouns “she” and “her” when referring to an indeterminate subject 
such as “the traumatized individual.” I do so in order to avoid awkward constructions such as “s/he” and to 
avoid the grammatically awkward “their” for the singular possessive adjective, which pains my inner 
grammarian, despite whatever degree of acceptability such usage may have achieved in scholarship. This 
decision to use the feminine pronoun is in no way intended as a political statement as to the gender of the 
trauma survivor, etc. Rather, I have chosen to use the feminine pronouns simply for clarity’s sake, and 






versus the call for its modification by heterogeneous, somatosensory experience – it 
becomes possible to identify two simultaneously occurring but mutually opposed 
traumatic processes; one individual, and the other social. The individual, in other words, 
is bound to signify her own unmediated sensory experience and yet, at the same time, 
must preserve the linguistic bond that she shares with the discursive community. 
There is not a single “true” or “more authentic” trauma narrative – a notion that 
has divided researchers among those who posit that the survivor alone can speak, and 
those who posit that the witness of trauma testimony and society must formulate that 
narrative. 6 Certainly the survivor is the only individual who can know and represent her 
own unmediated experiences, and any attempt to speak for the survivor or to interpret her 
traumatic crisis is an imposition of another individual’s own apprehension of that 
experience upon her. When that survivor brings a trauma testimony or narrative to the 
domain of social discourse, however, the heterogeneous nature of that narrative 
challenges the limits of shared symbolized meaning. As such, the witness or listener of 
                                                 
6 Kalí Tal strongly criticizes the tendency of recent trauma theorists (particularly Felman and Laub) to 
appropriate the survivor’s testimony, placing the locus of authentic interpretation with the witness of the 
testimony. Kalí Tal, Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) 53. As Tal observes concerning Felman and Laub’s Testimony:Crises of Witnessing: “[…] the 
survivor’s experience has been completely replaced by the experience of those who come in contact with 
the survivor’s testimony – an appropriative gambit of stunning proportions. We are treated to a new 
traumatic phenomenon: ‘the crisis of witnessing’” (53-54). Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub, Testimony: 
Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1991). I agree with 
Tal in her criticism of Laub and Felman’s claim that the witnesses are traumatized when they “encounter 
the real” through listening to the survivor’s testimony (53), as though the traumatized individual and the 
witness shared the same “true” experience. I object, however, to her dismissal of any “crisis of witnessing” 
(54). Certainly it would be incorrect and even unethical for the witness of a testimony to interpret the 
experience of trauma for the traumatized individual, or to claim that she can know that experience. I will 
argue, however, that the narrative of traumatic experience can indeed produce a crisis of witnessing insofar 
as that narrative brings heterogeneous content to social discourse, and as a result, forces the witness of that 
discourse to confront the dissolution of the linguistic bond shared with the traumatized individual. The 
crisis that may emerge would reflect the instability of meaning brought about by an encounter with an 
assertion of heterogeneous discourse, and would be unique to each witness, although that crisis could not 






trauma testimony is forced to come to terms with what is heterogeneous in the narrative. 
The witness and the survivor cannot share the same traumatic experience any more than 
they can share any unmediated somatosensory experience. What they share is the 
challenge of renegotiating symbolized meaning and of restoring the linguistic bond 
between them in the wake of evidence that such meaning does not objectively reflect a 
shared, external reality. They share, in other words, the lacuna of silence that follows the 
devaluation of symbolized meaning and language.7 
As I have suggested, the difficulty that researchers have faced when examining 
trauma is the reductive and fragmenting nature of what are generally held assumptions 
about subjectivity, meaning, and identity. In particular, static models of subjectivity urge 
one to resolve what is viewed as conflicted identity to a single subject-entity. Similarly, 
conflicted meaning (both as it is apprehended and expressed by the traumatized 
individual) is expected to resolve to a single locus of symbolized meaning that, in modern 
philosophical terms, is held in a social domain (i.e., Lacan’s symbolic order, Kuhn’s 
paradigm, and Foucault’s episteme).8 Confronted with the demand to maintain these 
                                                 
7 Leys has criticized Caruth, and Felman and Laub for supporting this notion that both the survivor and the 
witness of the testimony share the rupture in meaning and that it should be imperative that this lacuna, or 
incomprehensibility be preserved as the truth in traumatic testimony. Leys writes: “But for Caruth such an 
act of narration risks betraying the truth of the trauma defined as an incomprehensible event that defies all 
representation. Accordingly, she calls for a mode of responding to trauma that ensures the transmission of 
the break or gap in meaning that constitutes history as inherently traumatic” (269). I do not wholly agree 
with Leys’ rejection of Caruth’s claims. Indeed, although specific criticisms seem to be well-founded (in 
particular her criticism of Caruth’s claim in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, along with van der Kolk, 
that traumatic memory is held unmodified outside of ordinary, narrative memory), much of Leys criticisms, 
especially of Caruth and van der Kolk, appear to be more personally motivated than based upon scholarly 
disagreement. Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1995). 
8 See Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977) 125; Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1970) 
191; and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 






monolithic concepts of subjectivity and symbolized meaning, it is natural that researchers 
should have difficulty agreeing on a definition and understanding of trauma. Its ability to 
disrupt somatic functioning, identity, cognition, discourse, and social interaction, as well 
as unpredictability as to whether or not traumatic crisis will emerge in response to a given 
experience or as to which symptoms will appear, falls well outside of the framework of 
what may be explained using static notions of subjectivity and symbolized meaning. 
What is ultimately needed is a dynamic model of subjectivity, cognitive 
functioning and semiotic activity, not simply in order to understand trauma, but in order 
to understand the tension that exists between individual cognition and socially sanctioned 
meaning. We know that we are not born with a fully formed, cognitive apprehension of 
symbolized meaning and identity, but must somehow arrive at these from what is the first 
instance of our experience of the world – our own unmediated, sensory experiences. 
These sensory impulses, which arise within the body and via our sensory receptors and 
afferent nerves, comprise nothing more than an experience of our own bodies, and yet 
from these, we must somehow fulfill a range of dramatically diverse objectives, including 
the formation of bodily awareness, the separation of what is experienced (the object) 
from the experiencer (the subject), the development of a symbolized apprehension of 
reality and the capacity to communicate socially, the formation of individual identity 
within social interaction, the construction of a shared social identity (i.e., an identity that 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually held in the social domain. Rather, I argue that meaning can only be held individually, at the level 
of Idiolect – the individual’s personal apprehension of symbolized meaning –  since there is no single 
cognition that apprehends “shared meaning.” I will argue that shared meaning exists by a concensus, in 
which each member of a discursive community possesses their own cognitive apprehension of meaning and 
idenity, but agrees (not necessarily consciously) to behave as though meaning were shared in the interest of 






collectively characterizes a specific discursive community) and the formulation of a 
shared, social ethics. 
All of these objectives must be fulfilled using the same somatosensory input held 
by the individual, as well as from the interaction of individuals, each driven by their own 
unique sensory experiences. At a neurocognitive level, sensory experiences must be 
organized and reorganized using different logical terms, and although we cannot yet 
examine these aspects of cognitive functioning at a physical level using available 
research methods and technologies, existent theories already outline potential 
organizational differences (i.e., Lacan, Kristeva, Ricoeur, etc.). The model of cognition 
and subjectivity presented in this study attempts to explain this variegated functioning by 
creating what is essentially a metaphor for the functioning of cognition, subjectivity, and 
semiotic activity. In devising this model, I attempt to systematically account for the 
various ways in which sensory experience would have to be organized in order to fulfill 
the objectives listed above. These efforts yielded a set of five organizational domains that 
progress systematically from initial sensory experience to complex social interaction, 
each introducing some level of organization that is necessary for the overall progression 
from one to the other, but that simultaneously accounts for specific aspect of cognitive 
functioning. These domains are not conceived as physiological regions of the brain or as 
static loci of meaning and organization. Rather, they describe functional domains through 
which experience would pass as a current. 
The analyses of literature presented in this study serve to elucidate the functioning 






of experience within these domains often remains beneath the threshold of conscious 
awareness in our day to day functioning, and expressing the nuances of somatic 
responses, conflicted boundaries of self identity and conflicted expressions of symbolized 
meaning literary come across in a fragmented way in unmediated testimony. Literary 
(and filmic) expression makes available various means of artistic distortion that facilitate 
the expression of conflicted narrative content that is often censored from spontaneous 
communication. The interplay of tensions across the boundaries between the functional 
domains, and the ongoing evolution of symbolized meaning is more easily represented in 
a narrative medium. It is therefore my hope that the examination of the narratives 
presented in this study will facilitate the reader’s understanding of the dynamic by which 
meaning evolves, and the tensions that arise in narrative cohesion over the course of that 
evolution. 
In outlining the five functional domains that comprise this model of cognitive 
functioning and subjectivity, I drew upon existent philosophical and semiotic theories of 
subjectivity (many of which are touched upon in the first chapter of this study). Having 
done so, and having established the way in which a dynamic current of 
experience/subjectivity would function within those domains, it became apparent that this 
model could provide a cohesive explanation for the various kinds of traumatic symptoms 
and “dissociative disorders” commonly associated with traumatic crisis. In consequence, 
this theoretical approach provides both a model of subjectivity, and a way of viewing 
traumatic conflict that brings together theoretical views, which have hitherto been 






unified understanding of trauma. In this way, it has not been my objective to join into the 
acrimonious debate that has divided the study of trauma. Indeed, my intention is to create 
a way of integrating many of the meaningful contributions that have been made to the 
field in such a way that they need not negate one another. 
With a dynamic model of subjectivity and cognitive functioning, it is no longer 
meaningful or necessary to debate whether a “true” narrative of traumatic experience 
must come from the traumatized individual or from those who bear witness to that trauma 
from the social domain. Although each individual (whether directly traumatized or 
whether indirectly, by bearing witness to that trauma) has her own apprehension of any 
particular trauma, each contributes to an overall dynamic by which shared, symbolized 
meaning is constructed. The fragmentation of meaning and identity that results from 
trauma is experienced first by those who are directly traumatized. Some form of 
fragmentation is propogated socially as well, however, when trauma testimony or 
narrative brings heterogeneous content to social discourse, thereby weakening or even 
severing the linguistic bond that ties the participants within a discursive community to 
one another. Indeed, as I will argue more fully in this study, there are two traumatic 
processes at work that oppose one another, and it is this opposition (the dissolution of 
individually held meaning and identity versus the dissolution of socially sanctioned 
meaning and identity), each driven by its own specific urgency, that renders “trauma” 
(actually multiple traumata) so difficult to resolve. 
The distinction between individual trauma and collective/social trauma is of 






individual has her own apprehension of any given trauma and ultimately, no one can 
articulate or interpret the experience of trauma for anyone else. Indeed the witness to 
trauma narrative, who may herself be traumatized to some degree by the act of 
witnessing, knows only what she herself has experienced. This is not only true of trauma, 
of course, but of all experience. Traumatic experience, however, poses a unique difficulty 
for the survivor(s), the witness(es), and the discursive community to which they belong. 
Trauma is unique among the human experiences in the degree to which it demands the 
redefinition and reorganization of meaning and identity, both as these are apprehended by 
the individual, and as they are presumed to be shared socially (i.e., via the collective 
interaction of members within a discursive community). 
Trauma, in other words, is an experience (not necessarily related to an event) that 
challenges the accepted schemata of symbolized meaning to which we all must subscribe 
if communication and social interaction are to be successful, and therefore the knowledge 
of traumatic events and testimony of traumatic experience also pose a challenge to the 
witness, listener, or reader. As members of the social domain, we are obliged to be 
engaged. Beyond this, however, we possess only knowledge of our individual experience 
and reaction to traumatic narrative. This is true whether we accept that narrative and are, 
in some measure, shaken in our apprehension of meaning and identity by an experience 
we do not directly share, or whether we reject that narrative and yet, must defend our 
apprehension of meaning and identity against a narrative of heterogeneous experience we 
do not accept. The complexities of negotiating a consensus among participants in a 






individual who experiences and a social being. As a result, this conflict plays out both 
within the individual herself, and between that individual and the discursive communities 
to which she belongs. It is scarcely a wonder, then, that trauma should pose such a 
difficulty to comprehension or that it should engender such discord even among those 
who sincerely wish to understand it.9 
In this study, I will argue that the objective of language as the medium of social 
communication and mutual comprehension is to forge a social bond among individuals, 
even as those individuals are divided by their own privately held apprehension of 
meaning and identity. Only by accepting and behaving as though meaning is mutually 
held and shared does social interaction become possible, even as the innate separation of 
individual cognitive processes guarantees that the only thing we truly share is the 
compact to behave as though meaning exists and is unified at a social level. The social 
project is a reductive one, in which each participant in any given discursive community 
must compromise in order to support what can be presumed to be shared, (e.g., some 
elements of personal experience must be left out of this compact of “shared” meaning in 
the interest of this compromise). A trauma survivor may speak of her traumatic 
experience, but this testimony or narrative is itself constructed in the intersection of 
                                                 
9 This focus on the negotiation of meaning also leads me away from the notion that is built on the American 
Psychiatric Association’s diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, that traumatic crisis (if indeed a 
crisis is always the result of traumatic experience) is pathological in nature, or that the traumatized 
individual needs to be “treated” by forcing her to reinterpret her experiences from within a socially 
sanctioned interpretation of her trauma. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV, 4th ed. (Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) 424-29. While the traumatized individual may need relief from those symptoms generated by 
traumatic conflict, the objective of that treatment should not be the “repair” of her apprehension of meaning 
and identity. Rather, both the traumatized individual and her potential care-giver should recognize that they 
are both engaged in the renegotiation of meaning in the wake of evidence that existent, symbolized 







unmediated experience and the need to be understood by others. As such, the survivor’s 
narrative is already compromised in the interest of mutual comprehension once it has 
been expressed within language. Further, no interpretation of the survivor’s narrative is 
possible, since every individual who receives that narrative does so via the mediation of 
his or her own apprehension of meaning and identity. Upon its reception, the trauma 
narrative has already become, in this way, the witness’s own narrative. 
When we attempt to understand trauma as researchers, we automatically do so via 
our own experience of trauma, since it is impossible to escape the apprehension of 
meaning and reality that our own experiences have forged. It is therefore problematic, 
possibly even unethical to interpret or “analyze” the traumatic testimony of others in an 
effort to explain the phenomena of trauma. Certainly, we must look at the trauma 
testimony and trauma narratives of others in order to come to a greater understanding of 
the subject, however, the researcher must be aware that, in the act of doing so, she is 
actively participating in the renegotiation and compromise by which shared meaning is 
reestablished. The danger then lies in actually interpreting the experience of those who 
provide testimony in an effort to rectify the trauma that both survivor and witness share – 
the dissolution of the linguistic bond between them. This makes any study of trauma 
(including this one) a charged subject. While being aware of this, I have consciously tried 
to avoid providing an interpretation of actual survivor testimony. Rather, I have chosen to 
present a number of literary and filmic narratives as illustrative examples of my 
theoretical assertions. This choice may present difficulties for some who are engaged 






testimony” as the more authentic expression of traumatic experience.10 I would argue that 
this view ignores the reality that “unmediated testimony” is, for all of its immediacy, still 
a constructed narrative. While there is a precedent for using literary narratives to 
elucidate our understanding of trauma (i.e., Caruth, Felman, Laub, Shay11 and Langer), 
my decision to use such narratives rather than testimony is ultimately derived from the 
desire to avoid overlaying actual first-person testimony given by trauma survivors of their 
personal experiences with my own interpretations. 
The choice to utilize literary and filmic narratives brings up the question as to 
how we should define a trauma narrative, and whether it needs to be a first-person 
narrative that “realistically” represents the actual events (such as any exist) that are 
regarded as the origin of traumatic crisis. (Indeed, does trauma need to be defined as a 
“crisis,” or is this simply the only kind of traumatic experience that finds social 
validation?) Lawrence Langer, a literary scholar turned Holocaust critic, argued in his 
earlier work that fictive narrative was often a more adequate expression of traumatic 
experience.12 He subsequently abandoned that view in favor of trauma narratives as 
found in videotaped testimony, specifically the Holocaust testimonies recorded in the 
Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale.13 The presumption that oral narrative 
                                                 
10 See note 3 in Chapter 1. 
11 Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: 
Scribner, 2002), and Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character 
(New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994). 
12 Lawrence L. Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1975). 
13 Although Langer’s later position was that video testimony provided a more accurate representation of 
traumatic experience than the literary representations he had earlier championed, he himself admitted that, 
while video testimony may be more direct, that medium does not truly provide an undistorted testimony. 
As he notes in Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory: “In the beginning, I was convinced that these 






is “unmediated” testimony or that oral, first-person narrative is more authentic, or 
somehow more “true” than literary narrative in providing an unconscious view into the 
survivor’s inner experience, has itself fallen under criticism.14 
Defining trauma narrative by its medium, by the degree of “literary” 
embellishment attributed to it, or by how “literally” the narrative is perceived to represent 
a traumatic event is an inadequate way of delimiting that narrative form. Indeed, such 
means of definition are very much akin to the effort to define trauma using tautological 
references to the “event” believed to have produced that crisis. Just as it is necessary to 
move away from a definition of traumatic crisis that relies on external circumstances (the 
event and the social recognition that such an event is legitimately “traumatic”) in order to 
define it from within the innate structure of that experience, so too it is necessary to 
define the trauma narrative from within the structure of the narrative itself. The fact that a 
narrative depicts an unfortunate event, or that is presented as a oral testimony, in other 
words, does not in and of itself make a narrative a trauma narrative. Rather, I will define 
the trauma narrative in terms of its innate, narrative structure, and the capacity of that 
structure to depict the fragmentation of meaning and identity characteristic of traumatic 
crisis – a characteristic that I would define as polylexia, whereby the traumatic experience 
                                                                                                                                                 
though not identical with, ones we find in consciously contrived literary texts. But this expectation appears 
not to be supported by evidence.” Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991) 13. 
14 Laub also privileges taped testimony, going so far as to assert that the taped testimony constitutes a 
psychoanalytic dialogue (Felman and Laub 70). This position has rightly been challenged by Leys: “On this 
model, survivor and interviewer are brought together in an oral or face-to-face encounter in which the 
interviewer becomes the listener-analyst who is marked by the trauma but, unlike the victim, has the 






can only fully be represented by creating competing narrative realities such that these can 
neither be merged, nor separated. 
In this way, it is possible and even necessary to examine the trauma narrative 
according to the structure of the narrative itself by examining the conflict of 
heterogeneous experience, the need to negotiate meaning and, most importantly, the 
silence created not by an inability to speak of trauma, but by an inability to form a single, 
adequate, linear narrative of experience and identity. A trauma narrative can then be 
distinguished from a narrative of an unfortunate experience by innate characteristics, 
without reference to intentional fallacy. In its innate structure, the “successful” trauma 
narrative as I define it here, conveys the inadequacy of existent symbolized meaning to 
express the heterogeneous experience of trauma, and the resulting need for a polyglossic 
representation in order to fully express and communicate traumatic experience. The 
silence of trauma – actually the inadequacy of existent symbolized terms and relations – 
must be recreated in the listener or reader, rather than narrated. Traumatic experience can 
be conveyed as readily (indeed, arguably more readily) in a literary narrative, and the 
format of the narrative (narrative perspective, degree of realism, etc.) should be 
subordinate to the objective of conveying experience. 
In order to examine the innate structure of trauma narrative (as defined in this 
study), I have chosen two literary narratives as the focus of the final three chapters in this 
study: Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle, and Russell Banks’s The Sweet Hereafter. (I 
also draw on the filmic adaptations of these narratives – Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut and 






analyses.) Although there were many narratives from which I might have chosen, I 
selected these two works as my primary focus because they most clearly and succinctly 
illustrate the broadest range of theoretical features of the model that I plan to discuss. The 
organization of the narratives, in other words, allowed me to move through the theoretical 
discussion in a similarly organized way, thereby making it easier for the reader to follow. 
I begin these narrative analyses with Traumnovelle specifically because it is not a 
“trauma narrative” in the traditional sense – that is, it does not depict any sort of event 
that is socially recognized as being traumatic. In beginning here, I hope to lead the reader 
away from the expectation that trauma should arise in response to a particular kind of 
event (indeed, one may argue that there is no discrete, precipitous event in the novella at 
all, but rather and aggregation of experiences that gradually build to a traumatic crisis). 
The traumatic crisis depicted in Traumnovelle is a crisis of inner, subjective experience – 
specifically, of a mid-life crisis. The novella follows the entire course of that crisis from 
its initial emergence to its ultimate resolution, while the quality of that crisis facilitates an 
examination of the first part of the dynamic model of subjectivity and cognitive 
functioning presented in the second chapter. The focus of this first narrative analysis is 
primarily on the internal experience of crisis, rather than on the renegotiation of meaning 
through social interaction, although some reference to the role of the discursive 
community in the formation of meaning is unavoidable. 
The Sweet Hereafter, which I will examine in the fourth and fifth chapters of this 
study, deals with subject matter that would indeed be traditionally viewed as a 






a trauma narrative. (The author was not involved in a similar event, and therefore while 
the narrative may express an understanding of trauma derived from personal experience, 
the narrative cannot be said to constitute a testimony.) The narrative presents, as 
monologue, the traumatic reactions of four distinct characters to the same, ostensibly 
shared event. This narrative structure will allow me to examine the unique quality of the 
individual’s response to a specific event based on his or her prior experiences, and this 
will be my focus in the fourth chapter in this study. The Sweet Hereafter is also 
exemplary in its clear focus on social interaction, and on ethical aspects of trauma, 
especially the religious, and the legal treatment of trauma. The final chapter of this study 
will focus on these aspects of the novella, and in particular, the way in which shared 
meaning is renegotiated and the pragmatic concerns that shape that renegotiation. 
The status of these narratives as trauma narratives is based solely on their 
narrative structure. They are not “testimonies” given by traumatized individuals, and 
although I discuss the characters in relation to the narrative, their “experiences” do not 
represent actual experiences. Accordingly, the discussion of those narratives should not 
be understood as an analysis of those characters as though they possessed actual thought 
processes. Rather, they are narrative representations of fragmented identity and cognitive 
functioning. In these narrative analyses, I am merely interested in the way in which 
conflicted narrative realities (i.e., polylexia) can be recreated in literary and performance 
narrative (i.e., film and drama). The same polyglossic features can be found in actual 
survivor testimony (albeit generally in a less polished form), however as I have stated, I 






interpretations of his or her personal testimony. What is important in looking at the 
characters’ inner monologues then, is the way in which each circumscribes conflicted 
narrative elements rather than the ontological veracity of their existence. 
The objective of these literary and filmic analyses is twofold. On the one hand, 
they are intended to provide an example of the structure and functioning of the cognitive 
model presented in chapter two – a dynamic model of subjectivity and semiotic activity 
that strives to account for traumatic crisis from within the normal (i.e., non-pathological) 
functioning of subjectivity. It is also my objective, on the other hand, to propose the 
trauma narrative as a unique and unified genre of narrative that is defined not by its 
subject matter, narrative perspective, or authorial intention, but rather, by its innate 
structure. The trauma narrative, in other words, can be defined by its successful 
expression of the fragmentation and polylexia, which result from traumatic experience 
and which characterize traumatic crisis. In order to adequately fulfill these objectives, I 
have given unusually detailed, almost page-by-page analyses of the two primary 
narratives in chapters three through five. While such a detailed reading is not customary 
in literary studies, I feel that it is necessary in this case in order to show how the trauma 
narrative, as I define it here, is characterized by its innate structure as a whole. 
The scope of this project is quite large, embracing traumatic crisis at the level of 
cognitive functioning, of social interaction, and of narrative expression. With this study, I 
hope to allow traumatic crisis to inform and expand our understanding of subjectivity, 
meaning, and identity, rather than attempting to deal with the paradoxes engendered by 






for someone in a department of language, literature and culture studies to write a 
dissertation of this sort, however my interests, background, and preparation extend well 
beyond the limitations of the department that I now call home. Certainly, the approach I 
have taken to trauma may be viewed by some to be highly charged, in particular my 
refutation that traumatic crisis should be regarded as pathology. It is not my intention to 
add fuel to what has already been, at times, a bitterly acrimonious debate. Rather, it is my 
hope that by expanding our presuppositions about subjectivity, and meaning, some of the 
debate dividing trauma research today can be laid to rest. The majority of those 
theoretical approaches that I reject as a comprehensive explanation for traumatic crisis 
contribute meaningfully to our understanding of trauma as a whole. By establishing a 
dynamic model of subjectivity, and thereby eliminating the need to conceive of 
subjectivity, meaning and identity as monolithic, many hitherto conflicting theories of 
trauma may ultimately be brought together to contribute to one another in a meaningful 
way. 
 
The five chapters that comprise this study are laid out as follows: 
 
Chapter one introduces the essential scholarly discourses on which this study will 
draw. This includes a brief overview of trauma theory, psychological models of trauma, 
philosophical discourse concerning subjectivity, linguistic theory of the subject and 
semiotic theory. This study will draw on all of these areas, and since it is possible that the 






assumptions about subjectivity from within the various discourses in which those 
assumptions are developed. This chapter will be of limited interest to the reader who is 
reasonably well versed in these areas, however, it provides a kind of map as to the origins 
of my thinking on the topic of trauma. 
Chapter two is a largely theoretical chapter in which I present my own theory of 
subjectivity and semiotic activity as a dynamic process, subject to the same interactions 
and conflicts that characterize all dynamic systems. In this chapter, I define in great detail 
not only the structure of five organizational domains, but their effects upon experience 
that is passed, as a current, through them. I also outline the potential for conflict that 
exists when experience passes from one domain into the next, and the way in which such 
conflict is manifested as traumatic crisis. Although this chapter is largely theoretical, I 
also present a brief narrative analysis as a means of illustrating the theory. 
Chapter three presents a detailed narrative analysis of Arthur Schnitzler’s 
Traumnovelle as a trauma narrative (as defined in this study). The focus of this analysis is 
on the individual experience of trauma (i.e., that which cannot be shared), the division of 
subjectivity that defines the traumatic experience and its aetiology in previously existing, 
subjective experience, rather than in a “traumatic event.” This chapter looks at both the 
emergence of crisis and its resolution. 
Chapter four presents the first half of a narrative analysis of Russell Banks, The 
Sweet Hereafter. The novel depicts an event commonly recognized to be traumatic (e.g., 
a fatal school bus accident), but that event is described from the disparate perspectives of 






be on an expanded application of the discussion of individual trauma begun in chapter 
three, and will deal specifically with the first two of the five narrative sections. 
The fifth chapter presents the second half of the narrative analysis begin in the 
preceding chapter. Unlike Chapter four, however, this chapter will focus on social trauma 
and the social resolution of trauma. By contrasting the dissolution of personal identity 
with the dissolution of social identity and social cohesion, this chapter examines the 
delicate balance that must be struck between constructing a narrative that is “true” (i.e., 
that reflects actual experience), and constructing a narrative that is believable (i.e., that 






Chapter 1: Where Signification Fails: A Redefinition of Trauma 
 
 
In the opinion of various Arab authors […], the confusion [of language at 
Babel] was due to the trauma induced by the sight, terrifying no doubt, of the 




1.0 Historical View of Trauma 
Trauma as a subject of serious, albeit inconsistent, theoretical and scientific 
inquiry is generally accepted to have originated at the end of the nineteenth century. In 
his work on hysteria, French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot transformed the 
Salpêtrière, a longstanding Parisian mental asylum, into a facility where the most modern 
investigations in Europe into the new fields of psychiatry and neurology were conducted 
(Herman, Trauma 10).2 Freud himself traveled to Paris to learn about what Charcot 
termed the “Great Neurosis” (Herman, Trauma 11). Charcot’s methods consisted 
overwhelmingly of a positivistic cataloguing of symptoms and, regrettably, the public 
                                                 
1 Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, trans. James Fentress (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1995) 9. 
2 My references in this initial, historical section are largely drawn from Judith Herman’s book, Trauma and 
Recovery, not because I fully endorse her view of trauma, but because of the clarity of her overview and the 
concise manner in which she has picked out the most critical aspects of the emerging study of trauma. In 
her earlier work, Herman was among the first to examine women’s trauma, moving the focus of research 
away from Vietnam, and towards issues of domestic and sexual abuse in the early 1980s. Judith L. Herman, 
and Lisa Hirschman, Father-Daughter Incest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). Although 
her work is well respected by many in the field, there are some who view her work as problematic. As Leys 
notes, Herman privileges the notion that a recovery from trauma must entail the integration of the historical 
“truth” about the experience; an objective that is driven in part by a moral obligation to the “truth” which 
has “a public or collective value as well” (108-9). I have also chosen to draw on Bessel van der Kolk for a 
summary of Freud and Janet, since his treatment of the two men’s work has been largely instrumental in 
reviving scholarly interest in Janet’s work, and examines both the differences and intersection in the 
theories of each. Bessel A. van der Kolk, and Onno van der Hart, “The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of 
Memory and the Engraving of Trauma,” Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 158-182. It is not my purpose to present an exhaustive introduction 






display of those who suffered them before a morbidly fascinated assembly of spectators 
at what were called the Tuesday Lectures.3 This not withstanding, his efforts established 
a consistent departure from prior existing notions, impossibly naïve and often dismissive, 
that hysteria was the product of a malfunctioning or displaced uterus, or simply evidence 
of pernicious female malingering.4 
Before these organized efforts, only isolated attempts had been made to adopt a 
more humane view of hysteria, and the majority of those attempts tended to view hysteria 
as the result of organic disruption in the brain’s functioning and ability to process 
emotion.5 This notion, which proved to be such sound reasoning that it has persisted on 
one form or another to the present day, is related to current theories of alexithymia,6 “the 
incapacity to give symbolic/linguistic representation to internal affective states,” thought 
by some to result from “a fear of affective states” (van der Kolk, Psychological 193). A 
model similar to Briquet’s was proposed in 1869 by Reynolds, who postulated further 
that a “dissociation of pain originated from changes in the patient’s body image” (van der 
                                                 
3 For selected excerpts from nine of Charcot’s Tuesday Lectures, see Jean Martin Charcot, Charcot the 
Clinician: The Tuesday Lessons. Excerpts from Nine Case Presentations on General Neurology Delivered 
at the Salpêtrière Hospital in 1887-88, ed. and trans. Christopher G. Goetz (New York: Raven Press, 
1987). Jan Goldstein provides a standard account of the evolution of French psychiatry in Console and 
Classify; a classic work in the history of science, and the first book about French psychiatry to be produced 
by an English speaker. Jan E. Goldstein, Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the 
Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
4 Herman, Trauma 10. Other early researchers who contributed to our modern understanding of trauma 
include John Erichsen, who offered a physiological explanation for trauma in the 1860’s and Paul 
Oppenheim, a neurologist in Berlin who posited that traumatic neurosis was the result of organic 
alterations in the functioning of the brain. See Paul Lerner, “Rationalizing the Therapeutic Arsenal: 
German Neuropsychiatry in World War I,” Medicine and Modernity: Public Health and Medical Care in 
Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Manfred Berg and Geoffrey Cocks (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) 121-48. 
5 For an overview of early, physiologically-based definitions of trauma, see Allan Young, The Harmony of 
Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
6 See Henry Krystal, and John H. Krystal, Integration and Self Healing: Affect, Trauma, Alexithymia 






Kolk, Psychological 6). What makes Charcot unique, then, is not the absolute novelty of 
his ideas, but the organization in his advance of them. 
Like Briquet and Reynolds, Charcot situated the aetiology of dissociative 
phenomena in alterations to the brain that originated with exposure to traumata, yet it was 
not until the mid 1890s that psychological trauma was effectively advanced as the cause 
of hysterical symptoms. This conclusion was arrived at concurrently by Janet, who 
termed the characteristic alteration in consciousness “dissociation,” and Freud, together 
with Breuer, who used instead the term “double consciousness” (Herman, Trauma 12). 
Similar in approach, Janet and Freud nevertheless arrived at different explanations for the 
fragmentation which they observed in hysteria patients.7 Janet founded a descriptive 
model based on the assumption that cognitive schemata act to structure human 
consciousness; an epistemic approach that biomedical researchers such as van der Kolk, 
Van der Hart, and Greenburg would later pursue.8 Freud, by contrast, eventually 
developed a model founded on the intentional repression of tabooed memory and 
experience; an ethical correlate to Janet’s proposal adopted that was broadly by 
psychoanalytic and objects-relations theorists such as Fairbairn, Klein, and Bergler. 
Janet, who coined the term “unconscious,” regarded memory as “the central 
organizing apparatus of the mind, which categorizes and integrates all aspects of 
experience and automatically integrates them into ever-enlarging and flexible meaning 
                                                 
7 For an examination of the rivalry that erupted between Janet and Freud, see C. Perry, and J. R. Laurence, 
“Mental Processes Outside Awareness: The Contributions of Freud and Janet,” The Unconscious 
Reconsidered, ed. Kenneth S. Bowers and Donald Meichenbaum (New York: Wiley, 1984) 227-72. 
8 Bessel A. van der Kolk, “Trauma and Memory,” Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming 
Experience on Mind, Body, and Society, ed. Bessel A. van der Kolk, Alexander McFarlane and Lars 






schemes” (van der Kolk, Intrusive 159). The individual, he reasoned, filters memory, 
invoking what is relevant and banning at the borders of consciousness what is irrelevant, 
thereby maintaining a necessary cohesion and permitting the efficacious processing of 
new information (van der Kolk, Intrusive 159). This kind of schematization structures but 
also delimits the accommodation of experience in conscious awareness and as a result, a 
division is formed that produces two unique and mutually preclusive kinds of memory: 
so-called narrative memory in which experience is held, verbalized and subject to 
linguistic operations such as metaphor and metonymy (van der Kolk, Intrusive 172), and 
its counterpart, traumatic memory, in which experience is held without processing or 
conscious awareness (van der Kolk, Intrusive 163).9 
Van der Kolk and Van der Hart summarized Janet’s theoretical framework for the 
processing of traumatic experience, explaining that: 
Frightening or novel experiences may not easily fit into existing 
cognitive schemes and either may be remembered with particular 
vividness or may totally resist integration. Under extreme 
conditions, existing meaning schemes may be entirely unable to 
accommodate frightening experiences, which causes the memory 
of these experiences to be stored differently and not be available 
for retrieval under ordinary conditions; it becomes dissociated 
from conscious awareness and voluntary control. (Intrusive 160) 
                                                 






The result of this method of processing is that the individual’s adaptation to what is 
frightening or novel is imperfect, and the later compulsive revisiting of the source of 
traumatic crisis therefore represents attempts to adapt (van der Kolk, Intrusive 160). 
In 1891, four years after Janet published his findings as L’automatisme 
psychologique,10 Freud and Breuer published their own thesis that, when dissociation 
occurs in cases of hysteria, the subject has returned to the traumatic state, and from this 
return, a rudimentary splitting of consciousness occurs that is ubiquitous to all cases of 
hysteria. Breuer suggests in that text, Studies on Hysteria, that “an idea becomes 
pathogenic because it has been received during a special psychical state (a dissociated 
state of consciousness) and has from the first remained outside the ego.”11 Breuer and 
Freud also maintained that the hysteric response was rooted in a disturbance of memory, 
stating that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Breuer 7). 
Only a few years later, Freud began to pursue an explanatory model that diverged 
from that of either Breuer or Janet, largely because of their rejection of the sexual aspects 
of his theory.12 In so doing, he broke entirely with the line of thinking set into motion by 
Charcot at the Salpêtrière. In 1895 Freud proposed the idea of a “defensive hysteria,” in 
which traumatic memory was actively repressed out of a sense of guilt regarding its 
                                                 
10 Janet, Pierre. L’automatisme psychologique: essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les formes 
inférieures de l’activité humaine (Paris: F. Alcan, 1889). 
11 Joseph Breuer, and Sigmund Freud, “Studies in Hysteria,” Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. J. Strachey, vol. 2 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955) 
167. 
12 Sigmund Freud, The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1877-1904, ed. and trans. 






content.13 Not simply unavailable or resistant to processing because it falls outside of the 
available cognitive schemata, Freud claimed that the material of repression was the 
child’s relationship with his or her parents, which is characterized by sexual and 
aggressive ideas and impulses, and the subsequent censuring of those impulses.14 
Regrettably, Freud’s assertion that guilt motivated the retention of experience in 
traumatic memory ultimately resulted in a dismissal of the patient and led to the 
invalidating belief that her crisis originated not with the trauma of sexual exploitation, but 
rather, with the trauma that resulted when her own Oedipal wishes were fulfilled.15 
In an 1896 report on eighteen case studies entitled Aetiology of Hysteria, Freud 
stated: “the ultimate cause of hysteria is always the seduction of a child by an adult. The 
actual event always occurs before the age of puberty, though the outbreak of the neurosis 
occurs after puberty. The symptoms of hysteria can only be understood if they are traced 
back to experiences which have a traumatic effect.”16 Freud claimed that the oedipal 
nature of the trauma and the shame it occasioned was the cause of its being suppressed. 
This constituted a radical break with his contemporaries, although like Janet, Freud 
posited a volitional return to the site of traumatic crisis. The so-called repetition 
compulsion, or what Rangell, van der Kolk and Horowitz would later come to term 
traumatophilia (van der Kolk, Psychological 3), represented the individual’s effort to 
                                                 
13 Sigmund Freud, “An Autobiographical Study,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, vol. 20 (London: Hogarth Press, 1959) 29-31. 
14 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 
1955) 294-298. 
15 Freud, Autobiographical 34. 
16 Sigmund Freud, “The Aetiology of Hysteria,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 






return to the source of outrage in order to “change a passive stance to one of active 
coping.”17 
In the Aetiology of Hysteria, Freud sums up the problematic for the scientific 
community in bold terms: “I therefore put forward the thesis that at the bottom of every 
case of hysteria there are one or more occurrences of premature sexual experience, 
occurrences which belong to the earliest years of childhood, but which can be reproduced 
through the work of psycho-analysis in spite of the intervening decades” (203). The 
implications of this claim that hysteria originates with “perverted acts against children” 
was utterly devastating, given the fact that hysteria was so common among women, and it 
could not and would not be believed by Freud’s peers. He withdrew the assertion, 
renouncing his study not long after it was published.18 
Freud’s volte face is often scathingly dismissed by contemporary scholarship as 
unrepentant misogyny and “a matter of scandal” (Herman, Trauma 18). Nevertheless, his 
abandonment of the view that hysteria was a traumatic response to sexual abuse and his 
return to the hysteric’s own sexual desires as the source of her symptoms was not the 
result of Freud’s failure to accurately locate and lend credence to the traumatic origins of 
the disorder. It was, rather, a response to rigorous censorship by his peers which would 
have rendered all of his subsequent efforts in the development of psychoanalytic theory 
                                                 
17 Sara R. Horowitz, Voicing the Void: Muteness and Memory in Holocaust Fiction (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997). Van der Kolk, Psychological 5. See also Leo Rangell, “Discussion of 
the Buffalo Creek Disaster: the Course of Psychic Trauma,” American Journal of Psychiatry 133 (1976): 
313-316. Mardi Jon Horowitz, Stress Response Syndromes (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 2001). 
18 Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory (New 
York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1984) 11-13. Also of interest is Freud’s own account, in which he states: 
“[…] I was at last obliged to recognize that these scenes of seduction had never taken place, and that they 
were only phantasies which my patients had made up or which I myself had perhaps forced on them.” 






futile had he failed to retract his “seduction theory” (Masson 12). Herman notes that, only 
shortly after publishing Aetiology of Hysteria, Freud wrote to a colleague, Fliess, and 
stated: “I am as isolated as you could wish me to be: the word has been given out to 
abandon me, and a void is forming around me.”19 What is remembered, however, is not 
the traumatic abandonment and censorship of Freud by his peers, but his failure to 
persevere in his claims. Freud never again dared raise the question of the connection 
between traumatic sexual abuse and hysteria (Herman, Trauma 19). 
 
1.0.1  Public and Private Repression 
Just as the inception of trauma theory is characterized by a division between the 
predominant perspectives of Janet’s epistemic and Freud’s ethical analyses, and followed 
by a subsequent cessation of nearly all discourse on the matter, so that study has 
continued. Herman describes its erratic past in terms of a history of “episodic amnesias” 
(Trauma 2). The censorial suppression of Freud’s “seduction theory” has been 
persistently repeated, whether by act of volitional repression or not, as various sites of 
trauma have been identified and validated with the support of public outrage, only 
eventually to fall silent. Ironically, Freud’s same “seduction theory” claim is being 
restated by modern trauma scholars a century after he first proposed it, notably by 
Herman, Henke, Caruth, and Brown, who have been confronted with the ironic necessity 
of re-establishing that rape, domestic and child abuse do indeed constitute significant 
                                                 






traumata.20 As Herman notes: “Repeatedly in the last century, similar lines of inquiry 
have been taken up and abruptly abandoned, only to be rediscovered much later. Classic 
documentation of fifty or one hundred years ago often read like contemporary works. 
Though the field has in fact an abundant and rich tradition, it has been periodically 
forgotten and must be periodically reclaimed” (Trauma 7). 
Herman identifies three major periods of time in which an awareness of 
psychological trauma has “surfaced into public consciousness” (Trauma 9), each backed 
by an active political agenda which supported that awareness.21 The first of these, 
examined above, was the inquiry into hysteria, which Herman states originated with the 
“republican, anticlerical political movement of the late nineteenth century in France.”22 
The second was combat related trauma, which “began in England and the United States 
after the First World War and reached its peak after the Vietnam War.”23 Variously called 
shell shock or combat neurosis, the traumatic condition produced by combat was first 
                                                 
20 See Herman, Trauma 30; Caruth, Unclaimed 11; Suzette A. Henke, Shattered Subjects: Trauma and 
Testimony in Women’s Life-Writing (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998) xii; Laura Brown, “Not Outside 
the Range: One Feminist Perspective on Psychic Trauma,” Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy 
Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) 101. 
21 Herman’s Trauma and Recovery, which has become a classic in the field of trauma research, sets out to 
redefine Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as “complex PTDS.” I will draw on the organized and extremely 
detailed examination of trauma symptoms presented in that work throughout the next sections. 
22 Herman, Trauma 9. See references to Charcot and the initial investigations into trauma in note 3 in this 
chapter. 
23 Herman, Trauma 28. For an account of shell shock during WWI that are based on first-person (diary) 
testimony, see Charles Samuel Myers, Shell Shock in France, 1914-18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1940). For a recent study on WWI trauma see Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the 
British Soldiers of the First World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). A standard work in the 
study of combat trauma is Abram Kardiner, The Traumatic Neuroses of War (New York: P. B. Hoeber, 
1941). For a study of Second World War combat trauma, see Roy R. Grinker, and John P. Spiegel, Men 
Under Stress (Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1949). A seminal work in the study of Vietnam trauma can be found 
in: Robert Jay Lifton, Home from the War: Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims nor Executioners (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1971). One of the most comprehensive, empirical studies of Vietnam trauma is 
provided in: Legacies of Vietnam, the completion of the Vietnam Generation Study that was funded by the 
Veterans’ Association: Arthur Egendorf, et al., Legacies of Vietnam: Comparative Adjustment of Veterans 






introduced as a diagnostic possibility in 1980, when the American Psychiatric 
Association finally included Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.24 
The third site of traumatic inquiry identified by Herman is the “public awareness 
of sexual and domestic violence,” which began to come to the fore of discussion through 
the women’s movement in the 1970s.25 The efforts of organizations such as the New 
York Radical Feminists and the National Organization for Women helped to bring about 
legislative reform protecting women against rape and sexual assault, and encouraged 
women to come forward with their stories (Herman, Trauma 29-30). To these three sites, 
van der Kolk adds a fourth category of recognized trauma. Shortly after the close of 
World War II, an investigation of the long-term effects of the Holocaust was initiated as 
                                                 
24 The diagnosis, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was defined by the American Psychiatric Association in 
1980 largely in response to Vietnam trauma, and constitutes the first diagnostic recognition of traumatic 
sequelae. The definition, while groundbreaking, has not been without controversy. Allan Young contends 
that the diagnosis constitutes nothing more than a historical construct (Young, 5). Ian Hacking argues 
further, that the diagnosis serves the purpose of creating a categorical identity that, among other things, 
enables victims to be reimbursed by their insurance carrier for treatment, and allows the diagnosis to be 
utilized in a court of law in establishing degrees of culpability and the damages awarded: Ian Hacking, 
“Making Up People,” Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western 
Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986) 226-36. Another analysis 
of the socio-political complications connected with the diagnosis of PTSD is presented in: Wilbur J. Scott, 
“PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of Diagnosis and Disease,” Social Problems 37 (1990): 294-310. 
For a short history of the evolution of PTSD as a diagnosable disorder, see Berthold P.R. Gerson, and 
Ingrid V.E. Carlier, “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The History of a Recent Concept,” British Journal of 
Psychiatry 161 (1992): 742-48. For an examination of the conflict between current understandings and 
applications of  PTSD, and the original conception of the diagnosis, see Rachel Yehuda, and Alexander C. 
McFarlane, “Conflict between Current Knowledge about Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and its Original 
Conceptual Basis,” American Journal of Psychiatry 152 (1995): 1705-13. 
25 Herman, Trauma 9. Domestic and sexual abuse is initially referred to as a “problem without a name” in 
the seminal work of the American feminist movement, The Feminine Mystique. See Betty Friedan, The 
Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton, 2001). For an in-depth epidemiological analysis, see  Diana E. H. 
Russell, Sexual Exploitation: Rape, Child Sexual Abuse, and Workplace Harassment (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1984). For the definition of rape as a crime of violence, rather than a sexual act, see 
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1975). For a 
study of the psychological effects of rape on the victim and the correlation between war trauma and trauma 
that results from sexual abuse, see Ann W. Burgess and Lynda L. Holmstrom, “Rape Trauma Syndrome,” 






independent from the war traumata. It has become a very active area of independent 
investigation that has, in turn, contributed significantly to trauma discourses such as child 
abuse, and other captivity-like situations (Herman, Trauma 74). 
The reasons suggested for the persistent failure to found a consistent, ongoing 
theoretical or clinical discourse on trauma are expressed in various ways by different 
theorists. Freud summarized the medical practitioner’s inability or unwillingness to 
formulate a validating and respectful assessment of the hysteria patient’s plight: “He 
regards them as people who are transgressing the laws of his science – like heretics in the 
eyes of the orthodox. He attributes every kind of wickedness to them, accuses them of 
exaggeration, of deliberate deceit, of malingering. And he punishes them by withdrawing 
his interest from them.”26 Freud avails himself here of overt terms of judgment, 
transgression and heresy, that is, of ethics, and these are more or less reiterated in 
contemporary summaries of trauma’s failure to  assert itself as an ongoing and legitimate 
area of investigation. Herman explains that “those [witnesses] who attempt to describe 
the atrocities they have witnessed also risk their own credibility. To speak publicly about 
one’s knowledge of atrocities is to invite the stigma that attaches to victims” (Trauma 2). 
This is borne out in instances of social or professional sanction such as the 
aforementioned censor of Freud’s seduction theory or in the total dismissal of Sandor 
Ferenczi, for a time a favored student of Freud and a pioneer in the study of child abuse, 
                                                 







whose powerful address of childhood trauma was vehemently silenced both by Freud 
himself, and by others in the professional community.27 
In addressing what seems to be, at some level, an adversarial relationship between 
society and the traumatized, Herman sees evidence of Freudian repression operating at a 
social level in the public’s failure to retain a conscious awareness of trauma and its 
potential to recur. As stated above, Freud defined repression as resulting from guilt and 
the forbidding of what is viewed as transgressive. “The knowledge of horrible events 
periodically intrudes into public awareness but is rarely retained for long. Denial, 
repression, and dissociation operate on a social as well as an individual level” (Herman, 
Trauma 2). Since what is being censored when repression occurs in the Freudian model is 
perceived as being transgressive, it would appear that a tendency to blame the victim 
would naturally follow. In fact, research into the social repercussions of trauma 
substantiates this tendency. Herman indicates this when she states: “The study of 
psychological trauma must constantly contend with this tendency to discredit the victim 
or to render her invisible. Throughout the history of the field, dispute has raged over 
whether patients with post-traumatic conditions are entitled to care and respect, or 
deserving of contempt, whether they are genuinely suffering or malingering, whether 
their histories are true or false, and if false, whether imagined or maliciously fabricated” 
(8). 
It is clear that, for an awareness of trauma to be retained for any length of time or 
to attain any degree of currency, the event considered to have produced it must find 
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sufficient popular endorsement. Without a broad basis of social interest as a support, 
Herman observes that: 
[…] the bystander usually succumbs to the temptation to look the 
other way […] When the victim is already devalued (a woman, a 
child), she may find that the most traumatic events of her life take 
place outside the realm of socially validated reality. Her experience 
becomes unspeakable. […] to hold traumatic reality in 
consciousness requires a social context that affirms and protects 
the victim and that joins victim and witness in a common alliance. 
[…] The systematic study of psychological trauma therefore 
depends on the support of a political movement […] powerful 
enough to legitimate an alliance between investigators and patients 
to counteract the ordinary social processes of silencing and denial. 
(8-9) 
The social decision to support or deny a claim to traumatic crisis, consequently, becomes 
a critical issue. Herman’s observation that a process of traumatic repression may be 
active at the social level is both insightful and bold, pointing to a complex interaction in 
which the interests and agendas of society and of the individual seem to be working at 
cross purposes. As a thesis, however, it must be qualified since the social order and the 
individual are not ontological equivalencies possessing like consciousness. Still, if we 
accept Herman’s proposition that primary processes such as repression are operating at a 






society and the individual, but a conflict of opposing traumatic processes. This pre-
existing opposition, which essentially pits the individual against her social self, already 
constitutes a division of identity and will be demonstrated to be crucial to the 
understanding both of how trauma arises, and why it offers such resistance to resolution. 
 
1.0.2 Fragmentation and Inconsistencies 
The theoretical work done on trauma has accurately and consistently identified 
the fact that “trauma” fails to delineate itself as a uniform entity within the terms and 
concepts current to that inquiry. The term “trauma” remains at times openly undefined: 
“There is no firm definition for trauma, which has been given various descriptions at 
various times and under different names” (Caruth, Unclaimed 117). In other instances, an 
appeal is made to characterizations that can be understood as little more than place 
holders for what is unavailable to the terms of the discourse. These sophist arguments, 
essentially tautological formulas, fall back on reflexively accepted observations that 
trauma is very “bad,” or incommensurate with what is “human.” The most obvious 
example of such a tautology, and one often cited in exemplum of the inadequacy of 
available definitions is the ubiquitous “event that is outside the range of human 
experience,” taken from the 1986 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for 
Mental Disorders, the DSM-III. Other definitions evoke an empathetic sense of logical 
recognition in the reader, such as we see reflected in Herman’s statement: “The ordinary 






social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning of the word 
unspeakable” (Trauma 1). 
Resistant to concretization, trauma is often characterized by tendencies which are 
established, almost invariably, with a focus on the precipitating event. Most theoretical 
approaches begin with a basic starting point whereby “in its most general definition, 
trauma describes an overwhelming experience or sudden or catastrophic events in which 
the response to the event occurs in the often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive appearance 
of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena” (Caruth, Unclaimed 11). From here, a 
graded but unfixed evaluative scale is instituted according to which the likelihood of 
developing traumatic symptoms is suggested, based on the fact that “certain identifiable 
experiences increase the likelihood of harm. These include being taken by surprise, 
trapped or exposed to the point of exhaustion. The likelihood of harm is also increased 
when the traumatic events include physical violation or injury, exposed to extreme 
violence, or witnessing grotesque death. In each instance, the salient characteristic of 
each traumatic event is its power to inspire helplessness and terror” (Herman, Trauma 
34). 
This focus on the event is nonetheless an improvement over approaches to trauma 
taken just 15 years ago, when “the consequence of specific traumas – such as wars, 
concentration camp experiences, rape, civilian disasters, and child abuse – were generally 
described as separate entities” (van der Kolk, Intrusive 2). Since then, it is commonly 
understood that the responses “to overwhelming and uncontrollable events” share certain 






response are widely accepted. Within the consistency of the primary clinical symptoms, it 
is recognized that variables such as a person’s basic personality, background, age, gender, 
and social status play a role in determining specificities (van der Kolk, Intrusive 2). The 
primary symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, which are numerous, are most 
frequently categorized into three groupings; “called ‘hyperarousal,’ ‘intrusion,’ and 
‘constriction.’ Hyperarousal reflects the persistent expectation of danger; intrusion 
reflects the indelible imprint of the traumatic moment; constriction reflects the numbing 
response of surrender” (Herman, Trauma 35). 
Researchers who have attempted to characterize the division of identity that often 
accompanies traumatic crisis have often adopted a descriptive medical approach that 
catalogues the manifest oppositions. Herman presents a succinct tabular summation of the 
symptoms in Trauma and Recovery, and includes binary alternations in traumatic 
response as typified by narratives either of total victimization, or of total culpability; the 
contradictory manifestations of emotional flooding (hyperarousal) and emotional 
constriction; explosive or inhibited expressions of anger; hypermnesia and amnesia; and 
within existent memory, intrusive memory and narrative memory (121). Also noted are 
regular conceptualizations and distortions of the relationship with the perpetrator (such as 
one is identifiable) including identification with that person, revenge fantasies, notions of 
sharing a secret knowledge with or even “paradoxical gratitude” towards him or her 






Holocaust studies, have investigated the qualities of trauma literature as fragmented into 
opposing narratives and riddled with silences.28 
Complex though these symptoms appear, the primary connection has most often 
been taken to exist between trauma and memory, first examined in the initial scientific 
inquiries into hysteria and extensively pursued within the domain of neuroscience. 
Traumatic events produce profound and lasting changes in 
physiological arousal, emotion, cognition, and memory. Moreover, 
traumatic events may sever these normally integrated functions 
from one another. The traumatized person may experience intense 
emotion but without clear memory of the event, or may be 
remembering everything in detail but without emotion. She may 
find herself in a constant state of vigilance and irritability without 
knowing why. Traumatic symptoms have a tendency to become 
disconnected from their source and to take on a life of their own. 
(Herman, Trauma 34) 
The peculiarities of traumatic memory, accordingly, have been plotted as points of origin 
into the course of the traumatic response. 
The response to trauma is as indeterminable as the precipitating event, eluding 
efforts at quantitative analysis. Herman concludes that “the severity of traumatic events 
cannot be measured on any single dimension; simplistic efforts to quantify trauma 
ultimately lead to meaningless comparisons of horror” (Trauma 33-34). Further, 
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individual responses to traumatic experiences differ substantially, and therefore while 
those individual responses may share certain constant features, the pattern of symptoms 
that are manifested are shaped by factors such as childhood experiences and the manner 
in which the individual habitually adapts and deal with stressors (Trauma 58). Despite the 
fact that a certain unity of response has been recognized, Herman claims that what is 
founded is actually a heterogeneous grouping of traumata and traumatic disorders rather 
than any unified problematic and approach. The various individual responses to traumatic 
experiences suggest that post-traumatic stress disorder would be better defined as a 
spectrum of conditions (Trauma 119). 
These sites of trauma and individual responses favor the event as a means of 
taxonomic management, grouping traumata by the kind of event to which the crisis is 
attributed. Beginning with “the experience of the soldier faced with sudden and massive 
death around him (Caruth, Unclaimed 11), the list of events has progressed so that: 
slowly, over the last quarter of a decade: 
[…] physicians and psychiatrists have begun to reshape their 
thinking about physical and mental experience, including most 
recently the responses to a wide variety of other experiences, such 
as rape, child abuse, auto and industrial accidents, and so on, that 
are now understood in terms of the effects of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.” (Caruth, Unclaimed 11) 
Likewise, Herman summarizes the potential sites for trauma for “rape survivors and 






concentration camps and the survivors of small, hidden concentration camps created by 
tyrants who rule their homes” (Trauma 3). Diagnostically, these sites are frequently 
treated as separate: similar, but not identical, “the traumatic syndromes are complex 
disorders, requiring complex treatment” (Herman, Trauma 155-56). 
Because the terms and the criteria being utilized are slippery, providing no 
foothold for an overarching theoretical definition, and in particular, because the discourse 
on trauma tends to emerge at socio-historical sites of pervasive national and social 
involvement or interest, new sites of trauma have had to be advanced independently as 
addenda, often by invoking prior and accepted sites. Thus Herman, “as a practicing 
therapist, […] was able to compare post-traumatic stress disorder precipitated by rape, 
sexual abuse, or battering with the symptoms of neurosis exhibited by war veterans and 
victims of terrorism” (Henke xiii). Henke, a psychoanalytic critic and literary scholar 
whose primary interest is in autobiographical testimony and scriptotherapy, goes on to 
expand Herman’s category of “women’s trauma,” noting that “women often manifest 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder after a crisis precipitated by rape, incest, 
childhood sexual abuse, unwanted pregnancy, pregnancy-loss, or a severe illness that 
threatens the integrity of the body and compromises the sense of mastery that aggregates 
around western notions of harmonious selfhood” (Henke xii). 
The illogic of certain event-based and restrictive definitions has been challenged 
in a limited fashion by recent scholarship. In particular the aforementioned DSM-III 






such as Allan Young, Ian Hacking and Ruth Leys,29 and has provided an entry point for 
those wishing to expand on the set of events accepted as trauma, in particular, sexual and 
domestic violence against women and children (Herman, Brown, Henke). In her essay 
“Not Outside the Range,” for example, Brown challenges this formulation, stating that 
traumata such as rape and incest, suffered primarily by women, are statistically “well 
within the ‘range of human experience’” (101). “How could such an event which happens 
so often to women, so often in the life of one woman, be outside of the range of 
experience?” (Brown 101). The contention that she raises, however, is that the definition 
of “human experience” simply means “male human experience”, which includes only 
events that affect predominantly “the lives of men of the dominant class; white, young, 
able-bodied, educated, middle class, Christian men” (Brown 101). The flaw in the 
definition’s reasoning, as Brown presents it, is the precise delimiting of the definition of 
“human” to what is male (102). 
The logic of Brown’s argument neglects to address the most essential point, 
which is salient to the discussion in subsequent chapters; the philosophical conceit of 
positing a human experience that is not a human experience. Whether desirable or not; 
whatever a human being experiences belongs a priori to human experience. It may 
appear redundant to stress this point, but the longstanding opacity of the DSM-III 
definition and the persistence of theorists’ attempts to challenge that precarious definition 
from within its own failed logic points to something which will prove essential to any 
understanding of traumatic crisis. Over the course of this study I will demonstrate that the 
                                                 






masquerading of a prescriptive, limiting category of what constitutes trauma as a 
descriptive, inclusive one, that is, the ethical for the ontological, poses a real vulnerability 
underlying traumatic response. This occurs not only at a social level but as we will see, in 
the internal structure of subjectivity itself. 
This study does not propose to undermine the extremity of experience inherent to 
trauma, nor the suffering of the traumatized, which is clearly significant and often totally 
overwhelming, nor does it argue for the abandonment of efforts such as Brown’s to 
address inequities in the social recognition and validation of various forms of trauma. 
These efforts are both laudable and indispensable, but are primarily a concern of social 
ethics; the fields of jurisprudence and social reform. These attempts do not go far enough 
towards explaining the actual underlying conflict between the individual who experiences 
trauma in its terrible and unmediated form, and society which manages trauma 
economically in order to manage its shared, collective identity. Pragmatically, we find 
only those issues impugned socially which appear to threaten social identity with 
division. As will become clear, these are then presented as forces capable of 
disintegrating society’s efforts to manage the heterogeneity of its members in such a way 
that loss and benefit to its members is balanced and distributed with the overall good and 
long term goals in mind. 
Traumatic conflict arises for the most part not in overt attempts at social 
repression but simply in the fact that, in attending to trauma at all, society is addressing 
(not necessarily consciously) its own pragmatic interests, focusing only on events that 






targeting what is clearly outside the bounds of the social norm, the marked exclusion of 
what is already marginal functions centripetally to emphasize the social union. Traumatic 
experiences such as rape, incest or child abuse (all of which affect males as well, and 
with even less public attention than is given to women affected by these) indicate a 
diffuse group of victims attacked by a class of perpetrators that are disseminated 
throughout society’s own ranks. As Brown states above, far from being unusual, these 
events are shockingly widespread. They are centrifugal in their social effect, however, 
and their acknowledgement authentically threatens the social union with dissolution. 
Invoking once again Herman’s observation that the same defensive processes seem to be 
active at a social as well an individual level, diffuse traumata are accordingly repressed at 
a social level as dissociative phenomena, which threaten the integrity of the social 
organism. The cross purpose of traumatic ruptures that are specific to the individual or, 
on the other hand, to society, along with the economic use of trauma will be dealt with in 
detail in the chapters that follow. 
Attempts similar to Brown’s have been made to call into line the inadequate 
explanations for traumatic response and the gradual proliferation of new sites of 
recognized trauma. Like Brown, they have questioned the plausibility of a definition that 
is predicated on the infrequency of the event. Herman states: 
Traumatic events are extraordinary, not because they occur rarely, 
but rather because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations 
to life. Unlike common place misfortunes, traumatic events 






personal encounter with violence and death. They confront human 
beings with the extremities of helplessness and terror, and evoke 
the response of catastrophe. (Trauma 33) 
Even here, Herman questions the limitations of the definition in favor of an expansion of 
the event-based model: 
In 1980, when post-traumatic stress disorder was first included in 
the diagnostic manual, the American Psychiatric Association 
described traumatic events as ‘outside the range of usual human 
experience.’ Sadly, this definition has proved to be inaccurate. 
Rape, battery, and other forms of sexual and domestic violence are 
so common a part of women’s lives that they can hardly be 
described as outside the range of ordinary experience. And in view 
of the number of people killed in war over the past century, 
military trauma, too, must be considered a common part of human 
experience; only the fortunate find it unusual.” (Trauma 33) 
Here, she expands the set of acceptable claims to traumatic experience, although she does 
so without disabusing the event of its privileged position over the victim’s own 
experience. 
The most productive line of reasoning for extending the traditional definition of 
trauma to include narrative has been advanced by Caruth, and to a certain extent, Felman 
and Henke. Caruth directly challenges the importance of examining the specific event as 






introduction to Explorations in Memory, first published as two special editions of 
American Imago, she summarizes her position that the standard definition: 
[…] the pathology cannot be defined either by the event itself – 
which may or may not be catastrophic, and may not traumatize 
everyone equally – nor can it be defined in terms of a distortion of 
the event […] The pathology consists, rather, solely on the 
structure of its experience or reception: the event is not assimilated 
or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated 
possession of the one who experiences it (italics in original). (4) 
In this approach to trauma, it is the response that is primary, while the event is only a 
secondary consideration: “[…] trauma is not locatable in a single violent or original event 
in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature – the way 
it was precisely not known in the first instance – returns to haunt the survivor later on” 
(Caruth, Unclaimed 4). This extremely positive shift in the direction of inquiry, 
essentially a restating of van der Kolk’s observations on traumatic memory, is necessary 
if any unified discourse on the subject of trauma is to be formulated. It will also make the 
trauma narrative available to investigation in ways that will reveal crucial dimensions of 
the conflict inherent to subjectivity, and out of which that crisis arises. 
 
1.1 Systemic Failure: An Idiopathic Approach to Trauma 
Rather than terming the event catastrophic, extraordinary, comprising no less than 






limitations presented by the current definitions of trauma indicate that a systematic 
definition and analysis of trauma would be better served by viewing trauma in terms of 
what is idiosyncratic, taking as its origin the response of each individual internal to itself. 
Although this approach may appear to be one that would fragment the investigation of 
trauma still further, creating a unique traumatic form for each individual, this will not be 
the case. Rather, it will become possible to define trauma in terms of an organized 
dynamic, without having to resort to specific events or expressions of crisis as 
characteristic. While precipitating events or circumstances may act as stressors, these can 
be spoken of as representing no more than tendencies rather than as predictors. The 
traumatic response is predicated not on any innate quality of the experience or event, but 
instead, on the vulnerabilities of an underlying system which varies in its parametric 
composition from individual to individual, from society to society, and from one 
historical period to the next. 
Clearly events such as war or genocide may more reliably produce traumatic 
response, but what is essential is that the disruption is systemic, its appearance and 
characteristics internally defined by the category and quality of vulnerability innate to 
that system rather than by the characteristics of the stressor. This is not unlike the way in 
which carcinogens may stress the somatic system, which itself determines the way, shape 
and form of its own breakdown based on its own particular susceptibilities. 
An approach that begins with the system and its vulnerabilities will be able to 
establish a unified and dynamic process by which seemingly disparate models of 






absolute. Additionally, a systemic approach will make it possible to begin bringing 
together a number of disparate approaches, beginning here with Freud and Janet, but 
approaches that are rooted as well in the long term philosophical opposition of sensation 
and cognitive reflection, in order to demonstrate how these various theories closely 
interact, approaching the same problem from valid but distinct viewpoints. I will begin 
here by addressing the systemic underpinnings of identity and its connection to language. 
 
1.1.1. The Primacy of the Word 
An approach to trauma that takes as its vantage point a systemic disruption of 
identity requires that a system be identified that can adequately explain the symptoms of 
individual or collective traumatic response. A starting point for such a theoretical system 
can be found in the semiotic framework advanced primarily by Jacques Lacan (1901-
1981) and the French psychoanalytic movement.30 Lacan’s approach to psychoanalytic 
theory succeeds in expanding Freud’s observations on the human psyche to include post-
Freudian advances in the field of linguistics, observing that the concepts developed by 
Freud “take on their full meaning only when oriented in a field of language, only when 
ordered in relation to the function of speech” (Lacan, Écrits 39). Critical to a grasp of 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic interpretation is an understanding, then, of the ways in which 
identity is formed, defined and delimited by language. Since the role of language in 
identity serves as the origin of this study’s descriptive, system-internal approach, it is 
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indispensable to begin by laying out in some detail not only Lacan’s “linguistic 
Freudianism,” but also certain central philosophical approaches to language and identity. 
The notion of language as the ultimate foundation of identity refers first and 
foremost back to Kant’s so-called “Copernican Revolution,” which states that the 
representation makes the object possible, rather than the object the representation.31 Kant 
(1724-1804) argues that the individual cannot escape cognition in order to reach a direct 
knowledge of the object, unmediated by language. Indeed, as Kant argues: 
To determine a priori the connexion of the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure as an effect, with some representation or other 
(sensation or concept) as its cause, is utterly impossible; for that 
would be a causal relation which, (with objects of experience,) is 
always one that can only be cognized a posteriori and with the 
help of experience.32 
Judgment, according to Kant, “does not deal with any concept of the nature or of the 
internal or external possibility, by this or that cause, of the object, but merely with the 
relative bearing of the representative powers so far as they are determined by a 
representation” (Judgment 62). This notion that judgment, or active cognition, does not 
come to bear upon the object as external entity, but upon the perception of the object 
initiates a move away from the belief that meaning is correlate with an external, objective 
reality. 
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Since this thesis entered into philosophical discourse, the role of such knowledge 
in shaping identity, in particular as it is language-based, has played an increasingly 
critical role. Our inability to escape the representation renders the thing in itself (Ding in 
sich) unattainable, which in turn renders truth internal to representations: “Now a thing in 
itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that since 
outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its 
representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of 
the object in itself.”33 With shift in focus towards the role of the subject in the formation 
of objective identity, subsequent metaphysical and philosophical inquiry has shifted 
towards the systemic reification of the “manifold of sensation” into sense, particularly as 
language, a process which Kant calls synthesis: “By synthesis, in the most general sense, 
I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is 
manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (Reason 111). The subject, Kant contends, 
necessarily views the world and its sense in terms of its spatial and temporal dimensions 
(Reason 111). “Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but at the 
same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind – conditions under which alone it 
can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must also always affect the 
concept of these objects” (Reason 111), that is, knowledge will always appear to be 
grounded in a particular time and space. 
In formulating his notion of the Ding in sich as being unattainable by human 
cognition, Kant drew upon what was already a long-standing tradition in philosophical 
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and metaphysical inquiry that attempted to account for the differences between a priori 
and a posteriori knowledge in relation to the subject, most notably in the work of Leibniz 
and Locke. This tradition demonstrates more clearly than Kant’s own thesis the 
dependence of such synthetic knowledge on the signs and signifiers representing it. 
Leibniz (1646-1716) further developed an already existent theory of the characteristica 
universalis, “a general theory and a system of signs which comprehends both logic and 
grammar as parts.”34 
Attempting to establish a combinatorial system of simple concepts linked in a 
one-to-one relationship with signs, Leibniz arrived at his thesis of the monad, which he 
defined as spiritual substances that cannot be divided into parts and act wholly 
independently.35 The monad can be understood, then, as irreducible identity. The primary 
definition of a monad “is that of a self, capable of awareness” (Mautner 310). The unity 
of the monad is contrasted against the division in the system of signs (Adams 222). 
Leibniz does not dissociate the sign/concept from the underlying physical entity, the 
“organic body” (Adams 286), and therefore his combinatorial system is a system of 
“real” and fixed objects. Nevertheless, the theory of the monad addresses the dyadic 
notion of an indestructible and indivisible identity in concourse with the dynamic force of 
changing identity, as these are expressed in signs. 
John Locke (1632-1704), whose work on epistemology was contemporaneous 
with that of Leibniz, goes further towards developing a theoretical approach to the 
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differential functions and intrinsic division between signs and identity. This will play a 
critical role in explaining the division intrinsic to identity that I am proposing here. Locke 
claims that language is not innate (a priori) as previously believed, but instead must be 
acquired (a posteriori), with the mind originating as a tabula rasa.36 Ideas, Locke argued, 
are derived from experience, both of internal reflection and external sensation (Locke 
291-292). Using linguistic operators “such as comparing, combining and abstracting” 
(Locke 157-159), the individual is able to arrive at new ideas that differ from either 
sensation or reflection (Locke 157-159). In the nature of things, the real essence of an 
entity is comprised of the “inner constitution” of that entity (Locke 417). By contrast, the 
nominal essence, which is comprised of our ideas, does not correspond precisely with the 
real essence (Locke 417). Ultimately, Locke seeks to apply a “mitigated skepticism” in 
order to establish a via media between the Cartesian and scholastic “over confidence in 
the power of human reason,” which unduly privileges cognition, and the contrasting 
belief that we can know nothing, held by proponents of skepticism such as Hume 
(Mautner 321). Here again, a space is opened up between sign and experience, a gap 
which will be dealt with theoretically and in great length in the twentieth century. 
Deeply influenced by Leibniz and Locke, Kant’s subsequent declaration that the 
thing in itself exists beyond the limited reach of cognition moves the underlying entity 
into the background. Instead, the representation of the object, as the material of language 
and cognition, begins to take center stage in philosophical inquiry. As a result, with the 
advent of modern linguistic theory, Kant’s notion that direct experience of the thing in 
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itself cannot be accessed via the representation began to be framed in terms of the 
foregrounding of the signifier; that is, the linguistic representation of the underlying 
signified.37 The formation of meaning through language and in particular through the 
interrelation of signifiers has become a leading idea in modern linguistics since the work 
of de Saussure (1857-1913). 
The focus on the interrelations between signifiers, which establishes the 
foundation of structuralist theory, has shifted the focus of theoretical inquiry in many 
fields towards an inquiry into the role of the social compact in determining the value of 
the signifier. Ferdinand de Saussure invokes the reliance of language on this compact in 
his explanation of the arbitrary nature of the sign: “The link between signal and 
signification is arbitrary. Since we are treating a sign as the combination in which a signal 
is associated with a signification, we can express this more simply as: the linguistic sign 
is arbitrary” (67). For my present purposes, de Saussure’s assertion that signs form their 
own instances of meaning is critical. Despite the fact that the signifier is arbitrary, 
however, that signifier cannot be altered by the individual in isolation without the 
sanction of the social milieu in which he exits and communicates: “For any means of 
expression accepted in a society rests in principle upon a collective habit or on 
convention which comes to the same thing” (Saussure 68). The individual user of the sign 
is thus also placed under pressure by this gap. 
                                                 
37 The signifier is defined by de Saussure as the sound image that references an object, while the signified 
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Several dimensions of the gaps and interrelations between meaning, signifier, 
user, and social sphere have emerged as an independent theoretical discussion. A 
contemporary of de Saussure, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), examined the logical 
interrelation of signifiers as well as of separate dimensions of meaning within a single 
instance of signification. Frege examines the signifier in terms of its relation to its 
signified, and his linguistic theory examines the internal organization of the signifier. 
Like de Saussure, Frege contended that all relations exist between signifiers alone, not 
their underlying objects.38 The canonical example is that of the Morning Star versus the 
Evening Star, with which Frege illustrates that signification is, in itself, already an act of 
interpretation (625). The terms ‘Morning Star’ and ‘Evening Star’ both reference the 
planet ‘Venus,’ but all three terms are fixed temporally and spatially to a specific instance 
of the object in question and are referentially opaque. Despite the fact that the underlying 
entity is agreed to be the same, each presentation contains new knowledge of the object, 
not the sum of all knowledge regarding the entity (Frege 625). It is apparent, then, that 
signification is dependent upon the group’s consensus as to the use of an object, not just 
its identity. 
Drawing on but also revising Kant’s refutation of the possibility for the individual 
to claim a priori knowledge, Frege divides the differential functions of signification into 
three separate instances: meaning (Bedeutung), sense (Sinn), and idea (Idee) (Frege 626). 
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What Frege refers to as meaning,39 that is, the true, underlying entity referenced by the 
signifier cannot be established in the case of an object since we have no unmediated 
experience of it (626). What the signifier immediately references is the use of the object, 
its sense, which, like meaning, is also not of direct experience. It is, rather, the product of 
deductive reasoning in concourse with other individuals in our social milieu (Frege 626). 
Sense is an approximation of meaning pieced together by observing the language use of 
others and taking into account their response to our own. It thereby follows that sense can 
no more be held by the individual than meaning, but instead, the individual must attempt 
to formulate an approximation of sense, which is in a constant state of reanalysis and 
redefinition. Ultimately, the only unmediated experience of the object is the idea, that is, 
the cognitive object held in one’s own idiolect, which may be more or less correlate to 
sense, but never be precisely identical (Frege 626). 
Frege’s distinction between meaning, sense and idea, brings us to a twofold 
rendering of Kant’s solipsist “conditioned experience,” which states that we have no 
substantive a priori knowledge of the objects with which we interact, but only a 
subjective knowledge based on presuppositions of individual and collective experience 
(Mautner 291). The doubling of this proposition occurs in the fact that, between the 
solipsist rendering of the object as idea and the unattainable thing in itself (meaning), a 
third element intervenes that is neither sovereign by virtue of its assertion of ontological 
legitimacy, nor by virtue of its being solely possessed by the personal experience that 
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contains it. This third facet of meaning arises instead in social concourse within a 
template that is shaped by shared experience. It is in this mediation, sense, that 
communication is enabled, and here that social constraint is placed on the foundation 
both of the object and of the subject. The distinctions drawn by Frege regarding the levels 
of meaning within the discrete “object” will prove to be of critical importance to the 
foundation of subjectivity and traumatic vulnerability. Likewise, they serve as an entry 
point into the work of Jacques Lacan, who explicitly extends these dimensions of 
meaning and signification for the discrete entity to the systemic interrelations of instances 
within fields of meaning, sense, and idea. By so doing, he initiates a semiotic approach to 
the function of identity. 
 
1.1.2 Structuralism and the Landmarks of Linguistic of Identity 
At the foundation of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory is the understanding that the 
subject, no less than the object, is founded in the field of language and the function of 
speech (Lacan, Écrits 36). Lacan rewrites Freudianism within the topos of Saussurean 
semiotics in order to explain the emergence of the subject’s identity, drawing on the 
theoretical work of linguists such as de Saussure, Frege, Benveniste, and Jakobson.40 In 
doing so, he establishes what he terms a topography of the subject made up of the 
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real, which, as will become evident, correlate in certain 
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critical ways with Frege’s distinctions of sense, idea, and meaning. Lacan asserts a 
relation between identity, meaning, syntax, and the social unit, that systematically 
produces different articulations of individual subjectivity from within that underlying 
identity in relation to the group. 
The symbolic order, as Lacan defines the order of language constituted by the 
signs and their interrelations,41 dominated Lacan’s theoretical position until late in his 
work, and therefore it continues to dominate in theoretical discourse today. The domain 
of both rational thought (the Cartesian cogito) and social communication, the symbolic 
order is neither an iconography nor abstract symbolism: rather it encompasses the sum of 
all signifiers and, more importantly, the relations and social practices by which they are 
mutually defined.42 The symbolic order comprises what we refer to as “reality” in 
common discourse (Lacan, Écrits 65), but which will not constitute the sole order of the 
‘real’ as Lacan defines it. 
In speaking of the primacy of the signifier, we are actually speaking of the 
primacy of a symbolic order. Here, we must bear in mind that structuralism conceives of 
language as a system of differential elements that possess no meaning in and of 
themselves, but that instead derive their meaning in relation to one another (Saussure 66). 
While the signifier is fully arbitrary, the signifier’s very arbitrariness renders it to a large 
extent immutable, since it belongs to a closed and homeostatic system (Benveniste 727). 
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Additionally, the fact that language is the very material of cognitive thought renders it by 
in large immune to rational challenge (Benveniste 727). Contributing to the relatively 
conservative pace of change in the sign’s meaning is the interdependence of signifiers; 
signs derive meaning in minimal pairs, one instance defined in its relation to a second 
(synchronic), one moment in time in relation to the preceding moment in memory and the 
expectation of the moment to come (diachronic). The elements of the symbolic order are 
posited thetically, however, meaning that the individual perceives them to have arisen 
wholly independently, rather than in relation to other elements in the system.43 As a 
result, the relational interdependence of the elements in the symbolic order is obscured 
from the individual’s view. 
In Lacan’s theoretical approach to identity, the relational organization of the 
symbolic order makes it a holistic structure, and therefore, by necessity, it is also 
evaluative, serial, dualistic and causal. It is, in consequence, also prescriptive. It 
comprises an ethical order in the Hegelian sense of an effort to bridge the gap between 
the objective and the subjective. Rather than a prescriptive moral ethics, in other words, 
the ethics of the symbolic order defines and prescribes the relation of elements within that 
order. The fact that this ethics is shared within the social order means that alterations to 
the symbolic order can only be brought about through gradual social acceptance. If 
acceptance fails, a variant advanced by the individual will be rejected socially as an 
anomaly, as a logic violation or as a violation of socially shared values. Identity arising 
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within the topography of language thereby arises within a tension between the private and 
public spheres. The consensus is culturally and socially specific, mediated via language, 
and this has permitted Lacan’s linguistic Freudianism to retain what is efficacious in 
psychoanalytic theory, while at the same time avoiding the fallacy of cultural 
monadism.44 Lacan’s very approach provides an iteration of the balance that must be 
struck between individual identity and moral values. 
What has developed out of Lacan’s efforts to dynamically wed psychological and 
semiotic theories is a system that focuses on the interrelation of elements within 
subjectivity rather than on their specifics. Culturally mediated constraints in the symbolic 
order are able to check endless variation of subjective identity, since violations of the 
available symbolic order must either be accommodated in another form or must bring 
about an alteration of that order if they are not to find themselves discredited or even 
silenced (Saussure 21-22). Nevertheless, there are aspects of subjective identity that 
successfully challenge the symbolic order, arising out of an underlying domain available 
only to the individual, where the “flow of experience” and the stases of drives and 
sensations (Rose 30) establish an epistemic identity. This flow of experience is then 
articulated in the individual’s privately held apprehension of language and meaning – the 
idiolect. In this way, identity comes into existence in the interplay between socially 
signified structures and individual experience, the individually signified structures of 
language, and the social use and acceptance of those structures. 
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Lacan’s symbolic order represents the order of language in which discrete 
elements are established through the arbitrary and divisive process of signification (Rose 
31). Yet because of signification’s divisive nature, language and identity are formed in “a 
topological unity of gaps in play.”45 These gaps, which arise naturally and necessarily 
through the arbitrary process of signification (Lacan, Four 21) cause a false 
fragmentation of the subject and lead both to the shifting of identity and to an individual 
experience of discontinuity “in which something is manifested as a vacillation” (Lacan, 
Four 25). 
Adhering closely to the work and terminology of Freud, while simultaneously 
expanding these to include linguistic theories of signification, Lacan described the 
unconscious as the site of latent signification, comprised of that which is silenced within 
the gaps formed by the current symbolic order (Lacan, Four 182). It contains, in other 
words, “the entire structure of language” (Lacan, Écrits 147), not just that which can be 
expressed in any single contemporaneous manifestation of language, but all potential 
expression as well. The subject has internalized the entire structure of the symbolic order 
as a part of identity. Because of the subject’s need to repeat identity (wiederholen, which 
is to say, to retrieve that identity), it responds to these gaps, the unconscious, by striving 
towards a resolution of division (Rose 33). There exists, in other words, some awareness 
in the individual that the structures of signification, meaning, and identity comprise a 
false reduction. 
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In response to this tendency to return to what has been lost, Lacan advances a 
linguistic interpretation of Freud’s notion of the drive, which he defines as the subject’s 
efforts to reach what is excluded or divided by language (Rose 34). In this, Lacan refutes 
the widespread notion that the drives are instinct and thereby a product of biology and 
maturation (Rose 34). Instead, the unconscious comprises absence, rather than what is 
“non-conscious” or “more or less conscious” (Lacan, Four 24), and that absence is 
simply that which consciousness cannot possess because it is not currently defined within 
language. In other words, in response to the divisive functioning of language, the subject 
establishes, as ego, the myth of its own cohesion (Rose 30). That cohesion, the image of 
self or “capturing image,” is challenged by the unconscious as awareness arises, rupturing 
the ego (Rose 38). From Lacan’s perspective, the identity that comprises the ego and its 
ruptures is more broadly related to the symbolic order, forming an independent region, 
the imaginary. 
For Lacan, the imaginary is the order of the ego and its identifications and is the 
site of those instances of signification and expression that belong to the subject’s own 
idiolect (Rose 31-32). 46 The imaginary constitutes a part of reality for the individual 
subject, although Lacan claims that this reality is frequently destined to remain nothing 
more than a “phantasm” for the subject, since thought and discourse are constrained by 
the limitations of the symbolic order (Rose 31-32). The imaginary holds the specious 
image of the subject (the imago) through which the myth of subjective cohesion is 
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created (Rose 30). By identification with the imago, the image of self that arises in the 
imaginary, the individual is able to construct an identity which appears cohesive while, at 
the same time, is captured in its own image and subject to challenge by latent 
signification in the unconscious (Rose 30). This cohesion is, however, based on the 
signifying practices of the social order. 
This shift towards the semiotic also defines truth and ethics differently than in the 
theoretical approaches that preceded Lacan, who contends that the unconscious is pre-
ontological, neither being nor non-being, but simply that which has not yet been 
realized.47 In this way, he attempts to withdraw from a debate over the ontological 
validity of the subject’s truth, choosing instead to define identity based on the 
interrelation of differential organizational structures. Lacan describes not only the 
conscious but also the unconscious as structured by language; the unconscious contains 
“the whole structure of language” (Écrits 147). With this, Lacan does not mean that the 
divisions of language that emerge as a part of that subject’s identity are natural and 
therefore motivated, but rather, suggests that the processes of the subject’s unconscious 
operate within language as the impetus to new signification. The notion that the 
unconscious operates within language raises certain difficult questions that I will address 
in the following chapter. 
Although Lacan refutes the notion that identity is predetermined, he nonetheless 
also rejects any notion that that there exists an underlying one, that is, a totality of 
identity that underlies the discontinuity brought about by language. “Is the one anterior to 
                                                 






discontinuity? I do not think so, and everything that I have taught in recent years has 
tended to exclude this need for a closed one – a mirage to which is attached the reference 
to the enveloping psyche, a sort of double of the organism in which this false unity is 
thought to reside” (Psychoses 26). In refuting the existence of an underlying unity, that 
which Lacan calls the unconscious is therefore perhaps better termed the process by 
which identity, through the mutability of language, is altered. That identity of the subject, 
in turn, has been defined as the interplay of forces of signification, rather than as an 
organic self waiting to emerge. Although there are specific notions in Lacan’s model of 
subjectivity that need to be reexamined and questioned, his semiotic approach will 
ultimately have enormous implications for the study of trauma. 
 
1.2. Linguistic Freudianism 
Critical to any semiotic approach to identity and to trauma are the intrinsic 
differences between the subject and objects that share an environment: how they come 
into being, and the nature of their participation in signification and discourse. The object 
that emerges as significant to a subject’s identity is instituted on the basis of removed 
observation from a locus wholly outside of the objective position, which is to say 
deductively, using logic and comparison. Subjective identity, on the other hand, is 
inductive, originating with experience from within the locus of subjectivity itself, which 
is inescapable, no matter what the symbolic order attempts to dictate as authentic 
experience. This fundamental difference generates a critical underlying conflict upon 






each, inductive subjectivity and deductive objectivity, must be established before the 
present discussion progresses on to a more immediate definition of trauma and its 
treatment. 
Lacan divides the emergence of language, and hence the individual’s linguistic 
identity, into discrete phases that do not repudiate Freudian psychoanalysis, but instead, 
reiterate it, emphasizing Freud’s own attention to the role of language. Lacan stated that 
he intended for his theory to continue Freud’s work which, because of most therapeutic 
practitioners’ failure to completely understand the psychoanalytic model, came to be 
canonized as inflexibly as a liturgy (Écrits 119). Regrettably, Lacan’s initial use of 
classic Freudian terminology has left his own work vulnerable to conflation with the 
same falsifications of Freud’s theory that Lacan was attempting to challenge, rendering 
terms misleading and difficult to understand. (Lacan eventually distanced himself from 
his earlier, Freudian-based terms in order to overcome their inherent limitations). In 
addition, as Juliet Mitchell48 explains, Lacan himself utilizes a style that is 
“preposterously difficult,” purportedly in order to avoid “the popularization and 
secularization as it has occurred most notably in North America” (4). For this reason, a 
description of terms follows, which is perhaps redundant for some readers, but which is 
nonetheless essential. 
 
1.2.1 The Separation of the Subject from Its Environment 
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As previously noted, Lacan’s approach to the emergence of identity presumes that 
we, as human beings, are born into this world prematurely, without the ability to govern 
our bodies, affect our environment or communicate our needs (Rose 30). Lacking 
language, we cannot categorize and manipulate the world discursively. Instead, the initial 
stage of our existence is characterized by an undifferentiated consciousness made up not 
of discrete elements and structures, but forming a continuum. Somehow, out of this flow 
of energies, drives and experience, structured language has to emerge, and with it, the 
individual’s human identity. The first condition that is necessary for the structuring of 
language to occur is the individual’s realization that she is in the world, not the world 
itself, and that, since separate, she can act upon other entities found therein. 
Lacan places this moment of realization in the mirror stage,49 when the child 
becomes conscious that she has volitional control over her own body – the seminal 
beginnings of language. This stage is named for the mirroring function of the child’s 
environment, during which she learns to see in the response of others that her actions are 
seen and interpreted as belonging to him (Rose 30). Lacan identifies this external image 
of self-as-object in the world as comprising the subject in language, for which he draws 
on the work of Benveniste (Rose 31) among others. Benveniste developed the linguistic 
notion of the shifter: a term or designation that references neither a specific concept nor a 
certain individual, but instead “refers to the individual act of discourse in which it is 
pronounced, and by this, designates the speaker” at a particular place and time.50 
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The personal pronouns provide the most representative example of the shifter’s 
function. A pronoun acquires its meaning referentially rather than in the absolute identify 
of a given entity, referencing the speaker, listener and agents within the context of the 
utterance itself.51 The ‘I’ that speaks, in other words, represents a particular individual 
only within the context and at the moment of speaking. Likewise the ‘you’ being 
addressed obtains its meaning directly from the context in which it was spoken. Uttered 
under different temporal or spatial circumstances, or by another individual, the ‘I’ 
references a wholly separate subject. The personal pronoun as shifter marks the 
increasing control exerted by the social compact upon the individual’s identity. Moving 
beyond the syntactic level of the pronoun, Lacan’s subject in language extends the notion 
of a shifter to include subjectivity itself. The subject, then, as we commonly understand 
it, is in Lacan’s terms a subject in process (as well as on trial) – the sujet en process. In a 
symbolized expression, the subject is also symbolized, and is therefore subject to the 
same trial and negotiation of meaning that any other symbolized term undergoes. 
Out of her new awareness and her emerging ability to use pronouns in a socially-
viable way, the child establishes herself as an image in her environment and adapts her 
image to the idiom of that culturally, socially and historically specified moment. This 
renders the subject of language, which Lacan calls the ego, “the least stable entity in 
language, since its meaning is purely a function of the moment of utterance” (Rose 30). 
Rooted in gesture and mimicry, the child’s mimetic responses cannot yet be termed 
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language, but it is analogous to the child’s discovery of her capacity for language. In the 
same instance, however, the organism becomes captured in this alienating image it has 
found and identified in the world as self (Rose 30), beginning the process of thetic 
positing and the assumption that signifier and signified together represent a natural and 
motivated entity. In Lacan’s terms, the individual’s imago is founded in an internal 
imaginary, an artificial rendering of identity that constitutes the social sense of the subject 
as it has been apprehended by the individual. Through this alienating self-identification 
with the image in the world, Lacan explains, the ego is created as a reduced and falsifying 
identity that strives to maintain an illusion of its own completeness and the coherence of 
its actions and desires (Rose 30). Using rationalization and false statements about itself 
and its motivations, this falsifying ego maintains the illusion of coherence within the 
logical constraints of the symbolic and conceals what Lacan regarded as the body’s 
fragmentation into stases (Rose 30). 
At this early point in her psychological development, the child still posits herself 
in a symbiotic relationship with her environment and her primary caretaker, whom Lacan 
refers to as the mother (Rose 38). The division of the child from this symbiotic fantasy 
requires a third element outside of the mother-child pairing in order to break the 
symbiotic bond between the two. This third “paternal” element, which Lacan terms the 
phallus, is the element that breaks that bond. If one suppresses the natural instinct to 
conjure the penis as its referent, Lacan’s phallus can be understood as simply that which 
the mother desires that the child does not possess and cannot provide in order to win her 






The duality of the relation between mother and child must be 
broken, […]. In Lacan’s account, the phallus stands for that 
moment of rupture. It refers mother and child to the dimension of 
the symbolic which is figured by the father’s place. The mother is 
taken to desire the phallus not because she contains it (Klein), but 
precisely because she does not. The phallus therefore belongs 
somewhere else; it breaks the two term relation and initiates the 
order of exchange. (38) 
Stated more simply, the phallus is that object outside of both the mother and the child and 
to which the mother responds, establishing an inter-subjective relationship of at least 
three entities – the mother, the child, and the Other as abstract entity. The emerging 
evidence of this relationship demonstrates to the child that action and interaction do occur 
without the child’s direct, omnipotent involvement. There are now at least three 
autonomous entities in the world. 
Rather than expressing an oedipal wish to actually sleep with the mother, the 
child’s desire first to become the phallus (to be the object of the mother’s desire), then to 
possess it (to control that object) corresponds simply to the gradual realization that the 
mother does not respond in perfect accord with the child’s needs and desires. She 
behaves independently, motivated by a relation outside of that which the child shares 
with her. With this awareness that there is a third and unknown element in the picture, the 
child discovers that she needs language if she is to redirect the mother’s attentions back 






Freud’s image of psychological development as a model for psycholinguistics or 
psychosocial symbolic development. In his later work, Lacan moves away from these 
more traditional Freudian images in order to emphasize the linguistic aspects of this 
process, rather than the social, in particular in his work on the simulacrum. 
The phallus (and later, the simulacrum) can also be termed the master signifier 
around which the symbolic order reifies,52 since it does not correspond with a particular 
entity, but rather with those entities beyond the child which therefore exclude her and 
compete with her earlier sense of omnipotence. The phallus becomes the first symbol in 
the symbolic order, and it catalyses the process by which the child will begin to break up 
and classify the world into elements for linguistic manipulation, in accordance with the 
patterns manifested in the symbolic order and its gaps. Lacan retains the eroticized 
characteristic of Freud’s terminology because it invokes the desire for a return to 
symbiotic unity with that which language has declared to be separate. 
The individual subject’s desire to remerge into a symbiotic unity and thereby 
relinquish both subjective independence and the dissociative process of signification falls 
under Lacan’s concept of jouissance, a French word that glosses to multiple meanings in 
English: pleasure, death and orgasm (Rose 34). Lacan associates this with Freud’s death 
drive, and in so doing redefines that drive as the organism’s drive not to its own 
destruction, but rather its drive to return to an idealized and eroticized unity that preceded 
the emergence of consciousness. A return to a pre-linguistic, epistemic unity, however, 
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would constitute the destruction of language and linguistic identity (Rose 35) and 
consequently, would mean the death of cognitive identity. This, in turn, would therefore 
lead to the individual’s expulsion from social interaction – the death of the individual as a 
social subject. 
 
1.2.2 Emergence of a Subject that Speaks 
Lacan’s work highlights the tension between the individual and the social entity. 
The moment in which the individual discovers that she has an active role in 
communication and can modify her behavior and presentation in the world also marks her 
entry into the social order and a never-ending effort to restore the social accord found in 
the illusion of perfect symbiosis promised in the experience of the mother. While the 
subject’s epistemic project is a return to ontological unity with her environment and the 
seamless flow of experience, this is incommensurate with the ethical project of evaluating 
and choosing those gestures and signs which will be the most efficacious representation 
of subjectivity in language, and which can simultaneously effect the broadest range of 
control as a substitute for the lost security of symbiosis. The subject is thus caught 
between individual experience, and the power of the social compact to dictate the terms 
in which experience may be expressed. 
The “seduction” carried out by the child during the mirror stage marks the 
emergence of language use; gesticulation and mimicry at first, but still, a seminal effort to 
produce the ideal representation of discursive subjectivity in order to restore power to the 






competing objectives, the epistemic and the ethical, promise both conflict and accord. 
Both belong to the individual, and establish an inherent conflict of needs and articulations 
of self that will prove to be at times preclusive of one another. Stated more simply, the 
realization that she is separate from her environment deprives the child of her protective 
sense of omnipotence. At the same moment, it also provides her with the necessary 
means for manipulating that environment and reclaiming some power through the ability 
to signify and create discourse. From this point on during her psychological development, 
the child begins to acquire, through careful deductive observation of the social uses of 
language, the repertoire of signs with which she will balance the rendering of her identity 
in the domain of the signifier between that which will speak authentically for personal 
experience, and that which will correlate with an ideal subjectivity in social interaction. If 
she goes too far, however, she will find herself invested in a socially leased identity at the 
cost of her subjective experience. 
Lacan is not alone in his rewriting of Freud’s drives into a play of sound 
signification. When we begin to account for the “flow of experience” together with the 
constraints of shared and socially formed delimitations of meaning, it becomes apparent 
that disparate psychological approaches to identity and trauma may be regarded as 
commensurate in that they address different aspects of a conflict between self and 
society. While the eroticisation of drives in Freud’s psychoanalytic theory depicts the 
desire to remerge with what is lost in order to recapture the mother/child symbiosis 






subject’s attempt to gain mastery from within the condition of separateness.53 Likewise, 
Freud’s ethical approach to trauma as the repression of what is socially unacceptable 
differs from Janet’s thesis of a traumatic disruption to the cognitive schemata only in as 
far as Freud addresses the disruption from within the outrage of the evaluative symbolic 
order. In examining cognitive schemata, Janet, by contrast, provides an epistemic 
approach that is external to the field of symbolized meaning. 
The healthy individual, Lacan reasons, eventually renounces the sustained attempt 
to become the “phallus” (i.e. object of the mother’s desire), the perfect complement to the 
mother, which is fantasized to be capable of binding her through mutual desire to remain 
in symbiosis with her child. The child, instead, substitutes for that union the paternal 
metaphor (i.e. language) not as a single master signifier, but as a system of “situational 
phalli” capable of forging bonds even as they unavoidably sever others. The term 
‘parental metaphor’ is given a very specific meaning and function in Lacan’s theoretical 
framework, acting “as a reference to the act of substitution (substitution is the very law of 
metaphoric operation), whereby the prohibition of the father takes up the place originally 
figured by the absence of the mother” (Rose 38-39). The rules of prohibition and censure 
create and “ethical” account of that which has been excluded from language. Lacan, in 
other words, claims that the healthy individual ceases to struggle to return to the 
undifferentiated state prior to the discovery of language, and accepts the symbolic order 
as “reality.” 
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This definition of the healthy individual allows a redefinition of trauma as well. 
This moment in the individual’s development when she purportedly takes up residence in 
the symbolic order is referred to as castration, redefined in Lacan’s theory as phallus, 
rather than the (Freudian) penis. “Castration means first of all this – that the child’s desire 
for the mother does not refer to her but beyond  her, to an object, the phallus, whose 
status is imaginary (the object presupposed to satisfy her desire) and then symbolic 
(recognition that desire cannot be satisfied)” (Rose 38). In Lacan’s theoretical model, 
castration represents the inception of a law that prohibits the individual from founding the 
imaginary object which would be capable of returning the child to the pre-linguistic state 
of unity. In more immediate terms, the individual’s participation in the symbolic order 
(organized around phallic power) prohibits the dissolution of linguistic boundaries 
through “transgressive” language – transgression is by definition in heterogeneous 
experience (and as Kristeva will add, in the semiotic, the ability to generate new signs), 
not in socially established language. With the advent of prohibition and the marking of 
linguistic boundaries that threaten the transgressor with expulsion from the symbolic 
order, we find the beginning of contiguous loss of identity where it falls on the fault lines 
of language and the ethical’s discontinuity and reductive structure. Irrevocably severed as 
well is the experiencing, epistemic subject from the discursive and ethical public identity, 
at which point subjectivity continues its development straddling a schism. This will be 
examined in detail below. 
 






Having looked at the basic underlying structure of identity as it is constructed in, 
and through language, it is possible to return here to a discussion of trauma. In the 
traditional investigation of trauma, two descriptive characteristics consistently come to 
the fore as ubiquitous: the division of the trauma survivor’s identity, and her inability to 
speak of the trauma. A great deal has been written about the subjective experience of the 
traumatic response, both from the experiencing point of view of the survivors themselves 
and from the externally constructed view of theorists, researchers and mental health 
professionals, that indicates the centrality of these two characterizing features. In 
addition, it has been consistently observed that the traumatized individual’s system of 
experience is disrupted by dialectic oppositions. The way in which experience is 
organized in cognition gives rise to attitudes, perceptions and responses that appear as 
though they should preclude one another, and that, since unmerged, are manifested as a 
continually shifting response profile. Herman writes that: “in the aftermath of an intense 
experience of overwhelming danger, the two contradictory responses of intrusion and 
constriction establishes an oscillating rhythm. The dialectic of opposing psychological 
states is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the post-traumatic syndromes,” 
(Herman, Trauma 47). On page 87 of Trauma and Recovery, Herman cites George 
Orwell’s novel, 1984, and presents the notion of doublethink introduced there as one of 
the most succinct representations of divided identity: 
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs 
in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them. The 






he therefore knows that he is playing tricks with reality; but by the 
exercise of doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is not 
validated. The process has to be conscious, or it would not be 
carried out with sufficient precision, but it also has to be 
unconscious, or it would bring with it a feeling of falsity… Even in 
using the word doublethink it is necessary to exercise doublethink. 
(Orwell 176-177) 
This last sentence reveals an essential correlation that is underscored by Lacan’s 
theory: a correlation that exists between the inability to speak of the traumatic experience, 
and the resultant division of identity. It is doublethink to speak of trauma as doublethink 
precisely because the disunity inherent in two apparently contradictory beliefs 
presupposes disunity in the subject of cogito: that is, two thinkers, two speakers, two 
consciousnesses that must simultaneously be presumed to emanate from a single 
individual. This constitutes a violation of the basic social supposition that there should be 
a single cognitive process for a single individual: ego cogito ergo sum. Trauma, in other 
words, causes the individual to think suddenly beyond “what is thinkable.” This, in turn, 
sets up an alternate “symbolized order” that contradicts the existent symbolic order, and 
that is therefore subject to censor. Descartes regarded doubting what appeared to be a 
seamless reality to be prerequisite to separating from it in order to found his existence as 
subject (“ego dubito, ergo sum”), however, the traumatized asserts the inverse to arrive at 
the same conclusion. The survivor must circumvent social censorship and believe in that 






subjectivity. The implication, at least for the traumatized individual, is that cogito and the 
symbolic order in which it operates are inadequate to capture the individual’s 
subjectivity. 
The result of doublethink is an invalidation of the traumatized in the dominant 
social discourse, whether socially, or in self-awareness; invalidation of experience, of 
testimony, and of identity. The invalidation is not always apparent, and often the 
exclusion is a part of the discourse that professes to support the victim, or at least to 
identify her symptoms in its (not her) terms. Orwell’s statement that the person “knows in 
which direction his memories must be altered” and “[…] that he is playing tricks with 
reality” points to an assumption that is more often than not inherent in the traditional 
approach to trauma. The individual’s response is viewed in the social order as a 
pathological disorganization of cognition and emotional response, one which must be 
repaired in order for the individual to regain her “health.” Memories are expected to be 
altered, while divided perceptions are held to be false, a fundamental error in the 
cognition of the traumatized individual. In fact, the memory of an experience cannot be 
altered simply by volition, and some aspects of traumatic memory may not yet be 
integrated into conscious awareness and the terms and relations of symbolized meaning. 
Memory as a whole, both pre-symbolized and symbolized, can only be overlaid with a 
new interpretive narrative from a new deictic point of reference, resulting in a doubling 
into an experiential and a cognitive account that are at odds with one another. What will 
emerge as critical to the foundation of the crisis for the traumatized individual will be the 






The essence of the underlying conflict, which began with the emergence of 
subjectivity in the nascent individual, is the crisis of incongruity, either temporary or 
protracted, between two equally critical dimensions of subjectivity. On the one hand, 
there is symbolized identity, in which trauma is defined by the fragmentation of the ego 
in the symbolic and social order to which it belongs and which, therefore, responds with 
efforts to suppress that which is heterogeneous to itself. On the other hand, there is an 
experiencing self, whose trauma is the fragmentation of subjective unity that results when 
it attempts to bring its experience to a symbolic order that cannot adequately 
accommodate it, and finds itself silenced as heretical. Thus the traumatized individual 
chronically occupies divided sites of subjectivity, and since each is authentic in its own 
terms, she finds herself hindered or even prevented from reconciling those positions to 
form a single discursive point of origin. Turned against herself, experiencer on the one 
hand, and discursive social being on the other, the individual must reconcile opposing 
traumata: an ethical trauma with its dissolution of shared meaning, and an epistemic 
trauma with its fragmentation of the unity of experience. In either instance, the trauma 
survivor is cast out of the social domain and the shared linguistic compact that meaning is 
shared and shareable, since the transparency of the connection between the speaking 
subject and the underlying experiencing subject is lost. 
Naturally, society will claim that the ethical treatment of trauma has a place and 
plays a critical role in managing the reduction of future traumatic crisis. In as far as 
helping the individual resolve the experience of trauma, however, society maintains a 






conflicting dyad – the traumatized individual and her so-called “pathology,” but not the 
structures called into question by her experience. The opposition formed between shared 
symbolized meaning and individual experience is an articulation of the opposition that 
forms between the functioning of the subject within language and in transcendence of 
that language through the veracity of individual experience. While indisputably serving a 
critical function, the ethical approach preferred by society speaks only for the trauma 
which is shared by the researcher/witness and the victim: the dissolution of the linguistic 
bond between them. 
In Unclaimed Experience, Caruth consistently returns to the ethics of trauma and 
its resolution, stating: “I will suggest, that the shock of traumatic sight reveals at the heart 
of human subjectivity not so much an epistemological, but rather what can be defined as 
an ethical relation to the real” (92). The matter to be processed, Caruth contends, is the 
ethical imperative to awaken from grief and to bear witness (105). Moving away from an 
evaluation of trauma via social ethics, Caruth nevertheless applies a standard of formalist 
ethics. Like Lacan until very late in his work, Caruth privileges the symbolic order as 
authentic subjectivity, and ultimately, reality. Theories of trauma up to this point have 
therefore been theories of a narrative resolution to trauma. 
Newer inquiries, however, including Caruth’s cited above, have tended to focus 
increasingly on non-ethical matters such as the issue of how memory is organized, how 
incommensurability in cognition and in affect is constituted, and the structuring of the 
speech act. These approaches call the entire approach to an individual resolution to 






pathology, or the simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound 
that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not 
otherwise available” (Unclaimed 4). Henke, too, specifically makes the division of the 
subject the focus of her inquiry, and drawing on Herman, states: “There seems to be little 
doubt that trauma precipitates a violent fragmentation of the (perhaps fantasized) image 
of the integrated subject. Traumatic events, Judith Herman tells us, ‘shatter the 
construction of the self that is formed and sustained in relation to others’ and ‘cast the 
victim into a state of existential crisis.’”54 These more recent and somewhat revolutionary 
approaches to trauma focus on the structure of the traumatic experience, and are 
beginning to shift the precipitating event into the background of the inquiry. 
These newer approaches rest on work such as Lacan’s, which redefines the 
traumatic moment as a fragmentation within the social self rather than simply a crisis of 
affect. As stated, the fragmentation is manifest, in many instances, in a doubling of 
existence or an alter identity. Van der Kolk observes: “Many traumatized persons […] 
experience long periods of time in which they live, as it were, in two different worlds: the 
realm of trauma and the realm of their current, ordinary life. Very often, it is impossible 
to bridge these worlds” (Intrusive 176-77). He goes on to cite a 1991 study by Langer as 
follows: “‘[The world of trauma] can […] never be joined to the world he inhabits now. 
This suggests a permanent duality, not exactly a split or a doubling but a parallel 
existence. He switches from one to the other without synchronization because he is 
reporting not a sequence but a simultaneity’” (Langer 95). The subject of trauma thus 
                                                 






tries to be two (or more) subjects at once as individual experience articulates mutually 
preclusive sites within the symbolic order.55 
This simultaneity occurs at an experiential, epistemic level, but in fact, the 
division is also manifested as a sequence at the level of the speaking subject, that is, 
within the symbolic order, which accounts for the impression that a doubling has 
occurred. The narrative discourses that arise out of these “parallel existences” contradict 
one another, and where mutually preclusive, must be expressed as separate identities. In 
fact, the parallel identities expressed represent separate dimensions of an identity whose 
unity is divided by the symbolic order. Out of competing discourses, a shifting metonymy 
forms that circumscribes individual identity, the essence of doublethink as applied to an 
individual trying to realign the ethics of the symbolic order and her own knowledge of 
experience. Incommensurate sites of subjectivity point back to lost epistemic unity, but 
are never able to totally express it, and therefore render it as parts of self that alternate in 
parallel to one another. 
The literary analyses that I will present as case studies in the following chapters 
will demonstrate the fragmentation of subjectivity, and therefore of narrative that 
characterizes traumatic crisis. Indeed, the literary and filmic nature of these narratives 
provides the unique opportunity to create a bifurcated narrative using literary or visual 
devices that are unavailable to the individual in her immediate, first person account of 
traumatic experience. Trauma is a crisis of narrative, and more than that, it is a crisis of 
competing “realities” and competing apprehensions of meaning and identity. The trauma 
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narrative must convey more than the factual events of a traumatic experience. It must 
express the coexistence of mutually preclusive apprehensions of meaning and identity 
that exist in a covalent relationship with one another. Those competing apprehensions, in 
other words, can neither be merged, nor can they be separated. In the superfluity of their 
conflicted expressions they create the silence of traumatic crisis where a unified 
expression of experience should exist, but does not. 
Survivor testimony substantiates these observations with subjective experiences 
of psychic fragmentation. One Holocaust survivor, quoted in Langer, claims: “I live a 
double existence. The double of Auschwitz doesn’t disturb me or mingle with my life. As 
if it weren’t ‘me’ at all. Without this split, I wouldn’t have been able to come back to 
live” (6). Likewise, subjectivity that existed before the trauma may be held in separation. 
Drawing on the Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale, Felman quotes a 
Holocaust survivor who stayed with her estranged husband after the war, because as she 
claimed, he “knew who I was” (42). Writing about Hiroshima, Jay Lifton56 observes the 
same phenomenon in survivors of that disaster, and remarks on the testimony of a 
mathematician who stated that being called “Sensei” by his students (an honorific used 
for teachers), “gave me very relaxed feeling” (Lifton, Death 44). Lifton interprets this as 
follows: “Being so addressed at such a moment can have the significance for the survivor 
of being ‘confirmed’ in his prior identity […]” (Death 44). The subjectivity of the 
traumatized individual may remain divided such that one remains hidden or private, the 
                                                 






other public. In other instances, as these case studies will demonstrate, private identity 
may be opposed by more than one public identity, each held in isolation of one another. 
As I have suggested, the duality in the trauma survivor’s identity is, in part, the 
result of a narrative incompatibility, as in the case of the survivors of the Holocaust or 
Hiroshima just cited. In some instances, the duality may also be reflected in the 
inaccessibility of memory to the individual who finds herself “caught between the 
extremes of amnesia or reliving the trauma, […]” (Herman, Trauma 47). This recognition 
of an existential duality returns us again to Janet’s findings regarding dissociation and the 
division of experience into two, parallel systems of memory; traumatic and narrative, 
cited above. Narrative memory is summarized by van der Kolk as typified by its 
linguistic character. It is temporally altered, incorporating into itself ellipses, metaphor, 
metonymy, and other operations of language; a social act of communication (Intrusive 
163). Traumatic memory, on the other hand, is typified by its resistance to language: “the 
experience cannot be organized as a linguistic level, and this failure to arrange the 
memory in words and symbols, leaves it to be organized in a somatosensory or iconic 
level” (van der Kolk, Intrusive 172). Rather than being shaped by linguistic operations 
that serve to interpret the experience from within the text, traumatic memories are reified, 
“produced by the mechanism that Janet called restitutio ad integrum. When one element 
of a traumatic experience is evoked, all other elements follow automatically” (van der 
Kolk, Intrusive 163). 
One must not take the symbolic order and its narratives as merely abstract 






research have been able to discern certain neuro-anatomical and neuro-chemical features 
capable of substantiating these observations. Other researchers, such as Felman, Caruth, 
and Henke, follow a more humanities-based approach and have accurately identified a 
linguistic basis for the phenomenon, although they have failed to follow through with 
these findings. Caruth, cited above, has shifted the emphasis of her inquiry from the event 
that “caused” the trauma, and stresses instead the actual structure of its experience or its 
reception as definitive (Trauma 4). Likewise Julia Kristeva, in her work on the semiotic 
foundation of identity, alludes briefly to the phenomenological discourse that deals with 
the theoretical problem of divided subjectivity, but considers it beyond the scope of her 
study (Revolution 22). 
Henke’s observation comes closer to the kind of theoretical examination of 
trauma that will guide my case studies: 
Most psychoanalysts agree that traumatic experience generates 
inevitable psychic fragmentation – an aetiology that the Lacanian 
critic might construe as a disruption and dismemberment of the 
imaginary subject, the version of an integrated self that emerges 
from méconnaissance or misrecognition of one’s valorized mirror 
image. Whether attributable to fantasy or social construction, such 
misrecognition is vital to the individual’s sense of agency and 
subjectivity. In order to function as an effective being in the world, 






enabling myth of coherent identity, despite its status as a fictional 
construct. (Henke xvi) 
In the phenomenon of “doublespeak,” Henke rightly identifies the visible nature of an 
identity divided by trauma. Henke’s approach correctly directs our focus towards the 
division of subjectivity between the socially constructed subject, and an underlying 
subjectivity that must find an adequate correlation between itself and that construct. 
Although she draws on Lacan and Kristeva only tangentially, frequently only in 
footnotes, the essential recognition of a systemic vulnerability through which the object 
may be fragmented nevertheless brings up a crucial point. Experiences which are retained 
in traumatic memory, resisting articulation in the symbolic order, may simply be retained 
this way because their passage into narrative memory is impeded or blocked. 
Any individual’s knowledge or experience that violates the symbolized meaning 
in any substantial way will radically denature the ethical subject and render unavailable 
“who one was” (Felman 42), i.e. the symbolic order and one’s relation to its elements. It 
may also violate that order such that it destroys the individual’s relationship with the 
shared symbolic order altogether. Such is the situation of the Hiroshima survivor, who 
must come to terms with the sudden and unexpected disappearance of an entire city, even 
before a widespread knowledge of atomic weapons created an awareness of this 
possibility (Lifton, Death 79), and subsequently, with the seemingly endless destructive 
but utterly imperceptible effects of the bomb’s radiation (Lifton, Death 55). 
Considering the possibility of describing Janet’s cognitive schemata via the 






understand traumatic phenomena such as hypermnesia and amnesia within the linguistic 
terms outlined by Lacan, and likewise by Kristeva in Black Sun.57 Until it can be 
articulated, the traumatic experience is held, by necessity, in a separate system of 
memory, unmediated by language and unmingled with other memory. The establishment 
of a second, parallel identity may be a necessary stage, temporary or terminal, towards 
accommodating in language an experience or knowledge that otherwise could destroy 
“reason”. The next section will examine some examples of this phenomenon, to make a 
more concrete case for the relation of trauma to irreconcilable narratives. 
 
1.3.1 False Division of the Symbolic 
We find a contemporary representation of the kind of divided subjectivity that can 
produce (rather than be produced by) trauma in the popular film, The Net, directed by 
Irwin Winkler.58 Although this is a narrative belonging to popular culture, it nonetheless 
provides a remarkably clear illustration of the underlying problem faced in divided 
subjectivity. In the film, Sandra Bullock plays Angela Bennet, a computer specialist 
whose identity is stolen when a band of computer gangsters exchange her on-line records 
for those of someone else, Ruth Marx. Released in 1995, the film preys on society’s not 
always unreasonable mistrust of its own technologies of information, situating the 
narrative crisis in the tension between the integrity of personal identity, and the social 
control of the public persona that curbs one’s right to self-presentation. Like Frege’s 
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Morning-Evening Star distinction, these two names split her identity through their 
divisive nomenclature, even while clearly referencing the same underlying subject, the 
individual herself as a social agent. The distinction exists only at the level of sense, 
however, which, as previously stated, belongs to the social compact regarding use in 
language practice. 
Trusting in the standard schemata of mainstream film narrative, we can expect 
Angela Bennet to resume her former identity as though the rupture had never occurred as 
soon as the hackers have been suitably thwarted. This correlates to the notion that, after 
trauma, the victim will resolve his or her memory and experience so that it aligns with the 
symbolic order that preceded the experience, with memory on the one hand, and 
expectation (projected memory) on the other.59 This notion of a nominal return to prior 
identity does not conform to the reality of trauma, however, which Freud characterized as 
an anamnesis: a lacuna in the personal narrative that cannot be filled. Beneath the 
superficiality of an exchange of names, which is a literal expression of divided identity, 
we find the actual rupture, which cannot be repaired by returning to a previous 
nomenclature. 
Shocked that she is targeted for persecution, since she is “no one,” (i.e. no one of 
particular importance or particular note) Angela Bennet faces the equally shocking reality 
that, in the mutual pairing of social authority with the volatility of an identity managed by 
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electronic data files, her identity is rendered socially mutable. She is, as the hacker band’s 
password “nemo” indicates, “no one” in the dual sense of “no one” worth persecuting but 
also as someone fundamentally incapable of determining her social identity. “Why me, 
why me? I am nobody, I am nothing! They knew everything about me. […] They knew 
that I could be vanished; they knew that nobody would care, that nobody would 
understand, and that it wouldn’t matter any more!” 
At first glance, the conflict underlying the quote may not be apparent, but on 
closer examination, it becomes clear that this expression of crisis is also an expression of 
traumatic doublethink. Angela Bennet is shocked both because she is not enough of a 
“someone” to warrant her identity being stolen, while at the same time, she is not enough 
of a “someone” to prevent it. The traumatic subtext of the film is the conflict between 
identity and those agencies in the world that may speak more authoritatively to the 
subject’s identity than the subject herself. From a broader point of view taken outside of 
the film narrative itself, this is not a phenomenon that arises with the Internet or modern 
technologies of data exchange, but is inherent in what Foucault would call the 
“technologies of knowledge,” which enable social control through surveillance and the 
management of his personal history. Documents such as medical and psychiatric records, 
criminal files, or the media, which may contain errors or even deliberate 
misrepresentations, can be virtually impossible for the individual to challenge, and 
consequently may falsify identity, silencing subjectivity that is heterogeneous to the 






The kind of “identity theft” or “identity assassination” depicted in The Net 
constitutes an experience popularly regarded as negative that fragments subjectivity. 
Other experiences fragment subjectivity in a similar way, and yet are broadly regarded as 
positive experiences, even desirable and sought-after experiences. Great celebrity, for 
instance, constitutes a similar dehumanizing instance of regular traumatic rupture in 
which a public persona that is continually fed by media discourse, excessive scrutiny, and 
voyeurism, is not infrequently viewed publicly as more authentic than personal identity, 
while inevitably being incommensurate with it. Attempts to reclaim and embody a 
publicly constructed persona, like attempts of the conventional trauma victim to reduce 
identity to what can be articulated in symbolized terms, can lead to a crisis of subjectivity 
for the individual. Still, the public attitude is frequently insensitive to the traumatizing 
dimensions of celebrity such as the total invasion of the private sphere and widespread 
media coverage of intensely private events. Instead, the symbolic order (its profit-driven 
media and public consumers, in this instance) often views celebrity as desirable, which 
makes it a particularly interesting example of the limitations in what is understood and 
accepted as constituting trauma. 
 
1.3.2 Doublethink as Doublespeak 
Instances of socially reductive identity such as, celebrity or the “spoiled identity” 
of a criminal or psychiatric career,60 literally exemplify identity divided by discursive 
incommensurability, although these instances may or may not emerge or be validated as 
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traumatic within the socio-historical, event-based standard. In the theory I am proposing 
here, however, trauma defines itself by this mechanism, which can better be described as 
a division that occurs when any experience, whether event, circumstance, or emotional 
state, disrupts the unity of personal discourse by founding elements within that discourse 
that mutually exclude one another in the terms and relations of symbolized meaning. If 
personal experience, epistemic in nature, can find no expression in the symbolic order 
because language literally cannot accommodate it or hold it concurrently with other 
critical aspects of subjectivity, the response of the individual will be one of some degree 
of traumatic crisis. 
This naturally occurring incommensurability in the subject is the reason for the 
delay in the onset of traumatic symptoms: traumatization can first be said to have 
occurred when the individual attempts to express experience in symbolized terms, and 
cannot find adequate means of signification. As will slowly become clearer over the 
course of this examination, the very theoretical and clinical discourses of trauma that are 
presently available, support a socially shared symbolic order, and attempt to rehabilitate 
experience to available meaning. In this way, they serve, ironically, to reinforce the 
limitations of the symbolic order in which trauma is rooted. The film, The Net, addresses 
this, tongue in cheek, when Angela Bennet’s ex-therapist suggests that he might help 
alleviate her identity crisis and paranoia by helping her process her disrupted relationship 
with her father. The onus of traumatic disruption is placed on the individual as a 
manifestation of pathology when, as I will demonstrate in the chapters that follow, 






meaning so that it can express heterogeneous experience, and the need to maintain a 
socially shared apprehension of meaning such that the capacity to communicate socially 
is preserved. 
A more “serious” example of traumatic crisis and its narrative underpinnings is 
provided by William Styron’s novel, Sophie’s Choice, later made well known through the 
film adaptation of director Alan Pakula.61 Sophie’s Choice springs from a canonical 
trauma narrative. Set in 1947 Brooklyn, the narrative (both in the novel and in the film) 
chronicles the complex relationship between a Southern writer, Stingo, a refugee from 
Krakow, Sophie, and her brilliant but mentally unstable Jewish lover, Nathan. The 
narrative addresses the difficulty in forming a definitive narrative of personal guilt or 
innocence in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in particular, the Holocaust. 
Styron presents the reader with a figure – Sophie – who is neither wholly innocent, nor 
wholly guilty, while at the same time sidestepping social outrage over such an ambiguous 
treatment of ethics by making Sophie a Christian and a Pole. 
The title, Sophie’s Choice, appears at first examination to reference the choice 
which Sophie was forced to make at Auschwitz, where the officer making the selection 
“allows” her to choose which of her two children will go to the children’s camp, and 
which will go directly to the gas chamber. Sophie came to his attention when she 
attempted to distance herself from the Jews by declaring, in German, that she was Polish, 
and a Christian. In response, the officer, Höss, tells her: “You’re a Polack, not a Yid. That 
gives you a privilege – a choice” (Styron 529). This notion of “privilege” is quite the 
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opposite and it challenges reason in a manner that is similar to (if more dramatic than) 
Angela Bennet’s dilemma of being ‘no one.’ The fact that Sophie is Polish does not, in 
fact, ensure her privileged treatment. Since Sophie has no way to estimate which of her 
children could better survive, the “choice” serves only to implicate Sophie along with the 
perpetrators in her children’s deaths by ensnaring her in a persistent evaluation of her 
own guilt relative to the choice she finally makes: to “choose” to save her son by trying 
to have him enrolled in the Lebensborn program, and to “allow” her daughter to be sent 
directly to the gas chamber. The choice is an empty choice – a doublethink example of 
choice – since no choice that Sophie makes will save even one of her children. One child, 
her daughter, will die immediately, and the other, her son, will die later. (It is not without 
irony that Höss own “selection” separates the transported into these same two categories.) 
A standard Freudian reading would say that Sophie’s “choice” between her 
children at the camp was so terrible that it produced a rupture, called an anamnesis, in the 
cohesive flow of Sophie’s personal story, characterized by a repetition compulsion and an 
overflow of the death drive. Freudian analysis would argue that the unity of that linear 
narrative of her life must somehow be restored if recovery is to occur, and that that 
restoration requires a reintegration of her horrendous and aberrant experience into that 
narrative in order to regain prior identity. There is no question that the choice between 
her children is an ethical outrage – an outrage which the viewer reflexively feels and 
which crystallizes around that pivotal scene with Höss. Nevertheless, this outrage cannot 
be the source of Sophie’s divided subjectivity, since this choice poses no irresolvable 






war. Sophie’s post-war crisis as to her own innocence or guilt references that moral 
outrage, but her traumatic discourse itself focuses on other experiences and other choices, 
including the choice to attempt to garner special favor at the Auschwitz selection by 
speaking German and separating herself as a Pole, not a Jew. 
The choice between her children cannot be the primary source of moral conflict, 
since that “choice” is an amoral, empty choice. In purely mechanical terms, Sophie can 
be said to have made a choice to save her son and to abandon her daughter, but since that 
choice rests on pure chance and speculation on future results, one cannot speak of a 
choice that leads to an estimable evaluation of responsibility or culpability. The nominal 
choice set before Sophie in the camp does not provide Sophie with an opportunity to 
exercise agency; on the contrary, it serves only to emphasis her helplessness. Despite this, 
and despite the fact that no choice was available that could save even one child, she is 
unable to resolve her crisis after the war. This is because a deeper conflict is latent in 
Höss’s statement as the site where actual conflict arises. As a Pole and a Christian, 
Sophie had had a “choice” as to whether to align herself with the victims or with the 
perpetrators, and there is a suggestion that in that choice, she will have already decided 
the fate of her children. The nefarious illusion of “privileged treatment” implies that, 
even in Auschwitz, she has a choice between ethical orders, while in fact, the choice is 
between her children is an outrage is inflicted on her. Her role in that choice is amoral. 
The crisis in Sophie’s Choice resembles the crisis in The Net in that it displays the 
same resistance of divided (world) views to merger and resolution. In The Net, the 






individual thereby rendered both autonomous subject and socially defined object. In 
Sophie’s Choice, the traumatic experience is the necessity of making a choice during 
events that will be measured on a scale of absolute judgment and culpability, but which 
scale will emerge only in the wake of the event. In the narrative, Sophie’s outrage 
vacillates between various sites of conflict and her “choice” is revealed to have been an 
entire series of choices, each reiterating the same crisis: the impossibility of making an 
adequate decision. This series of non-choices is characterized by their absolute futility: 
whether she made the best choice possible to ensure even one child’s survival (Styron 
538-39); whether she was too stupid or simply too cowardly to challenge her father’s 
plans for the Jewish ghetto in Krakow or whether she is implicated in his guilt because 
she typed his anti-Semitic treatise (Styron 261); whether it was selfish or self-protective 
to refuse to translate documents for the Resistance (Styron 404-08), to work as Höss’s 
secretary in Auschwitz (Styron 242), to claim to have helped write her father’s Nazi 
treatise in order to convince Höss to put her son in the Lebensborn program, or to have 
identified herself as a Christian in order to distance herself from the other persecuted 
(Styron 528). 
Sophie is already aware that having her son enrolled in the Lebensborn program 
will not constitute a guarantee that he will survive. A gifted linguist, and fluent in 
German, she was approached by the Resistance and asked to translate documents that 
would help the Lebensborn children who were being murdered. She declined to help, 
however, because she didn’t want to endanger her own children’s lives. Ultimately, no 






reasonable choice becomes a liability later on, and her maternal instinct to safeguard her 
own children first will later form a part of her self-indictment of cowardice. There is no 
way to absolutely establish the degree of responsibility that she bears in the outcome of 
events. Sophie’s apprehension of this inability to choose “correctly” is expressed as a fear 
that she is too stupid to have made the right decision in any of the choices with which she 
was confronted – most especially the choice between her children. If she had been too 
stupid to make those earlier choices correctly, as she asserts, then she was also too stupid 
to make the right choice and ensure one child’s survival at the camp. If she had been 
smart enough to choose between them so that one survived, however, then she was also 
smart enough to have challenged her father, helped the resistance and so forth. Her 
ongoing examination of conscience centers on these two issues – ignorance and 
culpability – and shows us that her crisis is her inability to make an adequate choice that 
will render her either guilty or innocent. Since this inability places Sophie beyond the 
symbolic and ethical order, absolutely identifiable as neither perpetrator nor victim, it 
becomes impossible for her to create a discourse that adequately renders her experience. 
She experiences both; she speaks of neither in comprehensible terms. 
Sophie’s underlying crises are silenced by the overt atrocity of the choice at the 
camp, which seems to render those other crises so banal as to seem too trivial to talk 
about. Those crises are effectively silenced by the postwar mobilization of society to cope 
with the social and ethical crisis created by the Holocaust. Sophie emergence into post-
war Brooklyn, and its symbolic order places the events she has lived through on the 






very little, if anything, in between – an ethics that does not conform with her own 
experience. Alternately treated by her lover, Nathan, as a helpless victim (Styron 69), 
then as a perpetrator who is no better than death itself (Styron 50-51), Sophie can only 
plead ignorance and her language reflects this; an amalgam of the idioms both of 
perpetrator and of victim, aggressor and liberator. After the war, her innate facility with 
language, crucial to her story, is thus rendered inadequate in the linguistic home in which 
she finds herself. In this language, and in this symbolic order, there is no expression for 
the choices she has had to make, or for the ambiguities that made an “adequate choice” 
difficult or even impossible. Sophie’s truth is thus rendered “unspeakable,” simply 
because the socially negotiated terms of language itself is inadequate to express the 
fragmented oppositions that appear to defy “reality” as society needs to define it. 
Meaning, and in particular, the ethical evaluation of meaning and identity must be 
unambiguous in order that reason can be found in the events that have taken place. 
Styron chooses to put the crisis of non-choice through ignorance of an adequate 
evaluative system in the mouth of a Polish Catholic Holocaust survivor. Through this 
choice, he buys the permission to demonstrate the impossibility of ethics in a time of 
unreason, and the impossibility of speaking of that disaster in a symbolic order that 
weighs each choice of the individual on the scales of absolute Guilt and Innocence. The 
ethical value of many of Sophie’s choices will be determined when, informed by the 
outcome, society reconstructs and assesses a socio-historical context to which no one had 
access during the events themselves. The antebellum ethical order, particularly in 1947, 






paradoxes and ethical ambiguity of her discourse. She cannot define herself, hence her 
reliance on her instable relationship with Nathan, whose alternating condemnation of 
Sophie as perpetrator, and nurturing of her as victim, creates a social compact (albeit 
limited) in which Sophie’s discursively divided identity can be held. 
The novel serves as an example of narrative conflict, and confirms the viability of 
the approach to trauma and identity that I am pursuing here. This close interplay of the 
personal and the social is arguably the most critical conflict in defining an experience 
traumatic, and it is demonstrated in a variety of texts that deal with event-based trauma. 
In an essay on Hiroshima, for example, Georges Bataille examines the political 
dimension of traumatic conflict as he observes that an individual’s support of society and 
civilization, which are “made up of autonomous systems, each opposing each other” 
requires her to demonstrate an “indifference to the present instant.”62 
It is strange that concern for the future at the level of the State 
immediately diminishes the individual’s security and chances of 
survival. But this is precisely the sign of human indifference 
towards the present instant – in which we suffer and in which we 
die – […] that leaves powerless the desire to live. The need to 
make life secure wins out over this need to live. (Bataille 229) 
Thus configured, Bataille argues, social ethics tacitly declare a self-interest in survival an 
act of civil disobedience. This opposition of socially prescribed social indifference 
towards survival against the organism’s primal will to survive constitutes another locus of 
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potential systemic breakdown that leads to trauma as I am defining it here. Every 
individual is both experiencing being and social, communicating being, and is driven to 
safeguard both her own life and identity, and the survival and cohesion of the social 
entity to which she belongs. 
In the end analysis, Sophie is not able to make the decision to ethical self-
sacrifice; to risk her children’s lives in order to help the resistance, or to damage her 
fragile relationship with her father by persisting in challenging him in his political beliefs. 
However important the ethical discourse on trauma may be, particularly in catastrophic 
events where it is indisputably critical to the social good that culpability be clarified, it is 
an inadequate approach for dealing with the victims’ outrage or their speechlessness. 
Indeed, it plays the greatest role in creating these by reinforcing the symbolic order and 
its prescriptive interpretive agenda. By so doing, the ethical discourse on trauma 
advances the cause of social trauma while limiting, both clinically and socially, the 
traumatic discourse of an individual who is challenging the mechanistic and insensate 
functioning of the symbolic order. 
 
1.4 Divided Language 
What we have examined thus far primarily via the brief examples of trauma 
narrative is traumatic crisis as divided subjectivity; a rupture in identity that arises out of 
a conflict between the epistemic subject who knows without categorical constraint but 
without speaking, and the ethical subject, who exists in a social context and may speak, 






relations that comprise its structure. This dissonance, which is natural and inherent to the 
internal organization of subjectivity, creates in every symbolic order the paradoxical 
condition whereby the trauma testimony destroys the linguistic medium with which it 
must be conveyed. In any culture, pressure exerted by the individual, somatosensory 
experience to expand the terms and categories of what may be articulated is met by the 
resistance of the symbolic order and the discursive community, which must safeguard the 
medium of mutual communication. The traumatized is literally compelled to speak 
another language than that belonging to the social order from which she is consequently 
excluded. In cognitive and linguistic terms, trauma constitutes a transgressive and 
potentially destructive knowledge that must deform the symbolic and the social order in 
order to be communicated and find resolution. Trauma will, therefore, take on forms that 
reveal the instances of subjectivity (a subjective knowledge) and the instances of ethics 
(socially validated orders). 
Trauma is potentially a social gesture of revolution. The words that can be 
expressed within the delimitations of the symbolic order may be emptied of meaning 
when they have become denatured by traumatic association. As with divided identity, the 
divided signification of a sign or word creates a doubling whereby the socially shared use 
of the word and its post-traumatic association preclude one another, because they are 
incommensurate with one another. For the trauma survivor, an idea of the signified exists 
in unmediated experience that is not correlate with the sense of that signified in the 
shared symbolic order. This linguistic doubling is evident in survivor testimony, for 






Because when I talk to you about Auschwitz, it is not from deep 
memory that my words issue. They come from external memory, If 
I may put it that way, from intellectual memory, the memory 
connected with thinking processes. Deep memory preserves 
sensations, physical imprints. It is the memory of the senses. For it 
isn’t words that are swollen with emotional charge. Otherwise, 
someone who has been tortured by thirst for weeks on end could 
never again say “I’m thirsty. How about a cup of tea.” This word 
has also split in two. Thirst has turned back into a word for 
commonplace use. (Days 3-4) 
There are two potential outcomes to the trauma narrative once a narrative is revealed as 
to be comprised of at least two competing narrative threads, with different ethical and 
experiential claims: it must either submit to discrediting as a violation of the symbolic 
order, or it must in some way traumatize the witness and violate shared, symbolized 
meaning that precludes it to the point that shared meaning itself suffers discrediting and is 
modified. 
In this first instance in which the traumatized individual’s experience is 
discredited, that trauma narrative may flounder on the listener’s inability comprehend the 
distortion of meaning, and consequently be misunderstood. In that case, the witness may 
either listen past the devastating detail with which he is presented, or the victim may be 
dismissed as lacking reason. We saw this social response in the example of The Net, in 






serves as a case in point of this. Her crisis is reduced to a Freudian manifestation of her 
relationship with her father by her friend and ex-therapist. The alternative available for 
trauma narrative is for traumatic experience to become speak-able: to traumatize the 
witness in some small way by recreating part or all of the rupture in her own 
apprehension of symbolized meaning as well, thereby forcing her to share traumatic loss 
of meaning.  
Trauma is a transgressive knowledge of the fact that signification, in particular of 
the subject, is revealed to the individual as arbitrary and thetic positing an operation that 
follows the chance fracturing of the world into discrete elements. Lifton observes this 
phenomenon in his study of the after-effects of the atomic bomb on the survivors at 
Hiroshima when he notes that in the idiom of survivors, the distinction between life and 
death appeared to have become permeable: “Beyond death imagery per se, there was a 
widespread sense that life and death were out of phase with one another, no longer 
properly distinguishable – which lent an aura of weirdness and unreality to the entire 
city” (Lifton, Death 23). By extension, new subject positions will emerge as well: Caruth 
describes how seemingly incommensurate strands in a trauma narrative are “both 
compatible and absolutely inextricable,” citing Freud’s description of a train accident and 
the survivors’ belated traumatic response to it: 
Is the trauma the encounter with death, or the ongoing experience 
of having survived it? […] I would suggest, [there] is thus a kind 
of double telling, the oscillation between a crisis of death and the 






of an event and the story of the unbearable nature of its survival 
(italics in original). (Caruth, Unclaimed 7) 
This oscillation, a shifting metonymy, represents that moment when the arbitrary division 
between signifiers intrudes upon consciousness. The incompatibility of conflicted 
symbolized terms demonstrates the same incommensurability that occurs at the level of 
subjectivity itself. 
The duality of identity and language with which survivors must often come to 
terms is sometimes spoken of in terms of a quarantine of knowledge that transgresses 
against both reason and cohesive meaning or identity. Langer cites one Holocaust 
survivor’s description of this phenomenon:  
I often think about it, of course, how there is a sort of division, a 
sort of schizophrenic division, you know, a compartmentalization 
of what happened, and it’s kept tightly separated, and yet as I said, 
it isn’t. […] it’s more a view of the world, a total world view… of 
extreme pessimism […], of sort of one feels… of really knowing 
the truth about people, human nature, about death, of really 
knowing the truth in a way that other people don’t know it. (59) 
This realization that a division in the symbolic order is arbitrary and yet has been 
valorized as “reality” (in this instance the division between life and death), results in a 







The modification to symbolized meaning and identity occurs not only at the 
discrete point of rupture, but, as stated above, throughout the symbolic order as other 
signs are affected not by direct involvement in the crisis, but in their relation to the 
distorted element. Since the symbolic order represents a closed, homeostatic system, 
traumatic rupture does not constitute simply the loss of discrete instances of signification 
or the forced addition of new, eccentric signification. Rather, trauma brings about a 
denaturing of all of the symbolized terms and relations, out of which the subject will have 
to constitute her public identity. Even when the terms in her apprehension of symbolized 
meaning appear to correlate with the terms of shared, socially determined signification, 
what is available to the traumatized individual is a different language. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a brief introduction into trauma theory, along with 
a view of some of the difficulties faced in that discipline. Event-based explanations of 
traumatic crisis fail to provide an adequate etiological basis for the emergence of such 
crisis, which has proven to be unpredictable at best in terms of who will be affected, and 
what symptoms she will experience. Those symptoms themselves range from somatic 
disruptions, to the disruption of a personal sense of self, a disruption of language and 
ultimately, the disruption of the social fabric and the connections that bind us to one 
another. These inconsistencies in the traumatic reaction itself indicate that a definition of 
trauma using rigid criteria such as a specific event (i.e. war, genocide, incest, etc.), or a 






understanding of what constitutes psychic trauma. Such methods merely restrict any 
examination of traumatic crisis to our own cultural and linguistic reference – a post-
Freudian, Western perspective. 
In this chapter, I also presented a very brief examination of semiotic theory, 
including a few critical philosophical perspectives that help to lead up to the radical, 
linguistic view of the “subject” proposed by theorists such as Lacan, Kristeva, and 
Ricoeur (whom I will discuss in the following chapter), among others. In presenting that 
material, I began to lay the groundwork for what will be the chief focus of this study; a 
dynamic model of subjectivity that is centered not on the momentary stases or 
manifestations of meaning and identity, but rather, on the way in which experience helps 
to generate and modify subjectivity, and the ongoing process by which it does so. 
Experience begins with somatosensory impulses as an unshared and unmediated 
experience of our own body (not the object), and yet must somehow evolve to fulfill a 
broad range of disparate objectives. Experience, in other words, must be restructured 
within the individual body and individual cognition to form a basic spatial awareness, 
awareness of body-integrity and image, a discrete sense of self, an apprehension of 
symbolized meaning (including simultaneously held, hypothetical articulations of 
meaning and identity as in dream, fantasy, hypothetical supposition, etc.), and as a 
symbolized subjective identity. Ultimately, the same sensory experience must contribute 
to a public discourse and the social negotiation of meaning from the (perception of a) 
shared apprehension of the objects that surround us, to a shared, social ethics. All of this 






afferent nerves. It is in this complex series of objectives that must be fulfilled by human 
cognition that the basis for conflict arises, and here that traumatic crisis finds its origins. 
In the chapter that follows, I will present a revised model of subjectivity that, 
based on a dynamic model, will explain not only the origin of the widely disparate and 
“unpredictable” symptoms of traumatic crisis, but will also explain the necessity of such 
crisis in safeguarding meaning. The dynamic, semiotic model, which owes more to 
Lacan’s Borromean knot theory63 than it does to his earlier topographic model, will allow 
me to define trauma within its own dynamic, without reliance on the kinds of positivistic 
array of events usually seen in trauma theory that, once declared the etiological origin of 
crisis, must then remain outside the scope of the inquiry as a deus ex machina. The 
dynamic model that will be presented in this study will allow the study of trauma to 
transcend this kind of positivistic cataloguing, as well as eliminate the need for tenuous 
and essentialist claims to socially ratified sites of trauma (i.e. claims of traumatization by 
events raised by later generations who, although traumatized, have no socially ratified 
event through which to legitimize their claim). Trauma, as it will be defined in this study, 
is a ubiquitously human experience, transcending social, cultural and historical 
boundaries, and originating with the very fabric of human cognition itself. Only by 
viewing it as such, and by relinquishing the need to delimit that which is viewed as 
traumatic to those events that traumatize society will it become possible to understand 
and even resolve the traumatic crisis.
                                                 
63 Jacques Lacan, Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne, ed. Juliet Mitchell and 






Chapter 2: The Structure of the Semiotic Current 
 
 
I can interpret all her martyr’d signs – 
She says, she drinks no other drink but tears, 
Brew’d with her sorrow, mesh’d upon her cheeks. 
Speechless complainer, I will learn thy thought; 
In thy dumb action will I be as perfect 
As begging hermits in their holy prayers: 
Thou shalt not sigh, nor hold thy stumps to heaven, 
Nor wink, nor nod, nor kneel, nor make a sign, 
But I of these, will wrest an alphabet, 
And by still practice learn to know thy meaning. 
 





The purpose of this study, as stated in the previous chapter, is to dissociate our 
understanding of psychological trauma from notions of pathology or anomaly, redefining 
it instead as systemic disruption. Such disruption, as I will show, arises specifically when 
naturally occurring sub-processes in an ongoing dynamic of signification are attenuated. 
Under optimal circumstances, these sub-processes occur so swiftly that they remain 
beneath the threshold of our awareness. When they are attenuated, however, they give 
rise to what appear to be irregular or unpredictable symptoms that affect identity and 
meaning, and that are classifiable, at best, under a general pattern of “pathology” (see 
1.0.2). The unpredictability of these symptoms and the failure of available theories of 
subjectivity to systematically account for them lead to a perception that traumatic crisis 
constitutes an anomalous and pathological breakdown of meaning and/or subjectivity. In 
this study, I argue that traumatic crisis is neither pathological nor anomalous, but in fact, 
                                                 






comprises a part of the successful functioning of a dynamic semiotic system that 
generates both meaning and subjectivity. What are classified as “symptoms” are simply 
attenuated manifestations of states or conditions that are regularly present at a more or 
less subliminal level. More than this, traumatic crisis is essential to the preservation of the 
dynamic that drives that semiotic system and therefore in a very real sense, that crisis 
plays a crucial part in creating and preserving meaning and subjectivity. 
In the chapter that follows, I will argue that meaning and subjectivity originate 
within a dynamic flow or current of neurocognitive function, in which individual 
instances of meaning are subordinate to the dynamic as a whole. If meaning is understood 
to arise within a continuous dynamic, it will follow that all concretized instances of 
meaning and identity must be treated as ephemera – what a theory of dynamics would 
term observables. These instances are meaningful not in that they are correlate with an 
objective “reality” (i.e., one that exists beyond the constructs of signification), but only in 
that they can be used to describe, and to some extent, predict the behavior of the semiotic 
current in which they have arisen. As a foundation to this proposed manner of looking at 
meaning and subjectivity, I will examine those basic qualities common to dynamic 
systems in general, drawing on a theory of dynamics for a modest set of essential 
definitions and principles that will be indispensable to this study. Finally, I will carefully 
define a set of functional domains that are circumscribed within a dynamic system of 
signification, specifying the essential role that each domain plays both in generating and 






While this chapter will, by necessity, be largely theoretical, laying the 
groundwork for the narrative analyses that follow in chapters three through five, I will 
begin this chapter with a brief narrative analysis of Alejandro Amenábar’s 2001 film, The 
Others.2 This analysis will be useful in establishing a referential framework from which 
to compare traditional expectations of trauma and trauma narrative with the redefinition 
of these proposed in this study. Amenábar’s film provides an ideal narrative for this first 
analysis since, on the one hand, the film avails itself of firmly entrenched Freudian 
imagery for traumatic crisis that is likely to be familiar to the reader. At the same time, 
the film’s exceptionally nuanced use of that imagery provides a readily accessible entry 
point for a revised outlook on outdated assumptions about trauma. 
 
2.1 Separating Light from Darkness: The Origins of Traumatic Opposition 
Set on the Isle of Jersey just following the Second World War, Amenábar’s film, 
The Others (2001), depicts the struggles of Grace, a young mother who has had to cope 
with the responsibility of raising her two children alone amidst the German occupation. 
Although the war has already ended by the time the narrative begins, Grace has had no 
word from her husband, whom she fears may have been killed in the war. (As the viewer 
later discovers, this is indeed the case.) In addition, she has had to come to terms with her 
situation with no ancillary support since not only did her entire extended family flee the 
island shortly before the German invasion but, as she relates, even the servants have 
abandoned her, disappearing suddenly: “No notice; didn’t even collect their wages.” 
                                                 
2 The Others, dir. Alejandro Amenábar, perf. Nichole Kidman, Fionnula Flanagan, Christopher Eckleston, 






Among all of these stressors, the greatest burden placed upon Grace is the fact 
that her two children, Ann and Nicholas, suffer from Xeroderma Pigmentosum, a rare 
genetic disorder that leaves them with a life-threatening allergy to light. The children are 
acutely photosensitive and exposure to light any stronger than what is produced by a wick 
lamp has the potential to raise blisters and impair their breathing. In order to prevent 
accidental exposure, anaphylactic shock and death by suffocation, the home must be kept 
largely in darkness so that in finding one’s way around its many rooms, “one scarcely 
knows whether there is a table, or a chair, or one of my children playing…” Everyday life 
in the household follows a rigorous and unyielding routine that Grace has been forced to 
develop as a means of controlling both the children’s whereabouts and the amount of 
light permitted to enter the home. Under these conditions, the home is, as Grace relates, 
“like a prison” and her life in it “[…] difficult. One might almost say, unbearable.” 
The demands of the household routine are complicated by the fact that the house 
is not kept entirely dark. Under isolated circumstances when the children are not present, 
the curtains can be drawn back to allow Grace and the servants to work. While this 
arrangement permits light to be utilized, it also complicates the matter of protecting the 
children. In order to assure that they are not accidentally exposed, they must be kept shut 
up one room or another. Doors are locked and unlocked, and rooms and passageways are 
serially darkened as the children are moved from one room to the next – precautions, 
which contain and manage the children as much as they do the light, and which 
dramatically increase the home’s likeness to a prison. The difficulty in maintaining this 






arrived servants at the beginning of the film. “The light must be contained as if it were 
water by opening and closing the doors. My children’s lives are at stake.” 
Light’s destructive quality is emphasized in the film, however it also has a 
productive potential, which lies in the fact that it creates – through its presence or absence 
– parallel domains of light and of darkness. Each of these domains is available to Grace 
and each generates a specific manner of existence – one in which she is with her children 
but confined in darkness, and one in which she is unencumbered by that darkness but 
alone. The relative value of each of these domains is ambiguous since each possesses 
something that is indispensable as well as something that is unendurable. In the domain 
of light, Grace may escape the darkness and the burden of protecting her children’s 
vulnerable health, but in order to do so, she must somehow be rid of the children 
(whether temporarily or permanently). At the same time, to remain with her children as 
their mother, she must also remain with them in darkness as their custodian or warder, 
both subjugating them to a kind of imprisonment and enduring that imprisonment herself. 
The ambiguous value of each of these domains lies not only in the fact that 
neither domain can be wholly desired, nor wholly repudiated, but also in the fact that 
each possesses the solution for what is unendurable in its sister domain. The domains are 
linked in a reciprocal relationship such that they may neither be merged, nor separated 
from one another. Grace’s existence oscillates between what appear to be diametrically 
opposed worlds that compete with one another, deny one another’s validity, and defy all 
attempts at reconciliation. Since light’s absence or presence creates these coexistent 






Grace hints both at this ambivalence and at the radical entanglement of her parallel 
modes of existence when she tells the new housekeeper, Mrs. Mills: “You will soon 
discover that nothing in this house moves except the light. But it changes everything.” 
The suffocating regimen of the home and the ominous potential for disaster create 
a gloomy and sinister backdrop to the narrative – a horror scenario that is made complete 
by the fact that the home appears to be haunted. Grace’s daughter, Ann, is the first to 
claim to see apparitions who, she claims, move freely about the house, talking with her, 
and opening doors and curtains. Although it remains unresolved until late in the film 
whether there truly are any ghosts or whether Ann has fabricated them, this possible 
haunting introduces an immediate threat to the family, as the unexplained opening of 
curtains and unlocking of doors breaches the carefully managed separation of light and 
darkness. Through this degree of unpredictability, light acquires a kind of independent 
volition that allows it to violate the controls and checks of the household regimen. 
Regardless whether the home truly is haunted or whether the curtains and doors are being 
left open by some member of the household (Ann, the servants, or Grace herself), the end 
effect is that light can no longer be adequately controlled to ensure the children’s safety. 
The idea that the home is haunted adds an intriguing dimension to the motif of 
light separated from darkness, blurring the careful separation of the two through the loss 
of volitional control. At the same time, this purported haunting is pivotal to the 
development of separate or competing narratives as analogous to that more literal 
separation. Responding to Ann’s insistence that she has seen ghosts, Grace accuses her of 






accusation and Ann’s obstinate avowal comprise but one of many apparent 
inconsistencies that reflect a struggle among the film’s characters as to what constitutes 
the “reality” of their situation or condition. Grace, Ann, and Nicholas mutually censor 
one another and while Grace harshly suppresses the children’s discussion of certain 
topics, the children themselves strive to silence one another within their own limited 
domain of influence. Ann, for example, prevents Nicholas from suggesting that their 
father may not return home from the war. She herself is silenced first by Nicholas, and 
then by Grace’s sudden arrival when she makes reference to prior troubles in the home, 
telling the housekeeper, Mrs. Mills, that “Mummy went mad.” “I don’t like fantasies,” 
Grace subsequently warns Mrs. Mills. “Strange ideas – you know what I mean? My 
children sometimes have strange ideas, but you mustn’t pay any attention to them. 
Children will be children.” 
On the surface, Grace’s statement that “children will be children” appears to refer 
to a tendency to exaggerate and fantasize that is often attributed to children, thereby 
discrediting the children’s sometimes contradictory interpretations of reality within the 
narrative. This is by no means the only interpretation of this statement, however, since 
the truth is also known often to come “from the mouths of babes.” The statement’s 
ambiguity is underscored in a later scene, in which Nicholas reads aloud the story of 
Justin and Pastore – two children who are martyred by the Romans because they refuse to 
deny their faith. Ann expresses outraged at what she sees as their fatal and pointless 
obstinacy and she declares that she would have lied and denied the truth to save herself, 






admonishes her, she would have gone to “the children’s limbo, at the center of the earth 
where it’s very, very hot. That’s where children go who tell lies, but they don’t go there 
for a few days. Oh no… no. They’re damned forever.” The scene takes on a darkly ironic 
tone when one recognizes that the truth is never fully spoken in the home; neither by 
Grace nor by the children. These moments of mutual censorship reveal that, along with 
the management of light, there is a stringent management of information and it is not 
readily apparent what truth underlies this censorship. 
This development of competing narrative realities mimics the more literal 
separation of light from darkness in that, like that literal separation, these narrative 
variants can neither be merged, nor separated from one another. Rather, they create a 
narrative whole made up of simultaneously existent but mutually exclusive parts – a 
narrative manifestation of Orwellian doublethink (see 1.3). The question as to how we are 
to interpret the phrase “children will be children,” like the inconsistencies among the 
characters’ presentations of reality, remains open. What is certain, however, is that the 
inconsistencies among the characters’ mutually incompatible apprehensions of “reality” 
do indeed create a kind of limbo – an interpretive limbo – into which the viewer herself is 
cast. 
The censorship of “offensive” discourse and the inconsistencies among the 
characters’ portrayals of “reality” reveal a method of dealing with difficult circumstances 
that relies heavily upon what Freud termed repression. Grace in particular seeks to ban 
unwanted awareness by preventing certain ideas from seeing the light of day – a method 






awareness, suppressed in familial discourse, and only hinted at in the narrative finally 
comes to light late in the film. Unable to cope with the lasting strain of her situation, 
Grace has suffocated her children and then killed herself – an event that occurred prior to 
the narrative’s beginning and to which Ann had hinted when she mentioned that Grace 
had “gone mad.” 
This revelation that Grace and her children are dead rewrites the entire filmic 
reality beginning with the seemingly inconsequential event of the servants’ abrupt 
departure without their wages. Far from a callous act of abandonment, it is revealed that 
their departure was necessary, since they no longer had an employer from whom to 
collect those wages. More significantly, the viewer discovers that the beings believed to 
be haunting the home are not ghosts at all but the living – individuals who have moved 
into a home left vacant after the family’s death. The home is indeed haunted; however it 
is Grace and her children who are the ghosts. With this revelation – essentially a 
complete reversal of the film’s initial premise, all aspects of the film’s narrative “reality” 
become suspect including the assumption that the children are photosensitive. In fact, 
they cannot be harmed by light any longer, and Grace’s continued efforts to shield them 
from exposure become a reflection of the degree to which she has repressed any 
awareness of their deaths. The separation of light from darkness can no longer be 
interpreted in a primarily literal sense, and the film is opened up to a metaphoric reading 
– one which, as we will see, centers on the censure of traumatic awareness. 
The definitive break in the film’s narrative premise occurs when the home’s new 






In the only glimpse we are offered from the perspective of the “living” we see the séance 
table shake and objects fly disembodied through the room, while Grace protests and tries 
to confront the “ghosts” that “haunt” her home. The viewer is finally permitted to see 
what Grace herself has failed to recognize – that she and her children are trapped in a 
kind of limbo between their previous earthly existence and their existence as shades, and 
more specifically, that they are trapped by their inability to accept the tragic 
circumstances of their own deaths. At an interpretive level, two parallel, metaphoric 
divisions emerge alongside the literal division of Grace’s world into domains of light and 
of darkness. There is a division of metaphysical domains – those of life and of death – 
which can neither be merged nor separated, and simultaneously a division between what 
remains darkened from memory and what has been permitted to come to the light of 
awareness. 
In creating concurrent but competing levels of interpretation and in reversing the 
narrative premise late in the film, Amenábar utilizes our expectations as viewers to 
seduce us into what would otherwise be regarded as an abject viewpoint – that belonging 
to the ghost or monster. At a more subtle level, the manipulation of those expectations 
provides the viewer with an empathic understanding of Grace’s traumatic crisis. Her 
awareness, which at first guided our own apprehension of the narrative reality, has been 
compartmentalized and restricted by traumatic repression much as the house is 
compartmentalized to the passage of light. By revealing the fragmentation of Grace’s 
awareness of “reality” only after the viewer has been led to subscribe to that “reality,” 






herself must feel as her falsified story is eroded and as she remembers the terrible events 
she has darkened from memory. 
There is no discrete moment at which the narrative is clarified for the viewer, and 
instead, the premise of the narrative is undermined in serial increments. The viewer, in 
other words, is subjected in some small measure to the traumatic process itself with its 
competing realities and resistance to a cohesive symbolized apprehension of all 
awareness. The “meaning” of the film as it is carefully constructed by the viewer must 
repeatedly be discarded and created anew and as a result, we are left in a kind of limbo in 
which differing versions of the narrative simultaneously compete with one another. This 
fragmentation of the narrative itself generates an empathic understanding of how 
traumatic crisis is able to annul meaning and bifurcate personal experience into 
competing “realities” (see 1.3). The cinematic landscape shifts and just as the movement 
of light in the house “changes everything,” so too the advance of realization changes the 
landscape of the narrative for the viewer. 
The separation of light and darkness remains central to the narrative however the 
literal meaning of their separation is substantially altered, allowing a metaphoric 
interpretation of that separation to take the foreground. Light retains the capacity not only 
to release Grace from her imprisonment, but also to “kill” the children, since their 
invulnerability to light would destroy the protective fallacy of traumatic repression in 
which Grace keeps them “alive.” Their failure to be harmed by light, in other words, 
would reveal the truth that the children are dead. It would also allow Grace to escape her 






would escape the literal darkness of a home designed to “protect” her children, she would 
escape an existence that is suspended between life and death, and finally, she would 
escape a conscious awareness that is held in censorial darkness by traumatic repression. 
These interpretative levels are intertwined and each level contributes to a continuous 
progression of meaning such that the literal, metaphysical, and metaphoric can neither be 
merged, nor separated. I will return to this progression of interrelated meaning in sections 
that follow in this chapter. 
As a narrative, The Others deals with subject matter that is widely acknowledged 
as traumatic.  Returning here to the phenomenon of trauma itself, the metaphoric imagery 
in the film lends itself to analysis using dominant strains of theoretical inquiry into 
trauma and the trauma narrative. A psychoanalytic interpretation of the film would 
suggest that the traumatic event (the children’s murder and Grace’s subsequent suicide) 
was so terrible that it had to be removed or banned from awareness.3 As described in the 
previous chapter, such repression occurs when an event is judged to be so ethically 
abhorrent that it is actively excluded from conscious awareness (see 1.0). As a 
neurocognitive approach on the other hand, Janet’s theory of dissociation would posit 
that the experience of the murder/suicide so violated the existent cognitive schemata that 
                                                 
3 Specific features within the narrative lend themselves to a traditional, largely Freudian interpretation of 
traumatic crisis. These features reflect what psychoanalysis terms defenses (primary and secondary) against 
unwanted realization and should be broadly recognizable to the modern viewer, even if the specific 
psychological terminology for those defenses is not. The first of these defenses is what psychoanalysis 
would term displacement – the transfer of signified meaning from one instance to another. In addition to 
the manner in which darkness and light are made to symbolize repression and realization, Grace’s specific 
fear that the children may suffocate if they are exposed to light offers a classic example of the displacement 
of the repressed event of their actual smothering. Similarly, we find examples of other key defenses 
associated with traumatic crisis such as condensation, in which multiple instances of signified meaning are 
attached to a single signifier. The most prominent instance of such is the literal, metaphysical, and 
metaphoric significance of light and darkness (light/darkness, life/death, and awareness/repression, 






it could not be accommodated into the schemata’s innate structure. Rather than being 
“unthinkable” because it is ethically abhorrent, dissociated experience is unthinkable 
because it is unrecognizable within the terms and relations of cognitive thought. Such 
experience is said to be passively excluded on the basis of systemic incompatibility rather 
than on the basis of active evaluation and rejection. 
While both theories offer some explanation for traumatic memory (see 1.3), the 
complexity of Grace’s compartmentalized memory indicates what has likewise been 
attested in modern trauma theory – that neither Freudian repression nor Janet’s 
dissociation provides a theoretical explanation that adequately accounts for the 
phenomena associated with traumatic memory. It is not possible to say, for instance, that 
either an exclusively active process of repression or an exclusively passive process of 
dissociation leads to Grace’s inability to recall the murder/suicide. Rather, there are both 
active and passive elements in the manner in which light and enlightenment are 
controlled. Both passive and active elements are evident in Grace’s active effort to 
prevent her children from being exposed to light. On the one hand, exposure would 
betray their post-mortem invulnerability to its effects and therefore we can say that this 
active avoidance of that particular experience accords with Freud’s notion of active 
avoidance and repression. At the same time, as long as the children are not exposed, the 
proof that they are invulnerable remains passively unavailable in the same way that the 







One might argue that Grace’s protection of the children is simply guided by her 
previous assumption that they are still photosensitive, which would suggest the passive 
unavailability of any alternate interpretation in the cognitive schemata. The possibility 
that she is truly unaware that the children are dead is belied by the fact that that Grace 
censors certain speech and reference to specific events. This active censoring betrays the 
fact that, at some level, she is both aware of and wishes to prohibit something as 
abhorrent and deserving of censor. Her ability to recognize what is abhorrent (what 
Kristeva terms abject) must, in some measure, be attributed to its having acquired some 
signified value, even if that value is displaced. The abject, in other words, cannot be 
rejected on the basis of active evaluation unless it exists in some form in the “cognitive 
schemata” (e.g., the symbolic order). Here again, however, the active prohibition of 
certain discourse does not nullify the unavailability of what such discourse might reveal. 
If the abject is actively repudiated and expelled from the symbolic order, then one must 
also say that it is in some way not accommodated, and that it cannot be accommodated 
unless there is a reanalysis of that order. The outrage of the abject is derived in part from 
its violation of meaning and identity, and most particularly, from the separation of what is 
Self from what is Other. The basis of active rejection is the notion that the abject cannot 
and must not be accommodated by reason. The intrusion of experience that cannot be 
accommodated, in other words, is rejected both because of passive incompatibility, and 
because the intrusion of the abject is actively judged abhorrent. 
The intermingling of both active and passive processes in traumatic memory 






inability to establish either dissociation or repression as the fundamental mechanism 
behind traumatic crisis and, at the same time, the inability to formulate a theory that 
adequately accommodates both as contributors to that process. Rather than a process that 
is either passive or active, the management of traumatic experience appears to represent a 
manifold process that is both simultaneously active and passive, and that occurs in 
interconnected stages. The defenses against specific awareness are not monolithic such 
that a defense falls once it has been breached by banned awareness. Rather, these 
defenses work to guard against heterogeneous experience much in the same way that 
Grace describes the home’s defense against light – that is, like a ship that is divided into 
compartments in order to facilitate a graduated containment. 
Neither repression nor dissociation is conceived to accommodate a graded 
sequence of barriers. Instead, each focuses on a single threshold that must be crossed in 
order for an experience to become a part of what has alternately been called “reason,” the 
“cognitive schemata,” or the “symbolic order.” The reality of recovering what has been 
“forgotten” in traumatic experience is far different and, as stated in the previous chapter, 
that recovery is fragmented – characterized by stages of recovery (Herman, Trauma 175-
195). Likewise in the film, we see that there is no single breach in Grace’s defenses, but 
rather a series of breaches that lead to distinct stages or levels of awareness. Only when 
the prohibition of speaking about ghosts has been irrevocably violated does Grace begin 
to see those ghosts, and from seeing them, begin to address them, albeit as intruders 
rather than as ghosts. Finally, once she is able to acknowledge their existence and to 






able to confront the reality that it is actually she and the children who are dead. 
Awareness comes in serial increments, passing through various stages and levels to 
culminate in the terrible realization that it is she, and not the light, who has suffocated the 
children and who is ultimately responsible for their deaths. 
The critical features I have just mentioned – the intermingling of both passive and 
active elements in traumatic repression and the management of awareness in stages – will 
form the focus of the remainder of this chapter. In the sections that follow, I will begin 
outlining a model of subjectivity that is based on the premise that cognition and 
subjectivity arise within an ongoing current of semiotic activity. That current originates 
with the first instances of sensory experience, and then passes through and is shaped by a 
series of functional domains. Understanding the circuitous passage of experience via 
these domains will enable us to account for the broad range of cognitive phenomena that 
arise from the same initial sensory input – from an awareness of the body, the separation 
of self (as experiencer) from other (as experienced), the formation of a symbolized order 
(Janet’s ‘cognitive schemata’), to the acquisition of language, and co-founding of a 
shared social ethics. 
More specific to the experience of traumatic crisis itself, the model proposed here 
will enable us to comprehend the existence of seemingly contradictory symptoms 
associated with that crisis, making apparent how competing explanatory theories each 
contribute indispensably towards, but fail to fully provide an adequate account of 
traumatic crisis as a whole. In a model that defines a current of semiotic activity and that 






contradiction or paradox, as well as phenomena such as the gradual containment of 
heterodoxic awareness will cease to pose a challenge to theoretical interpretation. I will 
begin in the next section by outlining, in broad terms, the characteristics basic to dynamic 
system in general in order to introduce those terms and concepts needed to form an 
understanding of a semiotic current and its behavior. 
 
2.2 Force and Counterforce: How the Potential for Signification Arises 
Despite an innate perception that meaning and identity corresponds with a more 
or less stable external reality, they are actually generated and constantly regenerated 
within a continuous and circuitous flow of experience.4 That single, ongoing current of 
sensory perception, cognition, and ultimately, communication must fulfill a number of 
disparate objectives ranging from the generation of bodily awareness to the negotiation of 
a shared, social ethics. As outlined in the previous chapter, theorists such as Lacan, 
Kristeva, and Ricoeur have attempted to account for the range of objectives that must be 
fulfilled using the same experiential input by defining specific organizational domains. 
Regardless whether they are defined as the symbolic, imaginary, and real (Lacan), the 
                                                 
4 The concept of a dynamic of cognition, identity, or signification is not a novel one. William James posited 
something similar in his Principles of Psychology, in which he described the “stream of thought.” William 
James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1918) 224-290. More recently 
in cognitive science, researchers such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have drawn on the work of 
dozens of researchers to postulate an incremental but integrated progression from sensory perception to 
abstract reasoning. George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and 
Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Likewise in the fields of semiotics and 
philosophy, which are of greatest interest to us here, some attempts have been made to move away from 
“topographies” and concretized models. Towards the end of his career Lacan in particular began to search 
for a “matheme of psychoanalysis” that would allow him to bypass what had become concretized in his 
own theory (Lacan, Feminine 162). With his “Boromenean Knot Theory,” Lacan sought to express the 
endlessly recursive interconnection of every signified instance with every other. “Don’t think that by 
cutting through any one nexus of the weave you would set free any part whatsoever of what it is tied to. If 
you cut only one ring, then the six rings in between, thereby freed, will be held in place by the six times 






semiotic and the symbolic (Kristeva), or as personal and narrative identity (Ricoeur), 
such organizational domains articulate and arrange experience according to their own 
distinct internal structure. By defining organizational domains of this sort, these theorists 
have established models of subjectivity that begin to account for the conflict that can be 
engendered in cognition, subjectivity, and communication. 
In this study, I will draw on the work of theorists such as those mentioned above 
in order to define functional domains, since such domains allow an analysis of the 
distinct ways in which experience is shaped and structured. At the same time, my focus 
will be on the dynamic current of experience that passes through and is shaped by these 
domains. It is essential to remember that these kinds of domains are conventions that are 
defined as a convenience to theoretical discourse. In this study, I will use functional 
domains to specify subordinated regions within a single dynamic process in order to 
facilitate an understanding of the overall function. In this same way, one might describe a 
section in a riverbed and its influence on the river’s current without claiming that any 
section retains its function or “meaning” independent of the current it helps to channel. In 
any theoretical model of a dynamic system, divisions are imposed upon what is truly a 
unified entity by specifying perceptible characteristics – what may also be termed 
observables. These observables dictate the manner in which the contiguous whole is to be 
divided by focusing on what can be measured (“observed”) parametrically and what is 
available to the concretizing terms of cognition and language. 
Fields such as physics and mathematics have long been called upon to negotiate 






adequately grasped if the focus is placed on discrete data (i.e., the location of a single 
positive charge within an electrical current or a single numeric value generated within a 
differential equation). Researchers in these fields have developed specific conventions 
that utilize variable values (observables) to plot the course or behavior of the dynamic in 
question, while at the same time safeguarding the systems they describe against 
concretization by human cognition and language. Since the model of signification being 
pursued here poses the same challenges as dynamic systems in other fields, I will use this 
section to introduce the few terms and concepts from those fields that will prove useful to 
later discussion of specific functional domains.5 
All dynamic systems are founded on a differential. A differential is created when 
that system’s elements are arranged such that differing forces are exerted on its medium. 
If we take fluid dynamics as a model, a differential is established when the fluid 
contained in that system is held at differing degrees of pressure (e.g., a greater 
gravitational force is exerted on fluid held at a greater height). That differential generates 
an impetus, which drives fluid held at a higher pressure in one region of the system 
                                                 
5 A terminology exists for the kinds of organizational distinctions that characterize signification and 
subjectivity. Most notably, Jacques Lacan (real/imaginary/symbolic), Julia Kristeva (semiotic/symbolic), 
and Paul Ricoeur (reflective subject/narrative subject) have attempted, through their work, to define a 
vocabulary that expresses the extreme mutability of meaning and the arbitrary origin of its connections to 
an external reality. See (Lacan, Écrits 125), (Kristeva, Revolution 22-23). Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 2. This vocabulary has 
found a wider application among a variety of related disciplines (linguistics, semiotics, literary studies, 
sociology, and psychology, to name a notable few), and therefore has acquired a degree of currency among 
scholars, however overtime, it has itself acquired a concretized and concretizing quality; in part due to a 
lack of tolerance for perceived ambiguity on the part of the reader, and in part, due to the convoluted, often 
inscrutable presentation of those terms, which are frequently difficult for even a motivated reader to grasp. 
Ultimately, this terminology has become so imbued with associations of comparison and stasis, (Lacan 
himself privileged first one, then the other order) that its use becomes more of a hindrance than a help. 
Thus, while I acknowledge a profound debt to these theorists, I will nonetheless lay aside that more 






towards regions held at a lower pressure. The relative degree of the differential, coupled 
with the natural tendency of all dynamic systems to seek homeostatic balance (entropy), 
establishes that system’s capacity for dynamic movement. A greater differential, in other 
words, will, up to a point, generate a greater dynamic movement as it seeks to level the 
“conflict” of its parts. By the same token, the leveling of the differential and the 
“resolution” of systemic conflict (i.e., through the even distribution of systemic pressure, 
etc.) must spell the end of that dynamic, since impetus is lost and current ceases in the 
absence of a differential. Accordingly, the resolution of all “conflict” is not the desired 
outcome for a system in which the dynamic itself is the goal. 
Up to a certain point, the greater the differential, the greater its capacity to 
generate an impetus and drive a current, however if that impetus becomes too powerful, it 
may exceed the system’s capacity to accommodate it. A river into which there is a large 
influx of water, for instance, may be unable to channel that larger volume. There is a set 
of possible dynamic outcomes that may result, depending upon the force of the impetus, 
the degree of resistance (counterforce) that opposes it, and the innate structural 
vulnerabilities of the system. If a system’s structure cannot accommodate an impetus, 
such impetus may have to subtly alter the system in order to reduce or eliminate 
resistance – much in the same way that a powerful current of water may erode and 
eventually widen the channel through which it flows in order to better accommodate its 
force and volume. Similarly, if an impetus is very powerful, it may overflow to establish 






force by other means, a powerful impetus may simply overwhelm the system, thereby 
destroying its structural integrity. 
Not all impetus that fails to be accommodated by the system automatically elicits 
a radical change to that system. The challenge to the system’s integrity may occur 
gradually, following a long series of lesser challenges or a slow buildup of impetus. 
Unless it is otherwise dissipated, a weaker impetus that cannot be accommodated but that 
also lacks the force to abruptly alter, destroy or bypass what impedes it will be retained at 
the threshold of the differential as a latent tension. If an impetus so retained receives the 
cumulative support of subsequent impetus, it may become a more powerful impetus and 
behave accordingly – by altering, destroying, or bypassing what impedes it. In this way, a 
weaker impetus may kindle slowly to disrupt the system through a gradual or delayed 
process that cannot be correlated with a sudden shock to the system. 
As we examine the complex interaction of sensory experience, cognition, and 
communication within this paradigm of a dynamic system, these same possible outcomes 
may arise for distinct aspects of experience at any point in the system where a differential 
is established. As I will show, signification is a complex and asynchronous system 
comprised of multiple differentials that are established at the threshold between specific 
organizational domains (based on determined observables). Given the complexity of such 
a system and the number of variables involved, it should not be surprising that disruption 
to that system should evoke multiple and seemingly unrelated “symptoms” in different 
persons in response to the same event, or that there should be enormous 






symptoms. If we shift our focus away from the specifics of the symptoms and towards 
both the behavior of the overall current and the locus in the system where it is impeded, 
we can begin to account for the range of manifestations observed in traumatic crisis in an 
organized manner. More than that, a single theoretical approach can be established for 
what have hitherto been treated as distinct traumatic phenomena, doing away with the 
necessity for discretely defined subgenres of traumatic phenomena and narrative. 
Signification, as I will show, resembles all dynamic systems in that it is driven by 
a state of constant tension created by its differentials, which is to say, it is driven by 
conflict. What makes signification unique among dynamic systems, however, is that it 
constitutes the current of our own subjectivity, cognition, and apprehension of meaning. 
As such, that current tends to be interpreted as orthodoxy by the cognition evoked by that 
current rather than as the arbitrary system it truly represents. The cognitive tendency to 
generate a perception of stasis helps to guard against the dissolution of “meaning” and the 
breakdown of communication that might occur if the individual remained constantly 
aware both of dynamic changes in the system and of the disparate and often conflicting 
objectives that the semiotic system must fulfill. The semiotic current is characterized then 
both by an underlying and essential conflict (differential) that ensures its ongoing 
progression, and by a counterfeit perception of stasis. 
The interplay of impetus and resistance across one or more differentials is 
essential to maintaining the semiotic current, and as long as experience can be 
accommodated in each subsequent organizational domain or can bring about the 






perception that meaning and identity are more or less stable will remain largely intact. At 
the same time, however, there is an inevitable possibility that this interplay of impetus 
and resistance could attenuate the accommodation of experience, thereby obstructing to 
some degree the semiotic current. An obstruction of the semiotic current can disrupt the 
perception that meaning is static and stable (i.e., correlate with an accessible external 
reality) by interjecting one or more competing cognitive apprehensions of “reality.” This 
disruption may occur in a number of ways, each characteristic of the behavior of a current 
that has been obstructed. It may be retained at the threshold of a differential, creating a 
gap between what has been experienced and what can be expressed in the terms of 
language. It may, by exerting consistent pressure on the structure of subsequent domains, 
bring about their reanalysis so that new terms and categories emerge with which to 
describe an experience. Finally, failing that, it may form an alternate, diverted, semiotic 
current; the basis for what has been described as the doubling of the trauma victim’s 
identity, and which is evidenced by the existence of competing narrative realities.  
We saw a disruption of this last sort in the film The Others, in which conflicting 
interpretations of the narrative make it impossible for the viewer to assign an 
unambiguous meaning to events in the narrative (see 2.0.1). Rather, the viewer is forced 
to maintain simultaneous and competing narrative versions, which nonetheless arose 
from the same narrative experience both concurrently (i.e., Grace and Ann’s conflicting 
perceptions of reality presented to the viewer without one being privileged as correct), or 
consecutively (i.e., the serial reanalysis of “reality” by the viewer). By observing both the 






disruptions to which it is prone in traumatic crisis, it becomes possible to specify a 
number of specific points of vulnerability where a differential exists at the thresholds 
between the various functional domains within the system.6 
Functional domains are not delimited by hard boundaries, nor do they represent 
discrete, noncontiguous entities but instead, flow one into the other. The divisions that 
must be imposed in order to distinguish between them are determined by the manner in 
which each domain shapes and organizes the current of experience that passes through 
them – in other words, the observable characteristics of that current. These domains do 
not hold experience in a specific static form, nor do they manifest a unique variant of an 
objective reality in concatenation with variants held in preceding and subsequent 
domains. Rather, as I have suggested, the succession of domains forms a circuitous 
channel that both guides and shapes the current of signification, while at the same time 
being altered and shaped by that current.  
What is essential is the way in which this current of experience behaves in 
relation to any given domain, and the capacity of the subsequent domain to continue its 
transmission. Our focus, then, will be on the current of experience itself, the way in 
which that current is shaped and constrained by the domains through which it passes (i.e., 
the terms and the logical relations that govern these), and the ways in which the domain 
itself may be altered by that current. Thus, while we may examine the terms and 
governing logic of each specific domain, the kind of subjectivity that each engenders, and 
                                                 
6 Since functional domains are determined by convention alone, based on the characteristics of the system 







the objective that each domain fulfills (all are kinds of differentials), the ultimate purpose 
of this examination will be to describe the behavior of the current as a whole. 
The influx on new experience provides the initial impetus that drives 
signification. As experience is passed through a succession of domains, each domain 
introduces new organizational or structural elements, while at the same time eliminating 
elements that had previously been available. The structural and organizational differences 
between each functional domain set up a degree of tension that is constantly maintained 
throughout the flow of signification (i.e., a differential). In terms of a domain’s intrinsic 
structure, that tension may appear to represent a conflict or, in the case of traumatic crisis, 
may even be experienced as such. If we take an extrinsic view, however, we will see that 
this same tension that is experienced as conflict is actually a part of the requisite 
differential that drives the process of signification by compelling the ongoing reanalysis 
of each domain’s structure. 
The objective of this ongoing reanalysis is to better accommodate the influx of 
new experience while at the same time minimizing the degree of tension that is to be 
maintained. Signification, in other words, like any dynamic process, moves towards its 
own entopic demise by seeking equilibrium – in this case, an equilibrium in which 
experience matches the cognitive apprehension of that experience (meaning), cognitive 
apprehension matches communicative expression, and communicative expression 
matches the receptive comprehension of other individuals as though each referenced the 
same objective reality. Concurrently, the influx of new experience coupled with intrinsic 






ensure that this equilibrium is never reached. This assurance that there will always be 
conflict within both meaning and identity is what guarantees that subjectivity will 
continue to exist, since subjectivity, as I posit here, is in the movement of the semiotic 
current, not in the stasis of its expression in the functional domains. 
The specific behavior of the semiotic current is determined by the interplay of 
force and counterforce (impetus and resistance) across differentials established between 
various domains. These differentials themselves are derived from the organization and 
function of each domain, which differ in terms of the kind of logical terms it utilizes, the 
kind of subjectivity and objectifications (if any) it evokes, the way in which that domain 
is “known,” and the agency (individual or collective) that generates its terms and 
governing relations. I will explain each of these defining characteristics in the sections 
that follow, and I will outline the precise function and organization of each of five 
domains: the Epistemic domain, the Ethical domain, the Idiolectic domain, the Narrative 
domain, and the Communicative domain. By understanding role that each of these 
domains plays in signification, we can begin to see how trauma, while experienced as a 
crisis or breakdown, is nonetheless a mark and guarantor of the system’s successful 
functioning. 
 
2.3 The Epistemic domain 
In my discussion the film The Others, I suggested that Grace’s repression of 
traumatic events is not monolithic, but rather, it is characterized by a sequence of barriers 






her perceptions of “reality.” Sensory experience constitutes our initial contact with the 
world, and hence, with traumatic phenomena or experience. Accordingly, the first barrier 
to awareness that Grace must challenge is sensory perception. In her assiduous exclusion 
of death in any form, Grace initially fails to see the “ghosts” in her home, while at the 
same time, she prohibits any discussion of them. In so doing, Grace effectively bans or is 
protected from any sensory experience, whether visual or auditory, that could initiate an 
awareness that these “ghosts’” exist. She only begins to confront their presence in her 
home and permit discussion of that presence after she has seen Ann’s drawings of the 
ghostly entities, accompanied by a figure representing the number of times each has 
appeared to her. 
Grace’s defensive behavior, in particular of prohibiting discussion of the ghosts, 
would be called avoidance in clinical terms. Avoidance constitutes a defensive 
mechanism used to deal with traumatic crisis, by which the traumatized individual seeks 
to eliminate or avoid sensory input that can trigger unwanted (e.g., traumatic) recollection 
or awareness (see 1.0.2). At the same time, one of the key characteristics of traumatic 
crisis is the intrusion of somatosensory experience or even the complete physical 
reenactment of traumatic experience without any accompanying symbolized 
interpretation. (See Janet’s explanation of traumatic versus narrative memory, section 
1.0). This brings us to the first of the organizational domains that I will define here; the 
Epistemic domain.7 
                                                 
7 The names of these five organizational domains are derived from the function and/or organization of the 
domain in question. My usage of these terms is specific to the model of cognitive functioning and 
subjectivity that I am developing here. The term ‘epistemic’ refers to the way in which the domain is 






The Epistemic domain is a somatosensory domain, meaning that its input is 
comprised of neural impulses generated in the afferent nerves and receptors of the body. 
Put more simply, the contents of the Epistemic are derived from what we see, hear, taste, 
smell and feel with our bodies or within our bodies. Although we popularly consider 
these impulses to represent an experience of “objects” belonging to an external reality 
(see 1.1.1), this is not truly the case. Even at a neurobiological level, the Kantian 
assertion that we cannot attain the thing-in-itself holds true, since every quality of the 
“object” as we perceive it is created and structured by our own network of receptors, 
neural pathways, and regions of the brain associated with sensory processing (Lakoff & 
Johnson, Philosophy 25). 8 Sensory and somatic impulses constitute nothing more than an 
individual’s experience of her own body, and therefore they represent only a nascent 
experience of subjectivity or the subject-in-itself. 
                                                                                                                                                 
reflective distance from the consciousness that apprehends it. This usage if the term epistemic should not be 
confused with Foucault’s notion of the episteme. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault writes: “By 
episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices 
that give rise to the epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems […]. The episteme 
is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most 
varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations 
that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of 
discursive regularities.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972) 191. This definition is much closer to what Thomas Kuhn defined as the paradigm. See (Kuhn 38-
39). 
8 Something does exist beyond this perceptive network, however our perception is restricted to our own 
sensory excitations, and our cognitive interpretation of those senses. Any other “apprehension” of what is 
external to us can exist at the level of theory alone, which since such a theoretical construct would be 
metaphysical and thus, a product of cognition, with no greater access to an external “reality.” The 
unavailability of an external, objective “reality” does not justify a regression into radical scepticism, 
however, since, as this chapter will show, the subject, its apprehension of “reality,” and the basis upon 
which shared meaning is founded is not dependant upon on an experience of “things-in-themselves.” 
Instead, what will prove essential is the fact that the subject and “meaning” are formed by a system that 
functions as though there were an accessible objective reality while it simultaneously masks differences 






Although the objects that exist beyond an individual’s own neural impulses 
remain essentially unknown to her, this does not prevent the use of sensory perceptions as 
a surrogate for those unavailable “objects.” Somatosensory impulses and the sensory 
perceptions they generate are available to stand in for the thing-in-itself since those 
impulses cannot be reduced to anything beyond themselves in unmediated human 
experience. The biological exigencies of the human body enhance the perception of a 
stable external “reality” by providing us with what we presume is a similar basis for each 
individual’s apprehension of reality. Nevertheless, while the fact that we each share more 
or less the same gross anatomical physiognomy and biological function enables us to 
conflate perception with an external reality, the capacities and limitations of our 
biologically based perceptions contribute to the structure of experience in the Epistemic, 
but do not actually define it. This first organizational domain is shaped by the influx of 
somatosensory impulses, and is shaped in a way that is unique to the experiences of the 
individual. Even at this most basic level, each individual’s semiotic current is 
characterized by the singularity of her own personal experiences, the environment in 
which she finds herself, and the experience to which she is exposed. 
The Epistemic is a metaphysically conceived domain that circumscribes 
experience generated by somatosensory impulses. I distinguish this Epistemic experience 
from the impulses themselves, which are limited to transient neural excitations. The 
contents of the Epistemic domain, in contrast to somatosensory impulses, are cognitively 
structured, although they precede the scope of symbolized meaning and thus are not 






“meaning”). Instead, they encompass some of what Lakoff and Johnston identify as 
cognitive processes that precede rational cognition (Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy 10-
12). This is not to say that the pre-symbolic contents of the Epistemic do not form an 
integral part of meaning, however they also remain beyond the structures and operations 
of rational cognition. Rational cognition, as we will see, arises in domains further along 
in the circuitous route that guides the current of signification, and requires discretely 
posited symbolized terms that are held at a reflective distance from the subjectivity that 
examines them. 
The Epistemic exerts an indirect influence on symbolic meaning and rational 
cognition by integrating sensory impulses into a spatial awareness of the body and by 
extension, a spatial awareness of the environment surrounding that body (Lakoff & 
Johnson, Philosophy 30-36). The Epistemic is organized according to a spatial logic, 
which holds all instances of sensory experience within a structural unity and in a spatial 
relationship with one another. Our awareness of the body at the level of the Epistemic is 
an awareness of a single body in which various sites of sensory perception contribute to 
experience as a whole. Thetically posited “objects” do not yet exist within the spatial 
integration of that domain, and therefore sensory perception is not processed as a 
subject’s perceptions of the qualities belonging to external objects. At the level of the 






perceptions they evoke are mapped to the specific site in the (unified) body where the 
perception is perceived to have originated.9 
Spatial awareness in the Epistemic specifies where sensory experience is 
perceived to have arisen in the body. It is essential to note, however, that the spatial logic 
that orders this awareness cannot be correlated with later symbolized spatial relations. 
Spatial relations as they are later structured in symbolized and rational domains use a 
propositional logic to define something as here (not there). Spatial logic in the Epistemic, 
on the other hand, is neither comparative, nor does it yield a truth-value; it simply orients 
the contents of the Epistemic within the organic unity of the body. The Epistemic domain 
lacks the propositional terms of predicate logic, and therefore it also lacks those logical 
relationships that are dependant upon such terms, including temporality, causality, 
comparison, and serial ordering. These modes of ordering only become available once 
experience has been fragmented into discrete, noncontiguous terms. As a result, although 
the Epistemic is shaped by the influx of new experience, which may add to or alter the 
placement of instances within its spatial organization, it also lacks the evaluative 
operators needed to judge an experience to be incommensurate and to eliminate it.10 The 
                                                 
9 The “objects” themselves do not yet exist at this level of subjectivity, although the unity of the body will 
later contribute to the formation of what is external to the subject (i.e., what does not conform to the 
homologous unity of the “body”). Likewise, that unity will found the resistance to notions of intrinsically 
generated sensation. Experiences of this sort, such as psychosomatic sensations or disruptions (hysteria) 
will therefore be invalidated due to the failure of the other senses to corroborate the authenticity of that 
sensation. 
10  The question as to whether memory at this pre-narrative level constitutes an indissoluble account of all 
experience, or whether it, too, is subject to “memory loss” is not a primary concern here. What is critical to 
an understanding of “traumatic memory” is the fact this “corporeal” memory is structured differently than 
symbolized, narrative memory. The fact that the Epistemic is not vulnerable to the same conflicts and 
evaluative terms engendered by propositional logic means that it is not compelled to eliminate or restrict 
those conflicts, and this permits the Epistemic domain to retain aspects of experience that later 






Epistemic, in other words, is cumulative and integrative, retaining experience that may 
fail to find accommodation in later domains that are governed by predicate terms. Being 
thus cumulative, experience may continue to challenge the contents and structure of 
subsequent domains, since experience that is retained in the Epistemic constitutes a latent 
impetus in the semiotic current, the force of which has not been dissipated.11 
Evidence for the retention of experience in a somatosensory domain of 
organization within an integrated spatial logic is offered by traumatic crisis itself; in what 
Janet termed traumatic memory. As outlined in the previous chapter, traumatic memory 
serves as a repository for experience which “may not easily fit into existing cognitive 
schemes and either may be remembered with particular vividness or may totally resist 
integration” if they are frightening or novel (van der Kolk, Intrusive 160). Such 
memories, which emerge either dissociated from the cognitive processes of narrative 
memory or in behavioral reenactments, are characterized by two things. On the one hand, 
traumatic memory exists side by side with symptoms of anamnesis; an inability to tell the 
story of the traumatic experience, indicating that that experience as yet has failed to be 
processed using symbolic terms and logical relations governed by predicate operators 
(van der Kolk, Intrusive 162). At the same time, such memory is retained in somatic 
form, triggered by physical circumstances or sensory input (van der Kolk, Intrusive 163). 
The existence of traumatic memory makes evident the fact that somatic experience must 
be stored independently of volitional mechanisms of remembering, and in a form that is 
unavailable to the logical terms of rational evaluation. 
                                                 
11 This accords with Kristeva’s semiotic, but also with Janet’s notion of traumatic memory, which precedes 






As previously stated, functional domains such as the Epistemic designate 
contiguous segments of an uninterrupted channel through which experience passes as a 
current. These domains, which shape and structure that experience, can be delineated 
within that contiguous channel on the basis of observable characteristics. In the case of 
the Epistemic, these characteristics include the domain’s lack of “objects” or “subject” 
(i.e., objectified, symbolized experience), the unity of its subjectivity (the Epistemic can 
be said to possess only subjectivity) and its organization using an integrated spatial logic. 
I draw here on a distinction between the subject and subjectivity, and this distinction will 
play an important role in the model being developed here. In using the term subjectivity, I 
mean to specify that current of experience responsible for the mechanizations of 
cognition, beginning here with the integration of experience with in the spatial logic of 
bodily awareness, but including all subsequent domains as well. Subjectivity, in other 
words, comprises the intelligence that orders cognition and that apprehends it. I will use 
the term subject, by contrast, to designate that symbolized entity that represents the 
individual, but which, as we will see, is more accurately termed an objectification of 
subjectivity or subjective identity. I will return to this notion and will explain it more 
thoroughly below. 
The limitations of somatosensory experience determine what is passed to the 
Epistemic domain, and the limitations of somatosensory processing govern and delimit 
the ways in which that experience is ordered and retained. As experience is structured 
within the Epistemic, it must then be passed to the subsequent domains, and the capacity 






behavior. Recalling the behavior of an impetus in any dynamic system, we can expect a 
short set of possible outcomes for any given experiential impetus. It may be readily 
accommodated, being passed from domain to domain without substantial impedance such 
that no disruption to the semiotic current occurs. Failing to find accommodation or 
finding only incomplete accommodation, however, that impetus may bypass, alter, or 
destroy what impedes it, or (if it is a weak impulse) it may remain latent in the Epistemic 
domain possibly to kindle later disruption. (I will return to these specific outcomes vis-à-
vis the Epistemic in later sections of this chapter.) 
Without immediately detailing the characteristics of the domain that follows, it is 
already possible to pinpoint certain vulnerabilities endemic to the Epistemic domain. As 
long as the impetus from the Epistemic can be readily accommodated by existing 
structures in subsequent domains, experience will flow unimpeded from sensory 
perception to the Epistemic’s spatial mapping of the body. Even if an experiential 
impetus should fail to find immediate accommodation however, the tension it generates 
will not necessarily lead to a sustained cognitive dissonance or disruption if it is able to 
impel a satisfactory reanalysis of structures in the subsequent domain so that the impulse 
can be accommodated. Cognitive dissonance that results in a positive reanalysis is 
manifested as the interjection of spatial awareness (concrete or abstract); i.e., pattern 
recognition, the sudden realization of connections, etc. Accompanying that successful 
reanalysis and resulting new awareness is a release that of tension that was created by the 






of tension, as first Freud, then Lacan described it, is experienced by the individual as a 
discharge of “affective” tension – the “Aha-Erlebnis” or “Aha-Experience. 
In other instances, an impetus may be obstructed and simultaneously fail to bring 
about the satisfactory reanalysis of structure in the subsequent domain. If an impetus is 
not satisfactorily accommodated either by existing logical structures (whether of an 
integrated, spatial logic, predicate logic, etc.) or through the reanalysis of those 
structures, then the force of that impetus will either remain at the threshold of that 
differential as persistent, latent tension, or may seek to bypass systemic resistance by 
forming an alternate channel. Here at the threshold passing from the Epistemic into the 
domain that follows, impetus that is thus held or diverted gives rise to somatic symptoms 
or phenomena. Somatic symptoms that are commonly associated with traumatic crisis 
include: minor somatic disturbances (headache, tension, unexplained pains, 
gastrointestinal disturbance); hysterical symptoms (conversion reaction, paralysis, etc.); 
psycho-neural phenomena (seizures brought on by the “kindling” of neural impulses); 
fugue states (autonomic gestures, traumatic reenactment); and the complex symptoms of 
Somatization Disorder – the first of what Herman identifies as three graduated 
dissociative disorders (Herman, Trauma 122-126). These symptoms can be logically 
grouped together as arising in the Epistemic since they share a single, critical feature: 
they are expressed somatically (rather than symbolically) within the unity of the body, 
and without reference to a causative entity – i.e., an object. 
Thus far, I have specified three elements that characterized the Epistemic – the 






logic. These three observable characteristics will form a basis for the kinds of 
differentials that exist between organizational domains, but are not the only kinds. The 
way in which the contents of each domain are “known” and the kind of subjectivity the 
domain evokes also play a critical role in the dynamic process of signification. Since 
subjectivity in the Epistemic arises in a flow of experience that has yet to be fragmented 
into the symbolized terms of “meaning,” and since that experience originates not with an 
experience of any thing-in-itself, but with the individual’s own sensory experience, 
subjectivity in the Epistemic domain is best understood as a unified experience of the 
subject-in-itself. The Epistemic domain, in other words, possesses subjectivity and only 
subjectivity, since it precedes the fragmentation that gives rise to objectifications. That 
subjectivity, as the name suggests, possesses an epistemic knowledge of that domain. It 
is, in other words, a pre-thetic and doxic subjectivity, rather than protodoxic (preceding 
the cogito). 
In utilizing the term ‘epistemic,’ I am drawing on a philosophical distinction 
between epistemic awareness and epistemological awareness.12 Epistemic awareness is 
awareness that is itself structured in a particular cohesive order (in this instance, an 
integrated spatial logic), and apprehended by a cognitive apparatus that is defined within 
that structure. Epistemic awareness is non-reflective, since the agent that knows cannot 
                                                 
12 Standard usage of the terms ‘epistemic’ and ‘epistemological’ differ from the manner in which I use 
them here. In standard usage, the term epistemic is an adjective that simply means something that pertains 
to knowing or knowledge. The term, ‘epistemological,’ is defined as something that pertains to the study of 
knowledge. I use these terms in reference to the manner in which something is known, whereby epistemic 
refers to something that is known without an awareness of its innate structure (i.e., non-reflective 
awareness), and epistemological refers to something that is known including its innate structure (i.e., 







separate itself from that knowledge itself in order to examine both the terms of that 
knowledge, and the logical relations that structure it. The capacity to comprehend both 
what is known and the way in which it is organized demands a subjectivity that is thetic 
(post-Oedipal) and doxic, since such reflective awareness presupposes a separation of the 
“knower” from what is known. Reflective awareness is more properly termed an 
epistemological awareness – that is, a knowledge of both the terms and the logical 
relations that govern them. This epistemological awareness requires that the subject who 
“knows” be defined and structured in a domain that is separate and distinct from that 
which is known in order that the subject may reflect on it. Specific aspects of that 
reflection, in other words, would be epistemic (i.e., intrinsic to the operation of reflection) 
while other aspects would be epistemological (extrinsic, as the object of reflection). This 
requirement of a subjectivity separate from and reflecting upon what is known is fulfilled 
in later domains and is the foundation of cognitive awareness and rational thought. 
This distinction between epistemic and epistemological awareness will form a 
critical differential in the semiotic system. Since subjectivity structured in the Epistemic 
domain does not hold the contents of the domain in which it arises at a reflective 
distance, it cannot be said to possess an epistemological awareness of its own domain. Its 
epistemic knowledge of experience is expressed within the terms of its own spatial logic, 
while the cognitive processes that structure and restructure it remain beneath that 
threshold of rational (i.e., reflective) awareness. As a result, when an impetus is blocked 






perceived or interpreted as irrational in the sense that this overflow precedes rational 
(i.e., reflective) cognitionand the ability to reflect rationally on the crisis of that overflow. 
As stated, disruption in the Epistemic emerges as somatic disruption that is 
outside the propositional logic that governs reflective awareness and cognition. The fact 
that the Epistemic’s internal, spatial logic is unavailable to rational cognition helps to 
strengthen its influence on symbolic “meaning,” which, as we will see, must be balanced 
between the specific perceptions and experience of the individual, and the generalized 
and collective perceptions of society. The inertia of collectively defined meaning is 
countered, in other words, by the irreducible nature of somatosensory experience held in 
the Epistemic, and the authority of each must be balanced in the formation of symbolized 
meaning. The responsibility for maintaining that difficult balance and for establishing the 
thetic structure of symbolic meaning will fall to the Ethical domain, which follows as the 
next domain in the circuitous channel of signification. 
 
Differential Epistemic domain 
Logical Terms Integrated, spatial logic (mapping) 
Subjectivity Subject-in-itself 
Objectifications None 
Manner of “awareness” Epistemic awareness 
Table 1: Characteristics of differentials manifested in Epistemic domain (partial list) 
 
2.4 The Ethical domain and Epistemic Crisis 
The subjectivity that is evoked in the Epistemic domain fulfills the objectives both 






of generating spatial awareness. From this organic unity, the experiential impetus shaped 
within the Epistemic domain is passed into what I here define as the Ethical domain.13 In 
the Ethical domain, sensory experience is divided into the sensations perceived to be 
endemic to the body (i.e., the one who experiences), and externally posited characteristics 
of the “object” (what is experienced). The experience of both the “subject” and the 
“object” must be generated from the same set of sensory impulses, since our initial 
experience of the world around us is comprised of sensory impulses of some kind. It is 
here in the Ethical domain that subjective experience is first divided into the precursors of 
subject and its objects. 
The internal logic of the Ethical domain achieves this requisite splitting of sensory 
perception by distinguishing what is inside self, and what is outside self. Unlike the 
spatial logic of the Epistemic, this dualistic relationship expresses a rudimentary 
propositional logic and can be evaluated in terms of a truth-value: inside ≠ outside, or 
Self ≠ Other. What is inside, in other words, cannot be outside, and what is outside 
cannot possibly belong to the inside of Self. Subjectivity structured in the Ethical domain 
possesses an epistemic awareness of the domain in which it exists (i.e., the logical 
distinction of inside/outside) since like subjectivity structured in the Epistemic, 
subjectivity structured in the Ethical is evoked within the logical structure of its own 
                                                 
13 Again, the term Ethical domain is intended to evoke the special functioning of this particular 
organizational domain. I have chosen to use the term ‘ethical,’ since, as I will explain, the basis of ethical 
outrage (the experience of ethical violation) originates with overflow in this domain. This understanding of 
‘ethics’ differs markedly from notions of prescriptive ethics, and perhaps accords most closely with the 
notion of ethical relativism (i.e., ethical norms are the product of our cultural and social milieu) and of 
secular ethical notions as developed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 







domain. This epistemic awareness is the foundation of symbolic meaning and logic, and 
is fundamental to the development of cognitive reason, since it is this subjectivity in the 
Ethical domain that will reflect, with an epistemological awareness, upon the fully 
symbolized domain that follows the Ethical domain. In the domain in which it resides, 
however, that subjectivity is restricted to an epistemic, non-reflective awareness and 
therefore cannot rationally evaluate its own inside/outside dialectic in order to assess its 
relative validity. 
The distinction of inside from outside is the only propositional argument available 
within the Ethical domain itself and this initial distinction (a protean logic) is the 
prerequisite of symbolic logic. As other terms of prepositional logic become available in 
subsequent domains, the inside/outside opposition will be replaced by an ordering 
principle of either/or. This can only occur, however, once a reflective distance has been 
established from which subjectivity may regard both “subject” and its “objects” as like 
ontological entities that can legitimately be compared with one another. Only in this way 
can awareness of oneself arise as a part of the field of meaning and symbolized entities. 
Both subject and its objects, in other words, must be objectified and thereby declared 
outside of the subject-in-itself (i.e., its epistemic awareness of its own structure) in order 
for the full range of logical relations to become available for analysis with the positing of 
a full symbolic domain of organization. Experience that has been first ordered within a 






inside/outside, will subsequently be passed to a domain, where that experience will be 
articulated in fully symbolic terms that are governed by predicate logic.14 
The Ethical domain differs from the Epistemic in its governing logic (a protean 
predicate logic, as opposed to an integrated spatial logic) and in the fact that the Ethical 
has generated an Other opposed to Self, out of which distinction the subject’s “objects” 
will emerge. The Ethical is like the Epistemic, however, in that both possess a “true” 
subjectivity – that is, a subject that experiences itself rather than reflects upon itself as a 
symbolized entity. Like the Epistemic as well, when experiential impetus in the Ethical 
fails to find accommodation in a subsequent domain, the resulting overflow is perceived 
as irrational, although that crisis is manifested differently than the crisis that occurs in the 
Epistemic. In the Epistemic domain, an overflow of the semiotic current that occurs when 
experience cannot be passed to the next domain – the Ethical – manifests itself as somatic 
or psychomotor symptoms. These somatic manifestations of crisis do not appear to relate 
to subjectivity and signification in any way, since they are expressed in the 
somatosensory impulses and integrated spatial logic of that domain. That overflow 
precedes the inside/outside division of the Ethical domain, and therefore it tends to be 
                                                 
14 Subjectivity evoked within the Ethical domain is strictly limited to a non-reflective recognition of what is 
self, derived from the corporeal unity that it references in the Epistemic. By defining what is homologous to 
the body in its rhythms and dispositions, certain experiences in the Epistemic can be construed as consistent 
in their appearance, and hence more central to the body’s own functioning (i.e., autonomic functions such 
as respiration or digestion. Experiences that do not arise as regularly or with such predictability are situated 
further in the periphery of familiar sensation and function. Thus, while the “objects” themselves do not yet 
exist in either the Epistemic or the Ethical domain, spatial unity of the Epistemic helps to determine what 
will be regarded as inside or outside of subjectivity in the Ethical. The close bond between Epistemic and 
Ethical generates considerable resistance against sensations that arise in the body itself, but that are not 
intrinsic to its homologous unity. These kinds of experiences, which include psychosomatic sensations or 
disruptions (hysteria, phantom pains) tend to be invalidated on the basis of their eccentricity to prior 






ascribed to a pathological process within the body – at least until it is determined that 
such corporeal manifestations cannot be traced to a somatic etiology. 
An overflow of the semiotic current in the Ethical domain occurs when 
experience cannot be passed from the Ethical domain to a symbolized domain (Idiolect or 
a Narrative domain). The crises that such overflow generates appear to emerge from the 
most profound depths of meaning and subjectivity – in the distinction between what 
constitutes an individual’s self, and what constitutes the world around her. Crises arising 
in the Ethical domain are irrational not because they are without meaning, but because 
they relate to meaning in a way that cannot be comprehended using cognitive reason. Just 
as in the Epistemic domain, crisis in the Ethical domain is irrational in that it is epistemic, 
and therefore it cannot be examined from a reflective distance in terms of its intrinsic 
logic. Simply put, these crises lack the reflective distance needed for an epistemological 
awareness of them. 
The manner of crises engendered when the semiotic current in any given domain 
is disrupted will be determined by the structure of the domain in which that overflow of 
impetus occurs. Epistemic overflow will be manifested somatically; Ethical overflow will 
be manifested as a profound disruption to the core of identity, while overflow in later 
domains will take other forms specific to the intrinsic structure of the domain in question. 
At the same time, multiple symptomatic disruptions (i.e., disruptions to somatic 
functioning, identity, cognitive reasoning, social interaction, etc.) may occur 
simultaneously since the obstruction of current in any domain has the capacity to disrupt 






the flow of current in each functional domain dependant upon the flow in all others. The 
obstruction of the semiotic current as it attempts to pass from the Ethical into the domain 
that follows may very well lead to disruption in the Epistemic, as well as disruption in 
subsequent domains where experience that is impeded fails to be manifested. 
The impedance and overflow of impetus in the Ethical domain creates an 
epistemic crisis, as does overflow on the Epistemic, however that crisis is expressed and 
debated as a crisis of ethics. This is due to the fact that, while subjectivity in the Ethical 
domain is structured by the epistemic awareness of that domain, it is also the subjectivity 
that “reflects” upon Idiolect – the objectified and symbolized domain that follows the 
Ethical and that largely structures interpersonal communication. Since subjectivity 
structured in the Ethical is not indentured to Idiolect for its own internal structure, it holds 
Idiolect in an epistemological awareness and is able to evaluate both the terms of that 
symbolized knowledge, and the logical relations between those terms. The “rational” 
judgment that subjectivity in the Ethical levels at the terms and relations of Idiolect is 
nonetheless itself structured and driven by the epistemic awareness of its own 
inside/outside dialectic, and thus, in its own intrinsic capacity (or failure) to recognize the 
symbolized contents of idiolect as belonging to self. Thus, underlying rational judgment 
is a distinction that is extrinsic to symbolized meaning, but central to the structure and 
functioning of subjectivity in the Ethical. 
This differs from the Epistemic domain. When experience cannot be parsed to the 
Ethical, the overflow in the Epistemic does not produce a crisis of reason, since the 






predicate logic). That overflow is manifested as somatic disruption, symptoms and 
“pathology” that are not indentured to symbolized reason or identity in any way. In the 
case of the Ethical domain, an overflow of semiotic current generates instability in the 
distinction between Self and Other, thereby threatening the individual’s sense of self with 
dissolution. This epistemic crisis, when coupled with the inability of symbolized meaning 
(held in a subsequent domain) to “rationally” account for that crisis, results in the failure 
to express that crisis in symbolized terms – i.e., in language. 
 
Differential Epistemic domain Ethical domain 
Logical Terms Integrated, spatial logic (mapping) Protean predicate logic: 
inside/outside 
Subjectivity15 Subject-in-itself Divided subjectivity – Self/Other 




Epistemic awareness Epistemic awareness of own 
domain. Reflective, 
epistemological awareness of 
Idiolect 
Agency17 Single agency Single agency 
Table 2: Characteristics of differentials manifested in Epistemic and Ethical domain (partial list) 
 
                                                 
15 As noted in the text, I use the term subjectivity to describe the current of experience, while I reserve the 
term ‘subject’ to refer to the objectified subject (i.e., “subject as object”) that is contained in the symbolized 
terms of Idiolect. 
16 I use the term, ‘objectification,’ rather than ‘object,’ because the “object” actually comprises an aspect of 
subjectivity, unified at first, that is alienated when somatosensory experience (actually an experience of the 
subject-in-itself) is divided into the being who experiences (self), and that which is experienced (other). All 
‘objects’ (i.e., symbolized entities constructed as correlates to real-world and ultimately unattainable 
objects) are constructed from this initial experience of subjectivity, and therefore represent 
“objectifications” of initial subjectivity. 
17 ‘Agency’ refers to the agent who formulates meaning in a given domain. In all domains preceding the 
Communicative domain, there is a single agency; that of the individual cognition. The Communicative 
domain differs in that it’s symbolized “contents (i.e., the sum of social interaction by which “shared 
meaning” is created) is generated by as many agents as there are participants in a discursive community. In 






In the Ethical domain there is a conjunction of both epistemic crisis and ethical 
crisis. This conjunction can also be expressed as the conjunction of epistemic and 
epistemological crises since subjectivity in the ethical possesses both an epistemic 
awareness of the domain in which it is structured, and an epistemological awareness of 
the domain of symbolized meaning upon which it reflects. Rather than two separate 
crises, however, we will find that both the epistemic and the ethical (i.e., epistemological) 
derive from the same overflow of impetus in the Ethical domain, and yet appear to 
emerge as distinct from one another precisely because subjectivity in the Ethical domain 
possesses two distinct means of “knowing.” In other words, that subjectivity possesses an 
epistemic awareness of that crisis and yet, in reflecting on the symbolized field of 
meaning established in the following domain, it reflects upon and expresses that crisis as 
a crisis of ethics. 
Ethical discourse concerning trauma arises as the individual struggles to come to 
terms with the loss of boundary between Self and Other (a violation of meaning and 
identity that cannot be accounted for using terms and logical relations). That discourse, 
which typically centers on that which defines that which is “human” (i.e., the DSM-III 
definition of trauma) attempts to reform the Self/Other distinction by claiming as its point 
of origin an arché beyond the terms of symbolized and rational thought. In truth, the 
epistemic outrage experienced by the overflow of the semiotic current in the Ethical 
domain does originate from an arché beyond reason – non-reflective subjectivity 
structured in the Ethical domain. Ultimately the vehement outrage of ethical crisis derives 






crisis of the Self overwhelmed by what has been perceived to be Other. The question as 
to whether trauma should be interpreted as an epistemic or an ethical crisis, a point of 
critical contention in trauma research, cannot be resolved in favor of one over the other, 
since each represents a separate awareness of the same crisis. 
While subjectivity structured in the Epistemic domain manifests epistemic crisis 
as somatic experience, subjectivity in the Ethical domain manifests epistemic crisis as 
instability in the distinction between what belongs to self and what does not belong to 
self, i.e., Self and Other. This instability results when the critical integrity of the 
inside/outside opposition becomes instable. We can understand this instability by 
considering the position of the Ethical domain between the Epistemic (somatosensory) 
domain and the Idiolectic domain (symbolic terms and relations). As heterogeneous 
experience is passed from the Epistemic into the Ethical, and from the Ethical into 
Idiolect, the Ethical domain must mediate between both the preceding and the subsequent 
domain. (Each domain plays this kind of mediating role between the domains 
immediately preceding and following). The organization of the Epistemic, in particular 
its lack of evaluative logical operators and its resulting inability to eliminate experience, 
means that heterogeneous experience will be retained, and will continue to challenge the 
Ethical domain by demanding accommodation. 
It is not feasible for the Ethical domain simply to alter its innate structure by 
reanalyzing the inside/outside distinction of Self and Other in order to alleviate the 
tension produced by heterogeneous experience held in the Epistemic. The semiotic 






accommodated by the symbolized terms and relations of Idiolect.18 Resistance of the 
Idiolectic domain to heterodoxic experience arises from the fact that, as we will see, 
symbolic meaning is ultimately constrained by the need to communicate with others. 
Symbolized meaning, in other words, is generated both by the individual in response to 
personal experience, and by the discursive community (communities) of which she is a 
part. Meaning is generated by the interaction of the individual with that community. (I 
will examine Idiolect in greater detail in the next section of this chapter). Subjectivity in 
the Ethical domain is caught between the influx of the semiotic current from the 
Epistemic, which cannot be eliminated based on rational evaluation, and by the constraint 
on independent reanalysis of Idiolect by the individual, which is held in check by the 
imperative to maintain shared symbolic meaning. Individual sensory experience, in other 
words, does not have free reign to form our apprehension of reality. As a result of its 
placement between the biological exigencies of sensory perception, and the constraint on 
the formation of new meaning by the social imperative, the inside/outside distinction of 
Self and Other formed in the Ethical domain is particularly vulnerable to irresolvable 
tensions as a result of heterogeneous (i.e., traumatic) experience. 
If the Ethical domain fails to accommodate the semiotic current passed from the 
Epistemic, an overflow will occur in the Epistemic domain. If it accommodates that 
                                                 
18 I define the individual’s apprehension of symbolized meaning as Idiolect. This does not differ 
substantially from Frege’s original use of the term, which he defined as the sense attached to any 
symbolized expression by the individual (Frege 626). Where my concept of idiolect differs from the norm 
is in the fact that I will argue that no meaning exists apart from various, individual idiolects. There is no 
“perfect language” that exists outside of the personal apprehension of meaning, since no cognition extends 
to, and therefore holds the domain of social communication. Meaning that “exists” in the social domain 
exists by compact alone, since it is apprehended only in the social response that our own idiolect is 






current yet fails to pass it to Idiolect, however, then the Ethical domain is itself 
vulnerable to overflow. Vacillation or instability of this inside/outside distinction creates 
a degree of vulnerability that is not duplicated at any other threshold of differential in the 
current of signification. While an overflow of impetus in the Epistemic may produce 
somatic manifestations of experience (i.e., symptoms), the destabilizing effect is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that those manifestations can often be explained as an 
invasion of the body by pathogens, thereby maintaining the integrity of subjective 
identity. In addition, in extreme instances it is even possible to invoke the frailty of the 
human organism itself by refusing to believe one’s own senses. Overflow in the Ethical, 
however, threatens to eradicate the distinction between the "outside world" and the 
"subject," and therefore provokes an ontological crisis. 
Predictably, when an impetus from the Ethical domain is unable to overcome the 
resistance of Idiolect, the overflow of that impetus elicits the so-called "primitive 
defenses," including denial, splitting, etc. These defenses, together with the loss or 
absence of a well-defined ego structure characterize another one of three dissociative 
traumatic disorders identified by Judith Herman – the Borderline Personality Disorder 
(Herman, Trauma 123-129). Accordingly, Herman characterizes the Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) as the second in an escalating scale of dissociation, with 
Somatization Disorder comprising the first. The primary characteristics of the Borderline 
Personality Disorder include a reliance upon the so-called primitive defenses, most 
notably splitting (rigid separation of Self/Other boundary), and a near total absence of 






Disorder, in other words, is a disorder that primarily originates with instability in the 
distinction of Self and Other – the inside/outside dichotomy of the Ethical domain. 
As with all disruption to the semiotic current, the precise manifestation of 
epistemic crisis in the Ethical domain depends upon the behavior of the impulse that is 
impeded. An extremely powerful impetus that fails to find accommodation in the 
system’s established structures may simply destroy those structures. In all but the most 
extreme instances, however, that impetus will not create that level of damage. The 
impedance of a lesser impetus will simply hold that impetus as an "unresolved tension" 
(i.e., it will not be dissipated along the primary or an alternate channel). That 
"subliminal" tension may then be held at the threshold of the subsequent order until either 
protracted wear from that slight pressure, and/or the accumulation of repeated experience 
is successful in bringing about a reanalysis. 
Likewise, if the force of an impetus is insufficient to immediately destroy the 
subsequent domain, and yet is too great to be held for any protracted period of time in the 
domain in which it originates, it may be diverted and establish an alternate channel of 
current that both competes with, and yet preserves the integrity of the primary channel. It 
is this formation of a competing channel that results in the vacillation of ego identity seen 
in patients with a Borderline Personality Disorder. In understanding this range of 
outcomes, it now becomes possible to situate both repression and dissociation within the 
systemic intercourse of force and counterforce. Specifically, repression can be equated 
with a domain’s structurally based resistance (the stability of its "orthodoxy"), and 






alternate, competing channel.19 Systemic resistance of an organizational domain and the 
ensuing diversion of the semiotic current (its repression and subsequent dissociation) 
both occur at the threshold of each functional or organizational differential, and the form 
of the "crisis" is specific to the domain involved. 
 
2.5 Idiolect and the Emergence of Epistemology 
The organizational domain that follows the Ethical is the domain of Idiolect. 
Structurally, Idiolect differs from either the Epistemic or the Ethical domain in a number 
of critical ways. Experience that had been held in a relation of inside/outside (or as 
Self/Other) in the Ethical domain comes to be expressed in terms of an either/or 
relationship in Idiolect. Experience is articulated here using discrete and noncontiguous 
symbolized elements that are held in a comparative relationship to every other element in 
the domain’s symbolic system. Idiolect is, in other words, a fully symbolic order and 
accordingly, the relations between the terms expressed there are governed by a fully 
propositional logic. The terms expressed in Idiolect cannot be merged with one another 
and still retain their identity, nor can they be separated from one another and retain the 
meaning that they derived from their relationship with those other elements. They are 
fixed in their metonymic limitations and their metaphoric relationships with one another. 
                                                 
19 Van der Kolk suggests that the compatibility of dissociation and repression may lie in their belonging to 
separate models of the mind. “Repression reflects a vertically layered model of mind: what is repressed is 
pushed downward into the unconscious. […] Dissociation reflects a horizontally layered model of mind: 
when a subject does not remember a trauma, its ‘memory’ is contained in an alternate stream of 
consciousness, which may be subconscious or dominate consciousness, e.g., during traumatic 
reenactments” (van der Kolk, Intrusive 168). In fact, repression and dissociation describe two forces at 
work in a single model of mind. Repression refers to the arrest of the semiotic current, as impetus, by the 
impedance of the subsequent domain. Dissociation, on the other hand, refers to the lateral formation of a 






Idiolect comprises the individual’s apprehension of symbolized meaning and 
identity as it reflects what is assumed to be a valid external “reality” and world of objects. 
Experience that is passed to Idiolect is expressed in objectified form, which is to say that 
all experience comes to be expressed as some type of object. This includes the subject as 
well as those entities in the external world that we habitually recognize as objects. Here, 
we can begin to distinguish between subjectivity and the subject. Subjectivity, as I have 
stated, is best understood as the semiotic current itself, including all somatosensory 
experience, both what is recognized as Self and what is disavowed as Other, and in 
Idiolect, all objectifications (the subject and its objects). This might seem 
counterintuitive at first, however it must be remembered that both Self and Other, as well 
as all of the objectifications in Idiolect, are derived from the unified subject-in-itself 
instantiated by somatosensory experience. 
In contrast to subjectivity, the Idiolectic subject represents an objectified category 
that includes those symbolized terms and relations perceived to correlate with Self in the 
Ethical domain. The Idiolectic subject is, in other words, an object that represents Self 
and that heads the set of objectifications and categories perceived to represent personal 
identity (i.e., one’s own personal traits and qualities). That subject, essentially the 
subject-as-object, must be established as a like ontological entity with all other 
objectified entities in Idiolect in order for both the subject and its objects to be articulated 
within the comparative terms of the domain’s propositional logic. At the same time, that 
symbolized subject references pre-symbolic Self, since under optimal circumstances, 






subject. Ricoeur addressed this distinction of subject and self with the terms personal 
identity, and narrative identity whereby narrative identity correlates with the grammatical 
‘I’ that is underpinned by a self that transcends objectified grammatical categories 
(Ricoeur, Oneself 2). 
Subjectivity that is expressed in the Ethical domain reflects upon the 
objectifications of Idiolect – that is, upon the subject and its objects – as well as upon the 
logical relations between these from an epistemological distance. While subjectivity in 
the Ethical domain is endemic to the inside/outside dialectic of the Ethical domain and 
hence possesses an epistemic awareness of that dialectic, that subjectivity regards the 
symbolized expression of its own “identity,” and the “identity” of what is other (either/or) 
from a reflective distance. It is this distance that establishes the basis for an 
epistemological awareness of the contents of Idiolect. I use the term “reflection” here not 
in the sense of a psychologized process. The “reflection” of that subjectivity upon 
Idiolect constitutes the process by which that subjectivity experiences the adequacy or 
inadequacy of Idiolect’s symbolic expressions to accommodate experience as it has been 
structured in the Ethical domain. The process of evaluation need not be carried out by a 
sovereign or transcendent will, but instead, is accounted for by an interplay of tension 
(impedance, impetus, and subsequent overflow) and the resolution of that tension (the 
dissipation of impetus overflow) experienced in the Ethical domain. The process of 
“reflection” is endemic to the behaviour of the semiotic current.20 
                                                 
20 Like the relationship of the Ethical domain to Idiolect, the Epistemic domain precedes the Ethical 
domain. Subjectivity structured in the Epistemic domain cannot possess an epistemological awareness of 






The coexistence of both epistemic and epistemological awareness at the level of 
subjectivity in the Ethical domain bifurcates the crisis experienced by that subjectivity 
when the semiotic current cannot be passed from the Ethical domain to the domain of 
Idiolect. As suggested in the previous section, the Ethical domain passes what is Self and 
what is Other to Idiolect where each are fully symbolized. Since all entities that are 
articulated in Idiolect are objectified entities, they can be subject to the full range of terms 
and operations associated with propositional logic, through which they are evaluated in 
terms of their truth-value. If the terms and relations of Idiolect cannot adequately 
articulate the distinction between what is Self and what is Other, then an overflow in the 
Ethical domain results. The distinction between Self and Other becomes unstable, 
resulting in the decentering of subjectivity. This distinction is not held at a reflective 
distance and it cannot be examined logically and therefore constitutes an epistemic crisis. 
In its epistemological awareness of Idiolect, however, that subjectivity reflects upon that 
same overflow and resulting crisis as a crisis of meaning. 
When instability in the Self/Other dichotomy of the Ethical domain occurs, it pits 
the all-inclusive retention of somatosensory experience against the need to form an 
Idiolectic apprehension of symbolized meaning that more or less conforms with the social 
apprehension of meaning. The individual must either disbelieve the experiences of the 
senses, or she must acknowledge the fact that the terms and relations of symbolized 
meaning in Idiolect do not represent her experience and alter those terms and relations 
accordingly. At the same time, in altering those terms and relations, the individual begins 
                                                                                                                                                 
truth-value based logic (i.e., a predicate logic) such as the protean predicate logic of the Ethical domain 






to dissolve the linguistic bond shared with others in her social milieu – a bond that relies 
on the perception that symbolized meaning is shared by all members of the social entity 
in approximately the same form because that meaning derives from a single shared and 
perceivable “reality.” This placement between somatosensory experience (the Epistemic) 
and the individual’s apprehension of shared signification (her Idiolect) makes 
subjectivity structured in the Ethical domain particularly vulnerable to crisis. 
Both Lacan and Kristeva address the instability of the inside/outside distinction of 
Self and Other with their theories of desire (Lacan) and abjection (Kristeva).21 The 
inability to pass what is structured as inside within the Ethical domain (Self) into Idiolect 
as “subject,” creates a tension that is expressed as desire of the (lost) object. Likewise, 
that “object” may be reclaimed if Idiolect is modified to associate that “object” with 
subjectivity, leading to a subsequent dissipation of tension and an experience of the 
sublime (i.e., jouissance –the dissolution of separation, which is perceived as the 
satisfaction of desire). The inability to pass what is structured as outside in the Ethical 
domain (Other) to an “object” in Idiolect threatens to return this alienated aspect of 
subjectivity to Self, and creates a tension that is expressed as the contamination of that 
subjectivity through what is Other or abjected from Self. Ultimately, both abjection and 
desire arise from the same systemic instability in the division of Self from Other (and 
subsequently, of subject from its objects) – a division that has been imposed upon what 
originated as wholly subject-in-itself. The result is that unified subjectivity demands the 
                                                 
21 See Lacan, Feminine 116-121. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. 






return of what was dissociated from itself, while the construct of Self is simultaneously 
threatened with inundation by that return. 
Whether experienced as desire or as abjection, the vacillation or instability that 
epistemic crisis brings to subjectivity in the Ethical domain generates a condition of 
alexithymia in which there is an awareness that objectifying language is inadequate both 
to invoke the totality of subjectivity, and at the same time, to ban what must be separated 
from that totality in order that language may exist and communication may occur (see 
1.2.1). Symbolized meaning, in other words, is created, maintained, and annulled in the 
tension of bereavement and engulfment, and the fear of loss (desire) and of being 
overwhelmed (abjection), which characterize the epistemic crisis of subjectivity in the 
Ethical domain. Just as overflow in the Epistemic is capable of producing varying 
degrees of somatic disruption, so too overflow in the Ethical may be expressed as an 
entire range of manifestations. Those manifestations include phobia (abjection), anxiety 
disorders, with borderline personality disorder – the core characteristics of which are the 
instability of the ego and a concomitant fear of abandonment and engulfment – perhaps 
forming the extreme end of that range. 
As experience is passed to Idiolect, it faces the restrictive quality of its own 
symbolized structure that derives from the combined opposition of its parts and their 
evaluation according to predicated truth-values. This restrictive or conservative quality – 
a structural or systemic inertia –acts to bar heterogeneous experience from symbolized 
meaning in a manner that correlates with Janet’s theory of dissociation – that is, 






addresses traumatic crisis by taking an extrinsic view of the semiotic current and 
addresses the behavior of the system itself, rather than the experience of the subjectivity 
engendered therein. The crisis of dissociation correlates to the epistemic crisis described 
above in that the systemic incompatibility that produces that crisis – i.e., the inability of 
the cognitive schemata to accommodate heterogeneous experience – is unavailable to 
cognitive analysis by the individual experiencing that crisis. Freud’s theory of repression, 
on the other hand, addresses the ethical crisis of a “subject” that reflects on the terms and 
relations of Idiolect as a “reality” and hence as an orthodoxy. Repression is defined as the 
active exclusion of heterogeneous experience based on the perception or judgment that it 
is ethically abhorrent. Freud, in other words, describes the epistemological crisis of 
subjectivity in the Ethical domain. That crisis is engendered when the individual attempts 
to reflect upon and interpret that crisis in the symbolic terms of the domain that prohibits 
the impetus in question. Freud, in other words, addresses the outrage of heterogeneous 
experience from within the orthodoxy of symbolized meaning. Within the model being 
developed here, repression can be better correlated with the resistance of a domain to 
influx from the domain that precedes it, while dissociation can be better understood as 
the diversion of an impetus that is thus impeded, whether it is simply held in that 
previous domain, or dissipated via a competing channel. 
The coexistence of both epistemic and epistemological awareness bifurcates the 
crisis experienced by subjectivity in the Ethical domain into an epistemic crisis and an 
ethical crisis. That epistemological crisis is voiced as a crisis of ethics rather than a crisis 






Other, which is defined, as it were, from the arché of the Ethical domain. The basis for 
ethical judgment is, accordingly, off limits to cognitive reason. Understanding that 
“knowledge” or awareness in each of the various functional domains is organized across 
a differential that includes both epistemic awareness and epistemological awareness 
permits us to accommodate both an epistemic and an ethical view of traumatic crisis. 
As we will see, that opposition circumscribes a division that is innate to human 
identity and subjectivity; namely the expansive nature of unmediated, individual 
experience, which is cumulative and held by a single subjectivity in epistemic awareness, 
and the reductive nature of shared signification and social interaction, which relies upon 
the epistemological awareness of its participants to mediate between their separate 
experiences and their apprehensions of symbolized meaning in order to construct a 
“reality” that is perceived to be shared. Only in balancing these expansive (individual) 
and reductive (collective) agendas can signification ensure a common basis for 
communication and social cohesion, while at the same time providing the means for 
individual expression in establishing what is shared. Thus among the various objectives 
that signification must fulfill across its various differentials, the division of epistemic and 
epistemological awareness, together with the necessary mediation between what is 
individual and what is shared, will emerge as presenting the greatest potential for 
traumatic crisis, but also the most critical impetus that drives signification and enables 
subjectivity to emerge and be developed. 
The inertia or conservative quality of Idiolect with regard to modification is 






noncontiguous elements of which acquire their symbolic meaning in relation to all other 
elements in that signified field. The interrelation of all parts with all parts applies to the 
various articulated instances in Idiolect’s field of signification not only at any given 
moment, but in its entire temporal development.22 A capacity for temporal ordering only 
emerges with the fragmentation of experience in the Idiolectic domain, given that 
temporality expresses a logical (serial) relationship between discretely posited events or 
instances of signification. Temporality plays a role in other logical relationships as well, 
including relationships of condition and causality. Whatever its manifestation, however, 
the arrangement of experience within temporality’s linear and serial association depends 
upon the separation of experience into discrete instances, and the availability of the 
either/or dialectic that characterizes propositional logic used by Idiolect. 
Organizational differences between the domains both establish the requisite 
differentials that drive the semiotic current, and create the preconditions for 
incommensurability that can lead to the obstruction of that current. Temporality, for 
instance, is not expressed in the Epistemic, nor is it expressed in the Ethical domain, 
since these domains are not organized using a (fully) predicate logic. Temporal ordering 
characterizes Idiolect, however, and since subjectivity in the Ethical domain reflects on 
Idiolect, the introduction of temporality in Idiolect’s structuring of experience has the 
potential to create an epistemological crisis for that Subjectivity. Defined by the strict 
opposition (and interrelation) of its parts, previous instances of signification in Idiolect, 
both individually, and in the schemata in which they were logically ordered, are held in 
                                                 






successive temporal recession from the present manifestation of Idiolect.23 This temporal 
recession contextualizes the ongoing modification of Idiolect’s terms and relations within 
what appears to be an orderly and cohesive path of evolution (presumably towards a more 
accurate apprehension of objective reality). Such cohesion is necessary in order to 
conceal from reflective consciousness the arbitrary nature of signification which, if 
imposed upon awareness, could lead to a crisis of meaning. 
Despite their role in providing this necessary temporal cohesion, prior 
articulations and structures of Idiolect also create an ongoing potential for conflict in the 
cognitive schemata. New experience, in entering Idiolect, may engender a paradoxical 
relationship that invalidates a previously existing structure, since the structure of a closed 
system based on resolvable truth-values is intolerant of ambiguity. As stated earlier, 
despite the fact that traumatic crisis creates the appearance of an alternating sequence of 
identity, with one identity succeeding the other, in fact, those identities are a simultaneity 
(van der Kolk, Intrusive 177). That simultaneity rests on the fact that, with the influx of 
heterogeneous experience, competing “identities” are projected into Idiolect where the 
terms of Idiolect cannot simultaneously express all experience (and therefore, identity). 
Those competing identities and apprehensions of meaning then pass from Idiolect into the 
domain of social interaction by the same subjectivity in the Ethical domain. Such 
competing articulations of symbolized identity originate with what is inside that 
subjectivity and defined as Self. 
                                                 
23 See Roland Barthes’s theory of the simulacrum. Roland Barthes, “The Structuralist Activity,” Critical 







Sensory experience that is passed to the Ethical domain encounters difficulty 
when what has been defined as Self demands expression using terms in Idiolect that 
exclude one another. (The conflicted “baby-killer”/“war hero” dichotomy in the identity 
of the Vietnam veteran is a succinct example of such conflict.) The closed, interrelated 
terms of Idiolect precludes such ambiguity, however, since ambiguity in such a closed 
system of interrelated elements destroys the integrity of all of the system’s elements, and 
hence, of all meaning and identity. Unable to accommodate what is expressed in its terms 
and relations as an ambiguity, Idiolect divides and isolates competing representations of 
subjectivity within itself by creating a parallel channel or Idiolectic expression in order to 
dissipate the overflow of impetus. I will return to this later in the chapter, when I discuss 
secondary and parallel discourse. 
The Epistemic, Ethical, and Idiolect are not shared domains since they are not 
accessible to the unmediated experience of any other individual. The structure of each, in 
other words, is generated by a single agency – that of the individual herself. For each 
individual, symbolized meaning always remains an amalgam of individual experience 
and a cognitive approximation of what is perceived to be shared as an external, objective 
“reality.” Idiolect is established as a symbolized representation of an individual’s 
experience of the outside world that can neither be shared, nor escaped by the individual, 
despite the perception that meaning is shared by members of a discursive community. 
The isolation of individual cognition does not invalidate those individually held domains 
as capricious, however, since its unavailability to direct examination or challenge renders 






that the Epistemic domain cannot be reduced to anything beyond the senses themselves. 
The bipartite articulation and inside/outside governing relation of the Ethical domain 
acquire and maintain their validity by deiectically referencing their origins in the 
unmediated and unfragmented experience of the Epistemic domain, and subsequently 
lend that validity to the symbolic terms of the Idiolect they generate. This bond also 
serves to render the entire process of individual cognition stable with regards large-scale 
alteration in the face of social resistance. That deiectic connection is then carried forward 
to the domain of social interaction in which the individual represents herself. This shift 
from the self-containment of individual experience to the domains of shared 
communication, and the individual’s capacity to actively restructure Idiolect using 
hypothesis, fantasy, dream, or other creative processes will be the final theoretical focus 
of this chapter. 
 
Differential Epistemic domain Ethical domain Idiolect 
Logical Terms Integrated, spatial logic 
(mapping) 
Protean predicate logic: 
inside/outside 
Fully predicate logic: 
either/or 
Subjectivity Subject-in-itself Divided subjectivity – 
Self/Other 
Objectified subjectivity: 
subject & its objects 
Objectifications None Other as precursor to 
objectification 
Fully formed objects held 
in relation to subject 
Manner of 
“awareness” 
Epistemic awareness Epistemic awareness of 
own domain. Reflective, 
epistemological awareness 
of Idiolect 
Epistemic awareness of 
own domain. Held in 
epistemological awareness 
in the Ethical domain 
Agency Single agency Single agency Single agency 







2.6 The Narrative and Communicative domains: Public Discourse 
Two domains remain to be described here – the Narrative domain, and the 
Communicative domain.24 Although the Narrative domain precedes the Communicative 
domain in the circuitous channel of semiotic activity, functioning in tandem with Idiolect 
to structure the individual apprehension of symbolized meaning and identity, it will 
actually be useful to begin here by laying out the characteristics of the Communicative 
domain. As I have indicated, the reanalysis of any given domain’s structure in order to 
accommodate novel or heterogeneous experience is constrained by the tension 
maintained between that which is experienced by the individual directly, and that which 
is mutually comprehensible to others in social discourse (i.e., experience that is 
acknowledged to be shared). Being both an experiencing being and a social being, the 
individual is bound by two competing imperatives – an imperative to expand the 
categories, terms and relations of symbolized meaning in order to accommodate personal 
experience, and an imperative to uphold the limits placed on such expansion in the 
domain of social discourse (the Communicative domain). 
As we will see, the Narrative domain will play a unique role in mediating these 
often conflicting objectives by creating an experimental space in which symbolized 
                                                 
24 The term ‘Narrative domain’ refers to the function of this domain, in which symbolized terms can be 
temporarily manipulated without permanently altering the innate structure of Idiolect both during creative 
activities, and for the purposes of formulating interpersonal communication. Not necessarily a reflection of 
the individual’s apprehension of reality (i.e., correlate with Idiolect), the Narrative domain allows for 
speech acts that are purposefully deceptive, etc. The Communicative domain circumscribes the space in 
which social interaction takes place as a space between individual cognitions, and therefore it is not held or 
apprehended by anyone. If one can say that meaning is held in the Communicative domain, then the form 
which meaning takes would be constantly in flux, and comprised of some theoretical balance point between 
different apprehensions meaning as held by each of the participants in discourse. In this sense, meaning in 
the Communicative domain is intangible, amorphous, and can only be understood to exist as an “entity” 






meaning can be consciously manipulated. The Communicative domain, on the other 
hand, forms the bulwark of resistance against the modification of shared signified 
meaning (shared signification) by the individual without the consensus of at least some 
part of the discursive community.25 The need to perceive meaning as having been derived 
from an externally determined and hence shareable “reality” leaves the individual 
vulnerable to the resistance of the Communicative domain to modification. As a result, 
the Communicative domain is, in some measure, able to constrain the articulation of 
experience in Idiolect – the individual’s apprehension of shared (symbolized) meaning. 
Shared signification takes place in the space between unmingled subjects, each 
with her own personal history of experience and apprehension of meaning expressed in 
Idiolect. The symbolized expression of experience reflected in the Communicative 
domain is constituted and amended where the disparate semiotic activities of many 
individuals intersect, each of whom is driven to modify shared signification in such a way 
that her experience, identity, and apprehension of meaning are socially acknowledged. 
Despite individual efforts, the Communicative domain is a shared domain, which means 
that it must somehow accommodate semiotic input from all participants in social 
discourse as efficaciously as possible. The Communicative domain can be seen as a 
domain of compromise in which the expression of symbolized meaning that is the most 
                                                 
25 A discursive community is a community of individuals bound by a compact that meaning is shared 
among themselves. The community is defined and delimited, in other words, by what is perceived to be a 
field of shared, signified meaning, and by extension, by shared experience. It follows, then, that discord 
over the legitimacy of shared meaning (expressed as a heterogeneous contribution to that discourse) annuls 
the bond between the participants in that community. This, in turn, threatens to dissolve the discursive 






adequate for the greatest number of individuals comes to dominate.26 The individual’s 
linguistic bond to the Communicative domain and the imperative that language should be 
mutually comprehensible allows that domain to exert considerable influence over 
signification despite the fact that, unlike experience shaped in the Ethical or in Idiolect, it 
does not reference a single, irreducible somatosensory experience. Rather, it references a 
part of the somatosensory experience of each participant, but never any individual’s 
experience in its entirety.27 Symbolized meaning is not held in the Communicative 
domain. Rather, that domain is one in which individuals engage with one another in a 
discursive practice. 
With the introduction of a domain that is shaped by the input of many individuals 
comes the need for a critical new differential – that of agency. Prior to this, the notion of 
agency did not play an essential role in describing potential disruption to the semiotic 
current. The sensory perception of a single individual must be accommodated by the 
Epistemic, Ethical, and Idiolectic domains of that same individual and therefore we can 
say that the agency of all three domains is a single, unified agency; i.e., these domains are 
created, held, and organized within the cognitive processes belonging to a single 
organism. The agency of the Communicative domain, by contrast, is a collective agency 
that originates with as many individuals as there are contributors to a particular discourse. 
                                                 
26 Competing versions of symbolized meaning can be supported concurrently within a larger social unit, 
since each social unit or discursive community is made up of smaller discursive communities. The entirety 
of the discursive community can be variously delimited, expanding to the dimensions of the global, or 
limiting itself to the discursive compact between just two individuals. So, for instance, a returning Vietnam 
veteran may likely have encountered the rejection of their experience in the broader national discourse of 
political disillusionment. Among other veterans, the individual’s experience will have been received 
differently, as it may have been within the family unit. 
27 The need on the part of the individual to mediate between personal interest and social interest is 






That agency takes the form of a collective, social identity that is more or less shared by 
the members of a particular discursive community, and that is constructed and delimited 
within the field of signified meaning endorsed by that community. The individual must, 
in some measure, accommodate what is created in the Communicative domain – both in 
terms of shared, signified meaning and in terms of the collective social identity – if she is 
to continue to function as a social being within a discursive community. 
An individual’s identity arises both out of her own unique somatosensory 
experience, which gathers its authority from the fact that it is irreducible in human 
experience, and out of her need for social interaction, which demands that she subscribe 
in some part to a collective social identity invoked via the contribution of many 
experiencing individuals. Here, the foundation is laid for traumatic rupture and crisis, 
since on the one hand, individual identity is an inclusive identity driven to expand the 
limits of what can be signified by the constant influx of somatosensory experience. 
Collective, social identity, on the other hand, is a reductive identity that obtains its 
stability by excluding what is judged to be heterogeneous by the greater consensus of its 
participants. Collective social identity is thus driven to banish as Other whatever 
threatens its overall cohesion and in order to do so, it strives to limit the expression of 
experience that is not mutually shared. If the mediation between these competing 
imperatives fails, as it eventually must in a being that is both an autonomous individual 
and a social being, the conflict engendered by that failure emerges as cognitive 






In understanding the Communicative domain and its unique structure, we can also 
begin to understand why organizational domains cannot simply be altered to better 
accommodate novel experience. A potential for conflict exists when experience is passed 
from any organizational domain to the next. Certain constraints on modification are 
endemic to the individual’s own cognitive processes based simply upon the structural 
differences among the organizational domains. Nevertheless, since any individual’s 
apprehension of meaning and identity is cognitively constructed, we would not expect 
lasting disruption to the semiotic current if all of the domains in which experience and 
subjectivity are structured were entirely endemic to the cognitive processes of that single 
individual. Experience structured and held in the Epistemic, Ethical and Idiolectic 
domains alone, for example, would not challenge the autonomy of the individual to 
modify the structure of those domains as needed. The Communicative domain, however, 
is a domain in which the individual does not possess the autonomy to modify its contents 
at will. Rather, that domain is evoked, as stated, by the collective interaction of members 
of the discursive community. This collective agency allows the domain to refute 
individual experience that does not meet the consensus of that community’s members. 
Aside from a collective agency, other unique characteristics lend the 
Communicative domain the resiliency needed both to refute the contributions of the 
single individual and to impose a social interpretation of her own experience upon her. 
Unlike the previous domains, the Communicative domain is held in neither an 
epistemological nor an epistemic awareness. The Communicative domain extends beyond 






experience the Idiolect of another discursive participant, nor can she escape the confines 
of her own Idiolect in which her apprehension of shared meaning is held. The 
Communicative domain is a domain beyond cognitive apprehension, consisting of a 
pastiche of somatosensory cues and information – dispositions, rather than articulations, 
that must be interpreted by the individual in Idiolect before they acquire meaning. 
Interaction in the Communicative domain occurs via the body in some manner; i.e., the 
verbal utterances, gestures, expressions, etc., of its participants. Likewise, that interaction 
is received in that domain via the senses. We can say, in other words, that this interaction 
takes place not in the intrinsic cognitive processes of the individual, but rather, via the 
medium of psychomotor activities and sensory perception. What is received through the 
senses in this domain then enters the Epistemic domain as a renewed part of the 
individual’s semiotic current.28 
Each individual who participates in social interaction projects her own 
apprehension of “meaning” into the Communicative domain. Likewise, the contribution 
of other participants to shared signification is perceived by the individual in the form of 
somatosensory experience that can then be filtered through her cognitive structures (i.e., 
evaluated against what she herself has experienced, as well as against her own 
                                                 
28 The case of language presented in the Communicative domain offers a unique understanding of the 
existence of multiple organizing domains. If a person were to attempt to speak Chinese to the average 
English speaker in the US, for instance, that experience would be received as auditory input in the 
Epistemic, separated from Self in the Ethical, and in most cases, be symbolized at the very least as 
“linguistic output by another individual” in Idiolect. Some listeners may have Idiolectic structure that 
allows them to interpret the speech as being in an Asian language, while others might identify the language 
as Chinese or even as a specific dialect such as Mandarin or Cantonese. Unless the individual spoke 
Chinese, however, and therefore had matched the phonetic sounds of the language with terms and relations 
in Idiolect, then the utterance would be rejected on the basis of its content. There would be, in other words, 
a mismatch between the terms of the speakers Idiolect (which includes the forms and structures of 






apprehension of symbolized meaning as it is articulated in Idiolect). Participants in the 
Communicative domain are cognitively isolated from one another with the result that 
“meaning” believed to be held or shared in the domain of our social interaction exists by 
compact alone; a compact by which the participants agree that such a shared symbolic 
order exists and is (more or less) mutually held. This compact is absolutely essential. The 
Communicative domain functions successfully only because there is a perception that 
meaning is shared. 
Although meaning is not actually held in tandem with other members of any 
given discursive community, the need for a social consensus in the Communicative 
domain is still satisfied through the mechanism of social mirroring. The notion of 
mirroring was introduced with Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, during which the child 
first becomes aware of herself as a being separate from her environment and with a 
capacity – indeed, with a need – for symbolic expression (see 1.2.1). The mirror stage 
marks the child’s induction (and interdiction) into the linguistic world of her progenitors. 
There, her need to express her own subjective experience is pitted against her need to 
cultivate a mastery of shared signification (i.e., language) while at the same time, the 
psychic unity with which she was born is sacrificed in the interest of acquiring the 
capacity to manipulate her social environment linguistically. The need to acquire 
language, itself a traumatic process, is not, however, a terminal phase in a child’s 
development. Although Lacan’s mirror stage provides us with an excellent explanation 






signified values in our apprehension of shared meaning (Idiolect) via the response of 
others in order to better function in the domain of social interaction. 
The individual cannot formulate symbolized meaning in the absence of social 
interaction and social feedback. Since the cognitive structures or the experience of 
another individual are inaccessible, however, there must be some mechanism by which 
another person’s apprehension of symbolized meaning can be evaluated in our own 
Idiolect – both in the form of their linguistic output, but also in the form of non-verbal 
responses, gestures or actions. Even more importantly, there must be a way in which we 
can evaluate the adequacy or inadequacy of our own apprehension of symbolized 
meaning within the context of the social domain. This adequacy or in adequacy of our 
own identity and apprehension of symbolized meaning is mirrored back to us in the 
actions, responses, and discourse of others. Social mirroring effectively closes the 
circuitous route circumscribed by the semiotic current by returning that current to what 
may be viewed as its nominal beginning – somatosensory experience. What we take in 
via our senses concerning our interactions with others is then either passed successfully 
through the organizational domains or rejected by these – that is, it is either recognized 
(re-cognized) or not recognized by that innate cognitive structure.  
Without this capacity to be mirrored by others and to mirror back to others in the 
Communicative domain, the otherwise tenuously founded compact to behave as though 
symbolized meaning were shared – the fabric of social interdependence – could not be 
maintained. Just as essentially, without this mirroring function, we could not close the 






current.29 We receive mirroring through sensory perception just as we do any other form 
of experiential input and therefore, mirroring returns the modified projections of our 
Idiolect to our senses and to the semiotic current that passes through our Epistemic, 
Ethical and Idiolectic domains. In this way, it can be reevaluated against the innate 
structure of those domains (our “cognitive schemata”), making the process of 
signification an ongoing one. Social mirroring closes the circuitous route of signification, 
thereby establishing an uninterrupted current of reanalysis and re-signification -- 
subjectivity. 
There may be no perceptible conflict generated by what is socially mirrored back 
to the individual, and as a result, there may be no disruption to the semiotic current. This 
does not mean that the individual’s apprehension of “meaning” is the same as that of 
other participants in the discursive community – indeed it cannot be precisely the same, 
since meaning is created by the relationship of an instance of signification in the entire 
field of meaning, i.e., within the context of the entire Idiolect. Given that every 
individual’s experience is unique, the structure of her Idiolect is also thus – unique to 
only herself. From a pragmatic standpoint however, if the difference between individual 
apprehensions of symbolized meaning does not disrupt the consensus that meaning is 
shared, that consensus will continue to allow separate individuals to interact as though it 
were shared. Indeed, some variance is limitedly tolerated among the participants in a 
discursive community. An individual may accept what is mirrored back to her, or she 
may reject what is mirrored because it does not accord with her beliefs or identity as 
                                                 
29 If we interrupt this circuit at any point results in the cessation of that current, and the breakdown of 






based on her own Idiolect. In this way, the individual may, in return, mirror back 
acceptance or rejection to others in her discursive community. In either instance, however 
– either of acceptance or active rejection – there will have been sufficient accord between 
that individual’s apprehension of symbolized meaning and what she has received via 
social mirroring to make an evaluation based on a truth-value possible. Active evaluation, 
in other words, is only possible when that which is being evaluated can be accommodated 
in Idioect. 
This accord breaks down when the individual cannot parse through Idiolect what 
has been mirrored back in social discourse and interaction. If the mirrored response does 
not match the individual’s expectation and cannot be accommodated in the innate 
structure of Idiolect (or the Ethical domain), then we can say that the individual’s 
experience has not been adequately accommodated in the Communicative domain. 
(Conversely, it is equally true that the “contents” of the Communicative have not been 
adequately accommodated in the Epistemic, Ethical, and/or Idiolect of the individual). 
The individual will then be caught between the need to uphold shared signification and 
the collective social identity on the one hand (i.e., by bringing Idiolect into conformity 
with the Communicative), and the need to accommodate the semiotic current generated 
by her own somatosensory experiences on the other (i.e., by swaying the consensus in the 
Communicative to accommodate Idiolect). With this, I do not mean that a conflict will 
necessarily arise if the mirroring of another discursive participant does not match our 
individual’s expectation, (although depending upon the importance attached to that other 






cumulative rejection of the individual’s Idiolectic structure by multiple discursive 
participants and the resulting perception that the consensus supports a different 
articulation of symbolized meaning that will cause a disruption to the semiotic current. 
If experience passed through successive organizational domains alters Idiolect 
independently of the social consensus, the result will be the dissolution of the linguistic 
bond between the individual and the discursive community.30 At some point, the 
individual may be able to assert what is heterogeneous to the Communicative domain by 
swaying the consensus of its participants and bringing about a reanalysis of shared 
signification. (I will return to this later in the section). Until that time, however, Idiolect 
will be constrained by the Communicative domain and there will be an overflow of 
impetus in some number (or all) of the preceding domains. As I have suggested, such 
overflow is manifested as somatic symptoms when the overflow occurs in the Epistemic, 
and as instability in the dichotomy of Self/Other when the overflow takes place in the 
Ethical. In Idiolect, overflow of the semiotic current will result in the (unconsciouss) 
formation of an alternate symbolized order, which can be manifested as competing 
apprehension of “reality” and identity, as contradictory discourses concerning experience, 
or most dramatically, as the last of Herman’s three dissociative disorders – Multiple 
Personality Disorder (an entirely re-symbolized “reality” and “identity”). 
Mediation between the extrinsically determined structure of the Communicative 
domain, and the intrinsically determined structure of the remaining domains is 
                                                 
30 This dissolution of the linguistic bond with the discursive community need not automatically lead to 
crisis. In fact, in practices common in Buddhism, yoga, etc., the individual is able to cultivate a lasting 
awareness that “reality” and “meaning” are cognitively constructed, and yet, retain the ability to function 






indispensable if such breakdown is to be circumvented. It is the last domain that I will 
define here – the Narrative domain – that enables this mediation between the Epistemic, 
Ethical, and Idiolectic domains on the one hand, and the Communicative domain on the 
other. The competing objectives of the experiencing individual and of the community – 
that is, between the experiencing individual and her social self – require a critical but 
delicate compromise in how meaning should be represented symbolically. In order to 
achieve this compromise, there must be a space in which the individual can experiment 
with potential signification or meaning, establishing a temporary symbolized (Idiolectic) 
domain. This experimental activity, which takes place in the Narrative domain, includes 
dream, fantasy, and other forms of creativity, as well as the consciously manipulated 
form and content of public discourse. It also includes speculative and theorizing activity – 
essentially any cognitive activity that involves the temporary (i.e., experimental) 
reconfiguration of identity and/or symbolized meaning. The Narrative domain is not 
comprised of a single, alternate field of signification, then, but rather contains any 
number of such domains. 
The Narrative domain is unique in that here, we are dealing with a dissociative 
process that nonetheless may very well occur with conscious awareness. While Idiolect 
forms a cognitive apprehension of symbolized meaning, it also stands to reason that this 
apprehension would have no stability if Idiolect itself were the domain of experimental 
signification. Dreams, fantasies, and the creative activities of writing or playing a 
theatrical role do not automatically alter our perceptions of “reality” and when these 






meaning. What these activities are able to do is create a temporary space in which 
theoretical signification can occur, borrowing on the terms and relations of Idiolect but 
reconfiguring them to a greater or lesser degree. This experimental activity enables the 
individual to find a more adequate compromise between unmediated experience 
(Epistemic/Ethical), and shared signification (Communicative) by establishing a structure 
that better accommodates the flow of semiotic current (as evidenced by the alleviation or 
conversely, the creation of blockages that obstruct that current). 
The basic structure of the Narrative domain is borrowed from Idiolect, however, 
semiotic current is not passed from Idiolect into a Narrative domain. Rather, the 
Narrative is unique among the organizational domains in that it bypasses the primary 
semiotic channel. Semiotic current is temporarily passed from the Ethical domain directly 
into the Narrative domain, either concurrent to, or instead of that current being passed 
into Idiolect. Only a model thus conceived can account for both the emergence of 
unconscious (i.e., pre-signified) content in the experimental structures of the Narrative 
domain and the ability to examine and compare the contents of the Narrative and of 
Idiolect epistemologically (both the Narrative and Idiolect are held in epistemological 
awareness), as though they stood side by side. Were this not the case, the overall stability 
of the subject would be compromised. The existence of dreams, fantasy, the artistic 
process, cognitive creativity, as well as humor and language play attest to the existence of 






hypothetical meaning without denaturing or otherwise permanently altering the 
individual’s apprehension of identity and meaning as it is perceived to be shared.31 
The separation of Idiolect from the Narrative domains allow us to understand why 
cognition is capable of such innovation and creativity, and yet can simultaneously be 
unable to comprehend the structures that are closest to it. The capacity to actively utilize 
secondary domains to express Ethical organization is, as I will show, an crucial 
determining factor in the success (or lack thereof) of the individual when faced with 
traumatic circumstances, given that this capacity plays an essential, mediating role in 
negotiating new meaning, particularly where the structures of the Ethical and 
Communicative domains preclude or prohibit the articulation of experience. I will return 
to this mediating role later in this chapter. Here it will suffice to note that the Ethical 
domain exists as a dynamic domain because it possesses the ability to bring to life 
subordinate domains that may eventually divert the flow of signification through their 
structures and organization and insinuate themselves into the structures and organization 
of Idiolect. 
The availability of the terms of Idiolect (or lack thereof) for comparison with the 
contents of the Narrative domain tells us whether current is being passed through both 
domains, or whether it is being passed though the Narrative domain alone. When 
dreaming, for instance, evaluation using a comparison with the terms of Idiolect 
(perceived “reality”) is only possible in rare case of lucid dreaming. Ordinarily, however, 
                                                 
31 What I distinguish here as Idiolect and the competing Narrative domains (of which there may be any of a 
number) are subsumed in Lacan’s model under the single term, the Imaginary. It seems more useful here to 
distinguish between them, however, since Idiolect must retain a greater degree of stability and authority 






the semiotic current passes through a diverted channel not unlike the non-volitional 
overflow of Idiolect seen in traumatic rupture (see above), and that alternate, 
experimental symbolized order is itself perceived to represent “reality.” The innate 
asymmetry of the system that privileges Idiolect over the Narrative is lost. It is only after 
a dream has been recalled – that is, reconstituted in the Narrative domain upon 
awakening – that the dream can be analyzed comparatively with the terms and relations 
of Idiolect. Other activities, such as theoretical speculation take place exclusively when 
such comparison is possible. Again, this act of comparison need not be interpreted as a 
psychologized process. Rather, when the semiotic current passes alternately through 
Idiolect and through the Narrative, the generation or alleviation of obstruction to the 
semiotic current may be generated or alleviated. The resulting increase or decrease in 
tension serves as “judgment” either of the inadequacy or adequacy of a representation in 
one domain or the other. 
Based on the above described evaluation, subjectivity in the Ethical domain is 
able to modify Idiolect when it finds that the structures held in a Narrative domain 
represent a more satisfactory translation of experience, thereby reducing the tension 
produced across the various differentials. “Objects” can be placed in new relationship 
with one another or with the “subject,” – a metaphoric transformation of meaning – or the 
boundaries of a term may be altered to include or exclude an aspect of signification – a 
metonymic transformation of meaning. These two linguistic operations – metaphor and 
metonymy – are the two operations recognized as transforming meaning within 






detail throughout the remainder of this study, through which “meaning” is purposely 
made ambiguous. This notion of ambiguous signification – which I will call covalent 
signification – will prove to be indispensable to the resolution of trauma, as well as to the 










































































awareness in the 
Ethical domain 







Agency Single agency Single agency Single agency Single agency Collective 
agency - 
mirroring 
Table 4: Characteristics of differentials, complete table 
 
The various domains of organization described in this section, Epistemic, Ethical, 
Idiolectic, Narrative and Communicative, are domains of constant change and innovation 
that is prompted by their interaction with one another, their distinct structure, and the 
necessities of their varied agendas. Each individual constructs her own apprehension of 






organizational domains that shape (and are shaped by) that current. What is passed 
between individuals in the Communicative domain is not our individual experience, 
which is an experience of our own subjectivity. Rather, what we present in the 
Communicative domain is apprehended as somatosensory experience, and sets in motion 
that individual’s experience of her own subjectivity. There are these multiple currents, 
each influencing but not merging into one another, and with each current brought into 
contact with the other in ever changing configuration there is a constant source of 
heterogeneous impulse that keeps those currents in motion. Thus, we must examine the 
specific differentials and the manner of each domain’s organization as they shape the 
current of experience, accounting for the force and counterforce that initiates and inhibits 
its movement, as well as the innate properties of experience that shape its behavior when 
in motion. Only by exploring how these function in consort and indivisible from one 
another, can we begin to understand the progress of traumatic experience and its driving 
effect on signification and subjectivity. 
 
2.7 Trauma as an Experience of the Sublime: The Semiotics of Silence 
The symbolized and largely linguistic basis for our epistemological (e.g., rational) 
awareness, and the arbitrary nature of signification, leaves the thinking organism 
vulnerable to crisis simply on the basis of her own linguistic frailty. The individual relies 
upon the continuity and stability of symbolized meaning in order to maintain the 
perception that meaning is socially shared, and that it represents a stable, external reality. 






reanalysis of that symbolized domain is delayed, resulting in a division of identity both in 
terms of the symbolized subject, and in terms of the boundaries of Self. Confronted with 
incompatible manifestations of subjectivity and with irreconcilable ambiguity in 
symbolized meaning, the individual is driven to seek a resolution for the resulting 
traumatic conflict. Regardless the resolution that is ultimately found, prior meaning and 
identity as these were apprehended by the individual will be annulled or foreclosed upon, 
leading to a temporal rupture or lacuna in the continuity of the subject's evolution. 
Naturally, whatever resolution is sought must satisfy both the individual's need to express 
her own experience, and the need to maintain mutual comprehensibility in the 
Communicative domain. Every individual is bound by these competing imperatives – that 
of an experiencing being, and that of a social being. 
In the case of conflict that arises at the threshold of the Communicative domain, 
one might, in some measure, revive the now discredited DSM-III definition of trauma. 
Rather than describing trauma as something that is outside the range of human 
experience, however, we should say that trauma is outside the range of socially 
signifiable, and hence, mutually comprehensible experience. (Here, being "human" says 
more about our social identification with the discursive community than it does about the 
ontological category to which we belong.) Traumatic conflict does not originate with any 
intrinsic quality in the (traumatic) experience or event, but in limitations in available 
symbolized meaning, and in the irrefutability of somatosensory experience versus the 
inertia of shared signification. The need to compromise between signifying unmediated 






other, forces the individual to face the inadequacy of any symbolized field of meaning to 
express all meaning. With this, comes the traumatizing awareness that meaning, since 
based on compromise, is arbitrary. The individual does not suffer the loss of language as 
much as the complete devaluation of language, and the paradoxical need to express an 
experience that is characterized by the silence it has created. There are words, but the 
words are emptied of meaning. 
It is in this experience – the devaluation of symbolized meaning, and with it, the 
devaluation of identity, and rational, epistemological thought – that the traumatized 
individual encounters the sublime. The term sublime has been used by philosophers and 
theorists in a variety of senses, but with each use drawing upon a common image of that 
which is too vast or powerful to be confronted or comprehended. Kant distinguished 
between two aspects of the sublime; the mathematically sublime, which describes 
something that inspires awe because it is so immeasurably vast, and the dynamically 
sublime, which describes something that inspires awe because it is unspeakably powerful 
(Kant, Judgment 94-97). Closer to the field of psychology and traditional trauma theory, 
Freud took up the notion of the sublime and its power with his concept of sublimation. 
Sublimation, in Freudian theory, is the transformation of dangerously powerful drives or 
impulses into productive channels – usually as dream or as creative processes. Freud, in 
other words, addresses the individual's efforts to come to terms with the sublime in a 
productive manner, thereby resolving the symptoms produced by unbridled drives. In 
more recent years, Lyotard extensively developed the notion of the sublime, using the 






reasoned, expressed in terms of its intensity and in the "dissimilitude of signs and 
instances."32 
Trauma is an experience of the sublime in all of these various senses. Traumatic 
experience is simply an experience that fails to find accommodation within the structure 
of the various organizational domains, including the symbolized terms and relations of 
Idiolect. In this sense, traumatic experience is immeasurably large, extending beyond the 
articulations and dispositions of meaning. It is immeasurably powerful as well, exerting 
pressure on the structure of the organizational domains in order to create the 
accommodation it needs, and destroying meaning and identity in its efforts to do so. 
Lyotard's theoretical stance goes farther towards a semiotic understanding of the 
cognitively sublime by directly addressing the inability of the semiotic system to deal 
with vastly heterogeneous experience, and how this leads to a breakdown of cognitive 
reason. Viewed in terms of semiosis, it is not simply negatively evaluated experience that 
is sublime, and hence, in a sense, traumatic. Positive encounters with the sublime, 
including certain forms of meditation and the Unio Mystica of religious experience also 
rupture the categories, terms and expressions of symbolized reason, and yet may be 
highly desired and sought after experiences. All experience of the sublime leaves the 
experiencer speechless, and with a diminished sense of subjective identity. What I would 
argue ultimately distinguishes such positive experiences of the sublime from "trauma" is 
not the quality of the experience, but rather, the evaluation of the experience as desired or 
undesired. In terms of the breakdown of language and subjective identity that is evoked 
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by an experience of the sublime, however, there no difference between mystic experience 
and trauma. 
Freud's notion of sublimation, which was later take up by Lacan as a part of his 
semiotic reading of Freud's theories, specifically addresses the successful resolution of 
traumatic disorganization resulting from uncontrolled drives. In that initial, 
psychoanalytic sense, sublimation follows an encounter with the sublime, in which the 
raw forces that threaten to engulf and destroy the ego (subjective identity) are harnessed 
or channelled in a creative fashion. In semiotic terms, the creative realization of such 
drives ultimately serves to expand the possibilities of symbolized expression. Lacan 
elaborates on this notion, defining the encounter with the sublime as the return of 
alienated subjectivity (jouissance) in the form of the object of desire. This reunion with 
the object of desire (Self exiled as Other, and henceforth desired) annuls the presumed 
divisions created by the process of signification. The result, jouissance, leads to an 
expansion of subjective being. Kristeva further expanded the notion of re-merger with 
alienated subjectivity to include the return of Self that is misrecognized as still being 
Other, and that is therefore undesired. This darker side of the sublime, what Kristeva calls 
the abject, is nevertheless a counterpart to the object of desire. The quality of the 
encounter with the sublime, like the respective quality of the unio mystica or trauma, is 
determined by the terms available in the symbolized domains to evaluate that experience. 
Whether positive or negative, the dissolution of identity that follows an encounter with 






somehow find an articulation in newly formed meaning and identity. It must, in other 
words, be sublimated. 
The joint notions of the sublime and of sublimation can be easily understood 
using the model of subjectivity and of traumatic crisis being developed here. The 
sublime, in a strict, theoretical sense, describes the qualities of traumatic experience, 
which is literally "too large" to be contained in the existent terms and relations of 
symbolized meaning. As a result, the semiotic current produced by such an experience 
may be accommodated by concurrent and competing semiotic channels. Competing 
signification finds itself in a state of continual flux (oscillation). In terms of the dynamic 
system, that state of fluctuation and its eventual resolution are best expressed using the 
concept of the eigenstate: the expression of a moment of stasis within a dynamic system 
when (hypothetically) measurable and observable qualities can be expressed using 
discrete and non-contiguous values. A commonplace example of the eigenstate is a faucet 
fed by both a hot and a cold tap, for which there will be an endless array of temperatures 
at which water may emerge. The temperature at which it emerges at any given moment 
represents the water’s current eigenstate. 
The eigenstate in signification is like a snapshot of meaning within the 
uninterrupted flow of signification, isolated within an infinitesimal cross section of time. 
Beyond the discrete expression of a momentary stasis however (i.e., a single signified 
value at the moment of utterance) the eigenstate is indissolubly associated with a specific 
dynamic of fluctuation (expressed in physics as its specific wave function, Ψ), which 






of successive eigenstates of that dynamic. The concept, then, allows us to conceive and 
express a current state in the flow of signification, both in terms of a single value in a 
symbolized field of meaning (synchronic), and in terms of an instance within the 
temporal progression of signification (diachronic). 
Traumatic experience creates the need for competing symbolized expressions of 
meaning and identity, as observed in the phenomena of doublethink, and in the 
bifurcation of subjective identity. This kind of doubling – essentially the experience of 
competing eigenstates – is an expression of paradox that arises when symbolized 
meaning cannot express novel experience. The task of articulating traumatic experience is 
not one of simply telling a tragic story of unfortunate experience. Rather, the objective is 
to convey that experience using competing symbolized forms, identities and/or narratives 
such that each competing form is equally viable. Conflicted meaning as the indication of 
where signification fails is presented in such a way that competing expressions can 
neither be merged, nor separated. Multiple eigenstates are offered, redirecting the 
reader/viewer’s awareness to the inadequacy of symbolized meaning, and the ongoing 
dynamic that underlies all meaning and identity. 
A graphic illustration of fluctuation in symbolized meaning is offered by certain 
optical illusions (see fig. 1 below). In such illusions, the symbolized image being 
presented can resolve itself in one of several ways; in this example, either as a vase, or as 
two people facing one another. Each of these symbolized images contained within the 
“illusion” – the ‘vase’ or the ‘faces’ – comprises an eigenstate; that is, a momentary stasis 






a vase or two faces. Rather, it is an image of neither and both, since both symbolized 
images exist in a reciprocal relationship with one another in such a way that they can 
neither be merged nor separated from one another. (We saw a similar reciprocal 
relationship in the worlds of lightness and of darkness in The Others, which I discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter.) In linguistic terms, this type of suspension between 
fluctuating eigenstates constitutes a shifting metonymy, meaning that the boundaries of 
the signifier shift to delineate different signifieds (vase or faces), relegating what remains 
to the background. This puts into linguistic terms what, up until now, I have described as 
“fluctuating” or “competing signification,” and provides a way of speaking about a kind 
of signification that not only allows for ambiguity, it creates it. 
 
Figure 1: Optical illusion that demonstrates the eigenstates in a shifting metonymy.33 
A shifting metonymy facilitates the creation of ambiguity in symbolized form that 
will prove to be of critical importance to the definition of trauma being proposed here. 
Ambiguity of the signified characterizes traumatic crisis, when that signified – an 
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Vancouver. 29 March, 2005. < http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/200/301/ic/can_digital_collections/ 






experience – cannot be expressed in existent symbolized terms. Until now, trauma 
research has tended to invalidate the symptomatic, behavioral, and cognitive fluctuations 
observed in trauma and to “pathologize” traumatized subjectivity. The oscillation of 
identity and signified meaning that comprises that “instability” is, however, a part of the 
natural functioning of the dynamic process that creates or evokes subjectivity and 
meaning. Where trauma differs from so-called “normal” functioning is in the length of 
time needed for the process of reanalysis, by which meaning is constituted and re-
constituted to accommodate the semiotic current. That extended length of time, in turn, 
interjects an unwanted awareness that symbolized meaning does not represent an 
objective, external ‘reality,’ since experience is able to exceed the confines of what has 
been symbolized. 
Competing symbolized expressions have to be evoked in order to express 
conflicted aspects of traumatic experience, since by its very nature traumatic experience 
exceeds the boundaries of what can be expressed using available terms (i.e., the sublime). 
The necessary appeal to conflicted symbolized expressions of experience and identity, 
often achieved through the overflow of the semiotic current into competing channels, 
likewise creates fluctuation in the distinction between what is Self, and what is Other. 
Ultimately, until symbolized meaning can be expanded or modified, traumatic experience 
will have to be expressed in concurrently held, competing domains (Idiolect and 
Narrative) and if the force that such experience generates in the semiotic current is great 
enough, the natural asymmetry that would ordinarily subordinate the Narrative to Idiolect 






No longer subordinated, that Narrative becomes a competing Idiolectic domain, 
giving rise to concurrent but competing subjective identity. The subject expressed by 
symbolized, subjective identity is indeed divided, being constituted in different fields of 
meaning but originating with the same somatosensory experience. At the same time, 
language as a shared expression of a single symbolized field of meaning truly is 
incapable of expressing meaning that arises in separate symbolic orders. The 
manifestation of subjective identity in one field or the other is, accordingly, an eigenstate 
of the entire current of subjectivity. Although all meaning and identity are essentially 
eigenstates in the semiotic current (both diachronically and synchronically), the parallel 
and conflicted manifestations of traumatic oscillation creates a conscious awareness that 
meaning represents an eigenstate rather than reflects “reality.” 
The traumatized individual moves, cognitively, between these two fields of 
meaning which, in their covalent, reciprocal relationship with one another, can neither be 
merged, nor separated. The way in which Self is expressed – in other words, the 
eigenstate of Self’s expression – is determined by the movement between these fields, as 
well as by modifications to them as the Ethical domain is affected by the alternation 
between competing channels. The purpose of the trauma narrative is to represent this 
fragmentation of experience, meaning and identity into competing eigenstates and the 
expression of the way in which meaning is devalued by such oscillation. The successful 
trauma narrative manifests this oscillation by finding a way to express competing 






those “realities” can neither be merged nor separated within the narrative.34 The task 
becomes one of creating an instance or instances of covalent signification, in other words, 
that will allow the reader to move between “realities” as though moving in a topography 
of discretely defined regions. At the same time, covalent signification advances 
competing symbolized “realities” in such a way that each is perceived as valid. We saw a 
basic example of this mechanism in The Others, both in the competing interpretations of 
narrative reality presented by Ann and by Grace, and at a more subtle level, in the 
separation of light from darkness. In Traumnovelle and in other works I examine here, we 
will see a number of different kinds of covalent signification, all of which serve this same 
purpose. 
The objective of covalent signification is not merely to allow the individual to 
express competing symbolized forms in order to create accommodation for 
heterogeneous experience. In a trauma narrative, what is essential is the reader or 
viewer’s ability to experience two (or more) realities as valid such that they can neither 
be merged nor separated within the narrative. The coexistence of competing narratives 
simultaneously recreates the devaluation of symbolized meaning and with it, the silence 
of traumatic experience. The reader or viewer’s own apprehension of reality is brought, 
to some degree, into traumatic oscillation, thereby forcing her to share some measure of 
the traumatic experience itself. Optimally, the trauma narrative opens up the possibility 
that the individual’s heterogeneous experience will come to be accepted in the 
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depicts. Indeed, a narrative that depicts a so-called “traumatic event,” but that does not express the splitting 
of identity, and the loss or fragmentation of meaning is not a trauma narrative according to the definition of 






Communicative domain by creating a shared consensus as to its validity. The trauma 
narrative is, in this sense, a viral narrative that aims to convey through empathic 
experience the breakdown of meaning by interjecting the awareness that meaning is a 
cognitive and social construct incapable of expressing all experience. If it is successful, 
the trauma narrative will rupture the viewer or reader’s apprehension of meaning in a 
subtle way, and in so doing, will prompt the restructuring of her organizational domains 
while recreating in her what cannot be expressed – silence. The silence of trauma is the 
silence of symbolized meaning that can only be expressed in a covalent oscillation such 
that one valence invokes the absence of the other(s). Just as importantly, that silence 
represents the absence of the symbolized term that could unify the two. 
In the remaining three chapters of this study, I will turn to a more in-depth 
analysis of two narratives: Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle, and Russell Banks’s The 
Sweet Hereafter. In those analyses, I will return to the theoretical points outlined in this 
chapter in order to demonstrate precisely how they function in a trauma narrative. What 
is of primary interest in these analyses is the breakdown of meaning through the 
introduction of oscillating eigenstates characteristic of traumatic crisis, and the recreation 
of that oscillation in the trauma narrative through the use of covalent signification. 
(Although there are many more ways to create covalent signification than those 
illustrated in these two narratives, space will not permit me to present a more detailed 
analysis of those methods. A more in-depth examination of covalent signification will 
have to remain for a later study.) Through these narrative analyses, the functioning of this 






characteristics inherent in the disruption of that dynamic – characteristics that are 






Chapter 3: Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle: Traumatic Crisis as 
an Internal Experience 
 
 
Consider an actor. He sees himself as an actor, an actor with a fine physique, a 
handsome face and manly voice. He takes great care to keep himself in good 
physical shape. Yet as the years pass he will progressively and very critically 
note that he is becoming older. His handsome features start to fade, his body 
loses its strength and his voice loses its depth. […] He becomes depressed and 
unhappy because his conception of himself is disappearing. His self-





3.1 The Foreclosure of Identity: Displaced Subjectivity and Displaced Conflict 
The narrative that I have selected to examine in this chapter, Arthur Schnitzler’s 
Traumnovelle, does not depict a reaction to an event broadly regarded as traumatic and 
therefore, the novella that has not traditionally been viewed as a trauma narrative. In fact, 
one may argue of the novella that it does not depict a significant event of any kind. 
Nevertheless, the text provides an exceptionally clear example of traumatic crisis as it is 
described in the theoretical model presented here. Schnitzler, a physician, in fin-de-siecle 
Vienna, wrote Traumnovelle in 1926. The novella is still widely familiar to people in the 
field of Germanistik, and to a much lesser degree, to the English speaking readership at 
large under the title, Dream Story, since its translation in 1955.2 In recent years, the 
narrative has been introduced to a much wider audience through Stanley Kubrik’s 
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2 Except where noted, all English translations of Traumnovelle are from the following edition: Arthur 






adaptation of the text in the film Eyes Wide Shut (1999).3 My focus in this chapter will be 
on the original text, Traumnovelle although I will also draw on the film adaptation when 
it elucidates the narrative in a particularly concise manner. 
There is a rich body of secondary literature on Schnitzler’s work that spans many 
decades, any within that literature, there are certain interpretive trends. (That scholarship 
often overlaps with research on Kubrick’s adaptation of the novella, although the body of 
secondary literature that pertains to the film is significantly more limited.) One of the 
most productive areas of inquiry has come from the disciplines of feminist theory and 
gender studies. Scholars in those disciplines have looked closely at the way in which 
Schnitzler constructs his male and female figures, and accordingly, what these 
constructions tell us about Viennese culture at the turn of the century. In her article, “The 
Power of the Gaze,” Susan Anderson gives a modernist reading Traumnovelle that 
focuses the feminist gaze: a visual metaphor that she uses “to question fin-de-siècle 
gender norms and to offer a more differentiated idea of shifting gender norms.”4 A 
similar approach is taken by Andreas Huyssen in his article, “The Disturbance of Vision 
in Vienna Modernism.”5 In another recent study, Katherine Arens has looked at the 
construction of gender roles in Vienna’s “gendered and class-based economic and social 
                                                 
3 Eyes Wide Shut, dir. Stanley Kubrick. Perf. Nichole Kidman, Tom Cruise, Madison Eginton, and Sidney 
Pollack, 1999, DVD, Warner Home Video, 2001. 
4 Susan C. Anderson, “The Power of the Gaze: Visual Metaphors in Schnitzler’s Prose Works and 
Dramas,” A Companion to the Works of Arthur Schnitzler, ed. Dagmar C. G. Lorenz (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2003) 303. 







expectation” (Ahrens 244).6 Imke Meyer, by contrast, specifically examines the 
relationship between gender and class and in particular, how that relationship affects the 
male figures in Schnitzler’s works.7 
Many scholars have taken a psychological approach to Schnitzler’s work, and 
specifically, to Traumnovelle and Kubrick’s adaptation in Eyes Wide Shut.8 These studies 
tend to offer a Freudian reading of Schnitzler, and indeed, the two men have been linked 
by scholars such as Wolfgang Nehring and Peter Loewenberg.9 Others focus specifically 
on the interrelationship of Eros and Thanatos,10 or on notions of decadence and 
perversity11 – a focus that is not surprising given the degree of moral outrage that many 
of Schnitzler’s works engendered when they were first released, and for some years 
afterwards (Lorenz, Introduction 7). More relevant to what I do here is an essay by 
Waltraud Wende entitled, “Love is More than Just a Game for Two.” In that article, 
Wende looks specifically at the construction of ambiguity in Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut 
(as well as in Colombani’s A la Folie Pas du Tout), and at the way in which these films 
show us how desire blurs the lines between reality and psychological vision.12 Such 
                                                 
6 Katherine Arens, “Schnitzler and the Discourse of Gender in Fin-de-siècle Vienna,” A Companion to the 
Works of Arthur Schnitzler, ed. Dagmar C. G. Lorenz (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003) 243-264. 
7 Imke Meyer, “‘Thou Shalt Not Make Unto Thee Any Graven Image’: Crises of Masculinity in 
Schnitzler’s Die Fremde,” A Companion to the Works of Arthur Schnitzler, ed. Dagmar C. G. Lorenz 
(Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2003) 277-300. 
8 See Friedrich Hacker, “Im falschen Leben gibt es kein Richtiges,” Literatur und Kritik 163/164 (1982): 
36-44. Eve Leeman, “Dreamstory: a Sexual and Psychological Journey,” Lancet 354.9189 (1999): 1566-67. 
9 Wolfgang Nehring, “Schnitzler, Freud’s Alter Ego?” Modern Austrian Literature 10.3-4 (1977): 179-94. 
Peter Loewenberg, “Freud, Schnitzler, and Eyes Wide Shut,” Psyche – Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und 
ihre Anwendungen 58.12 (2004): 1156-1181. 
10 See Charles H. Helmetag, “Dream Odysseys: Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle and Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut,” 
Literature Film Quarterly 31.4 (2003): 276-286. 
11 See Bram Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin-de-siècle Culture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
12 Waltraud Wende, “Love is More than Just a Game for Two: The Experience of Limits in Stanley 






essentially psychological approaches have dominated the secondary literature on 
Schnitzler, although more recently some scholars have argued that Schnitzler’s writing is 
perhaps less psychologically oriented and symbolic, but instead, more focused on realism 
(Ahrens 260).13 
A significant body of secondary literature exists that looks specifically at 
Schnitzler’s work as it reflects social trends in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and more 
specifically, in fin-de siècle Vienna. In a recent cultural-historical study, Peter Gay 
examines how middle class culture emerged and evolved within this cultural context. As 
Dagmar Lorenz notes, the title that Gay chose for that study, Schnitzler’s Century: The 
Making of Middle-Class Culture, itself suggests that Schnitzler “is representative, even a 
paradigm of the modern bourgeois culture […]” (Intro 10).14 Lorenz goes on to note 
however, that this decision to use Schnitzler as such a representation is problematic, 
“given his status as a Jew in the Austro-Hungarian empire” (Intro 8). Egon Schwarz, by 
contrast, has examined Schnitzler in terms of his cultural-historical relationship to fin-de-
siècle Vienna, and in particular, his identity as a Jew in that culture. Schwarz concluded 
                                                                                                                                                 
German Version, Wahnsinnig Verliebt),” Lili Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 34.135 
(2004): 137-156. See also: Ernesto R. Acevedo-Munoz, “Don’t Look Now: Kubrick, Schnitzler, and ‘the 
Unbearable Agony of Desire,’” Literature Interpretation Theory 13.2 (2002): 117-137. 
13 See Felix W. Tweraser, Political Dimensions of Arthur Schnitzler’s Late Fiction (Columbia, SC: Camden 
House, 1998). Anton Pelinka, “Die Struktur und die Probleme der Gesellschaft zur Zeit Arthur 
Schnitzlers,” Literatur und Kritik 163/164 (1982): 59-66. Elizabeth G. Ametsbichler, “Der Reiz des 
Reigens’: Reigen Works by Arthur Schnitzler and Werner Schwab,” Modern Austrian Literature 31.3-4 
(1998): 288-300. 







that “[Jews] had an urban middle-class status imposed upon them” (Schwarz, Insiders 
58).15 
The interrelation of psychological processes and social interaction has also been 
the subject of study, and it is this line of inquiry that perhaps comes the closest to the 
project that I undertake here. In an article entitled “The Self as Process in an Era of 
Transition: Competing Paradigms of Personality and Character in Schnitzler’s Works,” 
Dagmar Lorenz looks at Schnitzler’s portrayal of social roles and cultural paradigms, 
which she characterizes as conflicted, shifting, and fluid (134).16 She observes that “a 
person’s role and function and his or her existential isolation present an unresolvable, 
even tragic dilemma” (Self 134). Here, Lorenz examines the restrictive nature of social 
roles and what she terms the “multilayered identity construction in Schnitzler” (134). As 
she notes of Schnitzler’s protagonists: 
[…] the struggle of Schnitzler’s protagonists with new modalities 
and levels of consciousness takes place in isolation from the world 
of work and careers, as if in defiance of the bourgeois work ethic. 
Unable and unwilling to assume the roles their respective societies 
have in store for them, and for the most part mildly bored, 
Schnitzler’s young men […] seek authentic experiences through 
their emotions and senses. (Self 134-35) 
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State University Press, 1994) 47-65. 
16 Dagmar C. G. Lorenz, “The Self as Process in an Era of Transition: Competing Paradigms of Personality 
and Character in Schnitzler’s Works,” A Companion to the Works of Arthur Schnitzler, ed. Dagmar C. G. 






In this way, Lorenz sheds light on the interaction of the social with the personal 
and psychological, and in particular, on the restrictive nature of social status that, 
although created by social convention, nevertheless limits the public expression of 
identity: “Reigen and Traumnovelle are among the works that expose the relativity of 
social norms without loosing sight of the fact that they determine an individual’s status 
and social range” (Self 135). 
Unlike narratives that deal with so-called “catastrophic events” such as war, 
genocide, or natural disaster, Traumnovelle depicts an experience that is deceptively 
prosaic. The novella deals with what in simplest terms, is referred to as “mid-life crisis,” 
an experience that is not commonly considered to be authentically traumatizing and that 
is even made the subject of humor. Certainly aging is not a discrete “event,” nor is it an 
experience that is outside the range of usual human experience, and yet the term ‘crisis’ 
itself indicates that mid-life crisis indeed represents an experience or phenomenon that 
disrupts the individual’s functioning and identity. If we look at mid-life crisis from within 
the model of subjectivity and the redefinition of trauma being developed here, it becomes 
more comprehensible how something as ubiquitous as aging can trigger traumatic crisis – 
a crisis of identity brought on by a disruption to the semiotic current that drives 
signification and evokes subjectivity. 
Mid-life crisis is precipitated by an abrupt shift in one’s perception of personal 
identity, characterized by the realization that one’s lifespan is limited (death as Other 
encroaching upon Self), and that one’s options as to how one lives one’s life are limited 






this disruption is laid well in advance of the actual crisis it engenders when specific life 
choices articulate some aspect of subjectivity, while concurrently silencing or excluding 
other aspects. This exclusion occurs either because specific articulations of identity 
preclude others, or simply because certain life choices have prevented the active pursuit 
of that excluded identity. In simpler terms, when an individual chooses a partner, she 
forfeits all other potential partners, and when an individual chooses a career, she forfeits 
other career paths through that choice – at least for a time, if not forever. The same holds 
true for many of life’s choices. Far from being an unusual circumstance, the tendency for 
life choices to articulate some aspects of subjectivity while silencing others is virtually 
unavoidable. Inevitably, everyone suffers some loss of subjectivity when she becomes a 
subject in the social domain. Identity is formed and emerges in its opposition to other 
instances of identity – the primary characteristic of the field of signified meaning. 
Subjectivity that does not find immediate expression in Idiolect and the 
Communicative domain is not necessarily irrevocably lost. While it is not possible to 
return to childhood and recover subjective identity that was articulated as oneself as a 
child, other aspects of subjective identity (the subject articulated in Idiolect) is more 
elective in nature. Someone who decides to pursue an education and a career in academia 
as an expression of identity, for example, may still change courses and pursue a career as 
a professional athlete, musician, or park ranger, for instance. We can say that such 
identity is temporarily deferred but still available. This is particularly true if the decision 
to forego an expression of identity is relatively recent. With time, however, the hold that 






frequently becomes more rooted in habit, career, family obligations, etc., and the 
likelihood that she will radically alter her life’s path decreases in proportion to the degree 
of inertia generated both by the difficulties that oppose such change, and the burdens of 
current responsibilities and commitments. At some point in many people’s lives there 
comes a time when they acknowledge that a drastic change in career or lifestyle is 
unlikely, that their health or stamina will no longer permit them to pursue certain 
activities, that they are past the age when they can bear children, or that they are no 
longer willing to accept a reduced standard of living in order to forge a new career path, 
etc. These kinds of realizations concerning the finitude of the human lifespan and the 
impossibility of living out all possible manifestations of one’s identity figure largely in 
mid-life crisis. At the moment when the realization is reached that one either cannot or 
will not pursue deferred aspects of identity, we can say that deferred identity has become 
foreclosed identity. 
When subjective identity is foreclosed upon, conflict may arise anywhere in the 
current of signification. It may arise in the Ethical domain when the boundaries of Self 
have to be shifted to exclude that which is no longer recognized as belonging to one’s 
current or primary subjective identity (Self), for example. Likewise, identity (the 
‘subject’) formed in Idiolect may include potential subjective identity as a part of the 
subject, and the foreclosure of potential subjectivity may demand the revision of the 
boundaries of the subject. (A doctoral student who abandons her efforts to complete her 
degree would be forced to exclude symbolized identity as a future Ph.D., for instance.) 






field of signification, but also within the temporal sequence of prior articulations, and as 
a result, conflict may arise when the foreclose of identity creates abrupt changes in that 
temporal sequence. Such abrupt changes – changes in which an articulation of identity 
does not gradually succeed a prior articulation – interject the perception that there is a 
discontinuity in subjective identity. This perception of discontinuity disrupts the 
expectation that identity is stable and that the ‘subject’ constructed in Idiolect comprises 
an accurate representation of a real-world entity rather than a cognitive construct. 
The conflict of mid-life crisis may be initiated in the Communicative Domain if 
the individual’s apprehension of their own subjective identity is increasingly rejected by 
others in the discursive community. The social rejection of deferred identity, for instance, 
may force upon the individual an awareness that that identity is, in some measure, no 
longer valid and therefore threatened with immanent foreclosure. Returned (via social 
mirroring) to the Epistemic domain as somatosensory experience, that rejection can 
disrupt the semiotic current across any number of differentials among the organizational 
domains as the individual struggles to mediate between the experience of Self as identity, 
and identity as it is accepted and acknowledged in the domain of social interaction. 
Regardless where it arises, foreclosed identity has the potential to create conflict that 
interrupts the flow of signification, foundationally disrupting subjectivity. 
It is just such a rejection of asserted identity in the Communicative domain that 
precipitates the traumatic crisis around which Traumnovelle is centered. The event at 
which this social rejection occurs is a masked ball (Redout) that the couple, Fridolin and 






pretend to belong to a higher social standing than they can legitimately claim. (This 
assertion of a higher social standing is, in fact, an expression of deferred identity since, as 
I will show later in this section, each at least perceives that they have foregone the chance 
to advance their own social status by choosing to marry one another.) Their attendance at 
this ball is unusual, given their middle-class status, and indeed, this ball at the end of the 
Carnival period is the only such event that is open to the couple. 
Kubrick’s film makes the point somewhat clearer to the modern audience. In Eyes 
Wide Shut, the couple (Alice and Bill), attend a Christmas party given by one of Bill’s 
wealthy employers. Their attendance there is equally unique, with a Christmas party 
being the one obvious social event at which individuals belonging to a wealthy class 
might ‘appropriately’ mix with their subordinates. While initial outward appearances give 
the impression that Alice and Bill are an upper-class couple among other high class 
couples, the two are not there as social equals. The inequality of their social standing 
with the other party-goers is betrayed when Bill is called away from the party to attend to 
a woman who has overdosed in an upstairs room. That woman is, herself, revealed to be 
one of the top-end prostitutes commissioned to “entertain” the wealthy guests, and like 
Bill, is attending the party in the capacity of a subordinate who can be called away with 
the snap of someone’s fingers. 
In the novella, as in the film adaptation, Fridolin and Albertine’s attempt to ‘blend 
in’ at the masked ball and to pass themselves off as belonging to the appropriate social 
standing constitutes a private strategy for managing deferred identity. They are engaging 






terms of the semiotic current, deferred identity – identity that would have been expressed 
had the couple achieved a higher social status – is articulated in a Narrative domain, 
which has been constructed as a means of holding subjectivity that is otherwise precluded 
in Idiolect. Their attempt to pass themselves off as upper-class at the ball is by no means 
successful. The couple’s responses to others in that environment demonstrate that they 
themselves are naïve about social cues and gestures that would be familiar to anyone 
legitimately belonging to that milieu. As a result, those with a legitimate claim to move in 
that environment are able to recognize very quickly that Fridolin and Albertine do not 
actually belong there. Fridolin, for instance, is approached almost immediately by two 
women, who behave as though they know him: 
Was Fridolin betraf, so war er gleich beim Eintritt in den Saal wie 
ein mit Ungeduld erwarteter Freund von Zwei roten Dominos 
begrüßt worden, über deren Person er sich nicht klar zu werden 
vermochte, obzwar sie über allerlei Geschichten aus seiner 
Studenten- und Spitalzeit auffallend genauen Bescheid wußten. 
(11-12)17 
The eagerness of these two women to greet him has nothing to do with 
recognition, but simply reflects their eagerness to find a paying client. Even the fact that 
they appear to know all sorts of stories about his days as a student and intern is 
unremarkable, since the women have been with any number of gentlemen of Fridolin’s 
                                                 
17 “No sooner had Fridolin entered the ball-room than he was greeted, like a long lost friend, by two women 
dressed in red dominoes. He has no idea who they were, although they were unusually well-informed about 






profession. These stories that they claim to recall are simply a means to becoming 
familiar with their potential mark, and their ruse is nothing more than a stylized manner 
of interaction characteristic of the women’s role at the ball. Fridolin’s naïveté with regard 
to these women, the earnestness with which he receives their flattering advances, and his 
sincere efforts to place where he might have met them before ultimately betray him to the 
women as an outsider and they abandon him as a potential customer with false promises 
of a speedy return. Fridolin is unable to recognize that he has been summarily dismissed, 
and his fruitless attempt to find these women merely underscores his status as a kind of 
“infiltrator:” 
Aus der Loge, in die sie ihn mit verheißungsvoller Freundlichkeit 
geladen, hatten sie sich mit dem Versprechen entfernt sehr bald, 
und zwar unmaskiert, zurückzukommen, waren aber so lange 
fortgeblieben, daß er, ungeduldig geworden, verzog, sich ins 
Parterre zu begeben, wo er den beiden fragwürdigen 
Erscheinungen wieder zu begegnen hoffte. (12)18 
Albertine fares no better than her husband in her interactions with the other party-
goers. She is approached by a minor Polish aristocrat, whom she at first finds charming, 
but who subsequently shocks her with his abrupt sexual advances: 
[Albertine hatte] sich eben jäh einem Unbekannten entzogen, 
dessen melankolisch-blasiertes Wesen und fremdländerischer, 
                                                 
18 “They had invited him into a box with great friendliness, but had left again with the promise that they 
would soon return without masks. When they did not appear, he became impatient and went down to the 







anscheinend polnischer Akzent sie anfangs bestrickt, der sie aber 
plötzlich durch ein unerwartet hingeworfenes, häßliches Wort 
verletzt, ja erschreckt hatte. (12)19 
Like Fridolin, Albertine has been recognized as possessing a lower social standing than 
the other guests, however unlike Fridolin, whose recognized lower status marks him as a 
kind of infiltrator, Albertine has been mistaken for one of the prostitutes commissioned to 
attend the party. Like Fridolin as well, she was too unfamiliar with the finer elements of 
social interaction in this milieu to recognize the cause of the Polish aristocrat’s 
familiarity. Indeed, the Polish aristocrat demonstrates the kind of behavior that the two 
women in red dominoes had expected from Fridolin – that is, he was expected to make a 
pretense of polite civility and then proceed straight to the business of negotiating a 
discrete sexual encounter. 
Their affectation having been recognized and rejected within the social domain of 
the ball, Albertine and Fridolin withdraw to one another’s company in order to regroup 
and to recover from the narcissistic injuries they have sustained. In so doing, they 
reestablish within the privacy of their own relationship the fantasy of social equality that 
had been so brusquely rejected only moments earlier: 
Und so saßen Mann und Frau, im Grunde froh, einem entäuschend 
banalen Maskenspiel entronnen zu sein, bald wie zwei Liebende, 
unter anderen verliebten Paaren im Büfettraum bei Austern und 
                                                 
19 “[Albertine] had just freed herself from the company of a stranger whose blasé manner and apparently 
Polish accent had at first charmed her. Suddenly he had offended her – frightened her by a rather common 






Champagner, plauderten sich vergnügt, als hätten sie eben erst 
Bekanntschaft miteinander geschlossen, in einer Komödie der 
Galantrie, des Widerstandes, der Verführung und des Gewährens 
hinein. (12)20 
Under the spell of this compact between only themselves, the couple return home in an 
amorous mood, feeling closer to one another than they had in a very long time. The 
underlying impact of the social rejection at the masked ball does not emerge until the 
“grey dawning of everyday life, when the grey shadows of figures from the ball return” 
(7). The return of those figures to their mind marks the emergence of the conflict that had 
prompted the compensatory behavior to begin with (that is, passing themselves off as 
belonging to a higher social milieu), and that will form the basis of the traumatic crisis to 
come – the foreclosure of deferred identity in the form of an elevated social standing. 
[nun] stiegen die Schattengestalten von der Redout, der 
melancholisch Unbekannte und die roten Dominos, wieder zur 
Wirklichkeit empor; und jene unbeträchtlichen Erlebnisse waren 
mit einmal vom trügerischen Scheine versäumter Möglichkeiten 
zauberhaft und schmerzlich umflossen. Harmlose und doch 
lauernde Fragen, verschmitzte, doppeldeutige Antworten 
wechselten hin und her, keinem vom beiden entging, daß der 
andere es an der letzten Aufrichtigkeit fehlen ließ, und so fühlten 
                                                 
20 “Fridolin and Albertina were glad to have escaped from a disappointingly commonplace masquerade 
prank, and soon sat like two lovers, among other couples, in the buffet, eating oysters and drinking 
champagne. They chatted gaily, as though they had just made each other’s acquaintance, acting a comedy 






sich beide zu gelinder Rache aufgelegt. Sie übertrieben das Maß 
der Anziehung, das von ihren unbekannten Redoutenpartnern auf 
sie ausgestralt hätte, spotteten der eifersüchtigen Regungen, die der 
andere merken ließ, und leugneten ihre eigenen weg. (13)21 
Fridolin and Albertine are confronting the foreclosure of identity precipitated by 
the social rejection of deferred identity, and the result of that rejection is the disruption of 
essential compensatory mechanisms that enable each to retain subjectivity that otherwise 
would be lost. In revisiting the rejection of the night before, Fridolin and Albertine 
reassert the fantasy that had precipitated that rejection, each portraying their 
disappointing encounter as though it had been a moment of potential infidelity, and 
seeking from one another the recognition that they failed to receive in the social 
environment of the masked ball. The couple’s jealous reaction to one another expresses, 
in part, a fear that the other will leave – a fear that, as I will discuss below, is itself tied to 
deferred identity and a sense of immanent loss. In a more positive sense, however, that 
jealous reaction also serves a very positive function in supporting deferred subjectivity, 
and in reducing the loss felt by having deferred other expressions of identity. 
By reacting with jealousy at their partner’s presumed inappropriate flirtation and 
by exaggerating the significance of their own failed encounter, the couple bypasses the 
rejection of their claims to a higher social standing and in essence, tacitly validate one 
                                                 
21 But now […], the shadowy forms of the masquerade, the melancholy stranger and the red dominoes, rose 
again into reality. And all at once those insignificant events were imbued, magically and painfully, with the 
deceptive glow of neglected opportunities. Harmless but probing questions, and sly, ambiguous answers 
were exchanged. Neither failed to notice that the other was not absolutely honest, and so they became 
slightly vindictive. They exaggerated the degree of attraction that their unknown partners at the ball had 






another in those claims. While their claims to a higher status are rejected by the 
discursive community of the masked ball (e.g., by those who possess that higher status), 
as a couple, Fridolin and Albertine themselves comprise a discursive community with the 
capacity to sanction or reject one another’s apprehensions of reality and identity. Within 
that private compact, their jealous reactions validate the partner’s potential to achieve a 
higher status (i.e., through a well placed match) thereby enabling them to repair the 
rejection of the discursive community at the ball within the discursive community of their 
relationship. 
The couple’s banter and quarreling constitute, in essence, a part of the routine that 
supports the “social compact” within their own private discursive community to validate 
deferred identity. The potential to realize deferred identity, in other words, can be 
perceived as authentic if it is able to provoke the outrage of the partner. This outrage over 
events that have not actually taken place serves the additional function of reassuring the 
partner that there is a vehement investment in the relationship. This signaling of 
investment is essential in allaying the fear that the jealous outbursts of each partner 
expresses. The dissolution of that marital union would essentially constitute a double 
foreclosure – the loss of subjectivity that has been foregone in favor of the marriage, and 
the subsequent loss of subjectivity that has been invested. The conflict, then, emerges as a 
conspiratorial conflict – one that that the partners engage in towards the common goals of 
stabilizing personal identity that otherwise remains unexpressed, but also of 






[...] sie redeten von den geheimen Bezirken, nach denen sie kaum 
Sehnsucht verspürten und wohin der unfaßbare Wind des 
Schicksals sie doch einmal, und wär’s auch nur im Traum, 
verschlagen könnte. Denn so völlig sie einander in Gefühl und 
Sinnen angehörten, sie wußten, daß gestern nicht zum erstenmal 
ein Hauch von Abenteuer, Freiheit und Gefahr sie anrührt; bang, 
selbstquälerisch, in unlauterer Neugier versuchten sie eines aus 
dem anderen Geständnisse hervorzulocken und, ängstlich näher 
zusammenruckend, forschte jedes in sich noch irgendeiner 
Tatsache, so gleichgültig, nach einem Erlebnis, so richtig es sein 
mochte, das für das Unsagbare als Ausdruck gelten, und dessen 
aufrichtige Beichte sie vielleicht von einer Spannung und einem 
Mißtrauen befreien könnte, das allmählich unerträglich zu werden 
anfing. (13)22 
The crisis engendered at the ball continues to emerge in the guise of a more 
deeply rooted marital discord as the couple extends their quarrel to earlier, potential 
moments of indiscretion; infidelities that each had had the chance to commit, and yet 
significantly, had chosen not to. Like the falsified accounts of “amorous encounters” at 
                                                 
22 “They spoke of those mysterious regions [for which they scarcely felt any desire, and] towards which the 
incomprehensible wind of fate might some day drive them, even if only in their dreams. For though they 
were united in thought and feeling, they knew that the preceding day had not been the first time that the 
spirit of adventure, freedom and danger had beckoned them. [Anxiously moving towards one another], each 
sought with disingenuous curiosity to draw out confessions from the other. Anxiously, they searched within 
themselves for some indifferent fact, or trifling experience, which might express the inexpressible, and the 
honest confession of which might relieve them of the strain and the suspicion which were becoming 






the masked ball, these “infidelities” over which the couple argues never actually took 
place, and indeed, never had any potential for fulfillment, but took place only in the 
minds of each. In Albertine’s case, she had had the briefest of infatuations – lasting a 
single day – with a naval officer she had seen while on holiday in Denmark the previous 
summer. As she explains to Fridolin, they had only had a single direct encounter, when 
she had run into him one morning, and the sum of their interaction had been that they had 
each scowled at one another: 
„Den ganzen Tag lag ich traumverloren am Strand. Wenn er mich 
riefe – so meinte ich zu wissen – ich hätte nicht widerstehen 
können. Zu allem glaubte ich mich bereit; dich, das Kind, meine 
Zukunft hinzugeben, glaubte ich mich so gut wie entschlossen, und 
zugleich – wirst du es verstehen? – warst du mir teuerer als je. 
Gerade an diesem Nachmittag, du mußt dich noch erinnern, fügte 
es sich, daß wir so vertraut über tausende Dinge, auch über unsere 
gemeinsame Zukunft, auch über das Kind plauderten, wie schon 
seit lange nicht mehr. Bei Sonnenuntergang saßen wir auf dem 
Balkon, du und ich, da ging er vorüber unten am Strand, ohne 
aufzublicken, und ich war beglückt, ihn zu sehen. Dir aber strich 
ich über die Stirne und küßte dich aufs Haar, und in meiner Liebe 
zu dir war zugleich viel schmerzliches Mitleid.“ (14)23 
                                                 
23 “That whole day I lay on the beach, lost in dreams. Had he called me – I thought – I could not have 
resisted. I thought I was ready for anything. I had practically resolved to give up on you, the child, my 
future, and at the same time – if you can understand it? – you were dearer to me than ever. That same 






Albertine does not act upon her impulses, if any action were in fact possible, since 
the naval officer does not show any interest in her whatsoever. The “Infidelity” is nothing 
more than a fantasy, and Albertine describes the end of her infatuation in these terms: 
“Nichts weiter. Ich weiß nur, daß ich am nächsten Morgen mit 
einer gewissen Bangigkeit erwachte. Wovor mir mehr bangte – ob 
davor, daß er abgereist, oder davor, daß er noch da sein könnte –, 
das weiß ich nicht, das habe ich auch damals nicht gewußt. Doch 
als er auch mittags verschwunden blieb, atmete ich auf.” (15)24 
Fridolin’s description of his “infatuation” is very different from Albertine’s, and 
reveals his much diminished ability to sublimate his impulses when compared with his 
wife, whose infatuation took place only in her mind. Fridolin’s voice is “slightly hostile,” 
as he gives his account of meeting a “woman” on the beach. That account is replete, with 
interjected fantasy (both in the quality of that account and its content) and reveals that 
rather than having been involved in a potentially romantic encounter, Fridolin had 
trapped a fifteen year old girl on the ledge of a bathing hut: 
„Ein Zittern ging durch ihren Leib, als müßte sie sinken oder 
fliehen. Doch da sie auf dem schmalen Brett sich doch nur ganz 
langsam hätte weiterbewegen können, entschloß sie sich 
innezuhalten, – und stand nun da, zuerst mit einem erschrockenen, 
                                                                                                                                                 
future, and our child. At sunset you and I were sitting on the balcony, when down on the beach, he passed 
without looking up. I was extremely thrilled to see him, but I stroked your forehead and kissed your hair, 
and my love for you was both sorrowful and compassionate” (10). 
24 “That’s all. I only know that I woke the next morning with a sort of restless anxiety. I don’t know now 
and didn’t know then what I was afraid of – that he had left or that he might still be there. But when he 






dann mit einem zornigen, endlich mit einem verlegenen Gesicht. 
Mit einemmal aber lächelte sie, lächelte wunderbar; es war ein 
Grüßen, ja ein Winken in ihren Augen, – und zugleich  ein leiser 
Spott, mit dem sie ganz flüchtig zu ihren Füßen das Wasser 
streifte, das mich von ihr trennte. Dann reckte sie den jungen 
schlanken Körper hoch, wie ihrer Schöhnheit froh, und, wie leicht 
zu merken war, durch den Glanz meines Blicks, den sie auf sich 
fühlte, stolz und süß erregt. […] Mit einmal aber schüttelte sie 
heftig den Kopf, löste einen Arm von der Wand, deutete 
gebieterisch, ich solle mich entfernen; und als ich es nicht gliech 
über mich brachte zu gehorchen, kam ein solches Bitten, ein 
solches Flehen in ihre Kinderaugen, daß mich nichts anderes 
übrigblieb, als mich abzuwenden.“ (16)25 
Fridolin’s interjected and elaborate interpretation of the girl’s facial expressions 
and gestures merely serve his fantasy and contrast dramatically with Albertine’s only 
description of the naval officer: “‘Er lächelte nicht, ja, eher schien mir, daß sein Antlitz 
sich verdüstere, […]’” (14).26 Albertine’s entire description is of her own inner processes, 
including the ambiguity of her feelings and her recourse to fantasy as a means of holding 
                                                 
25 “A tremor passed through her body, as though she wished to drop into the water or run. But as she could 
move only very slowly in the narrow ledge, she had to stay where she was. She stood there with a face 
expressing at first fright, then anger, and finally embarrassment. All at once, however, she smiled, smiled 
marvellously. Her eyes welcomed me, beckoned to me, and at the same time slightly mocked me, as she 
glanced at the strip of water between us. Then she stretched her young and slender body, glad of her 
beauty, and proudly and sweetly stirred by my obvious admiration. […] Then she shook her head 
vigorously, took one arm from the wall and commanded me with a gesture to go away. When I didn’t at 
once obey, her childlike eyes turned on me such a beseeching look that there was nothing for me to do but 
go” (13). 






inexpressible subjectivity. Unlike Fridolin, who gives a mildly erotic description of the 
young girl’s physical appearance and the seductive intent to many of her facial 
expressions, Albertine’s account cedes only a minor role to the officer. She demonstrates 
a much greater capacity to sublimate her impulses. In terms of the current of her 
subjectivity, she is able to hold conflicted desires and identity adequately in a Narrative 
domain (fantasy), thereby mitigating the crisis that she experiences. Fridolin, on the other 
hand, copes with such conflict by elevating his fantasy to the level of a competing reality, 
compartmentalizing conflicted aspects of experience and subjectivity – a strategy that 
ultimately drives him into a state of active crisis. This tendency to compartmentalize 
experience is dramatically illustrated when, in the midst of their quarrel, Fridolin is called 
away to attend the death of a patient: 
Das Stubenmädchen hatte den Pelz gebracht, Fridolin küßte 
Albertine ziemlich zerstreut, als wäre das Gespräch der letzten 
Stunde aus seinem Gedächtnis schon weggewischt, auf Stirn und 
Mund und eilte davon. (20)27 
Albertine and Fridolin’s infatuations on holiday are harmless in the sense that 
neither one acted upon his or her desires or impulses. At the same time, both the 
infatuations, and the quarrel they provoke play a crucial role in the novella – not, as is 
often assumed, as the substance of the crisis (jealously and infidelity), but as an essential 
part of the method by which the true underlying crisis is managed. Beginning with the 
productive role of the infatuation itself, each of these flirtations with indiscretion 
                                                 
27 “The maid brought his fur coat, and absentmindedly kissing Albertina on her forehead and mouth, as if 






represent a compensatory mechanism whereby they are able to maintain the perception 
that their options have been kept open. This perception then allows both Fridolin and 
Albertine to avoid foreclosing on identity that was deferred when they chose to marry one 
another. The point of conflict is not truly jealousy or the fear that the partner has a 
genuine interest in pursuing an extramarital affair, but rather the renewed fear of what is 
perceived to have been lost through the couple’s decision to marry one another and 
establish a family. 
The implications of their decision to marry, as well as the more critical life 
choices that are tied to this decision (i.e., the need for career stability, the decision to raise 
children, etc.), are perceived by both Albertine and Fridolin to have negatively impacted 
their potential social standing. (As I will show, Fridolin simultaneously entertains the 
fear that he actually is of a lower standing than Albertine, and in this way, is divided in 
his apprehension of his potential social standing.) This professed limitation goes beyond 
a desire for material comfort. As was evidenced at the masked ball, social standing in 
class-conscious fin-de-siecle Vienna has a profound impact on the manner in which each 
will be permitted to express their identity in the domain of social interaction. Fridolin’s 
sense of loss is centered on his loss of career potential and his failure to enhance his 
status through strategic choices in his profession. His overt focus is on the fact that he has 
chosen not to pursue a more prestigious academic career as a Doctor of Medicine, 
electing instead to become a medical practitioner so that he can, in his own words, sustain 
a more comfortable existence. This decision to practice medicine rather than to become a 






young family against his desire for a more elevated status –a status to which he must, to 
some degree, feel he has a justifiable claim. 
Fridolin’s underlying dissatisfaction with his chosen status is first revealed when 
he is suddenly called away in the midst of his quarrel with Albertine to attend the 
deathbed of the Count Councilor. There, he is met by the Councilor’s daughter, 
Marianne, who has been left alone to care for her father in his last days. Although 
ostensibly operating in his capacity as medical practitioner, Fridolin is nonetheless 
connected to this family to an unusual degree owing his lengthy involvement with them 
over the course of the Councilor’s protracted illness. The personal and the professional 
are mingled as Marianne presents Fridolin with news concerning her family, and in 
particular, her fiancé, Dr. Roediger. The mention of this fiancé and his academic 
achievements piques Fridolin and fills him with a sense of inferiority: 
Ihr Bräutigam wird wohl bald eine Professur erhalten; an der 
philosophischen Fakultät liegen ja die Verhältnisse in dieser 
Beziehung viel günstiger als bei uns! Er dachte daran, daß er vor 
Jahren auch auch eine akademische Laufbahn angestrebt, daß er 
auch bei seiner Neigung zu einer behaglicheren Existenz sich am 
Ende entschieden hatte; – und plötzlich kam er sich dem 
vortreffllichen Doktor Roediger gegenüber als der Geringere vor. 
(23-24)28 
                                                 
28 “ ‘I suppose your fiancé will soon get a professorship. The chances for promotion are more favorable in 
the faculty of Philosophy than with us in Medicine.’ He was thinking that, years ago, he also had aspired to 
an academic career, but because he wanted a comfortable income, he had finally decided to practice 






Although the title of Doktor and an academic appointment to a professorship 
would have afforded Fridolin greater prestige,29 it is also a career goal with less guarantee 
of financial security and fraught with the risk of potential failure. Fridolin’s disparaging 
observation that an academic career in philosophy is much easier than one in medicine is 
at once spurious, and revealing of Fridolin’s own fears and tendency to avoid challenge. 
He could only have achieved such an academic title and position by distinguishing 
himself intellectually and by fighting for recognition among a community of individuals 
who are both potential peers, but also potential competitors. Fridolin’s success as a 
medical practitioner, by contrast, rests solely upon his capacity to work diligently at an 
occupation in which his days are “nüchtern und vorbestimmt in Alltagspflicht” (12). 30 
Although he justifies his decision not to pursue an academic position by claiming it is a 
sacrifice he has made for greater financial stability as the provider for a young family, in 
reality, that choice also stems in part from his own reluctance to take great risks – a 
reluctance that we will see expressed repeatedly throughout the novella, consistently 
coupled with Fridolin’s doubts as to his own courage. 
Fridolin’s tendency to seek security and safety, even at the cost of some of the 
prestige he so earnestly craves, underlies a number of critical encounters throughout the 
novella. His attempts to renegotiate his identity with regards this basic capacity for risk-
taking is repeated so often that it becomes impossible to overlook the fact that his 
                                                 
29 Fridolin’s perception of a lowered social status derives from the fact that the title Doktor was not used for 
the standard on-call physician, a position that was viewed at the time as simply a trade, not a lettered 
profession. Instead, the title was reserved only for those who elected to write a doctoral thesis, thereby 
making a unique contribution to the fund of academic knowledge in the field of medicine. This distinction 
still survives in countries such as Germany […], where practicing physicians are properly addressed as 
Herr or Frau Doktor only if they have completed an academically oriented doctoral thesis in their field. 






fundamental pragmatism, if not outright timidity, has more to do with his failure to 
achieve greater prestige in his life than the supposed burden of his marriage to Albertine 
and the founding of a family. Fridolin demonstrates a long-term tendency not only to err 
firmly on the side of caution, but also to later elaborate on his own involvement in 
various events in order to conceal the timidity of his actions by greatly embellishing the 
degree of danger he faced. While Fridolin recalls having engaged in high-risk behavior as 
a youth, for instance, the text reveals that in none of those reported events was there ever 
more than a whisper of authentic risk, the masculine prestige of each benefiting 
enormously from the passage of time and Fridolin’s exaggerated recollection of them. 
These reflections themselves often betray an underlying timidity and anxiety, as in the 
instance when he is reminded of a dalliance he had had with a young woman, who 
claimed to be engaged: 
[…] er verspürte ein sonderbares Herzklopfen – ganz wie einmal 
vor zwölf oder vierzehn Jahren, als es so heftig an seine Tür 
gepocht hatte, während das anmutige junge Ding bei ihm war, das 
immer von einem entfernt lebenden, wahrscheinlich gar nicht 
existierenden Bräutigam zu faseln liebte; es war auch tatsächlich 
nur der Briefträger gewesen, der so drohend gepocht hatte. (29)31 
This tendency to exaggerate both present and remembered situations is 
demonstrated with even greater clarity when he ruins into a group of students from a 
                                                 
31 “[…] he felt his heart beating strangely, just as it had on a previous occasion, twelve or fourteen years 
before. There had been an unusually loud knock on his door while he had had with him a certain charming 
young creature who was never tired of prattling about her jealous [probably non-existent] fiancé. As a 







fencing fraternity on the street. There, one of the students, who has one eye bandaged 
from a recent fencing duel and swaggering with his own inflated sense of masculine 
courage, bumps into Fridolin. Fridolin interprets the incident as a challenge – an 
assumption that says as much about his desire to view himself as a worthy adversary as it 
does about the student’s intentions – however he reacts not with actions, but with 
thoughts that reflect both aggravation and timidity (even cowardice), as well as a need to 
rationalize his reluctance to return what he had thought was a challenge to his 
masculinity: 
Was ist das, fragte er sich ärgerlich und merkte nun, daß ihm die 
Knie ein wenig zitterten. Feig -? Unsinn, erwiderte er sich selbst. 
Soll ich mich mit einem betrunkenen Studenten herstellen, ich, ein 
Mann von fünfunddreißig Jahren, praktischer Arzt, verheiratet, 
Vater eines Kindes! – Kontrahage! Zeugen! Duell! Und am Ende 
wegen einer solchen dummen Rempelei einen Hieb in den Arm! 
Und für ein paar Wochen berufsunfähig? – Oder ein Auge heraus? 
– Oder gar Blutvergiftung –? Und in acht Tagen so weit wie der 
Herr in der Schreyvogelgasse unter der Bettdecke aus braunem 
Flanell! Feig –? (29)32 
                                                 
32 “What’s the meaning of this? he asked himself, and he noticed that his knees were shaking a little. Am I 
a coward? Oh! nonsense, he assured himself. Why should I go and face a drunken student, I, a man of 
thirty-five, a practicing physician, a married man and father of a child? Formal challenge! Seconds! A duel! 
And perhaps because of such a silly encounter receive a cut in my arm and be unable to perform my 
professional duties? – Or lose an eye? – Or even get blood-poisoning? – And in a week perhaps be in the 






Subjectivity is divided in such a way that the same impulse to act rationally and 
prudently both that which is demanded of him as a father and a husband, and that  which 
prevents him from claiming a more elevated status – in this case, by exhibiting greater 
masculine virility. Behind the rational response lurks the suspicion that he is innately 
incapable of behaving otherwise which, should it prove true, would render the temporary 
deferral of identity (elevated status) invalid and foreclose upon it. Fridolin’s appeal to 
responsibility, together with the implied accusation of cowardice that hides behind it, 
represents a defensive rejection of that aspect of his own subjectivity that wishes to yield 
to youthful temptation. The inner monologue with which he contravenes the desire for 
impetuous action, in turn, will become the exaggerated content of later recollection when, 
just as in the instance of the threatening mail carrier, Fridolin remembers his own 
emotional responses and thought processes with greater clarity than he does the events 
themselves. Fridolin’s reflexive fear that responsible action may be indistinguishable 
from cowardly action also sparks a subsequent re-defense of his primary identity and a 
retreat into an inflated memory of his own of bravado as he recalls his own “dueling 
years”: 
Drei Säbelmensuren hatte er ausgefochten, und auch zu einem 
Pistolenduell war er einmal bereit gewesen, und nicht auf seine 
Veranlassung war die Sache damals gütlich beigelegt worden. Und 
sein Beruf! Gefahren von allen Seiten und in jedem Augenblick, – 
man vergaß nur immer wieder dran. Wie lange war es dann her, 






Drei oder vier Tage, nicht mehr. Das war immerhin eine 
bedenklichere Sache als so eine kleine Sabelfechterei. (29)33 
This long-standing conflict, in which Fridolin’s need to behave responsibly 
collides with his longing to behave impulsively is further exacerbated by the fact that the 
rash and impulsive behavior he desires, while somewhat acceptable in youth, becomes a 
self-destructive behavior with age. The temporary foreclosure of subjectivity for the sake 
of youthful goals (i.e., in suppressing rash action that could threaten the stability of both 
career and family life), is now threatened with permanent foreclosure, since the actions 
that express that foreclosed subjectivity have become increasingly untenable. The cost of 
such actions increases in proportion to age not only in terms of financial loss or damage 
to close relationships, but perhaps most importantly, the loss of status in a society that 
forgives the sins of youth, but punishes the folly of old age. As a result, those critical 
aspects of subjective identity that were deferred in youth are now threatened with 
permanent foreclosure. Fridolin is unconsciously faced with the decision either to act on 
the temptation to behave impulsively (i.e., youthfully) or to abandon that behavior and 
reinvest the subjectivity that such behavior expresses by sublimating that current. He 
must, in other words, accommodate the flow of semiotic current by establishing a new, 
adequate articulation of subjectivity among the five organizational domains. The 
rambling, ultimately unfulfilling journey upon which he now embarks represents the 
effort either to abandon responsibility (thereby demonstrating that identity need not yet 
                                                 
33 “He had fought three sabre duels, and had even been ready to fight a duel with pistols, and it wasn’t at his 
request that the matter had been called off. And what about his profession! There were dangers lurking 
everywhere and at all times – except that one usually forgets about them. Why, how long ago was it that 
that child with diphtheria had coughed in his face? Only three or four days, that’s all. Agter all, that was 






be foreclosed upon), or to abandon the desire to be free of responsibility (thereby 
completing that foreclosure). 
While Fridolin’s crisis is a longstanding one that derives not from his current 
situation, but rather from the underlying makeup of his subjective identity, he focuses the 
majority of his anxiety and discontent on his relationship with Albertine. This focus is 
due in part to the fact that Albertine herself shares a form of that crisis, albeit in milder 
form, and therefore like Fridolin, contributes to an overall atmosphere of anxiety in the 
relationship. Albertine is confronted with the same desire to obtain a high social standing, 
however because of the cultural norms and standards of the day, she cannot hope to 
enhance her status through strategic career choices. Instead, Albertine would have to seek 
to elevate her social status with a clever match – by marrying into the highest social 
standing that would be reasonably suitable for a woman of her background. I will 
examine Albertine’s underlying crisis later, when I discuss her dream. For the present 
moment, what interests us here is that Albertine is susceptible to feeling disappointment 
in her life circumstances and life choices, and that Fridolin is aware of this potential for 
dissatisfaction. 
The financial burden of being the sole provider for a young family plays a 
considerable role in restricting Fridolin’s life choices, thereby limiting his potential career 
and social advancement. The match itself, however, is also problematic for him since it 
appears that it is Fridolin who has made the better match, or at the very least, feels as 
though he has. There is a subtle accusation in the narrative that Fridolin had made the 






when he wooed her (she had just turned seventeen at the time). The perception of such a 
“mismatch” is doubly indemnifying. Not only does it introduce the anxiety that Albertine 
might one day realize that she could do better for herself, but it also escalates the degree 
of Fridolin’s crisis concerning his own social standing. The higher his social prestige is, 
the stronger the legitimacy of his claim to Albertine. Ironically, this situation deepens the 
paradox he must solve in order to be able to resolve his crisis, for it is precisely in 
yielding to the temptation to take risks and choose reputation over responsibility that he 
could enhance his desirability as a match, and thus rectify the (perceived) original 
inequity in the suitability of the match with Albertine. At the same time now that he is 
already married to her and has begun a young family with her, it is his capacity to be a 
responsible and stable provider that best ensures that the partnership will succeed. In this 
sense, his window of opportunity in which to acquire a higher status is shut, regardless of 
age. Accordingly, while the perceived discrepancy of their initial standing heightens 
Fridolin’s crisis, it also dictates that the only sensible resolution should be for him to 
foreclose deferred identity, and to give himself over to his identity as physician, husband, 
and father. 
Fridolin’s underlying anxiety as to his adequacy in the relationship with Albertine 
is expressed in the repeated motif of the white-clad officer. The image is initially 
introduced during the couple’s heated discussion at the narrative’s beginning, in which 
Albertine “confessed” a mild infatuation with a naval officer she had seen at the hotel in 
Denmark (14-15), and the image of that officer continues to haunt Fridolin throughout his 






Fridolin views a painting that was done by the Court Councilor’s son, depicting a white-
clad officer charging down a hill with saber drawn. The most obvious connection of the 
officer in the painting is with the officer of Albertine’s confession, however a second, and 
perhaps more potent a correlation can also be drawn to the white frock worn by 
physicians. That correlation finds echoes in Fridolin’s comparison of his profession with 
the martial pursuits of fencing and dueling made during his encounter with the students as 
cited above. The double reference expresses not only the “competition” in Fridolin’s 
mind between himself and the white clad Danish officer, but also expresses the conflict 
between himself as stolid provider and a more virulent but less reliable self. The 
association that leads from the naval officer, to the officer in the painting, to Fridolin 
himself, initially drawn by the repetition and close proximity of the images in the text, is 
made more tangible by Fridolin’s own disheartened evaluation of the painting: 
[…] Fridolin begab sich ins Nebenzimmer um die ärztliche 
Todesanzeige abzufassen, drehte die Gasflamme über dem 
Schreibtisch höher, und sein Blick fiel auf das Bildnis des 
weißuniformierten Offiziers, der mit geschwungenem Säbel den 
Hügel hinabsprengte, einem unsichtbaren Feind entgegen. Es war 
in einen altgoldenen schmalen Rahmen gespannt und wirkte nicht 
viel besser als ein bescheidener Öldrück. (26)34 
                                                 
34 […] Fridolin went into the adjoining room to write out the official death certificate. He turned up the 
gaslight over the desk and his eyes fell upon the picture of the white-uniformed officer, galloping down 
hill, with drawn sabre, to meet an invisible enemy. It hung in a narrow frame of dull gold and rather 






This evaluation adds greater emphasis to the connection of the image with 
Fridolin’s self-image when one considers the death certificate, which Fridolin was in the 
process of filling out for his now deceased patient, is a testament to the fact that medical 
skills have unavoidably limitations, and are subordinate to death and natural law. Thus 
like the painting, Fridolin’s charge against his unseen enemy (the diphtheria bacillus, for 
instance, and possibly some more worthy rival for Albertine’s affections) is of uncertain 
outcome – possibly a charge into thin air. Like the painting as well, the gilded frame of 
an exaggerated self-presentation may simply reveal in a more poignant fashion the 
inadequacy of what has been framed. Finally, like the promising youthful painter, 
Marianne’s brother, who was driven from the family as a failure and whom the father 
pretends is dead. Fridolin, (or that aspect of his subjectivity that is threatened with 
foreclosure), may disappear into obscurity and be lost, denied by the responsible husband 
and father that remains: 
Der Bruder lebte jetzt irgendwo im Auslande, da drin in 
Mariannens Kabinett hing ein Bild, das er im Alter von fünfzehn 
Jahren gemalt hatte. Es stellte einen Offizier dar, der einen Hügel 
hinuntersprengt. Der Vater hatte immer getan, als sähe er das Bild 
überhaupt nicht. Aber es war ein gutes Bild. Der Bruder hätte es 
schon weiterbringen können unter günstigern Umständen. (22-
23)35 
                                                 
35 “Her brother was now living somewhere abroad. A picture that he had painted when he was fifteen was 
hanging over there in Marianne’s room. It represented an officer galloping down a hill. Her father had 
always pretended not to see it although it wasn’t bad. Oh yes, if he’d had a chance her brother might have 






The brother’s failure to make something more successful of himself expresses 
Fridolin’s fear that he, too, will come no further in life. The expression is a displaced, 
expression of Fridolin’s fear that his youthful plans to achieve a higher professional and 
social prestige are no longer viable. The fact that the brother is denied and treated as 
though dead by the father has an even greater significance here, and it articulates the 
essence of Fridolin’s crisis. He must foreclose on his undeveloped and youthful 
ambitions and embrace his identity as husband, father, and provider. This crisis – “mid-
life crisis” –is in essence a traumatic crisis that results from a confrontation with death. It 
does not truly represent a fear that one is physically mortal, however, but in a much larger 
sense, it is a fear of a death of subjectivity. The central crisis depicted in the novella is the 
crisis of a man locked in a life or death struggle, who must find a way to preserve not 
biological existence, but instead his experience of that existence – the cohesion of his 
own subjectivity. Thus Fridolin sets off onto his journey into night, facing “ewigen 
Gesetze Verwesung und Zerfall” (27)36, lured into temptation by the deceptive awakening 
of what has been foreclosed upon for some time: “[…] als wäre wirklich schon der 
Frühling da und die trügerisch-warme Luft nicht schwanger von Gefahren” (27).37 Not 
yet lost to him, those moribund expressions of subjectivity remain either to be abandoned 
or assimilated in a modified form. In either case, as with the Court Councilor, a last visit 
to determine the status of life or death is a part of his obligations, regardless whether he 
finds the patient dead or alive. 
 
                                                 
36 “[…] decay and decomposition, according to eternal laws” (30). 






3.2 The Origin of Ambiguity and the Demand for Structural Reorganization 
Fridolin’s traumatic crisis arises out of conflict between competing manifestations 
of subjectivity; subjectivity characterized by staid responsibility and stability on the one 
hand, and by spontaneous change and open possibilities on the other. In terms of systemic 
conflict, we know that identity that is socially manifested in the Communicative Domain 
can be traced back through successive articulations or dispositions in the preceding 
organizational domains. In Idiolect, subjectivity is articulated as the objectified ‘subject,’ 
expressed within the individual’s apprehension of symbolized meaning. Subjectivity that 
is precluded from Idiolect by the existent terms and relations of that domain may also be 
articulated in a Narrative domain where alternative symbolized forms are expressed 
either consciously (as active, creative processes and as fantasy) or unconsciously (as 
dream or as semiotic overflow). Prior to its symbolized articulation, subjectivity is 
expressed within the Self/Other distinction of the Ethical domain and even prior to that, 
in the dispositions and spatial mapping of the Epistemic domain. 
Given the manner in which an overflow of the semiotic current behaves, we 
would expect Fridolin’s conflict to be expressed somatically (overflow in the Epistemic), 
as a loss of the boundaries between Self and Other (overflow in the Ethical), as 
competing apprehensions of reality and identity, as competing manifestations of the 
subject (Idiolect and Narrative), and/or as competing discourses (discursive practices) 
representing that identity (Communicative). In fact, some elements of all of these types of 
overflow emerge and are manifested throughout the novella. Somatic disruption is 






the fencing fraternity described above. This fear of infection, which culminates in a self-
diagnosis of somatic illness at the end of the third chapter, itself reflects a preoccupation 
with death as the invasion of what had hitherto been Other upon the Self (instability of 
the Self/Other distinction) both in the sense of physical death, and more importantly, the 
“death” of deferred subjectivity. In the symbolized domains, Fridolin’s crisis is 
manifested as competing instances of symbolized identity; one articulated in Idiolect 
(primary identity), and the other articulated through the diversion of the semiotic current 
in a Narrative domain (deferred identity). As a result of an overflow of the semiotic 
current, that Narrative domain vies with Idiolect for dominance as Fridolin’s primary 
symbolized apprehension of meaning during his crisis. Both articulations of identity in 
turn, are alternately presented in the Communicative domain. While I will look at each of 
these five domains, I will begin with identity that is expressed in symbolized terms (i.e., 
in Idiolect, the Narrative, and the Communicative domains), and reference overflow in 
the preceding domains as evidence of it arises. 
The Narrative domain is a domain in which semiotic current can either be actively 
or passively dissociated from the primary semiotic current and accommodated via, a 
diverted semiotic channel, in an alternate symbolized domain until a more adequate 
expression for conflicted subjectivity in Idiolect can be devised. The unmediated passage 
of current from the Ethical into the Narrative, accounts for the emergence of unconscious 
(i.e., pre-symbolic) contents in the Narrative, which enables the Narrative domain to play 
a critical role in maintaining the integrity of subjectivity. Situated side by side with 






expression of symbolized meaning in a Narrative domain allows the individual to 
alternate between expressions of subjective identity that both compete with one another 
and compliment one another. 
In alternating between Idiolect and various Narrative domains, the individual is 
able to “compare” her current apprehension of “reality,” meaning, and identity with 
alternate apprehensions. That “comparison” occurs not through a ‘psychologized’ act of 
judgement, but simply through the experience of increased or decreased tension in the 
semiotic current in response to various articulations of symbolized meaning and identity. 
In terms of the fantasy that Fridolin and Albertine act out at the masquerade, the 
expression of deferred identity held in a Narrative domain was rejected within the 
discursive community of the masked ball, thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of 
subjective identity as it was expressed there. This rejection in the Communicative domain 
impedes the passage of the semiotic current, disrupting subjectivity throughout the 
circuitous semiotic channel. In Fridolin’s case, rejection in the Communicative domain 
and the invalidation of deferred identity threatens that identity with foreclosure. 
Even at the level of symbolized meaning, the resolution of conflicted identity is 
complex, involving many layers of meaning, categorization, and the interrelationship 
among all instances of terms both within a field of symbolized meaning, and within the 
temporal succession of symbolized terms as they are gradually altered over time. Beneath 
manifestations of identity such as career, spouse, or social standing, for example, lie 
oppositions that are more central to basic, core identity, including young or old, 






medical practitioner and a professor of medicine – an opposition that can be perceived as 
finding its expression in tangible, “real-world” entities – the appositive separation of 
young / old establishes symbolized terms that express can be called a res nulla or non-
entity; that is, a symbolic object that does not represent a concretized entity. The value of 
the res nulla is determined within the discursive community based on its function or 
pragmatic value within the social community. Both ‘young’ and ‘old,’ for instance, are 
delimited by the anticipated lifespan of an individual, as well as the span of her 
productivity in a given social community (capacity to work, bear children, etc.). Since all 
instances of signification are arbitrary, the res nulla is no less valid than any other 
signifier. The non-entity distinguishes itself, however, in that it is not readily associated 
with irreducible somatosensory experience that enables us to lay claim to validity as an 
external entity. The definition of the res nulla often differs markedly from community to 
community, or from circumstance to circumstance within a given community, and 
therefore can be more readily perceived and argued to be arbitrary. This weakened appeal 
to somatosensory experience results in a much higher incidence of discord over the value 
it is assigned. 
Mid-life crisis arises in the ambiguous area surrounding the distinction ‘young’ 
and ‘old.’ As with all socially defined non-entities (res nullae), no somatosensory 
experience discretely characterizes that distinction. While the extremes of the human life-
span may be unambiguously characterized as ‘young’ or ‘old,’ the transition from one to 
the other is a slowly evolving process in which the individual’s claim to youth is 






Communicative domain. As such, two diametrically opposed characteristics exist side by 
side for a time as a competitive fluctuation of subjectivity until the individual herself 
resolves that conflict by selecting a discrete point in her lifespan (whether consciously or 
unconsciously) when she begins to regard herself as old. She is thereby confronted with 
two difficulties – that of reorganizing symbolized identity around a new underlying 
category (i.e., from young to old), and that of determining a placement for the distinction 
in the continuum of her existence. The process of aging itself is a continual process with 
only two discrete points – the terminal points of birth and of death – however the 
distinction of young and old is a dichotomous division that can only be argued as; (if 
young=TRUE, then old=FALSE); or (if young=FALSE, then old=TRUE). 
In Traumnovelle, Fridolin has entered a period of life when the opposition of 
young / old begins to become unstable and to fluctuate. His ability to maintain deferred 
identity in the Narrative domain (identity he might potentially realize) is itself linked with 
this distinction, since aging often leads to the closing off of such possibilities. His crisis is 
likewise linked with other res nulla oppositions such as successful / unsuccessful, 
desirable / undesirable (as a partner), etc. As Fridolin is compelled to foreclose upon 
deferred identity, symbolized identity in Idiolect (the subject) is reconfigured in relation 
to these deeper aspects of identity as well – young/old, successful/unsuccessful, 
desirable/undesirable, etc. The forfeiture of surface expressions of identity demands, in 
this case, a large-scale reorganization of subjectivity that will disrupt the terms in the 
present field of symbolized meaning. That abrupt reorganization will also open a gap in 






Idiolect in two dimensions – the contemporary field of meaning and the temporal 
succession of symbolized meaning as it evolves. 
In Fridolin’s crisis – a traumatic crisis – reanalysis is difficult and the lateral 
oscillation between Idiolect and the Narrative domain and eigenstates of subjective 
identity continues for an extended period of time, interjecting an awareness of the 
ambiguity (and hence, the conflict) of meaning. Traumatic crisis represents an 
attenuation of the natural process of signification in which sub-processes that otherwise 
remain largely transparent to human perception are left unresolved for an extended period 
of time. The potential duration of that process forms a continuum that extends from 
instantaneous resolution (zero attenuation) through the failure to find resolution at all 
(infinite attenuation), and the point at which an attenuation of the semiotic process 
becomes trauma cannot be precisely defined. (Trauma, in other words, is itself a res 
nulla, as the difficulty in establishing an adequate definition for that experience palpably 
demonstrates.) The degree of disruption that arises depends upon the degree to which 
those processes are attenuated and the difficulty of resolution. In terms of this model 
then, trauma is wholly defined by subjective experience within the natural processes by 
which heterogeneous experience establishes itself in the structures of the semiotic system. 
What we observe in Fridolin’s wavering perspective is nothing more than the attenuation 
of an oscillation that defines the manner in which all meaning comes into being; an 
oscillation that shows us how our perceptions of “reality” are no more substantial, and no 






Fridolin’s traumatic crisis arises when subjectivity that had, for a time, been 
adequately held in a Narrative domain as deferred (i.e., potential) identity, has been 
rejected in the Communicative domain, and hence, invalidated. It remains for him now, 
either to find social acceptance of that rejected identity, thereby restoring its validity, or 
to make the decision to foreclose upon it, accepting that identity as potential that is lost. 
The second and third chapters of the novella focus on this quest for resolution, in which 
he seeks various forms of social contact in a compulsive, crisis-driven manner. Having 
been called away from his quarrel with Albertine to attend the Court Councilor’s 
deathbed, he finds himself unwilling or unable to return home. Instead, he is drawn into a 
series of encounters and misadventures that appear to present him with the opportunity to 
realize deferred identity. At the same time, his impulse to give in to temptation is 
countered by inner reason, a sense of responsibility and ultimately, an unwillingness to 
act on those impulses. Thus divided, Fridolin cannot fully manifest either aspect of 
identity; neither that of mature responsibility and stability, nor of youthful impetuosity 
and spontaneity. The two remain locked in a fluctuating, covalent relationship with one 
another, working together to create a suspended reality. 
The re-emergence of deferred identity is represented in the narrative by the motif 
of ‘awakening spring’ and the arrival of the Föhn – a warm, southerly wind. Chapter two 
begins with a reference to this awakening as Fridolin leaves Albertine to go to the Court 
Councilor’s: 
Auf der Straße mußte er den Pelz öffnen. Es war plötzlich 






weggeschmolzen, und in der Luft wehte ein Hauch des 
kommenden Frühlings. (20)38 
These references to spring and the thaw appear repeatedly throughout the chapter in 
gradually intensified form and their symbolism is twofold – both positive and negative. In 
positive terms, the spring season is associated with youth, or here, the re-emergence or 
reawakening of youth, as well as with love and new relationships. It is not difficult to 
correlate this with the re-emergence of identity that itself was deferred in youth – identity 
that is resurging now that it is threatened with permanent foreclosure. At the same time, 
the image of spring with its thawing wind (Föhn) is also somewhat sinister. The 
resurgence of deferred identity is deceptive – a kind of seduction – however it cannot 
truly be reclaimed. Foreclosure is immanent, as is the “death” of that identity, even if 
Fridolin should choose to act on his impulses to claim it. The warming breeze awakens an 
identity that will ultimately perish, and accordingly, that Föhn is described as being 
“pregnant with danger”: 
Auf beschatteten Bänken saßen da und dort ein Paar eng 
aneinandergeschmiegt, als wäre wirklich schon der Frühling da 
und der trügerisch warme Luft nicht schwanger von Gefahren. 
(27)39 
The notion of contagion borne on the wind is not new here. At one time, the Föhn 
was even blamed for having brought the plague to Europe, and thus the ‘awakening of 
                                                 
38 “When Fridolin reached the street, he unbuttoned his coat. It had suddenly begun to thaw; the snow on 
the sidewalk was almost gone, and there was a touch of spring in the air” (19). 
39 “As he walked through Rathaus Park he noticed here and there on benches standing in the shadow, that 
couples were sitting, clasped together, just as if Spring had actually arrived and no danger were lurking in 






spring’ acts as a covalent signifier intertwining the pursuit of renewed youth with a sense 
of immanent danger. The contagion that it brings in the form of reawakened identity 
constitutes the infection of primary identity – Self – with semiotic contents that had been 
Other, relegated to a Narrative domain as potential but ultimately unrealized subjectivity. 
Should Fridolin choose to act on reawakened identity – identity that itself is doomed to 
extinction – this “infection” or destabilization of the Self/Other distinction, in turn, could 
threaten primary identity with “death” – that is, with the annihilation of Self and subject 
as they are presently manifested. He could, in other words, destroy that which he has in 
the pursuit of what which he has already given up. In this sense, Fridolin’s repeated 
concerns about contagion as a danger that he and others might carry silently within 
themselves actually reference the lurking danger of deferred identity (i.e., his having been 
coughed upon by a child with diphtheria four days prior, the threat of infection from a 
dueling wound, etc.). That identity can awaken to begin a “disease process” that, if not 
halted, could lead to the ‘death’ of primary identity and his current life (marriage, career, 
etc.) before being itself foreclosed upon, costing him everything. 
The awakening of spring and the arrival of the Föhn are an expression of the 
emergence of competing subjective identity. The resulting fluctuation between conflicted 
aspects or manifestations of identity is itself expressed by the instability in Fridolin’s own 
perceptions of his role as husband and, in particular, as physician. Both of these roles are 
alternately inflated and depreciated as he oscillates between primary identity and deferred 
identity. The oscillating inflation and depreciation begins with Fridolin’s arrival at the 






from his integral identity. This distancing is an essential precondition to the emergence of 
deferred identity, since in this way, both deferred identity and realized identity are placed 
on an equal and competitive standing. Fridolin’s identity as physician, in other words, 
becomes a kind of theatrical role that is no more substantial than the role of professor, 
dandy, or duelist he has deferred. When he enters the home of the Court Councilor and 
approaches the Councilor’s daughter, Marianne, we see a first, subtle form of distancing 
in the narrative’s use of the term “the physician,” rather than of his name: 
Als der Arzt eingetretten war, hatte sie den Blick zu ihm gewandt, 
doch in der kärglichen Beleuchtung sah er kaum, ob ihre Wangen 
sich rötteten wie sonst, wenn er erschien. (21)40 
This reference to “the physician” might not be significant were it not for the fact 
that this depersonalized reference is unique within in the novella, where he is otherwise 
referred to simply as Fridolin. In addition, the novella is written largely from the narrative 
perspective of an inner monologue that reflects Fridolin’s thoughts, perceptions, and 
emotions. With the possible exception of Albertine, we are never provided with the inner 
perspectives of other characters and therefore we would not expect the use of the 
depersonalized reference, “the physician,” to represent a shift in the narrative towards 
Marianne’s perceptions. This idiosyncratic use of the depersonalized reference renders 
Fridolin’s role as physician an activity that is distinct from his core identity, and that 
might be exchanged for another role as one might exchange a costume. Indeed, this very 
                                                 
40 “When the doctor entered she looked up, but because of the dim light he could not see whether she had 






parallel is drawn later in the novella, when Fridolin compares the donning of a costume to 
the donning of his white physician’s coat every morning: 
Fridolin fiel ein, daß es höchste Zeit war, sich zu maskieren. Er 
zog den Pelz aus, fuhr in die Kutte, geradeso wie er jeden Morgen 
auf der Spitalabteilung in die Ärmel seines Leinenkittels zu 
schlüpfen pflegte [...]. (48)41 
This devaluation of primary identity and the concurrent “awakening” of deferred 
identity leads to a competitive fluctuation between the two, as each manifestation of 
identity is alternately diminished and augmented in his perceptions. This initial 
devaluation of Fridolin’s role as physician (primary identity) is emphasized by the very 
situation that has brought him to the Court Councilor’s home. He has been called there to 
attest the death of his patient and in this sense, Fridolin’s role as physician is invalidated 
to some degree by his inability to keep his patient alive. No medical art is of use to him in 
this situation and his role as physician is reduced to a few mechanical gestures, the 
passive function of witnessing, and the formal termination of the physician-patient 
relationship through the signing of the death certificate. The gestures with which Fridolin 
performs his routine duties have been emptied of meaning or function: 
Er trat an das Kopfende des Bettes, berührte mechanisch die Stirn 
des Toten, dessen Arme, die in weiten offenen Hemdärmel über 
der Bettdecke lagen, dann senkte er mit leichtem Bedauern die 
                                                 
41 “Fridolin realized that it was high time to put on his costume. He took off his fur coat and stepped into 







Schultern, steckte die Hände in die Taschen seines Pelzrockes [...]. 
(21)42 
These circumstances dramatically articulate the devaluation of Fridolin’s role as 
physician, although that devaluation actually originates with his underlying traumatic 
crisis. This initial devaluation is followed by repeated efforts to re-establish the value 
and, in particular, the status and authority of that role, however with primary identity 
reduced to the insubstantial level of deferred identity, Fridolin’s efforts amount to an 
impotent, even inappropriate assertion of medical authority. In his interactions with the 
Councilor’s daughter, Marianne, for example, he utilizes his prerogative as physician to 
depersonalize her and to enhance his own privilege with her by viewing her as a patient 
and evaluating the status of her physical health. In so doing, Fridolin takes on the role of 
protector, while at the same time establishing a seemingly justifiable basis for what 
would otherwise be socially unacceptable intimacy: 
Wie erregt sie spricht, dachte Fridolin, und wie ihre Augen 
glänzen! Fieber? Wohl möglich. Sie ist magerer geworden in der 
letzten Zeit. Spitzenkatarrh vermutlich. (23)43 
 
[…] natürlich ist auch Hysterie dabei. (25)44 
                                                 
42 “He stepped to the head of the bed and mechanically placed his hands on the forehead of the dead man 
and on the arms which were lying on the bedspread in loose and open shirt sleeves. His shoulders drooped 
with a slight expression of regret. He stuck his hands in the pockets of his coat […]” (20). 
43 “How excitedly she speaks, Fridolin thought, and how bright her eyes are! Is it fever? Quite possibly. 
She’s grown much thinner. Probably has tuberculosis” (23). 






Fridolin also utilizes his prerogative as physician to justify behavior and actions 
that, in truth, have no valid medical basis, and that are otherwise inappropriate. As he 
waits with Marianne for the arrival of other family members, Fridolin begins to feel 
stifled by the tension both of abiding with the corpse and of the rising temptation to 
respond to Marianne’s hysterical overtures towards him. In order to alleviate his own 
discomfiture over this tension, he opens a window without asking, inappropriately 
availing himself of the “dispassionate intimacy” accorded a physician in his interactions 
with a patient: 
Er warf einen Blick nach dem geschlossenen Fenster und, ohne 
vorher um Erlaubnis zu fragen, wie in Ausübung eines ärztlichen 
Rechtes öffnete er beide Flügel und ließ die Luft herein, die, indes 
noch wärmer und frühlingshafter geworden, einen linden Duft aus 
den erwachenden, fernen Wälder mitzubringen schien. Als er sich 
wieder ins Zimmer wandte, sah er die Augen Mariannes wie 
fragend auf such gerichtet. (24)45 
By misapplying his prerogative as physician, Fridolin is able to subsume his 
inappropriate actions and impulses within his primary identity as responsible husband, 
father, and physician. Thus in alternation with the intermittent devaluation of his role as 
physician (a devaluation of primary identity), Fridolin also inflates that role, along with 
the rights and privileges that it accords, thereby making room for deferred identity to be 
                                                 
45 “He glanced at the closed window, and without asking for permission but availing himself of his 
privilege as a doctor, he opened both casements and let some air in. It had become even warmer and more 
spring-like, and the breeze seemed to bring with it a slight fragrance of the distant awakening woods. When 






accommodated within it in an uneasy covalent relationship. By so doing, Fridolin is able 
ward off temptation (or at least the accusation of wrongdoing), while at the same time 
sanctioning the liberties he takes as he yields to salacious impulses. A precondition for 
covalent signification (i.e., ambiguity) is established whereby Fridolin is able to interpret 
Marianne’s behaviour as illness, while alternately interpreting that same flush and 
excitement as passion. The gesture of opening the casements is likewise ambiguous. It is 
not really appropriate for Fridolin to open them by appealing to his role as physician, 
since he has no patient who could benefit by his actions. Rather, it is a prerogative that 
would be more appropriate for Marianne’s lover or fiancé. The familiarity he usurps 
therefore comes about through the merger of the (apparent) rights of the physician and 
those of a lover. Indeed, the reference to the awakening of spring, this time encompassing 
a broader radius to include the distant woods, indicates the growing strength of deferred 
identity, and even Fridolin’s active participation in inviting it. 
Kubrik’s interpretation of the novella makes even clearer Fridolin’s potential use 
of the physician’s prerogative to merge conflicted desires – the desire to maintain his 
present identity, relationship, etc., and the desire to act on dangerous impulses and realize 
deferred identity. Indeed, in the film, Eyes Wide Shut, Alice recognizes the potential to 
misuse the “dispassionate intimacy” of the physician-patient relationship in order to 
legitimize otherwise inappropriate impulses when she accuses Bill of having an 






 “Now try to be honest. When some really great-
looking woman comes in to your office to have her tits checked 
out, don't you ever think about screwing her?” 
 “Come on, give me a break. I'm a doctor. It's all 
very impersonal. And anyway my insurance requires that a nurse is 
always present.” 
 “You're being evasive. When you're feeling her tits, 
is it never any more than sheer professionalism? 
 “Basically, that's all it is.” 
 “Just basically?” 
 “Oh, come on. There are no absolutes in anything” 
(Kubrick Eyes Wide Shut) 
Bill’s defense that these examinations always take place in the presence of a (female) 
witness betrays his inability to consciously apprehend the (potential) misuse of his office. 
It is irrelevant whether he follows all of the appropriate protocol governing the physician-
patient relationship. Alice’s accusation is not one of inappropriate action, but of 
inappropriate intent. (The viewer never discovers whether these accusations are founded.) 
Seizing the prerogative of the physician to justify impermissible familiarity and 
the crossing of social boundaries is one method of at least temporarily merging conflicted 
subjectivity. By inflating the status and authority due him as a physician, Fridolin is able 
to act out the intimacy with “another woman” that allows him to feel that his options are 






genuine jeopardy. In addition, this awkward merger of primary with deferred identity 
allows him to integrate into primary identity some of the prestige he desires of deferred 
identity. Part of that status rests upon his more stable earning capacity and greater ability 
as a provider. Based upon the presumption that he can furnish greater financial stability, 
Fridolin observes that he himself is the better suitor for Marianne, since he possesses 
greater means to truly care for her than the academian, Dr. Roediger. This assertion 
enables Fridolin not only to view Roediger as his inferior, but to dismiss his own dreams 
of attaining a professorship as well: 
Marianne sähe sicher besser aus, dachte er, wenn sie seine Geliebte 
wäre. Ihr Haar wäre weniger trocken, ihre Lippen rötter und voller. 
(22)46 
Also diesen Dozenten wird sie heiraten. Warum tut sie das? 
Verliebt ist sie gewiß nicht, und viel Geld dürfte er auch nicht 
haben. Was wird das für eine Ehe werden? (22)47 
This attempt at integration through the augmentation of his present identity is not 
sufficient to eliminate Fridolin’s doubts as to the worth of that identity, and his 
denigration of Roediger’s academic position is almost immediately followed by the 
devaluation of his own position as medical practitioner together with the material stability 
it provides. As cited earlier, Fridolin has a sense that his choice to seek financial security 
was a compromise for which he sacrificed the prestige of greater personal achievement: 
                                                 
46 “Marianne would certainly look better, he thought to himself, if she were his mistress. Her hair would be 
less dry, her lips would be fuller and redder” (22). 
47 “So she is going to marry this instructor! I wonder why? She surely isn’t in love with him, and he isn’t 






Er dachte daran, daß er vor Jahren auch auch eine akademische 
Laufbahn angestrebt, daß er auch bei seiner Neigung zu einer 
behaglicheren Existenz sich am Ende entschieden hatte; – und 
plötzlich kam er sich dem vortreffllichen Doktor Roediger 
gegenüber als der Geringere vor. (23-24)48 
Fridolin inflates the status and authority of his prerogative as physician in order to 
restore the value of primary identity, while at the same time suffering subsequent 
disillusionment at his perceived lack of status. The same fluctuation occurs in relation to 
deferred identity as well, and its relative value is inflated and devalued in much the same 
way. In this way Fridolin moves between deferred and primary subjective identity, 
occupying first one, then the other in alternation, he experiences the additional fluctuation 
within each identity of finding them either adequate or inadequate. 
Fridolin Occupies Primary Identity 
(Semiotic Current  Idiolect) 
Fridolin Occupies Deferred Identity 
(Semiotic Current  Narrative Domain) 
Primary Identity is Adequate 
& 
Deferred Identity is Inadequate 
Deferred Identity is Adequate 
& 
Primary Identity is Inadequate 
↕ ↕ 
Primary Identity is Inadequate 
& 






Deferred Identity is Inadequate 
& 
Primary Identity is Adequate 
Table 5: Reciprocal relationship of primary and deferred identity. 
                                                 
48 “He was thinking that, years ago, he also had aspired to an academic career, but because he wanted a 
comfortable income, he had finally decided to practice medicine. Suddenly he felt that compared with this 






Fridolin’s occupation of deferred identity essentially represents a return to 
unencumbered youth with its opportunity and virility, both in terms of potential sexual 
encounters and in terms of demonstrative masculine conflict such as dueling. Similar to 
the distortion of primary identity, the distortion of deferred identity constitutes the 
inflation of the “amorous” situations in which Fridolin finds or places himself. When he 
occupies deferred identity, his distorted assessment of these “opportunities” masks the 
fact that each is, in truth, a very sordid kind of affair, often with little or no potential for 
realization. The reader is made aware of this distortion by the sheer inappropriateness of 
these various encounters, i.e., in Fridolin’s behavior towards Marianne and more 
significantly, in his distorted perceptions of their interaction. That situation may, at first 
glance, appear to be morally ambiguous and to possess some real potential as an 
opportunity for infidelity, since Marianne does indeed make certain romantic overtures 
towards Fridolin: 
Unwillkürlich legte er seine Hand auf ihren Scheitel und strich ihr 
über die Stirn. Er fühlte, wie ihr Körper zu zittern begann, sie 
schluchzte in sich hinein, kaum hörbar zuerst, allmählich lauter, 
endlich ganz ungehemmt. Mit einemmal war sie vom Sessel 
herabgelitten, lag Fridolin zu Füßen, umschlang seine Knie mit den 
Armen und preßte ihr Antlitz daran. Dann sah sie zu ihm auf mit 
weit offenen, schmerzlich wilden Augen und flüsterte heiß: “Ich 






wenn ich Sie niemals mehr sehen soll; ich will in Ihrer Nähe 
leben.” (24)49 
Marianne repeats this declaration that she is enamored with Fridolin again, even after her 
fiancé, Dr. Roediger, has arrived at the apartment: 
Wieder ertönte die Türglocke, Doktor Roediger erhob sich und 
ging öffnen; indessen sagte Marianne, unhörbar fast, auf den 
Boden blickend: “Ich liebe dich.” Fridolin erwiderte nur, indem er, 
nicht ohne Zärtlichkeit, Mariannens Namen ansprach. (26)50 
While it appears that Marianne herself desires a relationship with Fridolin, his 
own observations of the situation give us to realize that these gestures are not what they 
appear to be on the surface. As he notes, Marianne is hysterical after the death of her 
father, and her chattering seems delusional. Certainly the timing of the encounter and the 
presence of Marianne’s deceased father in the room make it likely that Marianne’s 
advances express her own traumatic confusion and a realistic need for comfort rather than 
an authentic romantic interest. In a moral sense, were Fridolin to act on his impulses or 
even to respond to Marianne’s confused overtures, it would constitute a kind of rape, and 
a gross violation of the physician-patient relationship. At some level, Fridolin himself is 
aware of the ethical implications of acting on any amorous impulse towards Marianne, 
                                                 
49 “In spite of himself, he placed his hand on her head, caressing it. […] All at once she slipped down from 
her chair and lay at Fridolin’s feet, clasping his knees with her arms and pressing her face against them. 
Then she looked up to him with large eyes, wild with grief, and whispered audibly: ‘I don’t want you to 
leave here. Even if you never return, if I am never to see you again, I want, at least, to live near you” (25-
26). 
50 “Again the doorbell rang and Doctor Roediger rose to answer it. While he was gone, Marianne, with her 







and even as he embraces her and kisses her on the forehead, he is reminded of a similar 
situation he had read about in a novel in which a young man is seduced at his mother’s 
deathbed: 
Er hielt Marianne in den Armen, aber zugleich etwas entfernt von 
sich, und drückte beinahe unwillkürlich einen Kuß auf ihre Stirn, 
was ihm selbst ein wenig lächerlich vorkam. Flüchtig erinnerte er 
sich eines Romans, den er vor Jahren gelesen und in dem es 
geschah, daß ein ganz junger Mensch, ein Knabe fast, am 
Totenbett der Mutter von ihrer Freundin verführt, eigentlich 
vergewaltigt wurde. (25)51 
Fridolin’s recollection of this incident in the novel is not only associated with the 
awkward situation in which he finds himself with Marianne. It also immediately brings to 
mind Albertine, and his own unknown, potential rival, the Danish officer: 
Im selben Augenblick, er wußte nicht warum, mußte er seiner 
Gattin denken. Bitterkeit gegen sie stieg in ihm auf und ein 
dumpfer Groll gegen den Herrn in Dänemark mit der gelben 
Reisetasche auf der Hotelstiege. (25)52 
Fridolin’s thoughts of Albertine at this moment signals the emergence of an 
aspect of his underlying conflict at which the narrative only hints. Albertine was just 
                                                 
51 “He put his arms around her in a very hesitating embrace, and almost against his will he kissed her on the 
forehead, an act that somehow seemed rather ridiculous. He had a fleeting recollection of reading a novel 
years ago in which a young man, still almost a boy, had been seduced, in fact, practically raped, by the 
friend of his mother, at the latter’s deathbed” (26). 
52 “At the same time he thought of his wife, without knowing why, and he was conscious of some bitterness 






barely seventeen when Fridolin won her hand, while Fridolin was both markedly older 
and significantly more experienced in terms of previous romantic liaisons. In the 
disparity of their ages and the degree of their romantic experience lies the suggestion that 
Fridolin may have unfairly benefited from Albertine’s youth when he courted her. 
Indeed, in having done so, Fridolin may have made the better match of the two, 
“marrying up” as it were. This dimension of their relationship, which will be more 
explicitly articulated in Albertine’s dream, (see below), adds greatly to Fridolin’s 
insecurity regarding the adequacy of his status. The question of Albertine’s relative youth 
and her essential vulnerability find resonance in Fridolin’s encounters throughout the 
novella, including in his preoccupation with girls of young age (i.e., the girl he traps on 
the beach in Denmark), or women who are in some way vulnerable (i.e., Marianne). 
The lingering suspicion that it might be he who has made the better match by 
virtue of a slightly unfair advantage, rather than his own innate desirability (i.e., status, 
virility, courage, etc.) adds a critical dimension to Fridolin’s traumatic conflict. The 
competition between primary and deferred identity consists of more than the fear that he 
might loose the option to realize aspects of identity that are threatened with foreclosure. 
Rather, there is a sense that primary identity itself may be threatened by that foreclosure, 
both because potential identity played a role in making Fridolin appear more attractive as 
a suitor, but also because primary identity might not have been adequate to win Albertine 
had she not been rendered vulnerable by her relative youth and lack of experience. 
(Indeed, Albertine’s dream will validate the suspicion that she herself perceives that 






deliberate deception in his part, or as a result of her youthful inability to accurately judge 
who he was.) In this sense, Fridolin’s sudden recollection of the novel in which a youth is 
seduced by his mother’s friend addresses not only Marianne’s vulnerability at her father’s 
deathbed, but Albertine’s vulnerability when Fridolin courted her as a seventeen year old 
girl. Underlying Fridolin’s adventures then, we can see not only his desire to act out 
deferred identity, but perhaps his desire to legitimize his claim to Albertine through the 
realization of that identity and the assertion that he could have won her hand even if she 
had not been vulnerable. 
The background of Fridolin and Albertine’s relationship, which is revealed 
gradually over the course of the novella, shows the reader the significance of deferred 
identity, and the competing purposes towards which Fridolin works within that 
relationship. These competing purposes, which drive Fridolin in his nocturnal 
wanderings, are likewise manifested in his interactions with the various women he 
encounters, beginning with Marianne. Accordingly, Fridolin’s response to the situation 
with Marianne wavers between acting out the emotional distance of the physician, and 
returning Marianne’s quasi-amorous gestures returned as though he were a potential 
suitor. Thus, on the one hand, we see Fridolin remain unmoved by Marianne’s advances 
or even a bit repulsed by them: 
Er zog Marianne fester an sich, doch verspürte er nicht die 






trockenen Haares, der süßlich-fade Geruch ihres ungelüfteten 
Kleides einen leichten Widerwillen ein. (25)53 
At the same time, he caresses her head and kisses her forehead as though this were an 
apropriate way to interact with the engaged daughter of a deceased patient. Fridolin even 
reciprocates in some small measure the grief that Marianne expresses over their 
immanent separation – grief that, on her part most likely expresses the fact that Fridolin 
has been helping her with the burden of caring for her father and that, as long as he 
continued to visit, her father was still alive. Fridolin’s regret at their parting is expressed 
in significantly more muted terms: 
Es ist wohl möglich, daß ich sie niemals wiedersehen werde, denn 
nun habe ich in diesem Hause nichts mehr zu tun. Ach, wie viele 
Menschen habe ich nie mehr wiedergesehen, die mir näher standen 
als sie? (22)54 
Ultimately the arrival of Marianne’s fiancé and extended family members puts an 
end to the notion that there can be any real romantic tryst between them. As in 
subsequent encounters, Fridolin’s ability to move between primary identity and deferred 
identity with Marianne rests on the contingency that any “potential partner” be both 
essentially unavailable, and that they will be either unwilling or unable to pin him to one 
identity or the other. With Marianne, Fridolin’s justification for remaining in his practical 
role as physician has been stretched to its limits. The arrival of Roediger and Marianne’s 
                                                 
53 “He held Marianne closer, but without the slightest emotion. The sight of her lustreless, dry hair, the 
indefinite, sweetish scent of her unaired dress gave him a slight feeling of revulsion” (27). 
54 “It’s quite possible that I shall never see her again, since there’s nothing more for me to do here. Well, 






aunt and uncle render Fridolin entirely superfluous, generating the perception that the 
room is now overfilled with people: 
Das kleine Zimmer sah plötzlich wie von Trauergästen überfüllt 
aus, Fridolin erschien sich überflüssig, empfahl sich und wurde 
von Roediger zur Tür geleitet […]. (26)55 
Fridolin leaves Marianne at the home of the Court Councilor and, with the 
collapse of his fantasized interaction with her (as will be the case when he leaves each of 
his subsequent encounters), he becomes aware of the limbo state in which his crisis has 
placed him. What had, in the intensity of the moment, appeared to be an adventure and a 
possible escape from the tedium of his daily life and responsibilities, now emerges as a 
kind of enchantment that holds him captive: 
Er selbst erschien sich wie entronnen; nicht so sehr einem Erlebnis 
als vielmehr einem schwermütigen Zauber, der keine Macht über 
ihn gewinnen sollte. Als einzige Nachwirkung empfand er eine 
merkwürdige Unlust sich nach Hause zu begeben. (27)56 
The “enchantment” under which Fridolin had fallen is a covalent state in which deferred 
and primary identity exist side by side such that they can neither be merged nor separated 
from one another. With that “enchantment” having dissipated, Fridolin experiences an 
upsurge of the negative aspects of his traumatic crisis (i.e., semiotic overflow), including 
a sense of immanent death, and a fear of loosing Albertine. These fears and an awareness 
                                                 
55 “The little room suddenly seemed crowded with mourners. Fridolin felt superfluous, took his leave and 
was escorted to the door by Roediger […]” (28). 
56 “He felt as if he had escaped not so much an adventure as a melancholy spell that should not be allowed 







of his predicament had remained largely concealed while he was at the Court Councilor’s 
since, in his interaction with Marianne he had found a covalent expression for competing 
subjectivity in the dispassionate intimacy of his role as physician. At the same time, even 
as he confronts the emptiness of his limbo-state and his anxiety concerning death (both in 
the literal sense and in the sense of foreclosed identity) he attempts to defer these threats 
once again by consciously reasserting his youth: 
Und der Tote fiel ihm ein, den er eben verlassen, und mit einigem 
Schauer, ja nicht ohne Ekel dachte er daran, daß in dem 
langdahingestreckten mageren Leib unter der braunen Flanelldecke 
nach ewigen Gesetzen Verwesung und Zerfall ihr Werk schon 
begonnen hatten. Und er freute sich, daß er noch lebte, daß für ihn 
aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach all diese häßlichen Dingen noch fern 
waren; ja daß er noch mitten in seiner Jugend stand, eine reizende 
und liebenswerte Frau zu eigen hatte und auch noch einer oder 
mehrere dazu haben konnte, wenn es ihm gerade beliebte. Zu 
dergleichen hätte freilich mehr Muße gehört, als ihm vergönnt war 
[…]. (27-28)57 
Here, as evidence of his youth, Fridolin invokes both his highly desirable wife, 
and his ability to have any number of other, equally desirable women. These two being 
                                                 
57 “He was reminded of the dead man he had just left, and shuddered; in fact, he felt slightly nauseated at 
the thought that decay and decomposition, according to the eternal laws, had already begun their work in 
the lean body under the brown flannel blanket. He was glad that he was still alive, and in all probability 
these ugly things were still far removed from him. He was, in fact, still in the prime of his youth, he had a 
charming and lovable wife and could have several women in addition, if he happened to want them, 






coupled in such a way asserts once again that deferred identity has not yet been 
foreclosed upon, and indeed, that it can remain, held in a Narrative domain (fantasy) as a 
legitimate expression of subjectivity that might yet be realized. If the permanent 
foreclosure of deferred identity were not immanent, this assertion would be sufficient and 
Fridolin should be able to return home with is crisis laid to rest, at least for a time. This is 
not the case, however. The choice as to whether to foreclose deferred identity or not does 
not rest with Fridolin alone, but with the discursive community (the Communicative 
domain) as well. In the Communicative domain, where the assessment and mirroring of 
others no longer validates his claim to deferred identity, Fridolin is faced with increased 
pressure to complete that foreclosure, and he must find a more adequate means of holding 
incommensurate subjectivity than in a Narrative domain as potentially realizable. 
The suspension between competing symbolized orders gives Fridolin’s experience 
an unreal or dreamlike quality that is described at various times throughout the novella. 
Upon leaving the Court Councilor’s, for instance, Fridolin experiences a sense of 
isolation and the eerie lack of reality that renders both the living and the dead somewhat 
“ghostlike:” 
Fridolin, vor dem Haustür, sah zu dem Fenster auf, das er früher 
selbst geöffnet hatte; die Flüggel zitterten leise im 






waren, die lebenden geradeso wie der Tote, waren ihm in gleicher 
Weise gespensterhaft unwirklich. (26)58 
This sense of unreality signals the loss of the asymmetry that privileges Idiolect (the seat 
of primary identity) over Narrative domains (alienated current of subjectivity in which 
deferred identity is held). Such asymmetry prevents the contents of a Narrative domain 
(fantasy, dream, speculation, etc.) from undermining the stability of one’s own 
apprehension of symbolized meaning and “reality.” The loss of that asymmetry, which is 
characteristic of traumatic crisis, allows a Narrative domain to vie for dominance with 
Idiolect, thereby establishing competing Idiolectic domains among which, 
incommensurate experience is distributed. Such loss of asymmetry not only elevates a 
Narrative domain so that it competes with Idiolect for ascendancy, but it also diminishes 
the value of Idiolect, and with it, primary identity and the relationships and 
responsibilities associated with it. At the same time, the regulative function of the 
Communicative domain is diminished, since those relationships and responsibilities serve 
to anchor primary identity in the Communicative domain, thereby validating its primacy. 
The sense of other-worldliness that Fridolin experiences arises out of the overflow of the 
semiotic current, its redirection along a diverted (i.e., dissociated) channel in alternation 
with its passage via the existent, dominant channel. It is not surprising then, that this 
description sounds so much like dissociation as it is described in trauma research. 
                                                 
58 “When Fridolin stood on the street in front of the house, he looked up at the window which he himself 
opened a little while before. The casements were swaying slightly in the wind of early spring, and the 







Unable to go home but at the same time, unable and/or unwilling to act on his 
impulses, Fridolin is caught between competing realities. Until he is able to resolve this 
crisis and establish the primacy of one symbolized domain over the other, his only 
alternative is to move in a kind of limbo between them, during which time he repeatedly 
places himself in the path of temptation, and then abruptly terminates the encounter. 
Fridolin’s “adventures” represent a kind of flight: a flight from marriage and 
responsibility when he seeks out those adventures in potentially illicit encounters, and a 
flight from temptation when he abruptly quits those encounters. His repudiation of both 
identities is succinctly expressed in the description of how he leaves the Court 
Councilor’s, unsure of where he is going, but unable to bring himself to return home: 
Und er beschleunigte seinen Schritt, wie um jeder Art von 
Verantwortung und Versuchung so rasch als möglich zu entfliehen. 
(27)59 
Fridolin will continue to flee both articulations of identity until he can make a decision 
either to foreclose deferred identity or to abandon his present identity, or optimally, until 
he is able to find a way to integrate the two within a single symbolized domain. 
Fridolin’s next encounter is with a prostitute named “Mizzi,” and in that 
encounter, we see many of the same themes recur that have characterized his crisis thus 
far. The “unreal” ands dreamlike quality of his experiences is reiterated and expanded 
upon to include not only those individuals whom Fridolin has encountered thus far on 
that nocturnal journey, but Albertine and his child as well: 
                                                 






Er fand sich, mit einem Male, schon über sein Ziel hinaus in einer 
engen Gasse, durch die nur ein paar armselige Dirnen auf 
nächtlichen Männerfang umherstrichen. Gespenstisch, dachte er. 
Und auch die Studenten mit den blauen Kappen wurden ihm 
plötzlich gespenstisch in der Erinnerung, ebenso Marianne, ihr 
Verlobter, Onkel und Tante, […]; auch Albertine, die ihm nun im 
Geist als tief Schlafende, die Arme unter dem Nacken verschränkt, 
vorschwebte, – sogar das Kind […],– sie alle waren ihm völlig ins 
Gespenstische entrückt. Und in dieser Empfindung, obzwar sie ihn 
ein wenig schaudern machte, war zugleich etwas Beruhigendes, 
das ihn von aller Verantwortung zu befreien, ja aus jeder 
menschlichen Beziehung zu lösen schien. (30)60 
This loosening of “all the bonds of human relationships,” at least in his mind, frees 
Fridolin from the need to resolve conflicted subjectivity for a time, as symbolized identity 
need therefore not find consistent accommodation in the Communicative domain. The 
severing of all human bonds enables Fridolin to move freely between competing 
articulations of subjectivity. At the same time, Fridolin’s fluctuation between competing 
symbolized domains makes cohesive social interaction difficult, if not impossible. 
                                                 
60 “He was in a narrow street in which only a few doubtful-looking women were strolling about in a pitiful 
attempt to bag their game. It’s phantomlike, he thought. And in retrospect the students, too, with their blue 
caps, suddenly seemed unreal. The same was true of Marianne, her fiancée, her uncle and aunt. […] 
Albertine, too, whom he could see in his mind’s eye soundly sleeping, her arms folded under her head – 
even his child […] – all of them seemed to belong to another world. Although this idea made him shudder a 
bit, it also reassured him, for it seemed to free him from all responsibility, and to loosen all the bonds of 






Along with the fluctuation between Idiolect and a Narrative domain, (essentially a 
competing Idiolectic domain), Fridolin experiences the destabilization of preceding 
domains (Ethical and Epistemic), which is expressed as a fear of contagion. As Mizzi 
approaches him, his first impulse is the reflexive fear that she may be suffering from 
some hidden illness – presumably a sexually transmitted disease: 
Eines der herumstreifenden Mädchen forderte ihn zum Mitgehen 
auf. Es war ein zierliches, noch ganz jungen Geschöpf, sehr blaß 
mit rotgeschminkten Lippen. Könnte gleichfalls mit Tod enden, 
dachte er, nur night so rasch. Auch Feigheit? Im Grunde schon. 
(30-31)61 
Certainly there is a greater than average chance that Mizzi, as a prostitute, is indeed 
infected with some contagious illness. This realistic basis does not annul the fact that, in 
his fear, Fridolin himself recognizes one of the traits associated with primary identity that 
he finds undesirable – cowardice. The renewed awareness of his own tendency towards 
cowardice / prudence, a leitmotif in the novella, demonstrates that despite whatever 
realistic basis his reticence to act might have, Fridolin’s decision as to whether or not to 
go with Mizzi will be inextricably tied to his anxiety that subjectivity (whether as primary 
or as deferred identity) could be annihilated. The decision to go along with Mizzi and to 
follow through with having sexual intercourse would represent Fridolin’s fully acting out 
deferred identity, thereby sowing the seeds of primary identity’s demise. 
                                                 
61 “One of the girls wandering about stopped him. She was still a young and pretty little thing, very pale 
with red-painted lips. Se also might lead to a fatal end, only not as quickly, he thought. Is this cowardice 






Fridolin’s interaction with Mizzi, and his failure to recognize the source of her 
cordial familiarity with him vividly recalls the masquerade he had attended with 
Albertine the night before. Like the “red dominoes” of the preceding night, Mizzi affects 
a familiarity with Fridolin’s that is intended both to put him at ease as a potential 
customer while at the same time, safeguarding both party’s anonymity and maintaining 
an appropriate emotional distance between them. The relationship between a prostitute 
and her client is characterized, in other words, by a dispassionate intimacy that is not 
unlike that between the physician and his patient. Mizzi’s greeting is anything but 
personal, and yet as he had with the “red dominoes,” Fridolin responds as though she 
knew and had recognized him: 
Er hörte ihre Schritte, bald ihre Stimme hinter sich. “Willst nicht 
mitkommen, Doktor?” 
Unwillkürlich wandte er sich um. “Woher kennst du mich?” fragte 
er. 
“Ich kenn’ Ihnen nicht,” sagte sie, “aber in dem Bezirk sind ja alle 
Doktors.” (31)62 
We can attribute Fridolin’s failure to accurately assess Mizzi’s familiarity to his desire to 
see the encounter as something more, as well as to the unconscious nature of the crisis-
driven process that impels him to undertake this journey. Certainly it is not the first time 
that Fridolin has been to a prostitute since, as the narrative reveals, Fridolin had visited 
                                                 
62 “He heard her steps and then her voice behind him. ‘Won’t you come with me, doctor?’ 
 He turned around involuntarily. ‘How do you know who I am?’ he asked. 







them when he attended Gymnasium. In fact, Fridolin associates visiting a prostitute with 
being an adolescent, and in this sense, this encounter marks a conscious return to his 
youth. In this way, Fridolin’s visit to Mizzi does serve some function in “restoring his 
youth” – a time when identity had not yet been deferred and was not yet threatened with 
foreclosure. Indeed, his interest in her indicates originates with the re-emergence of prior 
identity: 
Seit seiner Gymnasiastenzeit hatte er mit einem Frauenzimmer 
dieser Art nichts zu tun gehabt. Geriet er plötzlich in seine 
Knabenjahre zurück, daß dieses Geschöpf ihn reizte? (31)63 
Even as he proceeds to follow Mizzi, Fridolin is already aware that he has no 
intention of acting on his impulses. It appears that although Fridolin repeatedly confronts 
himself with temptation in the form of what he believes he has given up in order to marry 
Albertine, he does so with no other objective than to consider its foreclosure. His ultimate 
objective is to salvage the current of subjectivity that is held as deferred in a Narrative 
domain (fantasy), however he either does not actually desire the fantasy itself, or if he 
does desire it, does not regard it as the equal of what he already possesses. As he follows 
Mizzi, having tacitly indicated that he desires her services, Fridolin thinks to himself how 
absurd his impulse is: 
Bin ich verrückt? fragte er sich. Ich werde sie natürlich nicht 
anrühren. (31)64 
                                                 
63 “He had had no relations with a woman of this sort since he had been a student at the Gymnasium. Was 
the attraction this girl had for him a sign that he was suddenly reverting back to adolescence?” (35). 






Further, when he arrives at her room, he both wonders at how strange it is that he has 
come to be there, and unconsciously refuses her advances by withdrawing from them 
physically: 
Wer auf der Welt möchte vermuten, dachte er, daß ich mich jetzt 
gerade in diesem Raum befinde? Hätte ich selbst es vor einer 
Stunde, vor zehn Minuten für möglich gehalten? Und – warum? 
Warum? Sie suchte mit ihren Lippen die seinen, er bog sich 
zurück, [...]. (32)65 
Fridolin’s inner ambivalence towards the situation is expressed in the question he asks – 
“why?” – and can be read in two contradictory ways. Following the observation that he 
himself had thought it impossible that he would now be with a prostitute, the question, 
“why?” seems to ask; why had he thought it impossible? With his physical withdrawal 
from Mizzi, however, it appears equally likely that the question asks; why is he here? The 
question, “why,” forms a covalent bond between opposing impulses – one that asks why 
he should seek an extramarital encounter, and another that demands to know why not? 
Thus linked, the two impulses can neither be merged, nor separated from one another, 
just as primary identity and deferred identity belong to the same semiotic current, and yet 
cannot be brought together in the existent field of symbolized meaning. 
Fridolin’s refusal of Mizzi’s advances might have signaled a decision to abandon 
this encounter and perhaps even to permit foreclosure. His pride is once again piqued, 
                                                 
65 “Who in the world would suspect that I’m here in this room at this moment? Fridolin thought. I’d never 
have thought it possible an hour or even ten minutes ago. And – why? Why am I here? Her lips were 






however, by Mizzi’s not unkindly suggestion that Fridolin’s reluctance indicates that he 
is merely afraid: 
“Du fürchtest dich halt,” sagte sie leise, – und dann vor sich hin, kaum 
vernehmlich, “schad’!” 
Dieses letzte Wort jagte eine heiße Welle durch sein Blut. Er trat 
zu ihr hin, wollte sie umfassen, erklärte ihr, daß sie ihm völliges 
Vertrauen einflöße, und sprach damit sogar die Wahrheit. Er zog 
sie an sich, er warb um sie, wie um ein Mädchen, wie um eine 
geliebte Frau. Sie widerstand, er schämte sich und ließ endlich ab. 
(32-33)66 
This accusation, a reiteration of the conflict expressed by his concern that he might be a 
“coward,” repudiates his assertion of deferred identity within the discursive community 
formed by the two of them, and leads to the resurgence of that identity. Fridolin’s 
subsequent advances upon Mizzi, however, are inappropriate to the circumstances, much 
as the amorous gestures he returned in response to Marianne’s overtures were 
inappropriate. His romantic behavior and treatment of Mizzi as though she were his 
“beloved” violates the dispassionate intimacy that the prostitute-client relationship 
demands and demonstrates in a palpable way the degree to which Fridolin is 
unconsciously acting out deferred identity. The “reality” upon which Fridolin acts is far 
removed from the reality shared by others. Mizzi responds to these inappropriate gestures 
                                                 
66 “‘You’re simply afraid,’ she said softly – and then to herself in a barely audible voice: ‘It’s too bad.’ 
These last words made the blood race through his veins. He walked over to her, longing to touch her, and 
declared that he trusted her implicitly […]. He put his arms around her and wooed her like a sweetheart, 






with resistance – a second rejection within the discursive community that the two of them 
together form (the Communicative domain). With deferred identity thus rejected, Fridolin 
returns once again to his (validated) primary identity as provider and protector – an 
identity that itself reflexively diminishes Mizzi from her inflated role as potential lover to 
a ‘poor, dear thing’: 
Das Tor fiel hinter ihm zu, und Fridolin prägte mit einem raschen 
Blick seinem Gedächtnis die Hausnummer ein, um in der Lage zu 
sein, dem lieben armen Ding morgen Wein und Näschereien 
heraufzuschicken. (33)67 
As the third chapter of the novella comes to a close, Fridolin is not yet aware of what 
drives him to continue wandering. He will not be able to return home until there has been 
an escalation, and the forced resolution of his crisis. 
 
3.3 The Foreclosure of Deferred Identity 
The third chapter of the novella begins with Fridolin’s departure from Mizzi. As 
he leaves her, he once again finds himself in a state of limbo between identities, faced 
with the active decision of going home or of continuing his search elsewhere for an 
opportunity to realize deferred identity. The description of this interim period between 
encounters reiterates many of the same motifs already observed, including the 
reemergence of spring, the Föhn, and the risk of contagion it carries with it. Indeed, the 
very first lines of the chapter begin with a reference to the awakening of spring: 
                                                 
67 “The door closed behind Fridolin and he quickly made a mental note of the street number, so as to be 






Es war indes noch etwas warmer geworden. Der laue Wind brachte 
in die enge Gasse einen Duft von feuchten Wiesen und fernem 
Bergfrühling. (33)68 
The dimensions of this “thaw” have once again increased from the awakening of the 
distant woods mentioned when Fridolin left Marianne, to the awakening of the meadows 
and the mountains that lie beyond them. With this ever expanding thaw, the danger it 
brings with it is increased, as is Fridolin’s sense of separation from his former life and 
relationships. That “dream-like” limbo state creates the sense that he now inhabits a 
separate and distant world. Fridolin situates the genesis of that state in the discussion he 
had with Albertine, and in their recollections both of the social snub at the Redout and of 
their fantasized infatuations on holiday in Denmark: 
Wie heimatslos, wie hinausgestoßen erschien er sich seit der 
widerwärtigen Begegnung mit den Alemannen... Oder seit 
Mariannens Geständnis? – Nein, länger schon – seit dem 
Abendgespräch mit Albertine rückte er immer weiter fort aus dem 
gewohnten Bezirk seines Daseins in irgeneine andere, ferne, 
fremde Welt. (34)69 
Rather than return home, Fridolin continues on, allowing his gradually escalating 
crisis to drive him until he reaches a coffeehouse, where he discovers that the pianist 
performing that evening is a man with whom he had attended medical school – Nachtigall 
                                                 
68 “Meanwhile it had become even milder outside. A fragrance from dewy meadows and distant mountains 
drifted with the gentle breezes into the narrow street” (40). 
69 “He felt homeless, an outcast, since his annoying meeting with the students… or was it since Marianne’s 
confession? No, it was longer than that – ever since this evening’s conversation with Albertina he was 






(in English, “Nightingale”). This encounter is significant. Not only will Nachtigall lead 
Fridolin to his final quasi-amorous adventures, but like Marianne’s fiancé Roediger, he 
also represents the kind of life that Fridolin might have led if he had not chosen to pursue 
the stable and less adventurous path of his primary identity. Like Roediger, Nachtigall 
confronts Fridolin with a corporeal manifestation of his own deferred identity. Both 
Nachtigall and Roediger embody a different combination of those character traits that are 
the focus of his conflict; courage / timidity, and impulsiveness / responsibility, 
establishing the negative and positive paths along which deferred identity might have led 
him respectively. Whereas Roediger represents deferred identity in which greater courage 
is wed to a sense of responsibility, Nachtigall confronts Fridolin with deferred identity 
that is not only bold, but also destructively impulsive. Each of these men, in other words, 
demonstrate both the success and the failure that could have been Fridolin’s had he not 
made the choices that he did, and had he realized identity that now is deferred. 
Rather than pursuing an academic career as embodied by Roediger (courage 
tempered with a sense of responsibility and self-discipline), or that of a medical 
practitioner (perceived timidity combined with a sense of responsibility), Nachtigall 
floundered in medical school. Unfocused and undedicated, his “spontaneity” disrupted 
his studies and disorganized his life: 
Er erinnerte sich, daß Nachtigall das Studium der Medizin schon 






Verspätung abgelegten Vorprüfung in Zoologie, endgültig 
aufgegeben hatte. (36)70 
Eventually Nachtigall’s unbridled temperament eventually led him to pursue the life of a 
libertine, playing piano for his more disciplined academic colleagues and acting as the 
“life of the party.” His lack of discipline and unwillingness to work marginalized him 
within his circle of colleagues even as his spontaneity endeared him to them. His chaotic 
lifestyle ultimately puts an end to his hopes of a career in the field of medicine. Unlike 
Fridolin, it appears that Nachtigall was unwilling to defer conflicting aspects of identity 
in which he was so invested, as is evidenced by his concurrent study both at the school of 
medicine and the conservatory of music. Similarly, even after his medical studies had 
foundered and he had essentially abandoned his efforts to become a physician, he 
continued to associated with his former colleagues for some time, maintaining an 
ambiguous status among them, no more willing to dedicate himself to his role as 
musician than he was to his role as medical student / physician. 
Doch noch durch geräume Zeit hatte er sich in Krankenhaus, 
Seziersaal, Laboratorien und Hörsälen herumgetrieben, wo er mit 
seinem blonden Künstlerkopf, seinem stets zerknitterten Kragen, 
der flatternden, einst weiß gewesenen Krawatte eine auffallende, 
im heiteren Sinn populäre und nicht nur bei Kollegen sondern auch 
                                                 
70 “He remembered that Nachtigall had definitely given up on the study of medicine after his second 







bei manchen Professoren geradezu beliebte Figur vorgestellt hatte. 
(36)71 
Nachtigall’s cautionary example makes it clear that, had Fridolin refused to defer 
conflicted identity, he would have had to forego and defer the identity that he now 
embodies. The attempt to maintain incommensurate manifestations of subjectivity must 
ultimately fail, leading to the underdevelopment, or even the total loss of both manifested 
identities. 
The combination of impetuosity and impulsiveness that drive Nachtigall to 
abandon his aspirations to become a physician, likewise prevent him from achieving his 
potential as a pianist. He soon finds himself limited in what he can achieve with that 
pursuit, even as he attempts to support his own wife and children: 
Schon in seinem Heimatstädtchen hatte er bei einem dort 
gestrandeten Pianisten die Anfangsgründe des Klavierspielens 
gelernt, und in Wien als Studiosus medicanae besuchte er zugleich 
das Konservatorium, wo er angeblich als vielversprechendes 
pianistisches Talent galt. Aber auch hier war er nicht ernst und 
fleißig genug, um sich regelrecht weiter auszubilden; und bald ließ 
er es sich an seinen musikalischen Erfolgen im Kreise seiner 
                                                 
71 “Since then he had been hanging around the hospital, the dissecting room, the laboratories and 
classrooms for some time afterwards. With his blond artist’s head, his crinkled collar, his dangling tie that 






Bekannten, vielmehr as dem vergnügen, das er ihnen durch sein 
Klavierspiel bereitete, vollauf genügen. (36-37)72 
This last sentence, which indicates that Nachtigall’s focus on the outward effect that his 
identity and behavior have on others, sheds light on Fridolin’s crisis concerning deferred 
identity. Like Nachtigall, Fridolin is more preoccupied with the outward presentation of 
identity than with the relative value of that identity. He appears to be unable or unwilling 
to sublimate the diverted current of subjectivity that is held in a Narrative domain as 
deferred identity. During this active phase of his crisis, is fixated on living out the 
external manifestations of conflicted subjectivity as distinct and incommensurate 
identities within the Communicative domain. Nachtigall becomes a failure as a result of 
his efforts to concurrently express conflicted aspects of identity and as a result of his 
desire to please and impress others rather than achieve something for himself. Fridolin’s 
impulses to prove his youth, virility and courage by dueling and by entering into illicit 
affairs may likewise lead to his ultimate undoing. 
It is his focus on the superficial expression of subjectivity that makes Fridolin 
more vulnerable than Albertine in terms of psychological stability. As his crisis indicates, 
he is unable to conceive of a way in which he can accommodate a diverted current of 
subjectivity other than by realizing it – acting it out – in concrete terms. As we will see, 
Albertine will be able to integrate her own diverted current of subjectivity by sublimating 
it as dream using that dream-state as a way to “live out” conflicts, while at the same time 
                                                 
72 “He had already learned to play in his home town from a pianist stranded there, and while he was a 
medical student in Vienna he had studied at the Conservatory where he was considered a talented musician 
of great promise. But here, too, he was neither serious nor diligent enough to develop his art systematically. 
He soon became entirely content with the impression he made on his acquaintances, or rather with the 






safeguarding primary identity and contemporary relationships. Fridolin, on the other 
hand, is more reliant on the social validation of all aspects of subjectivity so that, like 
Nachtigall, his success, status and primary relationships are jeopardized by his efforts to 
act out conflicted subjectivity. The consequences that follow impetuous actions such as 
giving in to sexual impulses or answering a challenge to his honor with violent gestures 
are plainly illustrated in Nachtigall’s own tale: 
[… er spielte] bei solcher Gelegenheit immer nur, was ihm eben 
und solange es ihm beliebte, ließ sich mit den jungen Damen in 
Unterhaltungen ein, die von seiner Seite nicht immer harmlos 
geführt waren, und trank mehr, als er vertragen konnte. Einmal 
spielte er im Hause eines Bankdirektors zum Tanze auf. Nachdem 
er schon vor Mitternacht durch anzüglich-galante Bemerkungen 
die vorbeitanzenden jungen Mädchen in Verlegenheit gebracht und 
bei ihren Herrn Anstoß erregt hatte, fiel es ihm ein, einen wüsten 
Cancan zu spielen und mit seinem gewaltigen Baß ein 
zweideutiges Couplet dazu zu singen. Der Bankdirektor verwies es 
ihm heftig. Nachtigall, wie von seliger Heiterkeit erfüllt, erhob 
sich, umarmte den Direktor, dieser, empört, fauchte, obwohl selbst 
Jude, dem Pianisten ein landesübliches Schimpfwort ins Gesicht, 






quittierte – womit seine Laufbahn in den besseren Häusern der 
Stadt endgültig abgeschlossen erschien. (37)73 
Nachtigall sacrifices his security and success as a result of his inability or unwillingness 
to control his impulses. Fridolin’s situation is different, however. While Nachtigall’s poor 
choices represent a life-long pattern, Fridolin’s impulses have arisen in response to an 
acute crisis (mid-life crisis). His ability or inability to resist those crisis-generated 
impulses will determine the final outcome for Fridolin. 
In response to Fridolin’s inquiries into his current plans, Nachtigall eventually 
informs Fridolin that he must go that night to play piano at a gathering so secret, that a 
password is needed to gain admittance. The individuals who have organized the highly 
clandestine event, a masked ball, send for him in a coach that brings him, blindfolded, to 
a different location each time. Despite the fact that he is forced to wear a blindfold 
throughout the event, Nachtigall admits that he has caught quick glimpses of what goes 
on there: 
“[…] Wirklich, ich weiß nicht. Ich spiele, ich spiele – mit 
verbundene Augen.” 
“Nachtigall, Nachtigall, was singst du da für ein Lied!” 
                                                 
73 “[…] on such occasions he would play only what suited him and as long as he chose. His conversations 
with the young girls present were not always harmless, and he drank more than he could carry. Once, 
playing for a dance in the house of a wealthy banker he embarrassed several couples with flattering but 
improper remarks, and ended up by playing a wild cancan and singing a risqué song with his powerful, bass 
voice. The host gave him a severe calling down, but Nachtigall, blissfully hilarious, got up an embarrassed 
him. The latter was furious and, although himself a Jew, hurled a common insult at him. Nachtigall at once 
retaliated with a powerful box on his ears, and this definitely concluded his career in the fashionable houses 






Nachtigall seufzte leise. “Aber nicht ganz verbunden. Nicht so, daß 
ich gar nichts sehe. Ich seh’ nämlich im Spiegel durch das 
schwarze Seidentuch über meine Augen...” Und wieder schwieg er. 
“Mit einem Wort,” sagte Fridolin ungeduldig und verächtlich, 
fühlte sich aber sonderbar erregt... “nackte Frauenzimmer.” (40-
41)74 
The intimations that Nachtigall makes about of these performances capture Fridolin’s 
lurid imagination, and he begs Nachtigall to assist him in sneaking into the ball to witness 
this for himself. Nachtigall is at first reluctant and cautions Fridolin that the undertaking 
is dangerous. In addition, he would need a costume to attend which, at that late hour, 
would be difficult to procure. Despite Nachtigall’s reticent, Fridolin presses him, 
claiming that he is not afraid and that he knows of a costumer in the vicinity from whom 
he could easily obtain a costume. 
At the costumer, Gibiser’s shop, Fridolin has one last encounter before the 
masquerade, which will mark the end of his journey through the limbo of unresolved 
subjectivity. Once again, many of the same themes that arose in each of Fridolin’s 
previous encounters emerge, most specifically, gradually increasing reluctance to act on 
his crisis-driven impulses. As he approaches the costumer’s shop, he experiences 
misgivings and a hope that circumstances themselves will put an end to the “adventures” 
                                                 
74 “‘I don’t know for what occasion. I simply play – with bandaged eyes.’ 
 ‘Nachtigall, what do you mean?’ 
 Nachtigall sighed a little and continued: ‘Unfortunately my eyes are not completely bandaged, so that I 
can occasionally see something. I can see through the black silk handkerchief over my eyes in the mirror 
opposite…’ And he stopped. 







he is pursuing. It is as though his actions were being driven by a force beyond his own 
volition, which is true in the sense that his volition is divided and conflicted with itself. It 
no longer represents a single, unified agency: 
Nach wenigen Minuten, im Laufschritt, war er zu dem Eckhaus 
gelangt, das er suchte, läutete, erkundigte sich beim Hausmeister, 
ob der Maskenverleiher Gibiser hier im Hause wohnte, und hoffte 
im stillen, daß es nicht der Fall wäre. (42)75 
This is a somewhat stronger expression of reluctance than we have previously seen, and it 
gives the sense that, while Fridolin is a puppet to his impulses and to the fluctuations in 
the semiotic current, he truly wishes for resolution and an end to this twilight state. That 
twilight state and loss of self is perhaps best expressed when, as he is dressed the rented 
monk’s garb required to gain admittance into the masquerade, Fridolin glances into the 
costumer’s mirror and experiences a sense of alienation from the identity that he is about 
to present in social intercourse: 
Fridolin erblickte in einem großen Wandspiegel rechts einen 
hageren Pilger, der niemand anderer war als er selbst, [...]. (46)76 
Fridolin’s costumed identity as a pilgrim – a seeker on a sacred quest – ironically 
underscores the true nature of his journey in search of self. It is a quest for an expression 
the sublime or, in other words, for an expression of subjectivity that transcends the 
limitations imposed by symbolized meaning. The costumer’s, however, proves to be yet 
                                                 
75 “He ran down the street and reached the corner house he was looking for a few minutes later. He rang the 
bell, inquired from the caretaker whether the costumer Gibiser lived in the house, and hoped in the bottom 
of his heart that he would receive a negative answer” (53). 
76 “He noticed with surprise, in a large wall mirror to the right, a haggard pilgrim who seemed to be 






again a spurious goal for that quest. There, Fridolin is confronted with an apparently 
sordid scene in which two older gentlemen dressed as vehmic judges are engaged in some 
illicit, sexual game with a young girl. As Gibiser startles the trio, the girl appears to 
escape the men, throwing herself upon Fridolin. It is unclear from this precipitous gesture 
whether she is seeking his protection or his attentions: 
Von zwei Stühlen rechts und links erhoben sich je ein Femrichter 
in rotem Talar, während ein zierliches helles Wesen im selben 
Augenblick verschwand. Gibiser stürzte mit langen Schritten hin, 
griff über den Tisch und hielt eine weiße Perücke in der Hand, 
während zugleich unter dem Tisch sich hervorschlängelnd ein 
anmutiges, ganz junges Mädchen, fast noch ein Kind, im 
Pierrettenkostüm mit weißen Seidenstrümpfen durch den Gang bis 
zu Fridolin gelaufen kam, der sie notgedrungen in seinen Armen 
auffing. (44)77 
Gibiser explains, with an apology to Fridolin, that the girl is both insane and depraved, 
however despite this explanation, Fridolin remains confused by the young girl’s motives. 
Her ambiguous gesture feeds into the fluctuation of his identity between caretaker 
(physician, husband, and father) and potential suitor. In either role – that of protector or 
of partner – Fridolin’s first impulse is either to remain with the girl, or to take her with 
him: 
                                                 
77 “Two men dressed in the red robes of vehmic judges, sprang up from two chairs beside the table and a 
graceful little girl disappeared at the same moment. Gibiser rushed forward with long strides, reached 
across the table and grabbed a white wig in his hand. Simultaneously a young and charming girl, still 
almost a child, wearing a Pierrette costume, wriggled out from under the table and ran along the passage to 






Am liebsten wäre er dageblieben oder hätte die Kleine gleich 
mitgenommen, wohin immer – und was immer daraus gefolgt 
wäre. Sie sah lockend und kindlich zu ihm auf, wie gebannt. (57)78 
Seizing the physician’s privilege of dispassionate intimacy (while at the same 
time abusing that prerogative), Fridolin attempts to use his position as medical 
practitioner both to safeguard the girl against abuse, and concurrently to secure an 
opportunity to return and see her again: 
Doch Fridolin rührte sich nicht vom Fleck. “Sie schwören mir, daß 
Sie dem armen Kind nichts Böses tun werden.” 
“Was kümmert Sie das, Herr?” 
“Ich hörte, wie Sie die Kleine vorher als wahnsinnig bezeichneten, 
– und jetzt nannten Sie sie ein verworfenes Geschöpf. Ein 
auffallender Widerspruch, Sie wurden es nicht leugnen.” 
“Nun, mein Herr,” entgegnete Gibiser mit einem Ton wie auf dem 
Theater, “ist der Wahnsinnige nicht verworfen vor Gott?” 
Fridolin schüttelte sich angewidert. 
“Wie immer,” bemerkte er dann, “es wird sich Rat scaffen lassen. 
Ich bin Arzt. Wir reden morgen weiter über die Sache.” (46)79 
                                                 
78 “He would have liked to stay, or, better still, to take the girl with him, no matter where – and whatever 
the consequences. She looked up at him with alluring and child-like eyes, as if spellbound” (57). 
79  “Fridolin, however, refused to move. ‘Swear that you won’t hurt that poor child,’ he said. 
 ‘What business is it of yours?’ 
 ‘I heard you, a minute ago, say that the girl was insane – and just now you called her a depraved 
creature. That sounds pretty contradictory.’ 
 ‘Well,’ replied Gibiser theatrically, ‘aren’t insanity and depravity the same in the eyes of God?’ 






The film expresses this misuse of the physician’s prerogative in an especially concise 
manner. In moments when Bill (i.e., Fridolin) is confronted with opposition, such as 
when he wishes to gain admittance to the costumer, he habitually pulls out his wallet and 
“flashes” his medical identification the way a law enforcement officer would flash his 
badge. This misappropriation of an authority that is not his (i.e., that of a police officer) 
by utilizing a gesture inappropriate to his own status serves to demonstrate how 
inappropriate such claims to privilege are to the role of physician. Those gestures draw 
the viewer’s awareness to the coexistence of competing realities in Bill/Fridolin’s limbo-
state. 
Costume in hand, Fridolin returns to Nachtigall, resolved to follow through with 
his intention of attending the secret masquerade. After questioning Fridolin’s resolve to 
attend on last time, Nachtigall relents and tells Fridolin the secret password he will need 
to get into the ball: 
“Du hast dir also richtig ein Kostüm verschafft?” 
“Wie du siehst. Und die Parole?” 
“Du bestehst also darauf?” 
“Unbedingt.” 
“Also – Parole ist Dänemark.” (47)80 
                                                                                                                                                 
 ‘Whatever it is,’ he remarked, ‘there are ways and means of attending to it. I am a doctor. We’ll have 
another talk about this tomorrow’” (59). 
80 “ ‘Then you did manage to get a costume?’ 
 You can see for yourself. What’s the password?’ 
 ‘You insist in knowing it?’ 
 ‘Absolutely.’ 






The significance of the password within the narrative is evident. ‘Dänemark’ recalls the 
holiday that Fridolin and Albertine had taken the previous summer during which, as the 
quarrel that evening revealed, both had vaguely entertained the possibility of committing 
adultery. In Eyes Wide Shut¸ this connection with potential infidelity is laid out with even 
greater clarity by the use of the password, Fidelio. The password, both in the novella and 
in the film, establishes the intention that prompts Fridolin to attend the clandestine 
masquerade – to commit infidelity. At the same time, in both instances the passwords 
themselves suggest that he will not actually act on these impulses. The password in the 
film is “fidelity” after all, not “infidelity,” and “Denmark” refers to events in which both 
partners considered adultery, but only in the most abstract sense. Neither took any action 
to realize that impulse. These “opportunities” existed largely in Albertine and Fridolin’s 
imaginations with little real possibility of fulfillment. In Fridolin’s case in particular, his 
“infatuation” was with a girl whom he had trapped unwillingly on the ledge of a bathing 
hut – a reiteration of a theme of vulnerability and rape discussed above. 
The masquerade’s location is clandestine, changing on a rotating basis, and even 
Nachtigall has no idea where it is to take place. The masquerade organizers send for him 
in a coach that, as Fridolin observes, closely resembles a mourning coach: 
Draußen stand ein geschlossener Wagen, unbeweglich auf dem 
Bock saß ein Kutscher, ganz in Schwarz, mit hohem Zylinder; – 
wie eine Trauerkutsche, dachte Fridolin. (42)81 
                                                 
81 “A closed carriage was standing outside. A coachman dressed entirely in black with a tall hat on the box, 






A mourning coach is appropriate, since it will be at this secret masquerade that Fridolin’s 
deferred identity will finally be foreclosed upon. Although Fridolin himself does not yet 
sit in that coach, the death of an aspect of his identity is immanent. In an echo of 
Fridolin’s earlier visit to the Court Counselor, no art or artifice will be of use, and the 
physician will arrive to find his patient already dead. 
Still trapped in his limbo-state as the cab makes its way to the remote, suburban 
location of the masquerade, Fridolin finds that he is unable to choose among the various 
manifestations of identity that he perceives to be open to him. As yet unaware that the 
foreclosure of deferred identity is inevitable and that none of the evening’s encounters 
have held any true potential, Fridolin is nonetheless becoming cognoscente of the fact 
that his journey may indeed end badly. Increasingly confused regarding the motivation 
for his actions, plans, and unseen even where he now finds himself, Fridolin’s crisis, 
which had begun with vague feelings of unease, has become increasingly uncomfortable: 
Es könnte auch übel ausgehen, dachte Fridolin. Dabei spürte er 
immer noch den Geruch von Rosen und Puder, der von Pierrettens 
Brüsten zu ihm aufgestiegen war. An welch einen seltsamen 
Roman bin ich da vorübergestreift? fragte er sich. Ich hätte nicht 
fortgehen sollen, vielleicht nicht dürfen. Wo bin ich nun 
eigentlich? (47-48)82 
                                                 
82 “This business may end badly, thought Fridolin. At the same time he remembered the fragrance of the 
roses and powder that had arisen from Pierrette’s breast. What strange story is behind all that? He 






Fridolin’s ambivalence and confusion are understandable when one considers that 
the resolution of his crisis will result in some form of loss. As long as there is no 
integration of competing currents of subjectivity, Fridolin will find it difficult to 
voluntarily put an end to his nocturnal journey, and his apprehension is founded on a fear 
of loosing some aspect of subjectivity; a loss which Fridolin characterizes as death, even 
as he laughs at his own hyperbole: 
Der Wagen stand still. Wie wär’s, dachte Fridolin, wenn ich gar 
nicht erst aussteige – sondern lieber gleich zurückkehrte? Aber 
wohin? Zu der kleinen Pierrette? Oder zu dem Dirnchen in der 
Buchfeldgasse? Oder zu Marianne, der Tochter des Verstorbenen? 
Oder nach Hause? Und mit einem leichten Schauer empfand er, 
daß er nirgendshin sich weniger sehnte als gerade dorthin. Oder 
war es, weil dieser Weg ihn der weiteste dünkte? Nein, ich kann 
nicht zurück, dachte er bei sich. Weiter meinen Weg, und wär’s 
mein Tod. Er lachte selbst zu dem großen Wort, aber sehr heiter 
war ihm dabei nicht zumut. (48-49)83 
The notion that the evening might end with a “death” may indeed seem overly dramatic, 
death need not necessarily be taken in a literal sense. The foreclosure of deferred identity 
would mean the “death” of subjectivity accommodated therein. At the same time, 
realizing deferred identity would likely lead to the “death” of primary identity, and 
                                                 
83 “His cab stopped. What if I don’t get out at all, Fridolin thought, and go back at once? But go where? To 
little Pierrette? To the girl in Buchfeld Strasse? Or to Marianne, the daughter of the deceased? Or perhaps 
home? He shuddered slightly and decided he’d rather go anywhere than home. Was it because it was 
farthest to go? No, I can’t turn back, he thought. I must go through with this, even if it means death. And he 






should Fridolin attempt to realize deferred identity and fail, he could experience a “death” 
in the loss of both deferred and primary identity. Even the integration of competing 
identity would mean the restructuring of the semiotic current and of subjectivity. No 
matter what resolution he ultimately finds, Fridolin’s crisis will end with a change in the 
way in which subjectivity is structured, and will therefore suffer some manner of loss. 
As he arrives at the masquerade in mask and costumed as a monk, Fridolin is able 
to enter more or less unobtrusively. The other attendees, likewise masked and clad in the 
garb of monks and nuns, mingle with one another amidst the sounds of Italian church 
music played above their heads on a harmonium: 
Masken, durchaus in geistlicher Tracht, schritten auf und ab, 
sechzehn bis zwanzig Personen, Mönche und Nonnen. Die 
Harmoniumklänge, sanft anschwellend, eine italienische 
Kirchenmelodie, schienen aus der Höhe herabzutönen. (49-50)84 
The masquerade marks the climax of Fridolin’s traumatic crisis, and therefore there is 
increased reference to semiotic overflow as it is manifested in all of the organizational 
domains, (i.e., somatic manifestations in the Epistemic, death as the encroachment of 
Other upon Self in the Ethical, as well as the profound disruption of symbolized identity 
and of social mirroring). The atmosphere of the masquerade reiterates the plague motif 
intimated earlier in the novella with references to the Föhn as a bringer of contagion and 
death. The ball scene itself, which is somewhat reminiscent Boccaccio’s Decameron, the 
ball also recalls a Danse Macabre, or “Dance of Death” associated with the plague in art, 
                                                 
84 “Sixteen to twenty people masked and dressed as monks and nuns were walking up and down. The 






literature and music. Its attendees take part knowing that they are threatened with “death” 
(whether literally, or figuratively in the sense of social death) should they be unmasked 
and their true identity made known. Only a few weeks prior, a young, aristocratic girl 
who was engaged with an Italian prince was forcibly unmasked by a male participant. 
That man was, himself, unmasked and driven from the masquerade: 
“Es war eine Nacht, da fiel es einem ein, einer von uns im Tanz 
den Schleier von der Stirn zu reißen. Man riß ihm die Larve vom 
Gesicht und peitschte ihn hinaus.” (54)85 
Not only was the cavalier violently expelled, but the young woman herself subsequently 
committed suicide, presumably because her reputation and prospects were ruined by the 
scandal. The precariousness of the clandestine masquerade is made evident by this event. 
The masquerade’s attendees are able to participate, living out a second, otherwise 
deferred identity that could potentially destroy primary identity. They are able to do so, 
however, only by preserving their own anonymity, and that of the other participants. 
Should that anonymity be violated, the mingling of both sides of their double lives 
constitutes a kind of infection that can destroy both identities (i.e., the loss both of 
anonymity and of the careful separation of identities brings contagion and death). 
Kubrick’s representation of this plague motif is visually direct, and many of the 
costumes worn by the masquerade’s participants consist of the long robes and beaked 
masks once worn by physicians to protect themselves from the plague. Ironically, Bill, 
although himself actually a physician, does not wear this physician’s garb. In the social 
                                                 
85 “‘One night during the dance here one of the men took it into his head to tear the veil from one of us. 






structure of the clandestine masquerade, Bill (Fridolin) does not possess a privileged role. 
Instead, he is an infiltrator and potential carrier of “contagion” that could destroy the 
compact under which the secret society is able to conduct its activities were he to reveal 
the identities of the other participants. The hermetic closure of the event that allows its 
participants to lead this double life is, in essence, breeched by Fridolin’s uninvited 
attendance. 
Fridolin is appropriately dressed and masked, and therefore his arrival does not 
arouse immediate suspicion. As was the case at the masquerade he attended with 
Albertine the night before, however, his familiarity with the customs and behaviors 
appropriate to the event are restricted to the most superficial level. In the details of how 
he conducts himself and in the finer points of interaction, he is gradually recognized as an 
interloper: 
In einem Winkel des Saales stand eine kleine Gruppe, drei Nonnen 
und zwei Mönche; von dort aus hatte man sich flüchtig zu ihm hin 
und gleich wieder, wie mit Absicht, abgewandt. Fridolin merkte, 
daß er als einziger das Haupt bedeckt hatte, nahm den Pilgerhut ab 
und wandelte so harmlos als möglich auf und nieder; ein Mönch 
streifte seinen Arm und nickte einen Gruß; doch hinter der Maske 
bohrte sich ein Blick, eine Sekunde lang, tief in Fridolins Augen. 
(49-50)86 
                                                 
86 “A small group, composed of three nuns and two monks, stood in the corner of the room. They watched 
him for a second, but turned away again at once, almost deliberately. Fridolin, noticing that he was the only 






At first, the other attendees at the ball appear suspicious but not yet prepared to decry 
Fridolin as an intruder. Rather, they watch him carefully, while avoiding direct contact 
with him. A single, masked woman approaches him discretely and warns him that he 
must flee while there is still time or he will soon be discovered: 
Wenden Sie sich nicht nach mir um. Noch ist es Zeit, daß Sie sich 
entfernen. Sie gehören nicht hierher. Wenn man es entdeckt, 
erginge es Ihnen schlimm. (50)87 
Fridolin is unable to bring himself to leave, bewitched, as it were, by this 
beautiful, masked woman. Indeed it is precisely this figure of the “unknown woman” that 
is the object of Fridolin’s desire – more so than Marianne, Mizzi, or the young girl at the 
costumer’s shop, since his ultimate pursuit is merely that which has been deferred in the 
most abstract sense. His crisis is one of foreclosed identity, and therefore it is no specific 
woman that he desires, but merely the possibility of being with another woman. 
Fridolin’s life choices have manifested his identity within the confines of one career, one 
partner, and so forth. The foreclosure of deferred identity does not in and of itself have 
any particular form, but instead represents the sum of what was lost. Consequently, as 
Fridolin’s crisis reaches its climax and as foreclosure looms inevitable, the figures that 
arouse his desire more closely embody the essence of that crisis by being both the 
unknown and the unknowable, forever unattainable: 
                                                                                                                                                 
against him and nodded a greeting, but from behind the mask, Fridolin encountered a searching and 
penetrating glance” (64). 
87 “‘Don’t turn around. There’s still a chance for you to get away. You don’t belong here. If it’s discovered 






[…] Frauen standen unbeweglich da, all mit dunkelen Schleiern 
um Haupt, Stirn und Nacken, schwarze Spitzenlarven über dem 
Antlitz, aber sonst völlig nackt. Fridolins Augen irrten durstig von 
üppigen zu schlanken, von zarten und prangend erblühten 
Gestalten; – und daß jede dieser Unverhüllten doch ein Geheimnis 
blieb und aus den schwarzen Masken als unlöslichste Rätsel große 
Augen zu ihm herüberstrahlten, das wandelte ihm die unsägliche 
Qual des Verlangens. (51)88 
The women at the masquerade confront Fridolin with a tangible metaphor for 
what he seeks, however like all of his previous encounters, he is not prepared to act on 
his impulses and desires. If there ever had been any realistic expectation that he might do 
so, that expectation is now annulled. Fridolin is literally not equipped to go any farther 
with his charade as the men change out of their monk’s cassocks and into the bright 
costumes of cavaliers: 
[…] – und plötzlich, als wären sie gejagt, stürzten sie alle, nicht 
mehr in ihren Mönchskutten, sondern in festlichen weißen, gelben, 
blauen, roten Kavalierstrachten aus dem dämmerigen Saal zu den 
Frauen hin, wo ein tolles, beinah böses Lachen sie empfing. 
Fridolin war der einzige, der als Mönch zurückgeblieben war, und 
                                                 
88 “They wore dark veils over their heads, faces and necks and black masks over their eyes, but otherwise 
they were completely naked. Fridolin’s eyes wandered eagerly from voluptuous to slender bodies, from 
delicate figures to those luxuriously developed. He realized that each of these women would forever be a 
mystery, and that the enigma of their large eyes peering at him from beneath the black masks would remain 






schlich sich, einigermaßen ängstlich, in die entfernteste Ecke [...]. 
(51-52)89 
As the only chaste pilgrim amidst cavaliers reveling in their debauchery, Fridolin is 
neatly exposed as what he truly is – an outsider playing a role and ultimately, playing it 
badly. The nocturnal journey is revealed as a futile, crisis-driven attempt to reclaim what 
has already been lost. Despite his obvious inability to participate any farther, however 
Fridolin is as yet unwilling or unable to admit his failure and exclusion: 
Was ihn trotzdem in seine Ecke gebannt hielt, wo er sich nun 
ungesehen und unbeachtet fühlen durfte – die Scheu vor einem 
ruhmlosen und etwas lächerlichen Rückzug, das ungestillte, 
quälende Verlangen nach dem wundersamen Frauenleib, dessen 
Duft noch um ihn strich; oder die Erwägung, daß alles, was bisher 
geschehen, vielleicht eine Prüfung seines Muts bedeutet hätte und 
daß ihm die herrliche Frau als Preis zufallen würde [...]. (55)90 
Unable to concede defeat and permit the foreclosure of deferred identity, Fridolin 
continues to be driven to find a “harmonious finale” that would allow him to old both his 
primary identity and deferred identity such that they were separate but equal. Fridolin 
perceives that this manner of resolution would resolve his crisis such that no loss need 
                                                 
89 “Suddenly all of them, as though pursued, rushed from the darkened room to the women, who received 
them with wild and wicked laughter. The men were no longer in cassocks, but dressed as cavaliers, in 
white, yellow, blue and red. Fridolin was the only one in monk’s dress. Somewhat nervously he slunk into 
the farthest corner […]” (67). 
90 “He didn’t know, however, why it was that he remained spellbound in his corner where he now felt sure 
that he was not observed. It might be his aversion to an inglorious and perhaps ridiculous retreat, or the 
excruciating ungratified desire for the beautiful woman whose fragrance was still in his nostrils. Or he may 
have stayed because he vaguely hoped that all that had happened so far was intended as a test of his 






occur, while also putting an end to the uncomfortable tantalization and the emptiness of 
his limbo state of unrealized identity. Ultimately what he seeks is validation by the 
discursive community at the clandestine masquerade (the Communicative domain) that 
his “adventures” that night might represent a valid expression of his own subjective 
identity. He wishes to know, in other words, that those “adventures” had a real potential 
for fulfillment, and that they were not a desperate but futile attempt to deny that 
foreclosure had already occurred: 
Und so kam ihm der Einfall, unter sie hinzutretten, sich selbst als 
Eindringling zu benennen und sich ihren in ritterlicher Weise zur 
Verfügung zu stellen. Nur in solcher Art, wie mit einem edeln 
Akkord, durfte diese Nacht abschließen, wenn sie mehr bedeuten 
sollte als ein schattenhaft wüstes Nacheinander von düsteren, 
trübseligen, skurrilen und lüsternen Abenteuern, deren doch keines 
zu Ende gelebt war. Und aufatmend machte er sich bereit. (55-
56)91 
This impulse is futile, since it is not possible to realize mutually opposed identity without 
at the same time dividing subjectivity. The end towards which his crisis drives him is 
actually the reintegration of subjectivity through the sublimation of diverted semiotic 
current and the restructuring of the organizational domains. 
                                                 
91 “The thought occurred to him to acknowledge himself as an intruder and to place himself at their disposal 
in chivalrous fashion. This night could only conclude in such a manner, – with a harmonious finale, as it 
were – if it were to mean more than a wild, shadow-like succession of gloomy and lascivious adventures, 






The desire to seek a harmonious conclusion to his crisis in the maintenance of 
bifurcated subjectivity and the validation of both currents of subjectivity in the 
Communicative domain constitutes Fridolin’s potentially “fatal” flaw. Unlike Albertine 
who, as we will see is able to sublimate diverted subjectivity without literally acting it out 
and embodying it, Fridolin is trapped by his inability to conceive of a solution to his 
crisis besides literally living out both identities concurrently, regardless their innate 
incompatibility. If he attempts to have both, however, everything will be lost sooner or 
later – both his primary identity and the object of his desire (what he has deferred). 
Fridolin cannot hold onto the “unknown woman,” nor take her with him as he returns to 
his everyday life (in a sense, his “waking” life). Her sexual availability in this dual 
identity is limited to these clandestine functions, and even there, she is unavailable to 
Fridolin, who is an infiltrator. Outside of the masquerade, her secret, second identity must 
remain a secret, or she (and any potential partner) risks forfeiting their everyday life and 
identity. As his unknown benefactress declares: 
“Du bist wahnsinnig. Ich kann nicht mit dir von hier fortgehen, so 
wenig – wie mit irgendeinem anderen. Und wer versuchen wollte, 
mir zu folgen, hätte sein und mein Leben verwirkt.” (54)92 
The situation in which Fridolin finds himself eventually puts an end to his charade. Even 
before he can attempt to seek a “harmonious finale” by revealing himself, he is 
discovered and forced to drop the pretense that he has any legitimate claim to be at the 
masquerade. At the same time, he must also relinquish his claim to deferred identity, 
                                                 
92 “‘You are mad. I can no more go with you than with anyone else. And whoever would attempt to follow 






which he has intermittently worn like a mask throughout the novella up until this point. 
Unlike the discrete withdrawal of the prostitutes at the Redout, the rejection of Fridolin’s 
deferred identity at this second masquerade fundamentally invalidates the notion that this 
identity is potentially realizable. Even in his last bid to stave off foreclosure by giving 
satisfaction in a duel (another manifestation of deferred identity) fails: 
“Die Maske herunter!” riefen einige zugleich. Wie zum Schutz 
hielt Fridolin die Arme vor sich hingestreckt. Tausendmal 
schlimmer wäre es ihm erschienen. Der einzige mit unverlarvtem 
Gesicht unter lauter Masken dazustehen, als plötzlich unter 
Angekleideten nackt. Und mit fester Stimme sagte er: “Wenn einer 
von den Herren sich durch mein Erscheinen in seiner Ehre 
gekränkt fühlen sollte, so erkläre ich mich bereit, ihm in üblicher 
Weise Genugtuung zu geben. Doch meine Maske werde ich nur in 
dem Falle ablegen, daß Sie alle das gleiche tun, meine Herren.” 
(56-57)93 
From this point on we can say that foreclosure has occurred whether or not 
Fridolin is prepared to accept it. The scene reiterates his discovery as an intruder at the 
first masked ball. Unlike that first masquerade, at which he was able to regroup with 
Albertine and continue the pretense within the privacy of their own, discursive 
community, however, Fridolin is ordered to remove his mask and quit the falsified role he 
                                                 
93 “‘Take off your mask!’ several of them demanded. Fridolin held out his arm to protect himself. It seemed 
a thousand times worse to be the only one unmasked amongst so many that were, than to stand suddenly 
naked amongst people who were dressed. He replied firmly: ‘If my appearance here has offended any of 
the gentlemen present, I am ready to give satisfaction in the usual manner, but I shall take off my mask 






has been playing. Rejection in the Communicative domain is unequivocal, and there is no 
way for him to “save” himself by deferring identity further. His one chance to remain at 
the masquerade rests on his ability to produce the house password, however just as he had 
arrived with the costume that gained him admittance, but not the costume that allowed his 
active participation, Fridolin has only been given the password for admittance 
(Denmark), not the house password that would allow him to abide there. His claim that 
he forgot the password (i.e., that he once had a valid claim to participate) is of no use to 
him, and as the cavalier who demands the password notes: 
“[…] ers gilt hier gleich, ob Sie die Parole vergessen oder ob Sie 
sie nie gekannt haben.” (56)94 
It is not enough, in other words, that identity was once valid and merely deferred. The 
passage of time and the foreclosure of identity annul that previous validity and with 
foreclosure, deferred identity becomes no different than identity to which he had never 
had a claim, with its only value being historical. Fridolin can no longer claim foreclosed 
identity as his own in the present field of symbolized meaning merely on the basis that he 
once might have done so. 
Having been rejected by the discursive community into which he sought 
admittance, Fridolin must now somehow “salvage” primary identity against devaluation 
or ruin through his attempted indiscretion. As I noted, exposure within the closed circle 
of libertines who attended this clandestine function can mean the loss of reputation and of 
key relationships, and can result in social ruin or even death. Ironically, it works in 
                                                 






Fridolin’s favor that he does not belong to the upper-class social milieu of which the 
masquerade’s regular attendees are a part, since exposure at the masquerade will not 
automatically lead to exposure within his everyday life. In addition, he has not actually 
acted on any of his libidinal impulses nor participated in the debaucheries being 
committed at the masquerade. As a result, unlike those other participants, Fridolin is not 
yet leading a true double life in order that he may live out conflicted subjectivity as 
separate but competing identities. Fridolin can still abandon his efforts to realize deferred 
identity and return to his life, eventually sublimating those impulses by holding diverted 
subjectivity in a narrative domain (dream, fantasy, creative pursuits, etc.), while at the 
same time, allowing that subjectivity to enhance primary identity (as Albertine will do 
with her dream). 
Fridolin’s escape from these sordid and “senseless childish adventures,” as he 
himself will later characterize them, is safeguarded by the voluntary sacrifice of the 
masked, “unknown woman” who warned him earlier that he should leave. She now steps 
forward and demands that he be permitted to go, unmolested: 
“Laßt ihn,” sagte die Nonne, “ich bin bereit, ihn auszulösen.” 
(57)95 
Whatever basis in reality the events at the clandestine masquerade might have, from this 
point on that realistic basis is eclipsed by the metaphoric significance of those events. 
The woman’s “sacrifice,” whatever that might actually be, acquires its significance in 
Fridolin’s situation in that it represents the sacrifice of the object of desire – a desire that 
                                                 






articulates deferred identity and that therefore cannot be fulfilled – in order to save 
primary identity. Only by giving up his claims to potential identities and potential 
partners (whether they possess real or imagined potential), and by allowing the demise of 
what he desires can Fridolin hold on to all he has of value in the life he has already 
chosen. 
The “sacrifice” suggested by the masked woman is found acceptable, and Fridolin 
is released “unharmed,” but with a warning to drop all further pursuit of the matter: 
“Sie sind frei,” sagte der Kavalier zu Fridolin, “verlassen Sie 
ungesäumt dieses Haus und hüten Sie sich, weiter nach den 
Geheimnissen zu forschen, in deren Vorhof Sie sich 
eingeschlichen haben. Sollten Sie irgend jemanden auf unsere Spur 
zu leiten versuchen, ob es nun glückte oder nicht; – Sie wären 
verloren.” (57)96 
The warning is clear: Fridolin should be satisfied that he has narrowly escaped, having 
pursued deferred identity and desire as far as possible without actually jeopardizing 
primary identity, career, and the integrity of his family, etc. Confronted with foreclosure, 
and perceiving his chance to realize his fantasy about to be lost forever, however, 
Fridolin makes one last futile attempt to salvage deferred identity by claiming that his life 
will have lost all meaning without the “unknown woman,” and by offering to openly 
claim deferred identity: 
                                                 
96 “‘You are free,’ said the cavalier to Fridolin. ‘Leave this house at once and be careful not to inquire 
further into what you have seen here. If you attempt to put anyone on our trail, whether you succeed or not 






“Das Leben hat keinen Wert mehr für mich, wenn ich ohne dich 
von hier fortgehen soll. Woher du kommst, wer du bist, ich frage 
nicht danach. Was kann es Ihnen, meine unbekannten Herren, 
bedeuten, ob Sie diese Faschingskömodie, und sei es auch auf 
einem ernsthaften Schluß angelegt, zu Ende spielen oder nicht. 
Wer immer Sie sein mögen, meine Herren, Sie führen in jedem 
Fall noch eine andere Existenz als diese. Ich aber spiele keinerlei 
Komödie, auch nicht hier, und wenn ich es bisher notgedrungen 
getan habe, so gebe ich es jetzt auf. Ich fühle, daß ich in ein 
Schicksal geraten bin, das mit dieser Mummerei nichts mehr zu tun 
hat, ich will Ihnen meinen Name nennen, ich will meine Larve 
abtun und nehme alle Folgen auf mich.” (58)97 
We cannot understand this attachment to this woman in a literal sense, since not only has 
he never seen her face, he is also willing to forego seeing her ever again in the future, 
vowing that he will not seek her true identity. (Fridolin’s declaration bears a striking 
resemblance to Marianne’s “love declaration” in the preceding chapter of the novella.) 
Rather, the loss of deferred identity signals the collapse of a Narrative domain that has 
arisen to compete as a second Idiolect. With that collapse, comes the loss of symbolized 
meaning as it was articulated in that domain, as well as the loss of its holding function for 
                                                 
97 “‘Life means nothing to me if I must leave here without you. I shall not ask who you are or where you 
come from. What difference can it make to you, gentlemen, whether or not you keep up this carnival 
comedy, though it may aim at a serious conclusion. Whatsoever you may be, you surely lead other lives. I 
won’t play a part, here or elsewhere, and if I have been forced up to now, I shall give it up. I feel that fate 
has overtaken me which has nothing to do with this foolery. I will tell you my name, take off my mask and 






diverted subjectivity. In this sense, life has indeed lost its meaning – as it was articulated 
in the symbolized terms of that Narrative domain. 
Fridolin seeks the empathy of those participants in this “Faschingskomödie” who, 
as he rightly notes, themselves lead a double life in which neither half is compatible. At 
the same time, he recognizes the gravity of his own crisis, which is existential, and which 
concerns the survival of the self. What Fridolin seeks, the sublime, cannot be 
accommodated in the playacting of such a lurid gathering. Fridolin is not seeking a 
random and meaningless sexual encounter, but the open possibility of shaping his life 
anew with a different partner, different career choice, etc. Any attempt to pursue deferred 
identity as a separate expression of subjectivity at this point must fail, destroying primary 
identity in the bargain. Once again the “unknown woman” seeks to warn Fridolin of the 
folly of his desires. He cannot hold onto her, and any attempt to do so can only end with 
his own ruin: 
“Hüte dich!” rief die Nonne aus, “du würdest dich verderben, ohne 
mich zu retten! Geh!” (58)98 
The narrative makes clear that a choice between primary and deferred identity is 
not open to him but rather, he must choose to recognize that deferred identity is lost to 
him. Circumstances have foreclosed identity without Fridolin’s active participation and 
his lack of volition in the matter is underscored by the manner in which he is expelled 
from the masquerade. Subsequent events unfold not only without Fridolin’s volition or 
active participation, but to a large extent without any discernable agency at all. Propelled 
                                                 






forward by arms, not people, the door seems to slam itself shut and the light to extinguish 
itself in his wake: 
Die dunkele Tracht fiel wie durch ein Zauber von ihr ab, [...] – 
doch ehe noch Fridolin das Bild ihres Antlitzes zu erhaschen 
vermochte, war er von unwiderstehlichen Armen erfaßt, 
fortgerissen und zur Türe gedrängt worden; im Augenblick darauf 
befand er sich im Vorraum, die Türe hinter ihm fiel zu [...]. (58-
59)99 
[…] das Haustor öffnete sich. Wie von einer unsichtbaren Gewalt 
fortgetrieben eilte er weiter, er stand auf der Straße, das Licht 
hinter ihm erlosch, […] (59)100 
Stressing the finality of the foreclosure and the “death” of deferred identity, Fridolin is 
prevented from returning home in the taxi he has hired, and instead, he is commanded 
into the mourning coach that had earlier brought Nachtigall. The entire adventure, which 
has become increasingly dreamlike as it progressed, appears to loose touch with reality 
nearly altogether in the hyperbolic description of his coach ride: 
Der Diener antwortete mit einer Handbeweging so wenig 
bedientenhafter Art, daß sie jeden Widerspruch ausschloß. Der 
Zylinder des Kutschers ragte lächerlich lang in die Nacht auf. Der 
Wind blies heftig, über den Himmel hin flogen violette Wolken. 
                                                 
99 “The dark costume dropped from her, as if by magic […] – but before Fridolin could even glance at her 
face, he was seized by irresistible arms, and pushed t the door. A moment later he found himself in the 
anteroom, the door closed behind him” (77). 
100 “The main door opened automatically, and as if driven by some invisible force, he hurried out. As he 






Fridolin konnte sich nach seinen bisherigen Erlebnissen nicht 
darüber täuschen, daß ihm nichts übrigblieb, als in den Wagen zu 
steigen, der sich auch mit ihm unverzüglich in Bewegung setzte. 
(59)101 
As he is borne home, Fridolin grieves the loss of deferred identity, once again 
noting that life will have lost all meaning without the “unknown woman”: 
Sein Dasein, so schien ihm, hatte nicht den geringsten Sinn mehr, 
wenn es ihm nicht gelang, die unbegreifliche Frau wiederzufinden, 
die in dieser Stunde den Preis für seine Rettung bezahlte. (59)102 
Despite this moment of grief and despair and despite the lingering desire to return to this 
woman, we also see the first return of Fridolin’s sensible and responsible nature on that 
coach ride. There, he recognizes, for the first time, the true nature of the event he is 
leaving behind: 
Wenn sie an diesen Gesellschaften teilnahm – und es konnte heute 
nicht zum erstenmal der Fall sein, da sie sich in die Bräuche so 
eingeweiht zeigte –, was mochte ihr daranliegen, einem dieser 
Kavaliere oder ihnen allen zu Willen zu sein? Ja, konnte sie 
überhaupt etwas anderes sein als eine Dirne? Konnte alle diese 
Weiber etwas anderes sein? Dirnen – kein Zweifel. Auch wenn sie 
                                                 
101 “The man replied with a wave of his hand which was anything but servant-like, so that objection was out 
of the question. The ridiculously high silk hat of the coachman towered up into the night. The wind was 
blowing a gale; violet clouds raced across the sky. Fridolin felt that, after his previous experience, there 
was nothing for him to do but to get into the carriage. It started the moment he was inside” (78). 
102 “His life, it seemed, would not have the slightest meaning any more, if he did not succeed in finding the 






alle noch irgenein zweites, sozusagen bürgerliches Leben neben 
diesem führten, das ein Dirnenleben war (60)103 
This realization is significant, since it not only provides a rational explanation for what 
has just transpired, but it also provides an explanation for his rejection at the ball the 
night before. That event, which constituted a rejection in the Communicative domain of 
Fridolin’s assertion of deferred identity, initially triggered Fridolin’s crisis as a result of 
his inability to recognize the “carnival comedy” being played out there. 
There is no chance, nor was there ever a chance, that Fridolin might have actually 
“chosen” identity he had decided not to pursue (or had been unable to pursue) in youth. 
The belief that he might yet realize such identity was the actual fantasy he had been 
chasing, while his “adventures” had merely been props aimed at restoring the belief that 
that identity was still valid, and could be deferred yet longer. The notion that he had ever 
truly had a choice between identities was a fallacy, and is dramatically illustrated as he 
arrives in Vienna at the end of his adventures. Crashing along at the same run-on tempo 
as the sentence that describes its progress, the coach finally comes to an abrupt halt, and 
both doors open simultaneously, taunting him with an empty choice: 
Der Wagen began zu holpern, fuhr bergab, immer rascher, 
Fridolin, von Unruhe, von Angst erfaßt, war eben davon, eines der 
blinden Fenster zu serschmettern, als der Wagen plötzlich 
stillstand. Beide Türme öffneten sich gleichzeitig wie durch einen 
                                                 
103 “If she attended these affairs – and since she seemed to understand the rules so well it could not be her 
first time – what difference could it make to her if she belonged to one of the cavaliers, or to all? Indeed, 
could she possibly be anything but a woman of easy virtue? Were any of them anything else? That’s what 
they were, without a doubt, even if all of them led another, more normal life, so to speak, besides this one 






Mechanismus, als wäre nun Fridolin ironischerweise die Wahl 
zwischen rechts und links gegeben. (61)104 
In truth, no matter which door he finally chooses – left or right – both will deposit him 
back in primary identity and the same “waking” life – his life as physician, husband, and 
father. 
Although Fridolin still experiences a reflexive impulse to return to the 
masquerade, in his heart he recognizes the futility of such an effort. Any attempt to 
proceed can only destroy what he has, while leaving what he sought tantalizingly out of 
reach: 
Eine Sekunde locket es ihn, den Weg zurück zu nehmen, in der 
Nähe des Hauses der weiteren Dinge zu harren. Doch er stand 
sofort ab, in der Erwägung, daß er sich in schlimme Gefahr 
begeben hätte und der Lösung des Rätsels doch kaum näher 
gekommen wäre. (62)105 
As the final chapters of the novella will demonstrate, foreclosure is complete. The loss of 
asymmetry that allowed a Narrative domain to assert itself as an alternative and 
concurrently competing Idiolect has been rectified and the Narrative domain once again 
subordinate to Idiolect. Deferred identity is not completely lost, since it belongs to the 
temporal succession of symbolized meaning and identity. In the contemporary field of 
                                                 
104 “The carriage began to jolt, going down hill, faster and faster. Fridolin, uneasy and alarmed, was on the 
point of smashing one of the blind windows, when the carriage suddenly stopped. Both doors opened 
together, as if by some mechanism, and as though Fridolin had been ironically given the choice between 
one side or the other” (81). 
105 “For a second he felt tempted to retrace his steps and to wait in the vicinity for further developments. 
But he gave up the idea when he realized that he would only expose himself to grave danger without 






meaning, however, it is expressible only in sublimated form – as dream, fantasy, or the 
creative processes. Not only would any attempt to return to his nocturnal encounters be 
futile (it would not return him to the mysterious twilight state in which he had 
experienced them), but it would pose a renewed danger to the integrity of his marriage, 
career, reputation, and ultimately, identity. He has no choice but to return home. 
Fridolin must still come to terms with the emotions evoked by the metaphoric 
death of deferred identity as a realizable, potential identity. His expulsion from the 
masquerade and the resulting invalidation by that the discursive community revealed that 
his claim to that identity was a pretension. In this sense, Fridolin’s entire nocturnal search 
for the fulfillment of his “potential” becomes something of a hollow mockery and only 
adds to his despair: 
Dieser Gemütszustand war so unerträglich, daß Fridolin beinah 
bedauerte, von dem Strolch, dem er begegnet war, nicht angefallen 
worden zu sein, ja beinah bedauerte, nicht mit einem Messerstich 
zwischen den Rippen an einer Planke in der verlorenen Gasse zu 
liegen. So hätte diese unsinnige Nacht mit ihren läppischen, 
abgebrochenen Abenteuern am Ende doch eine Art von Sinn 
erhalten. (62-63)106 
Fridolin is left to face the reality that he is not the sort of man who engages in frivolous 
extra-marital affairs, nor is he a man who demands satisfaction for every insult to his 
                                                 
106 “This state of mind was so unbearable that it almost made him sorry the tramp had not attacked him; in 
fact, he almost regretted that he wasn’t lying against the fence in the deserted street with a knife gash in his 
side. That, at least, might have given some significance to this senseless night with its childish adventures, 






honor or who impulsively demonstrates his virile masculinity by dueling or fencing. He 
does not possess the kind of “courage” or impulsivity necessary for such kinds of 
activities. Rather, he is at heart a prudent man, a careful and conscientious provider and a 
faithful husband and father. 
The forced recognition of the limitations in his underlying character is difficult for 
Fridolin to accept, and not merely because he must give up the various manifestations of 
deferred identity. That recognition also threatens his sense of security in his primary 
identity making him feel not only inadequate to win over another woman, but also 
inadequate in his relationship to Albertine: 
So heimzukehren, wie er nun im Begriff war, erschien ihm 
geradezu lächerlich. Aber noch war nichts verloren. Morgen war 
auch ein Tag. Er schwor sich zu, nicht zu ruhen, ehe er das schöne 
Weib wiedergefunden, dessen blendende Nacktheit ihn berauscht 
hatte. Und nun erst dachte er an Albertine, – doch so, als hätte er 
auch sie erst zu erobern, als könnte sie, als dürfte sie nicht früher 
wieder die Seine werden, ehe er sie mit all den anderen von heute 
nacht, mit der nackte Frau, mit Pierrette, mit Marianne, mit dem 
Dirnchen aus dem engen Gasse hintergegangen. (63)107 
                                                 
107 “It seemed particularly ridiculous to return home, as he now intended doing. But nothing was lost yet. 
There was another day ahead, and he swore that he would not rest until he had found again the beautiful 
woman whose dazzling nakedness had so intoxicated him. It was only now that he thought of Albertine, but 
with a feeling that she, too, would first have to be won. He could not, must not, be reunited with her until he 
had deceived her with all the other women of the night. With the naked woman, with Pierrette, with 
Marianne, with Mizzi in the narrow street. And shouldn’t he also try to find the insolent student who had 






With this realization, Fridolin makes it clear that his pursuit of deferred identity was a 
way of proving himself suitable or worthy as a partner for his wife, Albertine, as much as 
it was an effort to recapture his youth. Failing to follow through on any of his adventures, 
on the other hand, diminishes Fridolin’s worth in his own eyes. By returning to complete 
the various aborted affairs of that night’s journey, Fridolin will prove that he is capable of 
winning Albertine, and thus validate primary identity. 
This insecurity returns us to that specific vulnerability in their relationship 
mentioned briefly above – namely, the implication that Fridolin, not Albertine, has made 
the better match, and that Fridolin has managed to woo Albertine successfully only 
because she was so much younger than he, and therefore vulnerable to his more mature 
charms. Whether or not this is true is of no consequence to the narrative – indeed, it 
remains unresolved. What is essential is that Fridolin and Albertine both perceive it to be 
true (as Albertine’s dream will substantiate). Thus, even as deferred identity is foreclosed 
upon and the crisis that it engendered begins to approach resolution, a second crisis 
arises. That second crisis is created by the emergence of the awareness that he might have 
won his wife’s hand not so much on his own merit, but through his cunning (and his 
demonstrated predilection for young girls). The emergence of this second crisis once 
again brings about an abrupt shift, and the devaluation of primary identity. It likewise 
deranges the boundary between Self and Other while destabilizing symbolized meaning. 
Fridolin returns to his preoccupation with contagion, explaining away his behavior of the 







Und wieder fiel ihm ein, daß er möglicherweise schon den Keim 
einer Todeskrankheit im Leibe trug. Wäre es nicht zu albern, daran 
zu sterben, daß einem ein diphtheriekrankes Kind ins gesicht 
gehustet hatte? Vielleicht war er schon krank. Hatte er nicht 
Fieber? Lag er in diesem Augenblick nicht daheim zu Bett, – und 
all das, was er erlebt zu haben glaubte, waren nichts als Delirien 
gewesen?! (63)108 
This second crisis regarding the validity of his claim to Albertine certainly played 
a significant role in his initial crisis of foreclosing identity and represented the true 
underlying basis of it. The traumatic symptoms and the limbo-like state that Fridolin has 
experienced remain in the face of this renewed crisis. Seeking to reassure himself that he 
is rooted in reality, Fridolin checks his own vital signs and opens his eyes wide: 
Fridolin riß die Augen so weit auf als möglich, strich sich über 
Stirn und Wangen, fühlte nach seinem Puls. Kaum beschleunigt. 
Alles in Ordnung. Er war völlig wach. (63)109 
It is this gesture that gives Kubrick’s film its title, Eyes Wide Shut¸ for although Fridolin 
is awake and not feverish in the literal sense, he is still in the throes of a crisis that warps 
his perceptions until they are no more a refection of reality than a dream would be. 
Indeed, it is possible to equate Fridolin’s “adventures” with a dream, since those 
                                                 
108 “Again the thought came to him that even now the germ of a fatal disease might be in his body. 
Wouldn’t it be silly to die just because a child with diphtheria had coughed in his face? Perhaps he was 
already ill. Wasn’t he feverish? Perhaps at this moment he was lying at home in bed – and everything he 
thought he had experienced was merely delirium?” (84). 
109 “Fridolin opened his eyes as wide as possible, passed his hand over his forehead and cheeks and felt his 






adventures reflect his inner process rather than the external reality of those events. (In the 
final chapters of the novella we will finally see the reality behind each of these nocturnal 
encounters.) At the same time, the stage is now set for Albertine’s dream, which will 
demonstrate a more psychologically integrated method of dealing with conflicted 
identity. In its comparison with Fridolin’s dream-like experiences, that dream will 
possess an even greater validity. Albertine’s dream adequately holds incommensurate 
subjectivity, while Fridolin’s adventures do not. 
For the time being, Fridolin returns home, relieved to have escaped his rather 
sordid adventures and, despite his misgivings and desire to return to his encounters, he is 
nonetheless happy simply to regain his former life: 
Die Häuser lagen noch im Dunkel, wenig vereinzelte Fenster 
waren erleuchtet. Fridolin glaubte zu fühlen, wie die Menschen 
allmählich erwachten, es war ihm, als sähe er sie in ihren Betten 
sich recken und rüsten zu ihrem armseligen, sauren Tag. Auch ihm 
stand einer bevor, aber doch nicht armselig und trüb. Und mit 
einem seltsamen Herzklopfen ward er sich freudig bewußt, daß er 
in wenigen Stunden schon im weißen Leinenkittel zwischen den 
Betten seiner Kranken herumgehen würde. (64)110 
In this last expression of satisfaction with his life, which he characterizes as “not pitiful 
and dull” when compared with that of others, we see the beginnings of a process of 
                                                 
110 “The houses were still enveloped in darkness, though here and there a few windows were lighted and 
Fridolin thought he could feel the people gradually awakening. It seemed that he could see them stretching 
themselves in their beds and preparing for their pitiful and strenuous day. A new day faced him too, but for 
him it wasn’t pitiful and dull. And with a strange, happy beating of his heart, he realized that in a few hours 






sublimation, whereby Fridolin’s fantasy-based experiences contribute towards the quality 
of his “waking” life. The description recalls the beginning of the novella, in which the 
morning after the Redout is described as grey, and the day that follows as “nüchtern und 
vorbestimmt in Alltagspflicht” (12), however while that morning called forth memories 
of the narcissistic injury sustained at the ball, this new morning promises the eventual 
resolution of crisis. 
 
3.4 Albertine’s Dream and the Sublimation of Conflicted Subjectivity 
Throughout the second, third, and fourth chapters of the novella, we witnessed 
Fridolin’s futile quest to act out and thereby realize deferred identity. Those nocturnal 
adventures are doomed to fail, since Fridolin is essentially unwilling to destroy primary 
identity by committing infidelity. He is truly seeking validation that deferred identity is 
still defensible in the Communicative domain however at no point does Fridolin do more 
than contemplate the possibility of acting on his forbidden impulses. Indeed, most, if not 
all of Fridolin’s perceptions of opportunity in each of these encounters is an illusion. 
Caught in the throes of traumatic crisis and competing currents of subjectivity, Fridolin’s 
perception of events is distorted, interpreted via an alternate symbolized apprehension of 
meaning and reality that had once existed as a Narrative domain (fantasy). As the 
overflow of semiotic current (trauma) strengthens that Narrative domain, the natural 
asymmetry that would ordinarily subordinate the Narrative to Idiolect is temporarily lost. 
That Narrative domain itself becomes a secondary Idiolect (Fridolin’s apprehension of 






Idiolect. As in a dream, Fridolin interprets the events that occurred during his nocturnal 
adventures via a symbolized reality that differs from the shared reality of the 
Communicative domain. 
The emergence of one of Fridolin’s Narrative domains as a competing symbolized 
domain does indeed resemble a dream in its autonomy from the authority of Idiolect as 
the apprehension of “reality.” It differs from a dream, however, in very essential ways. 
Unlike a dream, in which Idiolect is nearly always unavailable for comparison with the 
Narrative domain out of which it arises, the loss of asymmetry does not allow Fridolin’s 
Narrative domain to supplant Idiolect (i.e., he does not suffer a complete psychotic 
break). Rather, his awareness fluctuates between Idiolect and a Narrative domain with 
each vying for ascendance. In consequence, his adventures are always anchored to some 
degree in the realistic awareness that acting on the impulses that arise in the Narrative 
domain could lead to the destruction and loss of his primary identity – e.g., career, 
marriage. In addition, Fridolin’s “adventures” differ from dream in that the sensory 
experiences that initiate the semiotic current are derived from real-world experiences. In 
terms of fulfilling desires as a manifestation of deferred identity, Fridolin is limited to 
real-world sensory experiences. The sensory experiences that he seeks out via his actions 
are themselves limited by the real-world consequences of those actions. Fridolin’s acting 
out, in other words, is not an effective means of dealing with the crisis of deferred 
identity and the crisis of its immanent foreclosure. 
Unlike Fridolin, Albertine deals with the narcissistic injury inflicted at the 






her primary identity and relationships by redirecting the energy produced by those 
impulses. As we saw in Albertine’s description of her infatuation with the Danish officer, 
her desire for a relationship with him generated an energy that she was at once able to 
reinvest in her relationship with Fridolin: 
“Zu allem glaubte ich mich bereit; dich, das Kind, meine Zukunft 
hinzugeben, glaubte ich mich so gut wie entschlossen, und 
zugleich – wirst du es verstehen? – warst du mir teuerer als je. 
Gerade an diesem Nachmittag, du mußt dich noch erinnern, fügte 
es sich, daß wir so vertraut über tausende Dinge, auch über unsere 
gemeinsame Zukunft, auch über das Kind plauderten, wie schon 
seit lange nicht mehr.” (14)111 
As a part of that ability to sublimate that energy, Albertine’s arguably greater 
psychological integration allows her to express and hold deferred identity adequately in 
one or more Narrative domains – in this case, expressed as a dream. 
Albertine takes up essentially the same themes in her dream that we saw emerge 
in Fridolin’s traumatic process: the perception of the loss of limitless possibilities through 
her marriage to one man, disappointment with her social status and with the prosody of 
her present life, among others. Unlike Fridolin, however, Albertine is not only able to 
pinpoint those aspects of identity of which she feels bereft, she is able to compensate for 
                                                 
111 “‘I thought I was ready for anything. I had practically resolved to give up on you, the child, my future, 
and at the same time – if you can understand it? – you were dearer to me than ever. That same afternoon – 
surely you remember – we discussed many things very intimately, among others our common future, and 






that bereavement through her dream, which is not limited by real-world opportunity or, 
most importantly, by real-world consequences. 
The dream, which Albertine relates to Fridolin on his return home after his 
adventures (e.g., his “dream”), begins at the little villa on Lake Wörther, where Fridolin 
and Albertine were first engaged: 
Sie aber began: “Erinnerst du dich noch des Zimmers in der 
kleinen Villa am Wörthersee, wo ich mit den Eltern im Sommer 
unserer Verlobung gewohnt habe?” (66)112 
The dream begins with the eve of their marriage. This location not only frames the dream 
as an examination of their relationship, it also recalls the actual circumstances of their 
courtship, which were indirectly touched upon earlier in the narrative – namely, that 
Fridolin wooed Albertine when she was just barely seventeen years of age and as such, 
relatively inexperienced. Being so young – substantially younger than Fridolin – she had 
not yet had a chance to be with anyone but him as she alluded earlier that evening during 
their quarrel. As the couple related their “infatuations” in Denmark, Albertine chides 
Fridolin that: 
“Sechzehn vorbei, ja, Fridolin. Und doch –” sie sah ihm hell in die 
Augen – “lag es nicht an mir, daß ich noch jungfräulich deine 
Gattin wurde.” 
“Albertine!” Und sie erzählte: 
                                                 
112 “She began: ‘Do you still remember the room in the little villa on Lake Wörther, where I lived with 






“Es war am Wörthersee, ganz kurz vor unserer Verlobung, 
Fridolin, da stand an einem schönen Sommerabend ein sehr 
hübscher junger Mensch an meinem Fenster, [...]” (18)113 
She then reveals that the young man at the window with whom she might have had a 
spontaneous sexual encounter had been Fridolin himself. Beyond the teasing in this 
exchange, there is also a sense that she was vulnerable to his charms and greater maturity 
as a result of her tender age and that she was therefore easily enamored. Fridolin’s 
appearance at her window put an end to her chance to have any other romantic or sexual 
experiences before marrying. 
Certainly Albertine’s young age only stresses the notion that her possibilities prior 
to her marriage were endless. On the eve of her marriage to Fridolin, she feels as though 
she were arriving “like an actress on a stage”: 
“So fing der Traum nämlich an, daß ich in dieses Zimmer trat, ich 
weiß nicht woher – wie eine Schauspielerin auf die Szene.” (66)114 
Unlike Albertine, however, an actress would have the opportunity to play many roles, and 
if she deferred playing one role, she might take it up later when the role she is currently 
playing is through. This expectation of limitless possibility is only substantiated as she 
goes to her wardrobe to see whether her wedding dress has arrived (its absence perhaps 
                                                 
113 “‘Past sixteen, yes, Fridolin. But it wasn’t my fault that I was a virgin when I became your wife.’ 
   She looked at him brightly. 
   ‘Albertina––!’ 
   But she continued: 
   ‘It was a beautiful summer evening at Lake Wörther, just before our engagement, and a very handsome 
young man stood before my window […]’” (15-16). 
114 “‘Well, it was where the dream began, I was entering this house, like an actress stepping onto the stage – 






indicating that she is really too young to marry). Instead, she finds and entire array of 
other, splendid costumes among which she finds it difficult to choose: 
“Aber das Brautkleid war noch nicht da. Oder irrte ich mich 
vielleicht? Ich öffnete den Schrank, um noch zu sehen, da hingen 
statt des Brautkleides eine ganze Menge von anderen Kleidern, 
Kostüme eigentlich, opernhaft, prächtig, orientalistisch. Welches 
soll ich dann nur zur Hochzeit anziehen?” (66-67)115 
Albertine’s notion of marriage is romanticized and not grounded in any realistic 
expectation. Her inability to decide which costume she will wear, and hence which role 
she will play in the marriage demonstrates her naïve expectation that her possibilities in 
life will first become available through her marriage, rather than being limited by it.  
Albertine’s perception of marriage is still colored by preconceived notions derived from 
childhood narratives, fairytales, and fantasies. The actual encounter between Fridolin and 
his bride is described as a fairytale in which they are clothed as a prince and a princess: 
“[…] Galeerensklaven hatten dich hergerudert, ich sah sie eben im 
Dunkel verschwinden. Du warst sehr kostbar gekleidet, in Gold 
und Seide, hattest einen Dolch mit Silbergehänge an der Seite und 
hobst mich aus dem Fenster. Ich war jetzt auch herrlich angetan, 
wie eine Prinzessin [...]” (67)116 
                                                 
115 “‘But my wedding dress hadn’t yet arrived. I thought I might be mistaken, and I opened the wardrobe to 
look. Instead of the wedding dress a great many other clothes, like fancy dress costumes, were hanging 
there, opera-like, gorgeous, Oriental. Which shall I wear to the wedding?’” (89-90). 
116 “‘Galley slaves had rowed you to the house. I had just seen them disappearing in the darkness. You were 
dressed in marvelous gold and silver clothes, and had a dagger in a silver sheath hanging by your side. You 






The connection between Albertine’s early expectations of marriage and childhood 
fairytales recalls the opening lines of the novella, in which Albertine and Fridolin as a 
“happy couple” read aloud to their little daughter: 
Vierundzwanzig braune Sklaven ruderten die prächtige Galeere, 
die den Prinzen Amigad zu dem Palast des Kalifen bringen sollte. 
(11)117 
Certainly the dream derives its contents from the day’s events, however, at the same time, 
the book that Albertine and Fridolin read to their daughter as she begins to doze off and 
dream constitutes a narrative that will inform the daughter’s expectations of marriage, 
just as it did Albertine’s. In addition, the idyllic scene of that opening passage, in which 
the happy young couple read to their young child, is an enactment of the family ideal, and 
the dissolution of that scene into the quarrel stresses the important dichotomy between 
expectation and real experience. The repetition of the fairytale early in Albertine’s dream 
gives us the sense that there has been a promise already in childhood that marriage should 
be like a fairytale – a story in which, like a dream, there are no real-world limitations 
placed upon its expansive possibilities. Even as that fairytale abides, however, there is 
already a premonition that it must end and that there is sorrow yet to come. In response to 
Albertine’s description of how much he loved her in the dream, Fridolin interjects: 
“Du [liebtest] mich hoffentlich auch,” meinte Fridolin mit einem 
unsichtbaren bösen Lächeln. 
                                                 
117 “Twenty-four brown-skinned slaves rowed the splendid galley which was to bring Prince Amigad to the 






“Ich glaube, noch viel mehr,” erwiderte Albertine ernst. “Aber, wie 
soll ich dir das erklären – trotz der innigsten Umarmung war 
unsere Zärtheit ganz schwermütig wie mit einer Ahnung von 
vorbestimmten Leid.” (67-68)118 
The dream’s positive, fairytale atmosphere does indeed end abruptly, and the 
couple suddenly and inexplicably find themselves divested of their fine clothes: 
“Doch nun war etwas Fürchterliches geschehen. Unsere Kleider 
waren fort. Ein Entsetzen ohnegleichen erfaßte mich, brennende 
Scham bis zu innerer Vernichtung, zugleich Zorn gegen dich, als 
wärst du allein an dem Unglück schuld; – und all das: Entseltzen, 
Scham, Zorn war an Heftigkeit mit nichts zu vergleichen, was ich 
im Wachsein empfunden habe.” (68)119 
It is unlikely that the loss of their clothing is meant to indicate an outright material 
poverty as much as it represents the loss of the costumes the couple had been wearing – 
that of a prince and a princess and along with it, the promise of a fairytale life. Their 
social standing as a married couple, we can infer, is not what Albertine had expected and 
quite possibly, not what Fridolin has led her to expect. (The narrative never clarifies 
whether Fridolin misrepresented their future together, whether Albertine simply had 
inflated expectations as a result of her youth and inexperience, or both). Certainly 
                                                 
118  “‘I hoped you loved me, too,’ remarked Fridolin with an invisible, malicious smile. 
 ‘Even more than you did me,’ replied Albertina seriously, ‘but how can I explain it – in spite of the 
intensity of our happiness our love was also sad, as if filled with some presentiment of sorrow’” (91). 
119 “‘But something terrible happened: our clothes were gone. I was seized with an unheard of terror and a 
shame so burning that it almost consumed me. At the same time I was angry with you, as though you were 
to blame for the misfortune. This sensation of terror, shame and anger was much more intense than 






Albertine blames Fridolin for their lack of status and the dissolution of the existence she 
had believed would be theirs. It is difficult to gauge from the narrative itself how realistic 
Albertine’s prospects might have been to marry up and therefore, to enhance her standing 
through a better match. What is essential is that both partners appear to feel that this is the 
case, as is indicated by Albertine’s resentment towards Fridolin (expressed in the dream), 
and Fridolin’s sense that he needs both to enhance his own standing, and to win Albertine 
by so doing. 
In Albertine’s dream, Fridolin is conscious of what he has failed to provide, and 
he rushes off to acquire what he can in order to rectify the situation. When he is gone, 
Albertine professes to be joyful, singing a melody she had heard at the masked ball the 
night before: 
“Du aber im Bewußtsein deiner Schuld stürtest davon, nackt wie 
du warst, um hinabzusteigen und uns Gewänder zu verschaffen. 
Und als du verschwunden warst, wurde mir ganz leicht zumut. Du 
tatest mir weder leid, noch war ich in Sorge um dich, ich war nur 
froh, daß ich allein war, lief glückselig auf der Wiese umher und 
sang: es war die Melodie eines Tanzes, die wir auf der Redoute 
gehört haben.” (68)120 
Her joyful reaction at his departure and her invocation of the ball, at which she had 
pretended to possess a greater social standing, suggests that in Fridolin’s absence, her 
                                                 
120 “‘Aware of your guilt, you raced away, naked as you were, to go and get clothes for us. When you had 
disappeared I felt very joyful. I neither felt sorry for you, nor did I worry about you. I was simply happy to 
be alone and I ran cheerfully about in the meadow singing the melody of a dance we had heard at the 






potential to achieve a higher standing is restored. Even in his temporary absence, she is 
able to fantasize freely as a means of restoring deferred identity (herself as the wife of a 
more prosperous man). That assumption is further substantiated by the arrival of the 
Danish officer, for whom she had entertained an “infatuation” the previous summer: 
“Ich aber lag plötzlich auf der Wiese hingestreckt im Sonnenglanz, 
– viel schöner, als ich je in Wirklichkeit war, und während ich so 
dalag, trat aus dem Wald ein Herr, ein junger Mensch hervor, in 
einem hellen, modernen Anzug, er sah, wie ich jetzt weiß, 
ungefähr aus wie der Däne, von dem ich gestern erzählt habe.” 
(68)121 
The dream is a correlate to Fridolin’s “adventures” – itself a kind of dream – although 
more satisfying in that the dream itself can generate the sensory experiences and 
situations she desires as though they really existed. Like the naked woman at the 
clandestine ball who embodied the “unknown woman” of Fridolin’s fantasies, the Danish 
officer represents the “unknown man” whom Albertine desires. He is, as she describes, 
always the same and yet, always a different man: 
“Er blieb wie das erstemal vor der Felswand stehen, verschwand 
wieder, dann kam er wieder aus dem Wald hervor, verschwand, 
kam aus dem Wald; das wiederholte sich zwei- oder drei- oder 
                                                 
121 “‘Suddenly I was lying in the meadow, stretched out in the sunlight – far more beautiful than I ever was 
in reality, and while I lay there, a young man wearing a light-colored fashionable suit of clothes walked out 






hundertmal. Es war immer derselbe und immer ein anderer [...]” 
(69)122 
In Albertine’s dream, Fridolin is forced to atone for his failure to provide status 
and wealth by toiling in the “underground city” in order to procure their necessities. Just 
as Fridolin obliquely expressed the sense that his role as the family’s provider is a burden 
that prevents him from working towards a higher status, so too does he appear as a kind 
of drudge in Albertine’s dream: 
“Zugleich aber sah ich auch dich. Du eiltest in der versunkenen 
Stadt von haus zu Haus, von Kaufladen zu Kaufladen, bald unter 
Laubengängen, bald durch eine Art von türkischem Bazaar, und 
kauftest die schönsten Dinge ein, die du für mich nur finden 
könntest: Kleider, wäsche, Schuhe, Schmuck [...]” (69)123 
In her dream, Albertine recognizes that Fridolin does his best to provide material 
comforts that extend beyond the basic necessities of life. He seeks out the most beautiful 
items he can find, including jewelry and exotic oriental wares. The procurement of those 
items by toil cannot match the promise of their availability in the fairytale conception of 
marriage at the beginning of the dream. The dream is an expression of deferred identity 
and Albertine’s expectation of a match that would have afforded her a higher social 
status. Accordingly, she is therefore nonplused by his efforts. 
                                                 
122 “‘He stopped before the wall of rock, vanished and came out of the woods again, appearing and 
disappearing two, or three, or a hundred times. It was always the same man and yet always different’” (93). 
123 “‘At the same time I could see you hurrying from the house to house, from shop to shop in the buried 
city, now walking underneath arbors, then passing through a sort of Turkish bazaar. You were buying the 






Albertine’s dream may represent a correlate to Fridolin’s nocturnal adventures, 
however the dream is more satisfying in a number of critical ways. Certainly the 
emotions she experiences are more intense than their expressions in her waking life: 
“Aber so wie jenes frühere Gefühl von Entsetzen und Scham über 
alles im Wachen Vorstellbare weit hinausging, so gibt es gewiß 
nichts in unserer bewußten Existenz, das der Gelöstheit, der 
Freiheit, dem Glück gleichkommt, das ich nun in diesem Traum 
empfand. Und dabei hörte ich keinen Augenblick lang auf, von dir 
zu wissen.” (70)124 
The dream itself provides a more integrated solution to Albertine’s conflict than 
Fridolin’s adventures can ever hope to provide him, and the dream does so without 
jeopardizing the security of Albertine’s waking life and primary identity. Albertine can 
acknowledge Fridolin’s conscientious efforts as a provider, his faithfulness and the 
sacrifices he is willing to make, while at the same time punishing him for his inability to 
facilitate the realization of her deferred identity. She can, in other words, act wholly on 
the behalf of deferred identity by taking revenge upon him without being checked by the 
recognition of what is good in the relationship and her primary identity. By expressing 
her conflict in dream, Albertine is able to live the “double existence” that Fridolin also 
desires, however she is able to do so in such a way that the energy of that second, secret 
life can be sublimated, enhancing her waking life with Fridolin. 
                                                 
124 “‘Just as that earlier feeling of terror of shame went beyond anything I have ever felt in the waking state, 
so nothing in our conscious existence can be compared with the feeling of release, of freedom, of 






Even as Albertine is enjoying this fulfilling (if temporary) expression of deferred 
identity, she is simultaneously aware that Fridolin is denied similar fulfillment. In an 
echo of Fridolin’s adventures, Albertine herself sees his rejection and the death of 
foreclosure brought about by his unwillingness to act on his impulses to be unfaithful: 
“[...] ich sah dich, ich sah, wie du ergriffen wurdest, von Soldaten, 
glaube ich, auch geistlicher waren darunter; irgendwer, ein 
riesengroßer Mensch, fesselte deine Hände, und ich wußte, daß du 
hingerichtet werden solltest. Ich wußte es ohne Mitleid, ohne 
Schauer, ganz von fern.” (70)125 
Having been seized by soldiers and, ironically, priests (which recalls the costumed 
figures at the clandestine masquerade), Fridolin is brought before the Queen. Albertine 
recognizes this woman as none other than the girl Fridolin essentially trapped, naked, on 
the ledge of a bathing hut: 
“[...] ich wußte, daß sie das Mädchen vom dänischen Strande war, 
das du einmal des Morgens nackt auf der Terrasse einer Badehütte 
gesehen hattest.” (71)126 
Like the masked woman, the girl from Denmark is an articulation of the “other, 
unknown woman” whom Fridolin might desire. While Fridolin’s response to Albertine’s 
                                                 
125 “‘Just as that earlier feeling of terror of shame went beyond anything I have ever felt in the waking state, 
so nothing in our conscious existence can be compared with the feeling of release, of freedom, of 
happiness, which I now experienced. Yet I didn’t for one moment forget you. In fact, I saw that you had 
been seized – by soldiers, I think – and there were also priests among them. Somebody, a gigantic person, 
tied your hands, and I knew that you were to be executed. I knew it, without feeling any sympathy for you 
and without shuddering’” (94-95). 
126 “‘I realized that she was the girl at the seashore in Denmark, the one you had once seen nude, in the 






“infatuation” had been one of lasting jealousy, however, Albertine is not threatened by 
Fridolin’s “infatuation” with that girl, recognizing that even if she were the most 
powerful and desirable woman imaginable (a queen), and even if his “life” depended 
upon committing an indiscretion with her, Fridolin will, as a matter of course, remain 
faithful to her: 
“Sie fragte dich – ich hörte die Worte nicht, aber ich wußte es –, ob 
du bereit seist, ihr Geliebter zu werden, in diesem Fall war dir die 
Todesstrafe erlassen. Du schütteltest verneinend den Kopf. Ich 
wunderte mich nicht, denn es war vollkommen in der Ordnung und 
konnte gar nicht anders sein, als daß du mir alle Gefahr hin und in 
alle Ewigkeit die Treue halten mußtest.” (71)127 
In their waking life, such recognition of Fridolin’s faithfulness would constitute a 
profound expression of trust in the relationship. Within the context of the dream, however 
it is emasculating. Contrary to what a young wife and mother would desire (Albertine’s 
primary identity), Fridolin’s faithfulness once again stresses that he is a kind of “drudge,” 
and not at all the virile, masculine “prince” Albertine had expected. His very underlying 
nature makes any other life than their own common existence unavailable to him while at 
the same time, in the dream, Albertine experiences limitless possibilities in Fridolin’s 
absence. 
                                                 
127 “‘She asked you – I couldn’t hear the woods, but I knew it was so – whether you were willing to be her 
lover, for in that case the death penalty would be remitted. You shook your head, refusing. I wasn’t 







Albertine’s initial expectation of Fridolin, whether realistic or not, shaped 
Albertine’s subjectivity and apprehension of meaning (Idiolect), where both of these are 
constructed in the intersection of memory (past experience) and expectation. When life 
with Fridolin turned out to be generally more prosaic than she had anticipated, this 
potential identity was deferred, just as Fridolin’s expectations for himself were deferred. 
Inhabiting solely that deferred identity in her dream, what would delight Albertine as a 
young wife and mother – Fridolin’s faithfulness – now disgusts her as a demonstration of 
the weakness that betrays his lack of virility and worth. Albertine can reject Fridolin, his 
effort, and everything he provides that, outside of this dream-reality would seem worthy, 
and even laudable: 
“Doch du grüßtest mich lächelnd mit den Augen, wie zum 
Zeichen, daß du meinen Wunsch erfüllt hattest, und mir alles 
brachtest, wessen ich bedurfte: – Kleider und Schuhe und 
Schmuck. Ich aber fand dein Gebahren über alle Maßen töricht und 
sinnlos, und es lockte mich, dich zu verhöhnen, dir ins Gesicht zu 
lachen, – und gerade darum, weil du aus Treue zu mir die Hand 
einer Fürstin ausgeschlagen, [...]plötzlich entschwanden wir 
einander, und ich wußte: wir waren aneinander vorbeigeflogen. Da 
wünschte ich, du solltest doch wenigstens mein Lachen hören, 






auf, so schrill, so laut ich konnte. Das war das Lachen, Fridolin, – 
mit dem ich erwacht bin.” (72)128 
It is painfully obvious to Fridolin that Albertine’s dream provided by far the better 
satisfaction and fulfillment of her desires than did his dream-like adventures set in the 
real world. Unable or unwilling to destroy his primary identity for the sake of what he has 
deferred, he has had to seek his fulfillment in the initial dalliances of illicit trysts that he 
then abruptly breaks off – a metaphoric coitus interuptus. Albertine, on the other hand, 
was free to carry her desires to their logical conclusion, indulging the series of men that 
the Danish officer became, while at the same time rejecting Fridolin’s honest efforts to 
provide, and even mocking him at the moment of his execution. (The film emphasizes her 
sexual fulfillment by having Alice (Albertine) explicitly mention the fact that she has 
intercourse with countless men in the dream.) In comparison to this dream, Fridolin’s 
“adventures” now seem laughable and scarcely adequate as a means of expressing, let 
alone holding, deferred identity: 
Sie schwieg und blieb ohne jede Regung. Auch er rührte sich nicht 
und sprach kein Wort. Jedes wäre in diesem Augenblick matt, 
lügnerisch und feig erschienen. Je weiter sie in ihrer Erzählung 
fortgeschritten war, um so lächerlicher und nichtiger erschien ihm 
seine eigenen Erlebnisse, so weit sie bisher gediehen waren, und er 
                                                 
128 “‘Your eyes smiled at me as of to show that you had fulfilled my wish and had brought me everything I 
needed: clothing and shoes and jewels. But I thought your actions senseless beyond description and I 
wanted to make fun of you, to laugh in your face – because you had refused the queen’s hand out of 
faithfulness to me. […] I lost sight of you: and I realized we had flown past each other. I hoped that you 
would, at least, hear my laughter when they were nailing you to the cross. – And so I laughed, as shrill and 






schwor sich zu, sie alle zu Ende zu erleben, sie ihr dann getreulich 
zu berichten und so Vergeltung zu üben an dieser Frau, die sich in 
ihrem Traum enthüllt hatte als die, die sie war, treulos, grausam 
und verräterisch, und die er in diesem Augenblick tiefer zu hassen 
glaubte, als er sie jemals geliebt hatte. (72-73)129 
Fridolin is emasculated by Albertine’s somnolent faith in his unwillingness to be 
unfaithful to her, and his fears that he is indeed neither virile nor daring enough to have 
won Albertine’s hand had she not been so young and vulnerable are seemingly 
substantiated by Albertine herself. Albertine’s dream, an expression of her deferred 
identity, essentially invalidates Fridolin’s deferred identity within the compact of the 
private discursive community – a community formed by their relationship with one 
another. Piquantly expressed as Albertine’s hideous, derisive laugh which Fridolin had 
heard just before he awakened her, that invalidation fans the flames of Fridolin’s crisis, 
and he resolves to trump the dream’s power by revisiting each of his previous encounters, 
bringing each to its conclusion. At the same time, even as he vows to do so as a means of 
taking his revenge on Albertine for her faithlessness, Fridolin is aware that the enmity 
between them is not real: 
                                                 
129 “‘Neither of them spoke or moved. Any remark at this moment would have seemed futile. The further 
her story progressed, the more ridiculous and insignificant did his own experiences become, at least up to 
date. He swore to himself that he would resume and conclude all of them. He would then faithfully report 
them and so take vengeance on this woman who had revealed herself as faithless, cruel and treacherous, 






Ein Schwert zwischen uns, dachte er wieder. Und dann: wie 
Todesfeinde liegen wir hier nebeneinander. Aber es war nur ein 
Wort. (73)130 
Fridolin’s quest will now take him to the scene of each of the preceding night’s 
encounters however his efforts will only serve to effect the emotional resolution of his 
crisis. While deferred identity is foreclosed upon and no longer competing with primary 
identity (the Narrative domain in which deferred identity is constituted no longer 
competes with Idiolect for dominance). Fridolin must still seek emotional closure. More 
importantly, he must find a way to productively sublimate diverted subjectivity in order 
to prevent its future overflow into traumatic crisis. 
 
3.5 “Not Every Dream is Truly a Dream” 
Fridolin rises the next morning with the intention of revisiting each of the 
encounters of the preceding night, envious of the satisfaction that Albertine’s dream 
provided her and her lack of distress. Her satisfaction following the dream allows her to 
sleep peacefully on, even when the maid knocks to awaken Fridolin for work: 
Manchmal, nicht immer, weckte dieses Klopfen auch sie. Heute 
schlief sie regungslos, allzu regungslos weiter. (74)131 
Although he will return to each of the same places he had just visited in his “delirium” of 
the previous night, Fridolin’s crisis will have a very different quality following the 
                                                 
130 “A sword between us, he thought, we are lying here like mortal enemies. But it was only an illusion” 
(99). 







foreclosure of deferred identity – a foreclosure that is represented by his forcible 
expulsion from the clandestine orgy/masquerade. His primary identity is now in full 
ascendance and even as he prepares to return to the scene of his potential crime, he does 
so with the great or even possibly excessive care and organization that is characteristic of 
that identity: 
In seiner schwarzen Arztenstasche, wohl verwahrt, trug er 
Mönschskutte und Pilgerhut mit sich. Das Programm für den Tag 
hatte er sorgfältig, ja mit einiger Pedantrie entworfen. (74)132 
This careful preparation is a far cry from the unconscious impulses that drove him 
the night before. Fridolin’s first order of business is to visit Nachtigall at the shabby hotel 
where he was staying. There, the porter reports that Nachtigall had arrived earlier, 
accompanied by two men under what could be interpreted as sinister circumstances: 
Während Nachtigall sich in sein Zimmer begeben, hätten die 
herren seine Rechnung für die letzten vier Wochen bezahlt; als er 
nach einer halben Stunde nicht wieder erschienen war, hätte ihn 
der eine Herr persönlich heruntergeholt, worauf alle drei zum 
Nordbahnhof gefahren wären. (74-75)133 
Fridolin does not waste a great deal of time speculating on whether or not this event had 
any particularly sinister import, nor does he attempt to find out what has become of 
Nachtigall. Instead, he disavows deferred identity, taking refuge in his identity as a 
                                                 
132 “The cassock and pilgrim’s hat were safely concealed in his black doctor’s bag. He had drawn up a 
program for the day with great care, indeed, even a bit pedantically” (100). 
133 “While Nachtigall was in his room, the two men had paid his bill for the last four weeks. When he didn’t 
appear after half an hour, one of them had gone up to fetch him, whereupon they all three took a cab to 






physician as a means of setting him apart from the squalid environment and 
circumstances in which he finds himself: 
Fridolin empfahl sich, es war ihm angenehm, daß er seine 
Arztenstasche in der Hand trug, als er aus dem Haustor trat; so 
würde man ihn wohl nicht für einen Bewohner dieses Hotels 
halten, sondern für eine Amtsperson. (75)134 
From the hotel, Fridolin goes to Gibiser, the costumer, in order to return his 
cassock and pilgrim’s hat. Here, as he had intended the night before, he addresses the 
supposed “condition” of the young girl clad as a Pierrette, whom he had seen in the 
clutches of two men dressed as Vehmic judges. His impulse to offer his services as a 
physician the night before had been a somewhat falsified gesture, and had merely 
constituted a means of seeing her again, possibly even of taking her with him. With 
primary identity and Idiolect once again restored to their privileged dominance over any 
Narrative domain and deferred identity, Fridolin now simply advises Gibiser to seek 
medical help for the girl: 
“Sie bemerkten gestern,” sagte Fridolin, die eine Hand mit 
gespreizten Fingern auf den Bürotisch gestützt, “daß Ihr Fräulein 
Tochter geistig nicht ganz normal sei. Die Situation, in der wir sie 
betrafen, legte diese Vermutung tatsächlich nahe. Und da mich der 
Zufall nun einmal zum Teilnehmer oder wenigstens zum 
                                                 
134 “‘Fridolin took his leave. He was glad that he had his doctor’s bag with him when he stepped out of the 
door, for anyone seeing him would not think that he was staying at the hotel, but would take him for some 






Zuschauer jener sonderbaren Szene gemacht hat, so möchte ich 
Ihnen doch nahelegen, Herr Gibiser, einen Arzt zu Rate zu 
ziehen.” (75-76)135 
Fridolin appears to want no more contact with little Pierrette and refutes Gibiser’s 
accusation that his interests in the matter are pecuniary. The enchantment cast by deferred 
identity has been broken and his return to Gibiser’s is characterized by a professional 
detachment that is without any exaggerated claim to intimacy on the basis of his office. 
Rather, Fridolin’s visit to this, as well as to each subsequent scene where he had had an 
encounter the previous night, is characterized by a somewhat cold, professional 
detachment accompanied by the interjection of rational awareness as to the true nature of 
the events that occurred. In this sense, it appears that Fridolin’s ultimate objective in 
these return visits is to present primary identity at those places where yesterday, his 
identity had been unstable. 
The true nature of the events that took place at the costumer’s is quite sordid 
indeed. The two men who purportedly had illicitly had their way with the “deranged” and 
“depraved” Pierrette are still there when Fridolin arrives, and Gibiser never called the 
police as he had threatened the night before. In truth, the costumer has been prostituting 
his young daughter, and his outrage was merely an act meant to deflect Fridolin’s 
potential outrage, as a customer, over this side-business. His attitude is now one of 
imperious disinterest in Fridolin’s view of the matter: 
                                                 
135 “‘Yesterday you said,’ remarked Fridolin, one hand with outstretched fingers resting on the desk, ‘that 
your daughter was not quite normal mentally. The situation in which we discovered her actually indicates 
some such thing. And since I took part in it, or was at least a spectator, I would very much like to advise 






“Man hat sich auf anderem Weg geeinigt, Herr Doktor,” bemerkte 
Gibiser kühl und erhob sich, als wäre eine Audienz beendet. 
Fridolin wandte sich zum Gehen, Gibiser öffnete beflissen die 
Türe, und mit unbeweglicher Miene sagte er: “Wenn der Herr 
Doctor wieder einen Bedarf haben sollten... Es muß ja nicht gerade 
ein Mönchsgewand sein.” (76-77)136 
Again, Fridolin has no intention of pursuing a tryst with the young Pierrette, even as 
Gibiser obliquely offers her to him (for a price). Reassured that the actual underlying 
circumstances of the encounter do not require his services or counsel as a physician, 
Fridolin leaves with what he himself characterizes as somewhat exaggerated annoyance. 
There are no lingering questions as to whether or not he should have taken Pierrette with 
him or whether he should return for her. The matter is closed, the ambiguity of his 
identity at that location resolved, and Fridolin simply proceeds to his work at the hospital, 
where his identity has not become unstable. 
At the hospital, Fridolin finds renewed satisfaction in the performance of his 
duties as a physician, in a sense vindicated for his brusque encounter with the students 
from the dueling fraternity the night before by the submissive attendance of the medical 
students following his rounds. In contrast to that encounter, in which he had felt put upon 
and impotent, Fridolin now feels competent: 
                                                 
136 “‘We had come to another agreement,’ remarked Gibiser coldly, and got up as though this were the end 
of an interview. He obligingly opened the door as Fridolin turned to go and said, without changing his 






Fridolin fühlte sich beinah glücklich, als er, von den Studenten 
gefolgt, von Bett zu Bett ging, Untersuchungen vornahm, Rezepte 
schrieb, mit Hilfsärzten und Wärterinnen sich fachlich besprach. 
(77-78)137 
This renewal of interest in his professional life contrasts sharply with the frustration and 
sense of inadequacy he felt the night before, during which time he had concluded that the 
“excellent Dr. Roediger” was the better man for having obtained the academic title, 
Doktor. In fact, this renewal of interest seems to point towards the emergence of 
sublimated energy that is now being invested in his primary identity. Upon hearing that a 
colleague, Dr. Hügelmann, is to receive an appointment as head of the ophthalmology 
department, Fridolin’s impulse is to integrate his desire of that higher prestige within his 
primary identity, rather than instead of it: 
Ich werde nie für die Leitung einer Abteilung in Betracht kommen, 
schon weil mir die Dozentur fehlt. Zu spät. Warum eigentlich? 
Man müßte eben wieder wissenschaftlich zu arbeiten anfangen 
oder manches Begonnene mit größerem Ernst wieder aufnehmen. 
Die Privatpraxis ließ immer noch Zeit genug. (78)138 
Whether or not Fridolin will actually pursue this scientific work in order to 
advance his career is not of great consequence. In fact, as we will later discover when 
                                                 
137 “Fridolin felt almost happy as he walked from bed to bed, followed by the students, making 
examinations, writing prescriptions, and having professional conversations with the assistants and nurses” 
(105). 
138 “I’ll never be considered for the headship of a department, if for no other reason that that I’ve never 
been a Dozent. It’s too late. But why should it be? I really ought to begin again to do scientific work or take 
up more seriously some of the things that I have already started. My private practice would leave me ample 






Fridolin relates these plans to Albertine with great animation, that he has expressed this 
intention before, but that this resolve does not seem to last long enough to materialize any 
appreciable progress: 
Er erzählte, daß die Ernennung Hügelmanns so gut wie sicher sei 
und sprach von seinem eigenen Vorsatz, die wissenschaftlichen 
Arbeiten wieder mit etwas größerer Energie aufzunehmen. 
Albertine kannte diese Stimmung, wußte, daß sie nicht allzulange 
pflegte, und ein leises Lächeln verriet ihre Zweifel. Fridolin eiferte 
sich, worauf Albertine mit milder Hand ihm beruhigend über ihre 
Haare strich. (82)139 
What is important in terms of Fridolin’s crisis is that he has (re-)identified a means of 
holding deferred identity as viably potential from within primary identity. A higher status 
as an “intellectual” is not, in other words, an identity that must be pursued from within a 
purely academic career – a career that Fridolin gave up in order to become a medical 
practitioner, and that is now foreclosed upon. Rather, the diverted current of subjectivity 
that gives rise to that desire can also be sublimated, investing primary identity with 
renewed vitality and interest. Such a solution also integrates some part of the diverted 
current of subjectivity within the primary current, thereby alleviating the crisis and 
symptoms of trauma to some degree. 
                                                 
139 “He told her that the appointment of Hügelmann was as good as settled, and then spoke of his own 
determination to take up scientific work again with greater energy. Albertine knew this mood. She also 
knew that it usually didn’t last very long and betrayed her doubts by a slight smile. When Fridolin became 






Upon leaving the hospital, Fridolin begins to make his way to the house where the 
clandestine masquerade took place. As he does so, he is already aware of the true nature 
of that encounter and of the banal nature of the seemingly occult events he witnessed 
there: 
Eine geheime Gesellschaft? Nun ja, jedenfalls geheim. Aber 
untereinander kannten sie sich doch? Aristokraten, vielleicht gar 
Herren vom Hof? Er dachte an gewisse Erzherzöge, deren man 
dergleichen Scherze schon zutrauen konnte. Und die Damen? 
Vermutlich... aus Freudenhäusern zusammengetrieben. Nun, das 
war keineswegs sicher. Jedenfalls ausgesuchte Ware. Aber die 
Frau, die sich ihm geopfert hatte? Geopfert? Warum er nur immer 
wieder sich einbilden wollte, daß es wirklich ein Opfer gewesen 
war! Eine Komödie. Selbstverständlich war das Ganze eine 
Komödie gewesen. (79-80)140 
This impression that the entire event had been a comedy – quite literally a masquerade – 
is substantiated by the bourgeois scene that greets him when he arrives in the 
neighborhood he is seeking. Inconsistent with the fantastical atmosphere of the ball, the 
neighborhood is middle-class, more something in keeping with his own primary identity 
as father, husband, and physician: 
                                                 
140 “A secret club? Well, yes, it certainly was a secret, though they seemed to know each other. Were they 
aristocrats, or perhaps eve members of the court? He thought of certain archdukes who might easily be 
capable of such behavior. And what about the women? Probably they were recruited from brothels. Well, 
that was not by any means certain, but at any rate, they seemed very attractive. But how about the woman 
who had sacrificed herself for him? Sacrificed? Why did he try, again and again, to make himself believe 






Eine stille Gasse. In diesem Vorgarten standen Rosenstöcke, 
sorgfältig in Stroh gehüllt, in einem nächsten stand ein 
Kinderwägelchen; ein Bub, ganz in blaue Wolle gekleidet, tollte 
hin und her; vom Parterrefenster aus schaute eine junge Frau 
lachend zu. (80)141 
When he arrives at the home at which the masquerade took place, the “unknown 
woman” Fridolin seeks is apparently not there. When he rings the bell to make his 
inquiries, a liveried servant brings a note, presumably from the home’s owner, asking 
once again that Fridolin abandon his investigations into the matter. In that note, which is 
not as threatening as Fridolin expected, he sees the substantiation of his conclusion that 
the masquerade, the threats of danger, and possibly even the woman’s “sacrifice” are a 
part of the comedy. The commanding tone with which Fridolin had been expelled from 
the masquerade the night before has been supplanted by a tone that is less secure. The 
double life that the attendees there had appeared to have mastered, now seem as fragile as 
Fridolin’s own bid for a second life. The concern is for anonymity and the prevention of 
discovery: 
Diese Botschaft enttäuschte ihn in jeder Hinsicht; jedenfalls aber 
war es eine andere, als die er törichterweise für möglich gehalten 
hatte. Immerhin, der Ton war mekwürdig zurückhaltend, gänzlich 
                                                 
141 “It was a quiet little street. There were rosebushes carefully covered with straw in a front garden, and in 
the next yard stood a baby carriage. A boy in a blue jersey suit was romping about and a laughing young 






ohne Schärfe. Er ließ erkennen, daß die Leute, die diese Botschaft 
gesandt, sich keineswegs sicher fühlten. (81)142 
Fridolin is still resolved to find the “unknown woman” – the figure that, like Albertine’s 
Dane, embodies the sum of his desire to escape the limitations placed on him by primary 
identity. The matter of the clandestine masquerade, however, is now resolved and its 
intrigue dissipated just as it is with the little Pierette and the costumer, Gibiser. His 
journey serves only to correct the misapprehensions of the previous night, and to verify 
that foreclosure has indeed occurred. Indeed, these visits might be compared with 
Fridolin’s last visit to the Court Councilor, where a final examination was required to 
verify the demise of the patient. 
Fridolin returns home for a meal with Albertine, and then returns to work for the 
afternoon. His next undertaking is to return to the home of the Court Counselor. Here, he 
tells himself, he will begin his revenge by entering into an illicit affair with Marianne, the 
Counselor’s daughter, who had expressed a kind of hysterical interest in Fridolin: 
Ohne Aufwand besonderer Mühe konnte er hier sein Rachewerk 
beginnen, hier gab es für ihn keine Schwierigkeit, keine Gefahr; 
und das, wovor andere vielleicht zurückgeschreckt wären, der 
Vorrat an dem Bräutigam, das bedeutete für ihn beinah einen 
Anreiz mehr. (83-84)143 
                                                 
142 “This message disappointed him in every respect, but at any rate it was different from what hew had 
foolishly expected. Nevertheless,, the tone of it was strangely reserved, even kindly, and seemed to show 
that the people who had sent it by no means felt secure” (111). 
143 “Well – there was no chance of failure here. He could begin his work of vengeance without any special 
exertion and with little difficulty or danger. What might have deterred others, the betrayal of her fiancé, 






This resolve proves to be nothing more than a reflex – an emotional impulse that, lacking 
the support of the traumatic process and the emergence of a competing identity, will 
never be fulfilled. His reaction to Marianne, which had been tinged with mild distaste the 
evening before, is now one of total aversion. He returns none of her overtures and adopts 
the dispassionate attitude of a physician without making the same exaggerated claims of 
intimacy he had the night before: 
“Also morgen schon fahren Sie aufs Land?” [fragte Fridolin]. 
Marianne sah ihn an, als wundere sie sich über den kühlen Ton seiner 
Fragen, und ihre Schultern senkten sich, als er mit beinah harter Stimme 
fortsetzte: “Ich finde das sehr vernünftig.” Und er erläuterte sachlich, wie 
günstig die gute Luft, die neue Umgebung auf sie wirken würde. 
Sie saß unbeweglich, und Tränen flossen ihr über die Wangen. Er 
sah ohne Mitgefühl, eher mit Ungeduld; [...]. (85)144 
The matter with Marianne is closed, and his perception of the situation there more 
realistic. As he continues to retrace his steps, Fridolin exhibits significantly more clarity 
than he had the night before, and there is an interjection of rational awareness that better 
allows him to evaluate events as they unfold. While foreclosure is complete, however, 
Fridolin still experiences some degree if the limbo-state of uncertainty and dream-like 
awareness characteristic of traumatic dissociation as he struggles to find emotional 
closure and a way to accommodated disenfranchised subjectivity: 
                                                 
144 “‘So you are going to the country tomorrow?’ [asked Fridolin]. 
 Marianne seemed a little surprised at the cool tone of his question and her shoulders drooped when he 
continued almost harshly: ‘I think that’s very sensible.’ And he explained in a matter-of-fact way what a 
favorable effect the good air and the new environment would have on her. 







Aber was nun? Nach Hause? Wohin sonst! [...] Er fühlte sich 
ungeschickt, hilflos. Alles zerfloßen ihm unter den Händen; alles 
wurde unwirklich, sogar sein Heim, seine Frau, sein Kind, sein 
Beruf, ja, er selbst, wie er so mit schweifenden Gedanken die 
abendlichen Straßen mechanisch weiterging. (86)145 
As evening approaches, some degree of his half-resolved crisis returns. With the increase 
of clarity on his second journey, however Fridolin is no longer driven to choose one 
identity over another, and instead, a conscious awareness emerges that two distinct 
identities exist, and that he wants to retain both identities, even though he does not 
immediately recognize how he can possibly do so: 
[...] – eine Art von Doppelleben führen, zugleich der tüchtige, 
verläßiche, zukunftsreiche Arzt, der brave Gatte und Familienvater 
sein – und zugleich ein Wüstling, ein Verführer, ein Zyniker, der 
mit dem Menschen, mit Männer und Frauen spielte, wie ihm just 
die Laune ankam – das erschien ihm in diesem Augenblick als 
etwas ganz Köstliches; – und das Köstliche dran war, daß er später 
einmal, wenn Albertine sich schon längst in der Sicherheit eines 
ruhigen Ehe – und Familienleben geborgen wähnte, ihr kühl 
lächelnd all seine Sünden eingestehen wollte, um so Vergeltung zu 
                                                 
145 “But what was he to do now? Go home? Where else could he go? […] He felt awkward and helpless. 
Everything he put his hands to turned out a failure. Everything seemed unreal: his home, his wife, his child, 
his profession, and even he himself, mechanically walking along through the nocturnal streets with his 






üben für das, was sie ihm in einem Traum Bitteres und 
Schmachvolles angetan hatte. (84)146 
Albertine has managed to hold onto both identities – primary and deferred – with 
her dream, sublimating the energy of diverted subjectivity to enhance primary identity. 
Her ability to find such satisfaction, which is now a more realistic basis for Fridolin’s 
resentment and jealousy than her imagined infidelity in Denmark, indicates a greater 
degree of psychological integration. Fridolin, by contrast, has been driven throughout his 
“adventures” by the conviction that conflicted identities must be manifested and lived out 
in real, waking-life. As he begins to approach the resolution of his crisis, his next attempt 
to find a means of preserving diverted subjectivity reflects the rigidity of this expectation: 
Nichts, niemand ging ihn an. Er verspürte ein leises Mitleid mit 
sich selbst. Ganz flüchtig, nicht etwa wie ein Vorsatz, kam ihm der 
Einfall, zu irgendeinem Bahnhof zu fahren, abzureisen, 
gleichgültig wohin, zu verschwinden für alle Leute, die ihn 
gekannt, irgendwo in der Fremde wieder aufzutauchen und ein 
neues Leben zu beginnen als ein anderer, neuer Mensch. Er besann 
sich gewisser Merkwürdiger Krankheitsfälle, die er aus 
                                                 
146 “To lead a sort of double life, to be the capable, reliable physician with a future before him, the upright 
husband and head of a family. And at the same time a libertine, a seducer, a cynic who played with people, 
men and women, just as the spirit moved him – that seemed to him, at the same time, very delightful. And 
the most delightful part was that at some future time, long after Albertina fancied herself secure in the 
peacefulness at [!] of marriage and of – family life – he would confess to her, with a superior smile, all of 






psychiatrischen Büchern kannte, sogenannter Doppelexistenzen: 
[...]. (86-87)147 
The awareness both that he desires two separate identities at once, and that those 
identities cannot be lived out or held in consciousness side by side, sets the stage for the 
resolution of his traumatic crisis. From this notion of a pathology that would wipe away 
memory and allow him to live a second life within a full-fledged new identity, it is but a 
short leap to his final conclusion that the alternation between waking-life and dreaming-
life offer just such an opportunity: 
Und in abgeschwächter Form erlebte sie wohl mancher. Wenn man 
aus Träumen wiederkehrte zum Beispiel? Freilich, man erinnerte 
sich... Aber gewiß gab es auch Träume, die man völlig vergaß, von 
denen nichts übrig blieb als irgendeine rätselhafte Stimmung, eine 
geheimnisvolle Benommenheit. Oder man erinnerte sich erst 
spater, viel später, und wußte nicht mehr, ob man etwas erlebt oder 
nur geträumt hatte. Nur – nur – – ! (87)148 
Not only does dreaming provide a parallel existence in which deferred identity can be 
adequately expressed and held without threatening to destroy primary identity, but it 
allows a return to primary identity, often without the interjected awareness of the 
                                                 
147 “There was nothing and no one that interested him, and he pitied himself not a little. Then the idea came 
to him – not deliberately but as a flash across his mind – to drive to some station, take a train, no matter 
where, and to disappear, leaving everyone behind. He could then turn up again, somewhere abroad, and 
start a new life, as a different personality. He recalled certain strange pathological cases which he had read 
in books on psychiatry, so called double-lives” (120). 
148 “‘Many others probably experienced the same things in a lesser degree. For instance, when one comes 
back out of dreams. Of course, one remembers some dreams, but there must be others one completely 
forgets, of which nothing remains but a mysterious mood, a curious numbness. Or one doesn’t remember 







opposing existence. Those existences, in other words, exist in a temporal sequence as a 
means of expressing conflicted identity – identity that nevertheless originates in the 
simultaneity of subjectivity and a single dominant semiotic current. The traumatic crisis 
of mid-life crisis forces the individual to come to terms with external limitations on 
identity and temporal alterations to identity that are imposed upon the continuity of the 
current of subjectivity. In the case of this kind of traumatic crisis, dreaming, fantasy and 
creative expression in a Narrative domain provide the ideal means of accommodating 
deferred subjectivity so that it need not overflow and produce traumatic crisis. 
With the groundwork laid for Fridolin to begin sublimating diverted subjectivity, 
only one task remains before he can achieve full closure – he must verify the death of the 
“unknown woman,” once again reenacting the demise he cannot prevent as a physician, 
and marking the formal termination of his relationship with the deceased. Indeed, this last 
return “visit” provides the most literal reiteration of this theme, as it will be an actual 
corpse that he visits. Scanning the newspaper for any report if unusual events that might 
be tied to his experiences the night before, Fridolin discovers that a woman has 
committed suicide by ingesting poison: 
In einem vornehmen Hotel der inneren Stadt hatte sich heute früh 
eine Frau vergiftet, eine Dame, die unter dem Namen einer 
Baronin D. vor wenigen Tagen dort abgestiegen war, eine 
auffallend hübsche Dame. Fridolin fühlte sich sofort ahnungsvoll 






Herren nach Hause gekomen, die am Tore sich von ihr 
verabschiedeten. (90)149 
This incident recalls the self-poisoning of Marie B. (who, not without irony, ingested 
‘Sublimat’), which occurred after she was forcibly unmasked at a previous clandestine 
masquerade. The similarities in Marie B. and Baronin D’s stories leads Fridolin to 
suspect that this second poisoning must be the woman who “sacrificed” herself for him. 
Fridolin resolves to view the body of the woman whom he believes saved him: 
Sehen würde er sie; kein Mensch auf der Erde konnte ihn daran 
hindern, die Frau zu sehen, die seinetwegen ja die für ihn in den 
Tod gegangen war. Er was schuldig an ihrem Tod – er allein – 
wenn sie es war. Ja, sie war es. (91)150 
It is impossible to say whether this is the same woman who “redeemed” Fridolin, 
or whether there truly were any consequences for her actions on his behalf. The fact that 
the woman is connected to the masquerade in Fridolin’s mind alone, rather than by any 
evidence, only reinforces the function of this deceased woman as the corpse of Fridolin’s 
“unknown woman” who perished along with deferred identity. In this sense, sense, 
however, the “unknown woman” as the symbolic object of Fridolin’s desire did indeed 
perish to save him – that is, to save his primary identity, which was threatened by his 
impulses to act out deferred identity in his waking life. Fridolin himself can never 
                                                 
149 “A woman had taken poison that morning in a fashionable hotel in the heart of the city. She was an 
unusually good-looking woman and had registered there a few days before under the name of Baroness D. 
At once Fridolin felt a strange presentiment. The woman had returned to the hotel at four o’clock in the 
morning, accompanied by two men who had left her at the door” (125). 
150 “He would see her; no one in the world could stop his seeing the woman who had died on his account; 







determine whether the body in the morgue is that of the woman who stepped forward at 
the ball to save him, since he never saw her face. What he does realize, however, is that 
the face on the corpse does not resemble the face in his imagination, which he finally 
recognizes had been that of his wife, Albertine all along: 
Er kannte ja nur ihren Körper, ihr Antlitz hatte er nie gesehen, nur 
eben einen flüchtigen Schimmer davon erhascht in der Sekunde, da 
er heute nacht den Tanzsaal verlassen hatte oder, richtiger gesagt, 
aus dem Saal gejagt worden war. Doch daß er diesen Umstand bis 
jetzt gar nicht erwogen, das kam daher, daß er in diesen ganzen 
letztverflossenen Stunden, seit er die Zeitungsnotiz gelesen, die 
Selbstmörderin, deren Antlitz er nicht kannte, sich mit den Zügen 
Albertinens vorgestellt hatte, ja, daß ihm, wie er nun erst 
erschaudernd wußte, ununterbrochen seine Gattin als die Frau vor 
Augen geschwebt war, die er suchte. (94)151 
As Fridolin views the body of the poisoned woman, silently witnessing the 
formalized end of deferred identity, he simultaneously reaches the resolution of his crisis. 
In that moment, he realizes that it is ultimately of no consequence whether it is the same 
woman, or an entirely different one. Her symbolic function supercedes any literal identity 
                                                 
151 “He had never seen her face, only her body. He had only snatched a hasty glance at the former when [he 
had left the dance hall, or rather, when] he had been driven out. Up to this moment he hadn’t thought of 
that fact. During the time since he had read the account in the paper he had pictured the suicide, whose face 
he didn’t know, as having the features of Albertina. In fact, he now shuddered to realize that his wife had 







and Fridolin is prepared to accept the irrevocable loss, in the abstract, of this particular 
object of desire: 
Denn ob die Frau, die nun da drin in der Todeskammer lag, 
dieselbe war, die er vor vierundzwanzig Stunden zu den wilden 
Klängen von Nachtigalls Klavierspiel nackt in den Armen 
gehalten, oder ob diese Tote irgeneine andere, eine Unbekannte, 
ein ganz Fremde war, der er niemals vorher begegnet; er wußte: 
auch wenn das Weib noch am Leben war, das er gesucht, das er 
verlangt, das er eine Stunde lang vielleicht geliebt hatte, und, wie 
immer die dieses Leben weiter lebte; – was da hinter ihm lag in der 
gewölbten Halle, im Scheine von flackernden Gasflammen, ein 
Schatten unter andern Schatten, dunkel, sinn – und geheimnislos 
wie sie –, ihm bedeutete es, ihm konnte es nichts anderes mehr 
bedeuten als, zu unwiderruflicher Verwesung bestimmt, den 
bleichen Leichnam der vergangenen Nacht. (100-101)152 
The final line in this passage marks the critical turning point in Fridolin’s 
traumatic crisis. At first glance, the phrase, “the pale corpse of the preceding night” 
appears to refer to the corpse belonging to “the woman of the preceding night,” who is 
now “doomed to irrevocable decay.” Careful reading shows that this reference is in fact 
                                                 
152 “It did not matter to him whether the woman – now lying in the hospital morgue – was the same one he 
had held naked in his arms twenty-four hours before, to the wild tunes of Nachtigall’s playing. It was 
immaterial whether this corpse was some other unknown woman, a perfect stranger whom he had never 
seen before. Even if this woman he had sought, desired and perhaps loved for an hour were still alive, he 
know that the body lying in the arched room – in the light of nickering gasflames, a shadow among 
shadows, dark, without meaning or mystery as the shadows themselves – could only be to him the pale 






false, since she was still living and not a corpse on the preceding night. The connection 
arises out of the context in which the statement is made – at the side of the woman’s 
body. The phrase, however, which signals the resolution of Fridolin’s crisis, is a covalent 
reference that makes a dual reference, only one of those being the woman as a corpse. At 
the same time and in the strictest grammatical sense, the phrase, “the pale corpse of the 
preceding night” more logically refers to the body of the previous night itself. The body, 
in other words, represents the end of the delusion or dream of deferred identity that 
brought him to that ball that, like all entities and manifestations of identity, is doomed to 
“decay and decomposition, according to eternal laws” (30). 
Having borne witness to and accepted the death, not of the specific woman at the 
masquerade (he cannot know whether it is she), but of the waking, real-life realization of 
the endless possibilities of youth – manifestations of deferred identity – there is nothing 
left for Fridolin to do but return home. There, he finds Albertine sleeping peacefully, and 
with restored tenderness towards her, he resolves to tell her everything that has happened: 
Ein Gefühl von Zärtlichkeit, ja von Geborgenheit, wie er es nicht 
erwartet, durchdrang sein Herz. Und er nahm sich vor, ihr bald, 
vielleicht morgen schon, die Geschichte der vergangenen Nacht zu 
erzählen, doch so, als wäre alles, was er erlebt, ein Traum gewesen 






gefühlt und erkannt hatte, wollte er ihr gestehen, daß sie 
Wirklichkeit gewesen waren. Wirklichkeit? (101)153 
At this moment when he himself pauses to question whether his “adventures” were real, 
he sees the mask that belonged to his costume the night before, placed carefully on his 
pillow beside Albertine in the place where his own head should now be resting. Despite 
all of his pedantic preparations and care with the cassock and pilgrim’s hat, the mask as 
the very symbol of his false identity has gone astray and been found by Albertine: 
The loss of the mask presents the reader with a careful metaphor for the loss of 
Fridolin’s pretended identity and the discovery of his duplicity in at least three different 
discursive communities (the Communicative domain) – at the Redout with Albertine, at 
the clandestine masquerade, and now most importantly, in his relationship with 
Albertine: 
So konnte er auch nicht daran zweifeln, daß Albertine nach diesem 
Fund Mancherlei ahnte und vermutlich noch mehr und noch 
Schlimmeres, als sich tatsächlich ereignet hatte. Doch die Art, wie 
sie ihm das zu verstehen gab, ihr Einfall, die dunkele Larve neben 
sich auf das Polster hinzulegen, als hätte sie nun sein, des Gatten, 
ihr nun rätselhaft gewordenes Antlitz zu bedeuten, diese 
scherzhafte, fast übermütige Art, in der zugleich eine milde 
Warnung und die Bereitwilligkeit des Verzeihens ausgedrückt 
                                                 
153 “Unexpectedly, his heart filled with a feeling of tenderness and even of security. He decided to tell her 
the story of the preceding night very soon – perhaps even the next day – but to tell it as though everything 
he had experienced had been a dream. Then, when she had fully realized the utter futility of his adventures, 






schien, gab Fridolin die sichere Hoffnung, daß sie, wohl in 
Erinnerung ihres eigenen Traums –, was auch geschehen sein 
mochte, geneigt war, es nicht allzuschwer zu nehmen. (102)154 
The secret desire to return to the (seemingly) endless possible manifestations of identity 
is something that Fridolin shares with Albertine, although their desire to realize deferred 
identity contains within itself a simultaneous disavowal of their relationship with one 
another. Within their own, private discursive community then, it is not only marriage and 
child that they share with one another, but their atavistic desires as well. Within that 
essentially a healthy relationship, there is room for both partners to harbor the now not so 
secret desire to express diverted subjectivity, provided it can be done in such a way (i.e., 
through dream or fantasy) that the energy of that current of subjectivity is sublimated an 
does not harm the integrity of primary identity. 
Fridolin’s confession to Albertine and her response, which validates his 
experiences within the compact of their discursive community, restores the harmony of 
their relationship. Ultimately, it is Albertine, the more psychologically integrated of the 
two, who recognizes that there are potential realities that are never expressed, even within 
the entire course of a lifetime, but that nevertheless form a part of a greater truth – the 
sum of who a person is, their experiences of self and of the world – in short, their 
subjectivity: 
                                                 
154 “Undoubtedly Albertina, after making this find, suspected something – presumably, more and worse 
things than had actually happened. And she intimated this by placing the mask on the pillow beside her, as 
though it signified his face, the face of her husband who had become an enigma to her. This playful, almost 
joking action seemed to express both a gentle warning and her readiness to forgive. Fridolin confidently 
hoped that, remembering her own dream, she would not be inclined to take his too seriously, no matter 






Sie lächelte, und nach kurzem Zögern erwiderte sie: “Dem 
Schickal dankbar sein, glaube ich, daß wir aus allen Abenteuern 
heil davongekommen sind – aus den wirklichen und aus dem 
geträumten.” 
“Weißt du das ganz gewiß?” fragte er. 
“So gewiß, als ich ahne, daß die Wirklichkeit einer Nacht, ja daß 
nicht einmal die eines ganzen Menschenlebens zugleich auch seine 
innerste Wahrheit bedeutet.” 
“Und kein Traum,” seufzte er leise, “ist völlig Traum.” 
Sie nahm seinen Kopf in beide Hände und bettete ihn innig an ihre 
Brust. “Nun sind wir wohl erwacht,” sagte sie – “für lange.” 
(103)155 
The novella ends with the dawning of a day that, unlike the grey awakening of the first 
morning after the Redout, is filled with the victorious light of renewal, the restoration of 
familial harmony, and resolution of traumatic crisis: 
So lagen sie beide schweigend, beide wohl auch ein wenig 
schlummernd und einander traumlos nah – bis es wie jeden 
Morgen um sieben Uhr an die Zimmertür klopfte, und, mit den 
                                                 
155  “She smiled, and after a minute, replied: ‘I think we ought to be grateful that we have come unharmed 
out of all our adventures, whether they were real or only a dream.’ 
 ‘Are you quite sure of that?’ he asked. 
 ‘Just as sure as I am that the reality of one night, let alone that of a whole lifetime, is not the whole 
truth.’ 
 ‘And no dream,’ he sad with a slight sigh, ‘is entirely a dream.’ 
 She took his head and pillowed it on her breast. ‘Now I suppose we are awake,’ she said – ‘for a long 






gewohnten Geräuschen von der Straße her, einem sieghaften 
Lichtstrahl durch den Vorhangspalt und einem hellen Kinderlachen 
von nebenan der Tag begann. (103)156 
Traumnovelle, which ends with the resolution of Fridolin’s traumatic crisis, is a 
narrative that represents the individual experience of such crisis. Focused almost in its 
entirety on the inner perceptions and attitudes of its protagonist, that narrative deals with 
trauma that is not immediately shared by others. Fridolin’s crisis is precipitated by a 
minor event however it is caused by a constellation of circumstances including his 
dissatisfaction with prior life choices, insecurity in his relationship with Albertine, and 
the inexorable process of aging. The novella gives us a view into how the structure of the 
organizational domains and the behavior of the semiotic current can act as the etiology of 
trauma. In its focus on a crisis that cannot be attributed to a “traumatic event,” it is 
possible to move beyond the stubborn assumption that trauma can be defined as a 
response to a specific kind of event. 
In chapters four and five of this study, I will examine a narrative that does focus 
on an event traditionally recognized as “traumatic.” Russell Banks’s The Sweet Hereafter 
depicts the effects that a deadly school bus accident has on the residents of a small town 
in upstate New York. This narrative will allow a closer look at the way in which an event 
that finds broad-scale acceptance as being “traumatic” nonetheless precipitates a unique 
crisis in each individual depending upon their past experiences, their relationship to the 
                                                 
156 “So they lay silently, dozing a little, dreamlessly, close to one another – until, as on every morning at 
seven, there was a knock on the door; and, with the usual noises from the street, a victorious ray of light 







event, etc. The structure of the organizational domains and the resulting behavior of the 
current of subjectivity in each of the individuals determine both the manner of crisis they 
experience, and the kind of resolution that each seeks. In addition, the narrative’s focus 
on the entire community will permit a closer examination of the shared, social response 







Chapter 4: Russell Banks’s The Sweet Hereafter: Individual 
Reactions to a Shared Event 
 
 
[The Gardner edition of John Donne] reads: ‘And death shall be no more, 
comma, death thou shalt die.’ Nothing but a breath, a comma, separates life 
from life everlasting. Very simple, really. With the original punctuation, death 
is no longer something to act out on a stage with exclamation marks. It is a 
comma, a pause. […] Life, death; soul, God; past, present – not insuperable 





In the preceding chapter, I examined Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle, a narrative that 
deals with a traumatic crisis that is purely internal to the person experiencing it. There is 
no event that we can point to as being “catastrophic” or traumatic in the sense posited by 
traditional trauma theory. Rather, the narrative’s primary character, Fridolin, suffers a 
crisis that is precipitated by what might even be considered a “non-event.” While 
attending a masked ball with his wife, Albertine, the couple’s subtle pretension that they 
belong to a higher social standing is rejected by the masquerade’s other participants – a 
rejection of subjective identity in the Communicative domain that proves to be 
problematic for Fridolin in particular. There is no quality inherent in this experience that 
makes it traumatic, and it certainly would not be included on the restricted list of events 
that traditional trauma theory considers to be “traumatic events.” When this instance of 
social rejection is added to unaccommodated experience that has already been kindling, 
                                                 
1 Wit, dir. Mike Nichols, perf. Ema Thompson, Christopher Loyde, Eileen Atkins, and Audra McDonalds, 






not yet possessing the force needed to create an overflow of the semiotic current, 
however, a critical mass is reached and traumatic crisis occurs. 
The form that this crisis takes is determined by the structure of the organizational 
domains and the behavior of the semiotic current in Fridolin alone. His wife, Albertine, 
who likewise suffers a narcissistic injury at that ball, is able to deal with this rejection and 
the resulting overflow of the semiotic current by accommodating it in a dream – a use of 
a Narrative domain that enables her to sublimate the energy of diverted subjectivity 
(overflow). In Fridolin’s case, the influx of diverted subjectivity into a Narrative domain 
(fantasy) temporarily disrupts the natural asymmetry that subordinates a Narrative 
domain to Idiolect, allowing that Narrative to compete with Idiolect as Fridolin’s primary 
apprehension of symbolized meaning – e.g. “reality.” Fridolin’s perceptions of “reality” 
and of identity fluctuate as he struggles to accommodate changes brought about by the 
gradual process of aging. Aspects of identity that have slowly become increasingly 
untenable are less and less able to assert their legitimacy and are in danger of permanent 
foreclosure. This crisis, specifically mid-life crisis, can only be shared with others with 
great difficulty. It does not demand that dramatically heterogeneous experience be 
accommodated within the Communicative domain. Rather, it requires Fridolin to 
reconstitute his identity within a more or less intact apprehension of symbolized meaning. 
Traumnovelle allows us to see how traumatic crisis arises idiosyncratically, based 
solely upon the structure of the individual’s organizational domains and the behavior of 
her own current of subjectivity – in other words, the delineation of Self from Other, the 






domains and the resulting behavior of the semiotic current (the current of subjectivity), in 
turn, have themselves been shaped by the individual’s own past experiences, as well as 
by the discursive communities to which they belong. Those discursive communities 
establish the Communicative domain, which acts as a constraint upon the way an 
individual may modify their apprehension of symbolized meaning (Idiolect). As none of 
the organizational domains are truly shared among individuals, traumatic crisis always 
arises idiosyncratically. It is not, however, idiopathic. Although there is a temporary 
disruption in Fridolin’s identity and a disorganization of what are represented as his 
“cognitive processes” – disruptions that could potentially be viewed and treated as 
pathology – the traumatic crisis that arises does not truly reflect a breakdown of either 
meaning or subjectivity. It is, instead, a part of a naturally occurring process by which the 
individual comes to terms with incompatibilities among the organizational domains 
(Epistemic, Ethical, Idiolectic, Narrative, and Communicative) as both meaning and 
identity are redefined. 
Individual traumatic crisis provides the impetus (Leidensdruck) either to 
challenge shared signification and demand the accommodation of heterogeneous 
signification prompted by individual experience in the Communicative domain, or (as in 
Fridolin’s case), it provides the impetus to modify one’s own organizational domains so 
that they better correlate the perception of one’s own identity with the social reception of 
that identity. Collective, social trauma deals with the fragmentation of social identity 
(identity shared by members of a discursive community). As we will see, social trauma 






preserving social identity and the basis for mutual communication (shared signification). 
Traumatic crisis arises in the intersection of competing traumatic processes, and the 
impetus generated by both individual and collective trauma enables the renegotiation of 
shared signification on a large scale. 
The narrative that I will examine in the last two chapters of this study is Russell 
Banks’s novel, The Sweet Hereafter, and to a lesser extent the filmic adaptation of the 
novel by Atom Egoyan of the same name.2 There is not an extensive body of secondary 
literature that deals with The Sweet Hereafter, and much of that which exists tends to 
focus specifically on the film. The majority of what can be found in print consists of book 
reviews that touch on the principle characteristics of the novel (i.e., its unique narrative 
structure, its treatment of the way in which “truth” is constructed) without offering any 
in-depth analysis. Perhaps the most all-encompassing examination of Russell Banks and 
his work is presented in Robert Niemi’s Russell Banks.3 That study, which provides a 
finely executed, twenty-eight page biography of Banks, also offers a brief examination of 
each of his works, including The Sweet Hereafter. 
Niemi approaches the novel as a representing what he calls “a Polyphonic Novel 
with the Community as Hero” (Niemi 161). The synopsis that he provides examines the 
organization of the narrative into five discrete sections (presented by four different 
characters), and places the novel’s treatment of the town’s social fabric within the context 
of Banks’s body of work, especially Affliction, and Rule of the Bone. Together, these 
                                                 
2 Russell Banks, The Sweet Hereafter (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991). The Sweet Hereafter, 
dir. Atom Egoyan, perf. Ian Holm, Caerthan Banks, Sarah Polley, and Tom McCamus, 1997, DVD, New 
Line Home Video, 1998. 






three novels form what Niemi calls Banks’s “most comprehensive and cogent treatment 
of working-class life in the Northeast” (Niemi 149), a theme that Niemi focuses on 
throughout his examination of Banks’s work as a whole. At the same time, his analysis of 
the novel’s characters and their individual crises is reductive. Niemi seems to view each 
character as an embodiment of a unified narrative function and faced with a single crisis, 
while ignoring dramatic ambiguities in the narratives given by each character. 
We find a more differentiated treatment of the narrative and its characters in an 
essay by Austin Sarat, who published a lengthy analysis of the filmic adaptation of the 
narrative and its representation of both the law, and the role of the father. That analysis, 
“Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in ‘The Sweet hereafter,’” 
reflects the interest that the film that has engendered among those who study law, and in 
particular, the dubious nature of ethics in the practice of law.4 In this, Sarat’s essay is not 
only one of the most well thought-out analyses of the narrative (whether novel or film); it 
is also representative of one of the most robust discourses to have arisen surrounding that 
narrative. Sarat’s analysis draws on the fields of psychoanalysis, gender studies, and film 
studies to expose the mythologized and mythologizing figure of the father as a metaphor 
for the law. The article represents Sarat’s efforts to move beyond the study of the law in 
deeds and the printed word, and to initiate the study of “law of the image” (Sarat 3). 
Another somewhat lengthy treatment of the film can be found in Kathleen 
Weese’s article: “Family Stories: Gender and Discourse in Atom Egoyan’s The Sweet 
                                                 
4 Austin Sarat, “Imagining the Law of the Father: Loss, Dread, and Mourning in ‘The Sweet Hereafter,’” 
Law & Society Review 34.1 (2000): 3-46. Sarat himself taught the film in a course entitled “The Social 
Organization of Law” at Amherst College in the Fall semester, 2004. See “The Social Organization of 







Hereafter.”5 Like Sarat’s article, Weese’s treatment of the narrative is unique in the level 
of detail it achieves, and is representative of a modernist approach that focuses on the 
objectification of women in the cinematic gaze. In that essay, Weese presents a 
modernist, feminist reading that draws to a large extent on Kaja Silverman’s The Acoustic 
Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema, and to some degree on 
Lacanian semiotic theory.6 This reading is, at times, forced, however Weese’s treatment 
of  Nichole Burnell’s relationship with her father and to the lawyer, Mitchell Stephens, is 
detailed, and captures the fragmentation of Nichole’s identity, as well as her discovery of 
what Weese calls her “discursive agency” (Weese 75). The primary focus of the essay, 
however, is on the relationship between gender and filmic narrative, and what Weese sees 
as the film’s unique “feminist vision” (Weese 71). 
Russell Banks’s own statements about his work to interviewers provides perhaps 
the greatest insight into the novel, which is but a part of what Banks acknowledges is a 
lifelong re-examination of trauma that reveals itself in his writing. Banks described the 
relationship of his own traumatic experiences to his work in these terms: “I can see my 
life as a kind of obsessive return to the ‘wound’ […] Going back again and again trying 
to get it right, trying to figure out how it happened and who is to blame and who is to 
forgive” (Brown 68). A number of Banks’s works deal specifically with trauma and the 
disruption created by traumatic experiences however The Sweet Hereafter presents the 
reader with the most extensive treatment of the way in which traumatic events can affect 
                                                 
5 Katherine Weese, “Family Stories: Gender and Discourse in Atom Egoyan’s The Sweet Hereafter,” 
Narrative 10.1 (2002): 69-85. 
6 Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington: 






an entire community in a collective manner. As Banks told a reviewer for the New York 
Times, he wrote the novel “to explore how a community is both disrupted and unified by 
a tragedy” (Nicholls 29). The community takes the foreground as a character unto itself, 
as I will show in the fifth chapter of this study, and this is precisely as Banks himself 
conceived of the narrative: “I wanted to write a novel in which the community was the 
hero, rather than any single individual. I wanted to explore how a community is both 
disrupted and unified by a tragedy” (Nicholls 29). 
Like Traumnovelle, The Sweet Hereafter presents us with a narrative that depicts 
traumatic crisis. Unlike Traumnovelle, however, Banks’s novel depicts several parallel 
crises, each precipitated by a single event that would be considered “legitimately” 
traumatic in traditional trauma theory. Like the snub at the masquerade in Traumnovelle, 
however, the event around which The Sweet Hereafter is constructed – a school bus crash 
in which fourteen children die – can also not be considered in and of itself definitive of 
trauma, but is merely a precipitator of traumatic crisis. The nature of the traumatic crisis 
in each individual (indeed, whether such a crisis develops at all) is determined by the 
existing structure of the individual’s organizational domains, as well as by their innate 
capacity to accommodate change. While the school bus accident will figure in the 
testimony of each character, in every instance the disruption to the current of subjectivity 
will be determined by the innate vulnerabilities of the individual herself – in particular 
traumata (unaccommodated or conflicted current) that occurred earlier in life, but that 






The crash and resulting death of the children differs from the precipitating 
experience in Traumnovelle in that it represents an experience that calls for the abrupt 
reorganization of Idiolect and other organizational domains. Unlike Fridolin’s crisis in 
the preceding chapter, there are no symbolized structures to accommodate that 
experience. The nature of any current and the channel that contains it, is such that these 
are better suited to gradual change. An abrupt influx of heterogeneous experience will 
much more reliably cause the overflow of the semiotic current (traumatic crisis) and as a 
result, inquiry into trauma has focused on the event as the etiology of crisis. A demand 
for the dramatic revision of the organizational domains is very different from the slow 
kindling of unaccommodated experience and eventual overflow represented in 
Traumnovelle, in which the gradually building discordance between Fridolin’s perception 
of his identity and the public perception of his identity eventually builds to a crisis. 
The accident depicted in The Sweet Hereafter generates the kinds of experience 
(i.e. the death of one’s child) that are more universally excluded from the structures that 
shape the current of subjectivity, and are therefore much more likely to demand a radical 
reorganization of those domains. The broader the traumatic effect, the more likely that an 
event will be viewed as legitimately traumatizing, although the number of people who are 
perceived to be similarly affected should not be used to determine the “validity” of an 
experience of traumatic crisis. This increased likelihood of precipitating a traumatic crisis 
notwithstanding, the event does not define the experience of the individual who is 
affected. The novel presents the experience of the school bus driver – Dolores Driscoll, 






arrives to represent the families – Mitchell Stephens, and the most severely injured child 
to survive the accident – Nicole Burnell. In each of these four individuals, that single 
event will produce a crisis that is wholly unique to each, based upon the vulnerabilities 
inherent in his or her organizational domains. 
The Sweet Hereafter not only provides us with an account of four individual 
traumatic crisis that arise in response to a single event, it also offers and account of 
collective (shared, social) trauma. Each of the novel’s four principal characters is given a 
chapter in which to present his or her individual account of events surrounding the 
tragedy – perceptions of the accident and his or her relationship to it. The fifth and final 
chapter is a continuation of the testimony by the bus driver, Dolores Driscoll, who began 
that account in the novel’s first chapter. In that final chapter Dolores speaks not only of 
the resolution of her own individual traumatic crisis, but of the crisis of a fifth character 
as well; the town of Sam Dent. At that point, the narrative provides the reader with an 
interpolation of collective trauma by addressing both the effects of the accident on the 
town, and the town’s mobilization to restore social cohesion and social identity in its 
wake. By providing a testimony that speaks for the town itself (placed in the mouth of 
Dolores Driscoll, whose name itself etymologically means “interpreter of sorrows”), the 
close interrelation of the individual traumatic process and the collective traumatic process 
becomes apparent. 
The final chapters of this study will deal with Banks’s novel. In this (the fourth) 
chapter, I will present the first two of five accounts that comprise the narrative – that of 






who die in the accident. My focus in this chapter will be on the unique response to a 
single event by each individual, as well as the role that prior experience plays in shaping 
traumatic crisis. In the final chapter of this study, I will present the remaining accounts: 
those of the lawyer, Mitchell Stephens; Nichole Burnell, an eighth grader who survived 
the accident; as well as a second account by Dolores Driscoll in which we learn both of 
her own resolution to crisis, and that of the town. This division onto two separate 
chapters is useful, since my analysis in each chapter will focus on entirely different 
aspects. In chapter four, I will be primarily interested in contrasting the experiences of 
distinct individuals to a shared event. In chapter five, I will examine the differing agendas 
of the individual and the social (i.e., collective) responses to traumatic experience. By 
carefully examining both the way in which guilt and innocence are manipulated, and the 
way in which meaning is ultimately reestablished, I will demonstrate how the negotiation 
of personal identity within a community functions to resolve the fragmentation of that 
community. Through this careful examination of how the individual and her community 
interact in the wake of traumatic experience, it will become clear how “truth” is 
constructed at both an individual and a social level in order to preserve the functioning 
and integrity of the individual and society. 
 
4.1 Dolores Driscoll: Embedded Trauma 
The Sweet Hereafter is set in the dead of winter in Sam Dent, a fictitious small 
town in upstate New York. The town’s inhabitants form a closed, tight-knit community 






how long such an “outsider” might have lived there. This tightly woven social structure 
of the town helps the reader to appreciate the degree to which the inhabitants’ identity is 
tied to the town itself, both in terms of their sense of belonging, and in terms of the way 
in which their identity is drawn from their role in that community. Only one of the 
novel’s primary characters, the lawyer, Mitchell Stephens, comes from outside of this 
community. With the exception of the “summer people” – wealthy outsiders who either 
own or rent vacation homes in the area, and who remain largely unknown to most of the 
town’s full-time residents – very few people ever stop in Sam Dent. As the school bus 
driver, Dolores Driscoll describes it: 
Sam Dent is one of those towns that’s on the way to somewhere 
else, and people get this far, they usually keep going. (21) 
The closed nature of the town’s community means that the notion of connection and the 
loss of connection to the community are vital to the narrative. While the traumatic 
reaction of each of the primary characters to the fatal school bus accident is unique, those 
reactions can never be separated from the trauma of the town as a whole – a collective 
trauma. 
The importance of connection, and the traumatic crisis that arises when essential 
human and social connections are lost figure, centrally in the first “testimony” – that of 
Dolores Driscoll in chapter one of the novel. Like each of the novel’s chapters, chapter 
one consists of a first person narrative that reflects the conscious thoughts, feelings and 
perceptions of a single character without authorial interjection or interpolation. Dolores is 






part time in the post office and as a mail carrier. The nature of her work places her in a 
unique position to provide a broad sketch of the town’s residents, many of whom she 
introduces and briefly characterizes for the reader over the course of her account. Indeed, 
her focus on these characterizations makes it clear to the reader that human and social 
connection and most importantly, its loss is an essential concern for Dolores. 
The employment that Dolores has sought out which, by its very nature, brings her 
into contact with virtually the entire community makes the importance of social contact 
apparent at the most obvious level. Her familiarity with even the “summer people” and 
the newcomers is a point of pride for her, but also demonstrates a certain degree of 
sensitivity towards those who are otherwise marginalized by the community: 
I’ve spent my whole life in this town, and I can safely say I know 
everyone in it, even the newcomers, even the summer people. 
Well, not all the summer people; just the regulars, who own their 
own houses and arrive early and leave late. Them I know because 
when school’s out I work part time their sorting mail in the post 
office and helping Eden Schraft deliver it. That is, I used to, before 
the accident. Now I work in Lake Placid, driving for the hotels. (7-
8) 
Dolores’s work is not merely a way to get by financially. Her jobs as school bus driver, 
postal worker, and as mail carrier make her an integral part of the community, providing 
services that benefit a majority of the population and that therefore give her much 






level, providing an adequate expression for what she characterizes as a “sanguine 
personality:” 
It’s almost impossible to say how important and pleasurable that 
job was to me. Though I liked being at home with Abbott and had 
the post office and mail carrier job to get me through the summers, 
I could hardly wait till school started again in September and I 
could get back out there in early morning light and start up my bus 
and commence to gather the children of the town and carry them to 
school. I have what you call a sanguine personality. That’s what 
Abbott calls it. (23) 
Her sense of connection and her enjoyment of human contact brings with it a 
shadowy counterpart – a sense of disconnection and a fear of exclusion. In essence, this 
desire for connection and its antithesis, the suffering brought about by the loss of 
connection form the core of Dolores’s traumatic crisis, establishing a point of 
vulnerability in her subjective identity that both drives her actions, and shapes her 
interpretation of events as they transpire. The school bus accident, which led to the death 
of fourteen children in her care, certainly is the precipitator of traumatic crisis. The 
traumatic crisis that arises, however, is shaped entirely by the vulnerabilities that already 
existed in Dolores’s current of subjectivity including her need for connection, and her 
painful awareness of connection that is lost or missing. Interestingly enough, Dolores 
devotes little time in her testimony to the accident itself or the events that lead up to it. 






of her town,” and in particular, her relationship both with the children on the bus and with 
her own children. 
Although Dolores is familiar with nearly everyone in town, her relationships with 
adults in the town do not figure in her testimony with the sole exception of her 
relationship with her husband, Abbott, and her two grown sons. This relationship with 
Abbott is itself uniquely limited. Abbott suffered a stroke several years prior, and as a 
result, he is housebound and confined to a wheelchair. In addition, Abbott’s ability to 
communicate is profoundly affected and his speech has been rendered incomprehensible, 
or very nearly so. Dolores, however, claims to understand his speech, and her account is 
peppered with references to things that Abbott has said or with characterizations he has 
made: 
Abbott was at one time an excellent carpenter, but in 1984 he had a 
stroke, and although he has recovered somewhat, he’s still pretty 
much housebound and has trouble talking normally and according 
to some people is incomprehensible, yet I myself understand him 
perfectly. No doubt because I know that his mind is clear. (3) 
Dolores ability to understand Abbott’s speech, or at least to understand meaningful 
speech is highly questionable. A verbatim rendering of what Abbott says is only given 
twice in the chapter, and in both instances, the content is devoid of any significant 
meaning. One of those examples includes a rather nonsensical observation on the 
weather, and Dolores’s equally arcane validation of its significance: 






No arguing with that. (4) 
Abbott’s ability to produce meaningful speech is judged differently by other 
characters in the novel. In a later chapter of the novel, Mitchell Stephens, the slick lawyer 
from New York City, offers his assessment both of Abbott’s speech and of Dolores’s 
claim that she can “understand” what he says. He observes that Abbott’s speech is indeed 
unintelligible both in its phonetic rendering and in its content. In Dolores’s ability to 
interpret not only the phonetic sounds Abbott produces, but also the content, which is as 
brief and as obscure as “a Delphic pronouncement,” Mitchell Stephens sees her 
unrealistic desire to understand him and her desire to communicate with him: 
Although he [Abbott] seemed bright enough, his speech was 
seriously impaired, and I could make out only about half of what 
he said. Most of the other half Dolores translated, whether I 
wanted her to or not. He spoke in these odd cryptic sentences that 
didn’t really mean a whole lot to me but to Dolores were like 
Delphic pronouncements. I guess she loved the hell out of the guy 
and heard what she wanted to hear. (149) 
The most striking contrast between what Abbot articulates and Dolores interprets occurs 
in a critical scene later in the novel, in which Mitchell Stephens attempts to pressure 
Dolores into testifying against either the school board or the bus manufacturer (whoever 
has the “deepest pockets”) in an injury suit. Responding to Mitchell Stephens’s 
increasingly sharp tone, Abbott erupts into an inarticulate roar, rendered by Mitchell 






Then Abbott spoke. He twisted his face around his mouth as best 
he could and pursed his lips on the left side as though he were 
sucking a straw and in a loud voice said something like “A down… 
gloobity-gear…and day old’ll… find you… innocent… if a 
brudder… lands… gloobity first…” (150-151) 
Dolores “translates” the garbled sounds he makes with the lengthy text that pointedly, 
almost poetically sums up her own reasons for not participating in the class action suit: 
“What Abbot said was: The true jury of a person’s peers is the 
people of her town. Only they, the people who have known her all 
her life, and not twelve strangers, can decide her guilt or 
innocence. And if Dolores – meaning me, of course – if she has 
committed a crime, then it’s a crime against them, not the state, so 
they are the ones who must decide her punishment too. What 
Abbott is saying, Mr. Stephens, is forget the lawsuit. That’s what 
he’s saying.” (151) 
Ultimately, Mitchell Stephens concludes that, like a ventriloquist and her dummy, 
Dolores puts her own words into Abbott’s mouth while at the same time distancing 
herself from them by attributing authorship to Abbott: 
 “Yep. I told you he was logical,” she declared. “He 
understands things better than most people. He understands me 
too.” 






 “Oh, yes. Abbott’s a genius.” 
 A genius, eh? A gibbering fool, is what I thought. From what I 
could see and hear, Dolores was the ventriloquist and Abbott the 
dummy. And you can’t argue with the ventriloquist about what the 
dummy really said. (151-152) 
However comprehensible or incomprehensible Abbott may be, we hear most of 
what he has to say through Dolores herself, who often “quotes” him as a way of 
providing a pithy summation of her own more sweeping, garrulous discourse. She 
concludes the description of how much she loved her job (cited above), for instance, with 
Abbott’s rather pointed summation that she quite simply has a “sanguine personality” 
(23) – i.e. she is outgoing and enjoys contact with people. It is as though she relies on 
Abbott to make her own perceptions and feelings comprehensible, making him the 
embodiment of transcendent or occult knowledge: 
Me, I’m a talker, and consequently like a lot talkers tend to say 
things I don’t mean. But Abbott, more than anyone else I know, 
has to make his words count, almost like a poet, and because he’s 
passed so close to death he has a clarity about life that most of us 
can’t imagine.” (3) 
While she claims that Abbott possesses extraordinary clarity and wisdom, the fact 
remains that Abbott’s communication is both phonologically incomprehensible and by 
and large substantially meaningless. Consequently, the succinct and incisive observations 






Dolores herself. Her “interpretations” of Abbott’s essentially incomprehensible 
utterances provides her with a second locus of speech, thereby allowing her to articulate 
her own subjectivity in contrasted, eve conflicted ways. 
In terms of the Dolores’s use of Abbott’s voice, Abbott stands in for the part of 
Dolores that is more reserved, insular, and even profound. The reserved and concentrated 
quality of that speech contrasts sharply with the more social and garrulous nature of her 
own primary identity. Dolores’s projection of her own speech into Abbott serves as a way 
to hold diverted subjectivity. Interestingly, Dolores attributes Abbott’s greater self-
containment and the precise and insightful quality of his speech more to his experience of 
trauma than to motor difficulties that make speaking an effort. That clarity, in her 
opinion, reflects a wisdom derived from having “passed so close to death”, or in other 
words, from his own traumatic experience. This observation presages the change that we 
will observe in Dolores herself in the final (fifth) chapter of the novel when not only will 
her discourse permanently take on the qualities attributed to Abbott’s speech (profound, 
precise, clear), but she will also find a self-containment and self-sufficiency that will 
allow her to leave Sam Dent and her connections there. (I will return to this 
transformation in Dolores in the final chapter of this study.) 
Abbott’s impediment, created by his stroke, disrupts his relationship with 
Dolores. That relationship, we discover in the novel’s final chapter, had been particularly 
close and all-consuming, to the detriment of other significant relationships – even those 
with her sons.  As a result, Dolores’s difficulty in communicating with Abbott constitutes 






which she suffers from a feeling of disconnection however. Her relationship with her now 
adult sons – the only other adult relationships of which she speaks – is also problematic 
and plagued by an experience of distance or even of loss. In the case of her younger son, 
William, she attributes that distance to his recent experiences in combat – a disruption of 
connection brought about by his presumably traumatic experience. In the case of 
Reginald, she senses a disdain for what she believes he sees as her diminished intellectual 
capacity: 
William, who is the younger, is in the army in Virginia and was 
just back from Panama then, and although he had not been 
wounded or anything, he was sounding a little strange and distant 
to me, which is understandable, I suppose. […] Reginald was 
having some marital problems, you might say, in that his wife, 
Tracy, was bored with her job at the Plattsburgh Marriott, where 
she worked as a receptionist, and wanted to get pregnant. […] I 
told him why didn’t he tell Tracy to find a job that wasn’t boring. 
That irritated him. […] “Ma, it’s not that simple,” he said, as if he 
thought I was simpleminded. (8) 
Dolores brings up this sense of disconnection and distance from her sons a number of 
times throughout her account as an explanation for a variety of her actions on the day of 
the accident, acknowledging that it had contributed to her level of distraction, 
excitability, as well as to her sometimes conflicted interactions with some of the children 






These three primary relationships in Dolores’s life – that is, with her sins and with 
Abbott – have always been fraught with difficulties in terms if the adequacy of the 
connection that Dolores feels. This is particularly true of her relationship with Abbott, 
which the reader learns has been all-consuming in its intensity, but punctuated by 
Abbott’s punitive withdrawal of connection in the form of language. Abbott used his 
taciturn nature as a means of controlling Dolores and her sons, and some of her garrulous 
tendencies were developed as a means of placating Abbott: 
 Abbott didn’t say anything. When he chooses his gaze alone 
makes a powerful statement. Without a word, just by sitting there 
and putting on a hard look, he can set me or Reginald or William 
to jabbering elaborate apologies and explanations, until finally he 
smiles and we can stop. Sometimes I think that’s why Reginald 
moved to Platsburgh and William joined the army, just to get away 
from their father’s gaze. For privacy. Me, of course, I never really 
thought I needed that kind of privacy. (243) 
Abbott’s imperious behavior and Dolores’s efforts to placate him demonstrates a 
dramatic imbalance of power in the relationship and that imbalance resembles an adult-
child relationship in certain ways. (Indeed, ‘Abbott’ means ‘father.’) Abbott’s sparing use 
of language, the power in his withdrawal of language, and the authority of his 
pronouncements has a profound impact on Dolores’s sense of security. Even after his 
stroke and the impediment of his speech, Dolores continues to interject Abbott’s 






In so doing, she maintains the inequitable relationship that had historically been theirs, 
and she usurps the voice by placing her own more succinct thoughts in Abbott’s mouth. 
Dolores’s relationship with the adult members of her town is superficial, but 
generally friendly, however Dolores’s significant adult relationships are conflicted. She 
appears to feel much more relaxed and competent in the presence of children, where she 
can establish the rules and command a certain degree of respect simply by virtue of her 
position as the adult responsible for their care. Dolores finds a manifestation of her 
conflicted relationship with Abbott and her sons in her relationships with the various 
children who ride her bus, as well as a means for compensating for its failings in those 
significant relationships. Just as Dolores projects a conflicted (and desired) aspect of her 
own subjectivity onto Abbott, Dolores find a distinct manifestation for aspects of her 
conflicted feelings about her sons in her relationships with specific children on the bus. 
Those different relationships are explored over the course of her account as she picks up 
the children at their various stops along the bus route. 
The first children on her route, the three Lamston children, make the connection 
between the children on the bus route with her sons in particular her conflict with her 
sons readily apparent. The arrival of the Lamstons segues seamlessly with her rumination 
on that conflict, appearing at first almost as though it were her sons who had just arrived 
at the bus doors, rather than the Lamstons: 
Anyhow, I was feeling cut off from my sons, which is unusual and 






like a hunger, and I wanted to do something to change it, but 
nothing would come to my mind. 
 Then suddenly they were there, the Lamstons, the two older 
boys, Harold and Jesse, banging on the door, and the little girl, 
Sheila […]. (9) 
Dolores’s conflict with the Lamston children correlates precisely with the conflict that 
she experiences with her sons (disconnection), but also with Abbott (punitive silence). 
The children are taciturn, and she is unable to establish contact with them or to develop 
the warm bond she desires: 
I never exactly liked the Lamston kids; they made it hard. But I felt 
sorry for them, so instead I acted as if I was very fond of them. 
They were what you call uncommunicative, all three, although 
they certainly communicated fine with one another, always 
whispering back and forth in a way that made you think they were 
criticizing you. (9) 
The Lamstons’ refusal to reciprocate Dolores’s gestures and overtures provoke a range of 
responses from Dolores. Emotionally, these run the gamut, including a vague dislike of 
them, compensatory friendliness, open hostility, empathy with them, to disgust with her 
own exaggerated efforts to illicit a response from them: 
Little, pinch-faced kids, a solemn trio they were, commiserating 
with one another in whispers behind my back while I drove and 






All ready to read ‘n’ write ‘n’ ‘rithmatic?” That sort of thing. Make 
myself sick. “Pretty damned cold this morning coming down the 
hill, I bet.” Nothing. Silence. (10) 
Dolores’s efforts to engage the Lamstons closely resemble the loquacious manner 
with which Dolores and her sons attempted to appease Abbott when he disciplined them 
with his stony silence. In those efforts, we can begin to see how some degree of Dolores’s 
“sanguinity” represents less a feeling of underlying warmth towards people, and more a 
compensatory mechanism – a way of warding off rejection and a feeling of exclusion. 
That compensatory mechanism is not entirely unconscious. Even as her interactions with 
the Lamstons betrays her vulnerability – a vulnerability that drives her actions in ways of 
which she herself does not approve – she is simultaneously aware that he behavior is 
false and that the Lamston children have their own, personal reasons for being self-
contained and for shrinking from contact: 
[…] the Lamstons were a family that, after a good start, had come 
to be characterized by permanent overall failure, and people 
generally shunned them for it. In return, they withheld themselves. 
It was their only point of pride, I suppose. Which is why the 
children behaved so sadly aloof, even to me. And who could 
begrudge them?” (11) 
Dolores is divided in her perceptions of the Lamstons, fluctuating between a paranoid 
sense that the Lamstons’ silence and distance from her indicates a hostile and very 






with their own difficulties and sense of social exclusion. This division in her perceptions 
and, ultimately, in her behavior and sense of self, mimics the division of Dolores’s 
speech into a loquacious voice that strives for intensified contact with others, and the 
sparse but incisive speech she falsely attributes to Abbott as the embodiment of her desire 
for greater self-containment. 
Unable to tolerate silence, which literally ‘signifies’ disconnection, Dolores is 
eventually driven to push the Lamston children into a response by goading them to anger. 
That hostile impulse betrays a dark side to Dolores’s “talkativeness” or “outgoingness” in 
which language becomes as coercive a tool as silence. Not only is her drive to be in 
contact with others – in particular with children – a compensatory mechanism that 
enables her to manage her fear of disconnection, it is a potential weapon. It is easier for 
Dolores to be with children than to be with adults in the sense that she can control the 
relationship, define the terms under which contact is to be established and maintained, 
and even demand contact when it is withheld: 
Most days I just ignored them, left them to themselves, since that’s 
clearly what they wanted, and whistled my way down the hill to 
the second stop, treating it in my mind like it was my first stop 
coming up and not the second and I was still alone in the bus. But 
that day for some reason I wanted to get a rise out of at least one of 
the three. Maybe because I felt so cut off from my own children; 






motives is like fixing blame – the further away from the act you 
get, the harder it is to single out one thing as having caused it. (10) 
Dolores’s efforts to bully a response is as much desperation as it is hostility. As her 
efforts become more desperate, however, they eventually lead to a more overt expression 
of rejection that, unlike the children’s earlier silence, truly represents a rejection of 
Dolores herself: 
“Harold!” I said. “You hear me ask you a question?” I turned 
around and cut him a look. 
 “Leave us alone!” he said, coming right back at me with those 
cold blue eyes of his. His brother, Jesse, sat by the window, 
looking out as if he could see into the dark. Harold was trying to 
wipe his baby sister’s red face with the end of his scarf. She had 
been crying in that silent way of a very sad and frightened person, 
and I suddenly felt terrible and wished I had kept my big mouth 
shut. (12) 
Dolores’s relationship with the Lamstons shows us the conflicted nature of her 
need for contact – the compensatory nature of her outgoing behavior, the productive as 
well as the destructive potential in her behavior, and the fluctuation between self-
condemnation and condemnation of those with whom Dolores experiences a diminished 
connection. Underlying all of this is a self-contained, taciturn, less needy self that she 
projects onto Abbott as profoundly admirable but as foreign to her – diverted subjectivity 






with the children on her bus are this conflicted, however, and her relationship with 
various children on the bus differs, articulating different aspects of her subjective 
identity. The connection that Dolores seeks out with the children as a means of 
establishing a sense of belonging functions, in many ways, productively. She is invested 
both in personalizing those relationships, and in ensuring the active participation 
(interpersonal connection) of all of the children in her care: 
The bus I had given the name Shoe to, which is just something I 
do, because the kinds seemed to like it when they could 
personalize the thing. I think it made going to school a little more 
pleasurable for them, especially the younger children, some of 
whose home lives were not exactly sweetness and light, if you 
know what I mean. […] By staying away from the cutesy names, 
sticking with names that were slightly humorous, I was able to get 
the older kids to go along with the game, making the ride more 
cheerful for everyone that way. It was something we could all 
participate in together, which was a value I tried to promote among 
young people. (5-6) 
There is a degree of safety in interacting with children as opposed to interacting 
with adults, over whom Dolores cannot exercise the same control. Dolores idealizes 
childhood as a time in which all of the various manifestations of social interaction are 
represented, but in which nothing is hidden and from which, no permanent harm can 






temporary. Children’s use of language – their questions, arguing, gossiping, bragging, 
etc. – is just another kind of play through which they practice for the “real” use of 
language later and hence, Dolores claims that children’s language is non-threatening: 
By now there was some noise in the bus, the early morning sounds 
of children practicing at being adults, making themselves known to 
one another and to themselves in their small voices (some of them 
not so small) – asking questions, arguing, making exchanges, 
gossiping, bragging, pleading, courting, threatening, testing – 
doing everything we ourselves do, the way puppies and kittens at 
play mimic grown dogs and cats at work. It’s not altogether 
peaceful or sweet, but it doesn’t do any serious harm. And because 
you can listen to children without fear, the way you can watch 
puppies tumble and bite and kittens sneak up on one another and 
spring without worrying that they’ll be hurt by it, the talk of 
children can be very instructive. I guess it’s because they play 
openly at what we grownups do seriously and in secret. (16-17) 
Dolores feels safe and, just as importantly, she feels competent and connected when she 
is with children. Being present as the only adult allows Dolores to feel competent in her 
care of them, but also allows her to feel that she is a part of their discursive community. 
Driving her school bus, Dolores can allow herself to return, mentally, to what she 
imagines childhood to have been like, thereby experiencing an even stronger sense of 






expressions of subjectivity – herself as a child, and herself as an adult. Dolores “returns” 
to childhood, however, as a child who knows to treasure the supposed safety of those 
fledgling interactions that as yet can create no lasting schism if they go awry, but who 
also knows to fear the end of childhood and the coming disconnection – even exile – of 
adulthood: 
I just perched up there in the driver’s seat and drove, letting them 
forget all about me, while I listened to their jumble of words, 
songs, and shouts and cries and it was almost as if I were not 
present, or were invisible, or as if I were a child again myself, a 
child blessed or cursed (I’m not sure which) with foresight, with 
the ability to see the closing off that adulthood would bring, the 
pleasures, the shame, the secrets, the fearfulness. The eventual 
silence; that too. (19) 
This perception of childhood is, of course, highly idealized, and as Dolores 
herself points out at various points in the narrative, many of the children’s “home lives 
were not exactly sweetness and light” (5). In truth, while she idealizes childhood in a 
general way and projects her desire for safety and connection onto certain of the children, 
she also sees her fear, disconnection, and her sense of being an outsider in other children. 
One of these, Sean Walker, most clearly represents the darker side of childhood. Dolores 
displays an empathic understanding of what Sean experiences as an “outsider,” and of the 






He was a strange little fellow, but you couldn’t help liking him. 
Apparently, although he was way behind all the other kids his age 
in school and was too fragile and nervous to play at sports, he was 
expert at playing video games and much admired for it by the other 
children. A wizard, they say, with fabulous eye-hand coordination, 
and when sitting in front of a video game, he was supposed to be 
capable of scary concentration. It was probably the only time he 
felt competent and was not lonely. (21) 
The empathic connection with Sean’s loneliness and with the security he feels in those 
limited areas of his life in which he feels competent will later be echoed by Dolores when 
she talks about her job driving the bus. Still other children represent an even more 
profound level of a failure to fit in and of total disconnection from the community at 
large. Dolores groups those children collectively, referring to them only as the kids of 
Wilmot Flats, “mostly named Atwater, with a few Bilodeaus thrown in” (29), mentioning 
neither name nor any defining characteristic of any individual. This impersonal treatment 
stands in sharp contrast with the care she puts into describing other children on her route, 
and renders the “children of Wilmot Flats” a kind of faceless rabble beyond the pale – 
children whom Dolores herself characterizes as exiles: 
There’s intermarriage up there and all sorts of mingling that it’s 
better not to know about, and between that and alcohol and 
ignorance, the children have little chance of doing more with their 






you have to sympathize. Regardless of what you think of their 
parents and the rest of the adults up there. It’s like all those poor 
children are born banished and spend their lives trying to get back 
to where they belong. And only a few of them manage it. The 
occasional plucky one, who happens also to be lucky and gifted 
with intelligence, good looks, and charm, he might get back, before 
he dies, to his native town. But the rest stay banished, permanently 
exiled, if not there on Wilmot Flats, then someplace just like it. 
(30) 
Dolores’s idealized perception of childhood as a time of belonging and 
harmlessness is simultaneously belied by her description of the children themselves. 
Likewise, the way she describes her relationship with children and her ability to unite 
them in a harmonious way is greatly idealized. There are, in fact strong indications that 
Dolores has difficulty dealing with children, as her uncomfortable dealings with the 
Lamston children indicates. She tends to visualize children as small adults, interpreting 
their behavior as adult behavior, and eschewing childlike behavior as inappropriate or 
undesirable. Her expectation of adult-like behavior leads Dolores to interact in some 
ways inappropriately with the children and her ability to deal with children ends when 
their behavior becomes child-like – that is, when their behavior is not like a mock version 
of adult behavior. Her response to such behavior is to suppress it, and even in suppressing 
that behavior, she tends to do so in ways that are only appropriate to an interaction 






Perhaps the most dramatic display of Dolores’s unreasonable expectation of 
maturity in the children, and her own, at times, inappropriate, adult-like interaction with 
them occurs when she picks up Sean Walker. As already noted, Sean is an anxious child 
with a learning disability and very few connections with his peers. As a result of his 
difficulties, Sean is unusually dependent on his mother, Risa Walker. On the morning that 
Dolores is describing – the morning of the accident – Risa helped Sean onto the bus, and 
as she goes to cross the road in front of the school bus, she is nearly hit by a speeding car: 
Then suddenly Sean shrieked, “Mommy!” and he was all over me, 
scrambling to get across my lap to the window, and I glimpsed 
Risa off to my left, leaping out of the way of a red Saab that 
seemed to have bolted out of nowhere. It had come around the 
bend in front of me and the truck and hadn’t slowed down a bit as I 
drew back onto the road, and the driver must have felt squeezed 
and had accelerated and had just missed clipping Risa as she 
crossed to the other side. I hit the brakes, and thank God the driver 
of the truck behind me did too, managing to pull up an inch or two 
from my rear. (24) 
Sean’s reaction is reasonable for a young child who has just witnessed his mother’s 
narrow escape from death. Dolores’s reaction however, which is no doubt to a substantial 
degree an expression of her own shock, is nonetheless an insensitive response to anyone’s 






“Sean! Sit the hell down!” I yelled. “She’s okay! Now sit down,” I 
said, and he obeyed. (24) 
Far from recognizing the inappropriateness of her own reaction and taking 
responsibility, Dolores continues to focus on Sean’s behavior as she seeks to smooth 
things over. She attributes his reaction not to the panicked feelings of a young child who 
has nearly seen his mother killed in front of him, but to an adult-like worry about the 
dangers of traffic in general, the idiocy of some drivers, and the habitual peril to his 
mother when crossing such a road: 
“There’s a lot of damn fool idiots out there, Sean,” I said. ‘I guess 
you got a right to worry.’ I smiled at him, but he only glared at me, 
as if I were to blame. (25) 
This incident shows us not only Dolores’s realistic difficulties in dealing with children 
and interpreting their responses accurately, it also brings up the matter of Dolores’s own 
responsibility or even culpability in that event. This issue of culpability, in particular with 
regards Dolores’s bus driving is significant, of course, as it was she who is driving when 
the bus accident occurs a short time later. Sean’s anger is no doubt directed at her for 
having shouted at him. Her perception that Sean’s glare might contain an accusation that 
she is to blame for Risa’s near death relates to her own sense that she may have 
contributed to the near accident. Although Dolores never claims direct responsibility, her 
description of that near-miss incident suggests that she herself nearly caused the accident 
by pulling out into traffic without having seen the car, thereby forcing the driver to 






truck, and then the bus which stood in front of it – simply the observation that the car 
“seemed to have bolted out of nowhere.” I will return to the matter of Dolores’s driving 
presently. In addition, the fact that she has to slam on the brakes nearly causes a second 
accident as the eighteen-wheeler nearly hits the bus from behind. All of this is being 
recalled after the fatal bus crash; a fact which, in and of itself, stresses the issue of 
Dolores’s driving and possible culpability. 
The next child on Dolores’s rout after the Lamstons is Bear Otto, of whom 
Dolores is particularly fond, and whom she professes to admire. Bear, the adopted son of 
Wanda and Hartley Otto, is an outgoing child whose interaction with Dolores is 
especially welcoming and affirming: 
From the Lamington’s stop at McNeil and Avalanche, the route ran 
west along the ridge into the dark, […] out to the crest of the hill, 
where I picked up a kid I actually liked personally a whole lot and 
was always pleased to see. Bear Otto. […] Bear was ready and 
waiting for me, and the second I swung open the door he jumped 
straight into the bus from the ground, as if he had been planning it, 
and grinned in triumph and held out the flat of his hand for a high 
five, like a black kid from the city. I slapped it, and he said, “Yo, 
Dolores!” […]” (12) 
In stark contrast to the Lamstons, Bear radiates a fondness and an acceptance of Dolores 
for which she must not make a great effort. In particular, Dolores praises those qualities 






therefore minimize tension. Bear has a facility as a peacemaker, as Dolores describes it, 
and an ability to “bring out the best in people” that immediately calls to mind the 
qualities she would desire in a man: 
Numerous times, in the quick bristly quarrels that boys like to get 
into, I had seen him play the calm, good-natured peacemaker, and I 
admired him and imagined that he would turn into a wonderful 
man. He was one of those rare children who bring out the best in 
people instead of the worst. (13) 
The phrase, to “bring out the best in people” refers to Bear’s ability to smooth out 
conflicts, however it applies equally to his ability to evoke the best in Dolores’s herself. 
In contrast to the Lamstons’ moody silence or Sean Walker’s anxious and needy lack of 
ease, Bear’s easygoing and accepting nature makes it possible for Dolores to interact with 
him in a way that emphasizes the best in her nature – a true sanguinity, rather than a 
frantic attempt to defend against the silence of others that Dolores interprets as rejection 
or disdain. 
These qualities in Bear – his warm and outgoing nature and his ability to manage 
and eliminate conflict – are qualities that Dolores equates with maturity or, more 
accurately, that Dolores wishes to see in adults. Those qualities in an adult would allow 
her to enjoy the same kind of frictionless interaction she enjoys with Bear. Naturally 
adults can be sullen and taciturn like the Lamstons, (as Abbott can be). They can also be 






this fact, she posits it as a reason for her efforts to encourage a precocious maturity in her 
own sons: 
That morning, while I waited for the Lamstons, I was thinking 
about my sons. Reginald and William. We always called them that, 
never Reggie or Billy; I think it helped them to grow up faster. Not 
that I was in a hurry for them to grow up. I just didn’t want them to 
become the kind of men who think of themselves as little boys and 
then tend to act that way when you need them to act like adults. (8) 
It is clear that Dolores does not deal very well with children’s behavior when it 
presents her with an experience of rejection or of neediness. Her apprehension of children 
and of childhood is idealized, and yet at the same time, she recognizes that childhood is 
not so idyllic, especially for certain children. Her nostalgic bond to childhood looks back, 
most immediately, on a time when she had a relationship with her sons that, by virtue of 
their youth and their dependence on her, was a close relationship, and one over which she 
could exercise a certain degree of control. Their childhood represented a time in which 
she could decide how to manage the relationship without having to account for her sons’ 
feelings or emotional needs, or for their autonomy to act on those feelings by 
withdrawing from her. As adults, Dolores’s relationship with them is now subject to the 
same complexities, difficulties and “silence” that she associates with being an adult. 
Unlike her sons now, she can enjoy a warm repartee with children like Bear Otto, or can 






Dolores displays a certain sensitivity and awareness of the children’s inner lives. 
At the same time, as happened when she shouted at Sean Walker, she also exhibits a 
certain intolerance of their feelings and situation in the way she deals with them, and in 
the rules she imposes on them: 
Rule number two: No fighting. Anyone fights, he by God walks. 
And no matter who starts it, both parties walk. Girls the same as 
boys. They could argue and holler at one another, but let one of 
them strike another, and both of them were on the road in seconds. 
I usually had to enforce this rule no more than once a year, and 
after that the kids would enforce it themselves. Or if they did hit 
each other, they did it silently, since the victim knew that he or she 
would have to walk too. (18-19) 
This non-judicial rule serves to maintain quiet on the bus and to remove Dolores from the 
role of mediator in the children’s conflicts, and it dramatically compounds the injustice 
done to the child who is struck by a peer. In essence, its ultimate purpose is not to stop 
the children from fighting, but merely to silence the needs of the child who is being 
victimized. It gives us a powerful insight into just how far removed Dolores is from the 
children’s feelings (something we have also seen in her interactions both with the 
Lamstons and with Sean Walker). It also shows a somewhat ambivalent perception of 
silence, which she could not tolerate from the Lamstons, but which she desires in terms 
of what she perceives as needy demands. That ambivalence, in turn, calls to mind the odd 






contrasted with her admiration for self-contained, taciturn behavior and a succinct use of 
language. 
Dolores’s nostalgic attitude towards childhood as a halcyon time no doubt extends 
beyond the time when her two sons were still children. Her return in her imagination to 
her own childhood as she sits quietly in the driver’s seat and pretending to be a child 
again marks a desire to return to a time when she bore no responsibilities for the welfare 
of others or for the outcome of relationships. As I have already noted, the issue of 
responsibility, and even culpability, prefigures Dolores’s entire account, although she 
herself never addresses it directly. Indeed, as the person who was driving the bus when it 
went over the embankment and sank through the ice, the matter of responsibility is 
conspicuous in its absence. In the wake of the school bus accident, it is easy to 
understand Dolores’s reluctance to address the question of responsibility. Driving the bus 
has afforded her an intense joy, a feeling of human connection and a sense of competence 
that she is unable to find elsewhere in her life. Much of her testimony betrays an effort to 
emphasize her level of competence both in terms of preparation as a means of avoiding 
problems, and in terms of her awareness of safety. She characterizes herself as someone 
whose nature is tempered by an abundance of caution: 
By nature I’m a careful person and not overly optimistic, 
especially when it comes to machinery and tools; I keep everything 
in tiptop condition, with plenty of backup. Batteries, tires, oil, 
antifreeze, the whole bit. I treated that bus like it was my own, may 






temperament. I’m the kind of person who always follows the 
manual. No shortcuts. (4) 
Some of this characterization may have a basis in truth, however much of it 
represents an obvious effort to rehabilitate some of her behavior in order to make it 
appear more cautious than careless. In this same way, she attempts to explain her 
tendency to speed along the stretch of road where the accident occurred as a safety 
measure, rather than a habit that has arisen out of inattention and a desire to make quicker 
time: 
Coming down from the Flats on the Marlowe road towards the 
town, the greatest danger was that I would be going too slow and a 
lumber truck or some idiot in a car would come barreling along at 
seventy-five or eighty, which you can easily do up there, once 
you’ve made the crest from the other side, and would come up on 
me fast and not be able to slow or pass and would run smack into 
me, […]. As a result, since I didn’t have any more stops to make 
once I’d gathered the kids from the Flats, I tended to drive that 
stretch of road at a pretty good clip. Nothing reckless, you 
understand. Nothing illegal. Fifty, fifty-five is all. Also, if I 
happened to be running a few minutes late, that was the only time 
when I could make up for it. (32-33) 
The veracity of her self-characterization is somewhat belied by the reported impressions 






example, who is the town’s chief mechanic, mentions the fact that after the accident, 
many people blamed Dolores both because of her driving and because of her instance on 
maintaining the bus herself. He then adds his own, somewhat more generous assessment 
of her capabilities: 
Many of the folks in Sam Dent have come out since the accident 
and claimed that they knew it was going to happen someday, oh 
yes, they just knew it: because of Dolores’s driving, which to be 
fair, is not reckless but casual; or because of the condition of the 
bus itself, which Dolores serviced at home in her barn, and as a 
consequence it did not get the same supervision by me as the other 
school buses got; […]. (38) 
Whatever truth there may be in Dolores’s characterization of her own competence 
(or lack thereof), the question of her competence represents a point of vulnerability in 
terms of her own identity and the current of her subjectivity. Her general competence in a 
number of areas in her life are tightly interwoven throughout the narrative, including her 
competence in her relationship with her sons, her competence as a mother, her 
competence in her dealings with the school children, and her competence as the driver of 
their school bus. Ultimately, it is her role as school bus driver – a role which, like Sean 
when he plays video games, is the only time when she “felt competent and not lonely” 
(21) – that allows her to compensate for feeling incompetent in other areas of her life. 
Her true, underlying competence – is held apart in a Narrative domain as diverted 






observation) as a way of holding what conflicts with the sanguine nature she presents in 
her current identity (an attempt at good-natured inoffensiveness). 
The impact of the accident on Dolores and the crisis it engenders is focused on 
this point of vulnerability, calling into question her competence at many levels and 
destroying the mechanism by which she compensates for areas if her life in which she 
feels less competent. Her relationship with the children is destroyed, not only in the case 
of those fourteen children who die in the accident, but with all of the children, when her 
job as school bus driver is taken from her. At a more personal level, her sense of pride in 
that job is annulled by her failure to conduct them safely to school. We see this shift from 
custodian of the children to the cause of their deaths in the metaphor Dolores habitually 
uses to describe the manner in which she picks the children up. The image she conjures – 
as though she were plucking berries – is a covalent reference that describes Dolores’s role 
in the community both prior to, and following the accident. Initially a kind of pastoral 
image without negative connotation, the idea of “clearing the hillside of its children” 
takes on a macabre aspect in the wake of the accident as though she were the grim reaper: 
By the time I reached the bottom of Bartlett Hill Road where it 
enters Route 73 by the old mill, I had half my load, over twenty 
kids, on board. They had walked to their places on Bartlett Hill 
Road from the smaller roads and lanes that run off it, bright little 
knots of three and four children gathered by a cluster of mailboxes 






sometimes thought as I made my decent, clearing the hillside of its 
children. (17-18) 
Dolores’s descent, both as a literal reference to the downward stretch of road 
where the accident occurs and as a Dantean metaphor, marks her expulsion from the 
community, whether permanently or temporarily. Not only has Dolores lost her 
connection to the children, the trust of her fellow townspeople is also lost as they 
consider blaming her for the accident. She is not only stripped of her formal social 
function as school bus driver, but of her role as assistant mail carrier as well. Thus shut 
out of the town, either because she is blamed for the accident, or because she is an 
uncomfortable reminder of the town’s loss, she is forced to seek employment in the 
closest city, Plattsburgh. The accident does more than sever social connections by calling 
Dolores’s competence into question however. It also ties into her feeling of disconnection 
in her own family. Indeed, there is an unbroken line of association beginning with the 
distance she feels from her sons and her inability to restore that crucial connection, 
through the events leading up to the accident, to the accident itself. The motif that links 
each of these is the inability to find a course of action that will ensure a positive outcome, 
which she expresses with regards to her sons early in the narrative (cited earlier): 
Anyhow, I was feeling cut off from my sons, which is unusual and 
gives me an empty feeling in the stomach when it happens, almost 
like a hunger, and I wanted to do something to change it, but 






That sense of disconnection from her sons and her inability to restore that 
connection are not merely background to her account of the accident, but instead, form 
the very context in which the accident occurs. Dolores repeatedly mentions her 
preoccupation with that feeling of disconnection as an explanation for her actions, in 
relation to the series of events that lead to the accident itself. There are two “events” that 
precede the accident itself – the appearance of a dog in the road, and the “illusion” of a 
second dog shortly afterwards that causes her to swerve defensively. Dolores sees an 
unbroken chain of connections in her emotional response, first to her sense of 
disconnection from her sons and her helplessness to repair that bond, then to the 
appearance of the real dog, and finally the “appearance” of the second, illusory dog that 
causes her to swerve and go off the road. 
The “first” dog, or real dog, dashes across the road in front of the bus and startles 
Dolores. Although this “first” dog does not create any problem for her, she attributes the 
appearance of the “second,” imagined dog to this first dog: 
That’s when I saw the dog. The actual dog, I mean – not the one I 
thought I saw on the Marlowe road a few minutes later. It’s 
probably irrelevant, but I offer it as a possible explanation for my 
seeing what I thought was a dog later, since both were the same 
dull red color. The dog on Wilmot Flats was a garbage hound, one 
of those wandering strays you see hanging around the dump. They 






in the town shoot them whenever they come across one in the 
woods. (30-31) 
The “reappearance” of the dog a few minutes later as a psychological illusion no doubt 
derives from Dolores’s exaggerated fear response to this first dog. The dog startles her at 
a moment when her thoughts were not on the task at hand, but on her sons: 
 As I was saying, I had picked up the kids on the flats and was 
passing by the open chain-link entrance to the dump, when this 
raggedy old mutt shot out of the gate and ran across the road in 
front of me, and it scared the bejesus out of me, although I could 
not for the life of me tell you why, as he was ordinary-looking and 
there was no danger of my hitting him. 
 My mind must have been locked onto something contrasted – 
my sons Reginald and William, since I felt that morning 
particularly estranged from them, and you tend to embrace with 
thought what you’re forbidden to embrace in fact. For when that 
dog entered my field of vision, it somehow astonished and then 
frightened me. (31) 
This incident with the dog is a non-event, however Dolores’ reaction is infused with the 
intensity of emotions she feels regarding her sons and their distance from her, 
compounding those turbulent emotions with the shock of seeing the dog dash across the 
road, and doubtless the realization that she is not really focused on her driving. In a literal 






driving further undermines her sense of competence. In this moment of amplified 
emotion, Dolores’s  inner conflict, her feelings of helplessness and anxiety, are 
inextricably linked with a third near-accident leading up to the accident itself (the first 
and second being the sports car and the eighteen-wheeler in front of Risa Walker’s 
home). With this intertwining of affective content, Dolores’s  reaction to the dog is 
amplified beyond all proportion to the event and persists even after the situation has been 
successfully negotiated: 
Although the snow was blowing in feathery waves by then, the 
road was still dry and black, easy to see, and I gripped the wheel 
and drove straight on, as if nothing had happened. For nothing had 
happened! Yet I wanted intensely to pull the bus over and stop, to 
sit there for a moment and try to gather my fragmented thoughts 
and calm my clanging nerves. (31-32) 
Dolores herself is perplexed by her own reaction, and professes to offer it simply 
as an explanation for the second dog she sees a few moments later, establishing an 
unbroken chain of associations in which her feelings about her sons color her reaction to 
the first dog, and her exaggerated reaction to the first, real dog, dictates her reaction to 
the second dog. This second dog does not even exist, and in retrospect, Dolores 
recognizes that it was an “optical illusion” or an “afterimage” that arose in response to 
the shock she received when she saw the first dog: 
And, yes it was then that I saw the dog, the second dog, the one I 






was an optical illusion or a mirage, a sort of afterimage, maybe, of 
the dog that I had seen on the Flats and that had frightened and 
moved me so. But at the time I could not tell the difference. (33-
34) 
Again, like the situation with her sons (now linked to the illusory dog via a concatenated 
association with the real dog), Dolores does not know what course of action to take in 
order to secure a positive outcome. She believes, at the time, that she must either hit the 
dog or swerve, thereby putting the children at risk: 
And as I’ve always done when I’ve had two bad choices and 
nothing else available to me, I arranged it so that if I erred I’d 
come out on the side of the angels. Which is to say, I acted as 
though it was a real dog I saw or a small deer or possibly even a 
lost child from the Flats, barely a half mile away. (34) 
While Dolores professes that she always arranges her actions so that she chooses 
the lesser of two evils – “erring on the distaff side, if you get my drift” (1) – the results of 
her actions prove the contrary. She is driven by the concatenation of associations and 
traumatic reactions beginning with her emotional upset over her disconnection from her 
two sons, to her overreaction to the real dog on the Wilmot Flats (for which, ironically, 
she does not swerve), to her exaggerated reaction to the after image of the dog a few 
moments later. With each instance her emotions are augmented and rational thought 
diminished until the choice that she ultimately makes leads her to swerve to avoid hitting 






embankment. The trauma of the bus accident – a precipitating event – occurs as the result 
of Dolores’s  underlying traumatic experience, just as that past trauma dictates the way in 
which she will experience the accident, shaping, as it were, the traumatic crisis 
precipitated by the accident. 
The lack of clarity in her thinking and awareness preceding the accident, during 
which time her mind has been dwelling on her sons, is followed by a moment of 
inescapable clarity and a complete loss of active agency as the bus begins its descent onto 
the ice: 
For the rest of my life I will remember that red-brown blur, like a 
stain of dried blood, standing against the road with a thin screen of 
blown snow suspended between it and me, the full weight of the 
vehicle and the thirty-four children in it bearing down on me like a 
wall of water. And I will remember the formal clarity of my mind, 
beyond thinking or choosing now, for I had made my choice, as I 
wrenched the steering wheel to the right and slapped my foot 
against the brake pedal, and I wasn’t the driver anymore, so I 
hunched my shoulders and ducked my head, as if the bus were a 
huge wave about to break over me. (34) 
The accident is bound by the series of associations that preceded it to another, earlier 
trauma – the “loss” of her sons. However that preceding trauma may eventually resolve 







There was Bear Otto, and the Lamston kids, and the Walkers, the 
Hamiltons, and the Prescotts and the teenaged boys and girls from 
Bartlett Hill, and Risa and Wendell Walker’s sad little boy, Sean, 
and sweet Nichole Burnell, and all the kids from the valley, and the 
children from the Wilmot Flats, and Billy Ansel’s twins, Jessica 
and Mason – the children of my town – their wide-eyed faces and 
fragile bodies swirling and tumbling in a tangled mass as the bus 
went over and the sky tipped and veered away and the ground 
lurched brutally forward. (34-35) 
Dolores’s  testimony ends here, in a sense frozen at the moment of the accident 
itself. Unlike the testimonies of Billy Ansel, Mitchell Stephens and Nicole Burnell, this 
first testimony doesn’t focus on the aftermath of the accident or the changes that Dolores 
undergoes as a result. Naturally each of the four individuals, who give their accounts in 
the novel, including Dolores, will undergo a revision of subjectivity. As Billy Ansel notes 
in his account in the second chapter of the novel, recalling his experience after the death 
of his wife (by cancer) and his children (in the accident): 
When someone you love has died, you tend to recall best those few 
moments and incidents that helped to clarify your sense, not of the 
person who has died, but of your own self. And if you loved the 
person a great deal, as I loved Lydia and my children, your sense 






will have many such moments to remember. I have learned that. 
(43) 
Dolores account is unique, however, in that she will return in the final (fifth) chapter of 
the novel to complete her testimony. (I will examine that continuation of her account in 
chapter five of this study.) Dolores’s  account will go farther than that of the novel’s 
other primary characters, detailing not only her crisis, but her recovery from that crisis as 
and the revision of her subjectivity. The changes that she undergoes will give her a 
transcendent awareness, however, and her narrative voice will change as she claims the 
clarity and concise quality of observation that she has hitherto ascribed to Abbott. As this 
occurs, her analysis of the trauma suffered collectively by the town of Sam Dent and the 
changes that follow in its wake will benefit from her forced separation from her town and 
her emancipation from the need to cultivate the social bonds that were severed by the 
accident. Her revised narrative voice and her heightened awareness and clarity will 
enable her to provide a voice for Sam Dent itself – giving a dispassionate voice to the 
town’s collective trauma. 
 
4.2 Billy Ansel: A Topography of Separate Realities 
In the novel’s second chapter we are presented with the account of Billy Ansel, 
the widowed father of fraternal twins, Jessica and Mason, both of whom die in the 
accident. Billy drives behind the school bus every morning on his way to work, waving to 
his children sitting at the back of the bus. As a result, he is the only witness when the bus 






relationship to the accident shapes his response to the tragedy, however that response is 
shaped to an even greater degree by the fact that Billy has experienced a series of 
significant traumata throughout his life. Indeed, those preceding traumata are interwoven 
throughout Billy’s testimony in such a way that they cannot be separated from it, painting 
a much broader picture of the way in which Billy comes to terms with disruption to 
subjectivity and meaning, and ultimately demonstrating how one’s entire field of prior 
experience comes to shape new experience. An understanding of Billy’s traumatic crisis 
will first require an understanding of his existing traumatic vulnerabilities, in particular 
with regards loss. 
Billy’s traumatic experiences include his father’s abandoning the family and 
burdening Billy with the responsibility of caring for his mother and siblings, his tour of 
duty as a field lieutenant in Vietnam, the loss of his wife, Lydia, to cancer, and ultimately 
the death of his two children. Each traumatic experience disrupts the semiotic current and 
divides subjectivity in a unique way. Those experiences represent an influx of 
heterogeneous experience that demands the revision of signified meaning (Idiolect), and 
that disrupts the almost imperceptibly perception of a temporal continuity in meaning and 
identity that ordinarily preserved by the gradual alteration of meaning. Abrupt traumatic 
experiences in particular (perhaps traumatic because they are abrupt) bring about a 
rupture in the normally seamless temporal succession of modified articulations of 
Idiolect, leading to an Idiolectic apprehension of reality before and an Idiolectic 






Much like Fridolin’s conflict of competing Idiolects as a result of deferred 
experience, abrupt (i.e. “catastrophic”) trauma generates Idiolectic domains that compete 
with one another (with one relegated, in alternation, to a Narrative domain) such that the 
modified Idiolectic domain cannot be reconciled as a natural outgrowth of the originating 
Idiolect. The changes are too dramatic. Billy’s response to traumatic experience is shaped 
by the fact that he has suffered a series of abrupt traumata in his life, and his reaction to 
each is affected by the traumatic experience that these. It will be useful then, to look at 
each of the preceding three traumatic experiences (the loss of his father, experience of 
combat in Vietnam, and the death of his wife) very briefly in order to clarify their role in 
his experience after the bus accident. 
The first traumatic experience that Billy describes is the departure of his father 
when he was still a boy. That act of abandonment resulted in a split in Billy’s subjectivity 
that is focused on excluding those character traits he associates with his father, and on 
emphasizing those traits he views as being diametrically opposed. Billy blames his 
father’s leaving on his father’s impractical streak, his seductive and romantic character, 
and his lack of substance: 
He was an impractical man, not quite honest, a fellow of grand 
beginnings and no follow-through, one of those men who present 
their children and wives with dreams instead of skills, charm in 







While an impractical and romantic nature is not in and of itself objectionable, those 
qualities were unbalanced in his father by the lack of more steadfast and practical 
qualities, and they therefore led to Billy’s first traumatic loss. Rejecting those qualities in 
himself, Billy attempts to purge his father from his own identity. The identity that he 
“chooses” instead effectively negates those qualities he abhors: 
I am known as a self-contained man and am probably not very 
approachable, which has always been my choice of character 
anyhow, insofar as a person can choose his character. (63) 
Naturally what Billy “banishes” from his public persona (manifested identity) is not 
eliminated from the semiotic current and from subjectivity. We will see those 
characteristics, and even a qualified acceptance of them emerge later in his relationship 
with Risa Walker, effectively merging competing identities in an uneasy, “separate but 
equal” kind of alliance. 
Billy’s choice to make a self-contained nature and emotional reserve the basis for 
his own public persona (i.e. his identity in the Communicative domain) serve a dual 
purpose. On the one hand, they serve to make Billy feels that he is a more “competent” 
man than his father, thereby allowing him to avoid the kind of disaster that resulted from 
his father’s romantic but inconsistent nature: 
I like to be the strong, silent man in charge, the boss, the point 
man, the lieutenant, the head of the household, et cetera, a 
preference that may come from my having been the oldest of five 






took off for Alaska when I was twelve and was never heard from 
again. (63) 
Cultivating a sense of stability and of difference from the parents who let him down 
creates a defense against Billy’s anxiety that he might prove to be as feckless as his 
father, particularly with regards his own two children. At the same time, the stoic, 
capable, even courageous identity he claims as his own by banishing subjectivity that 
contravenes that identity, also serves a compensatory function.  It not only gives him the 
sense that he can avoid trauma, but it also renders him somewhat impervious to the 
injuries inflicted by the traumatic experience – at least on the surface and in what he 
shows to others. Compensatory mechanisms such as repression and denial, in particular, 
can be passed off as innate character traits of stoicism and pragmatism. 
The second significant trauma oft which Billy speaks is his tour of duty in 
Vietnam, during which he received a field promotion to Lieutenant that placed him in 
charge of a combat platoon. That field promotion mimics, in some senses, the 
abandonment by his father, since Billy obtains that commission and the responsibility for 
his platoon through the death (sudden loss) of his own immediate commander. The 
experience of combat, coupled with his role as ranking officer of his platoon, 
strengthened Billy’s investment in his identity as a self-contained man of action. Indeed, 
Billy continued to take refuge in that role when he returned to Sam Dent after the war, 
where he opened his own garage and, for many years, refused to hire anyone but Vietnam 






Billy Ansel, though, was always a man with a mission. Nothing 
discouraged him or made him bitter. When he came back to Sam 
Dent, right away he joined the VFW post in Placid, and soon he 
became an officer and went to work making the boys who had 
served in Vietnam respectable there, at a time when, most places, 
people still thought of the as drug addicts and murderers. He got 
them out marching proudly with the other vets every Fourth of July 
and Veterans Day. In fact, until recently, to work for him at the 
garage you yourself had to be a Vietnam vet. He hired young men 
from all over the region, surly boys with long hair and hurt looks 
on their faces. At different times he even had a couple of black 
men working for him – very unusual in Sam Dent. His men were 
loyal to him and treated him like he was their lieutenant and they 
were still back in Vietnam. (28) 
By creating a work environment that replicates his relationship with his subordinates in 
Vietnam, Billy is able to continue in the role of lieutenant and leader, dealing with the 
trauma suffered by those in his charge, while at the same time using that role as a 
compensatory mechanism to avoid dealing with his own trauma. This represents a 
lifelong tendency that started when he was forced to become the “man of the house” 
when his father left, and that continues on even through the death of his children in the 






It’s something I have done since childhood, practically. When a 
person tries to comfort me, I respond by reassuring him or her – 
it’s usually a her – and in that way I shut her down, smothering all 
her good intentions by denying my need. 
 I can’t help it, and I’m not sorry for it; I’m even a little proud. 
People think that I’m cold and unfeeling, but that’s a price I’ve 
always been willing to pay. […] To forestall or cover my anger, I 
jump in front of them, and suddenly I myself have turned into the 
person come to provide comfort, reassurance, help, whatever it is 
they originally desired to provide me with. I take their occasion 
and make it my own. (75-76) 
In psychological terms, Billy’s primary method of dealing with traumatic crisis is 
called compartmentalization, a means of separating and quarantining conflicting or 
objectionable subjectivity and awareness as Billy did when he banished those character 
traits he saw in his father from his own identity. In many respects, the very nature of 
Billy’s various traumatic experiences itself promotes compartmentalization as a 
compensatory response since those experiences are abrupt and demand a sudden and 
radical reanalysis of Idiolect (symbolized meaning and manifested identity). The abrupt 
demand for a substantially modification of Idiolect leaves a rift in symbolized meaning 
and identity, leaving (at least for some time) an invalidated reality that is invested with a 
great deal of experience, and a nascent reality that is demanded by a single, novel 






another for dominance as competing Idiolects, with first one, then the other, relegated to 
the status of a Narrative domain in alternation. This naturally leads to the isolation of 
experience and identity that precedes an abrupt traumatic experience from experience and 
identity that follows such an experience – at least until a means can be found to mediate 
between the two Idiolectic domains and merge their contents in a satisfactory manner. 
Having been faced with a number of such traumatic experiences, Billy has 
developed an ongoing strategy of compartmentalization. That strategy is facilitated by a 
tendency to take refuge in action, thereby deferring the need to reflect and confront 
subjectivity and meaning that are conflicted. The role that Billy takes as the continued 
leader of the returning Vietnam veterans compartmentalizes his experiences in Vietnam, 
allowing him to preserve them within the context of his work environment as coexisting 
side-by-side, but not mingled with his life apart from the war (both before and after). 
Ultimately, Billy manages to contain the profound death-experience of Vietnam by 
creating a superstitious belief that bans death to that discrete period of time, thereby 
purging it from his ordinary life. In so doing, he is able to believe that, because death had 
occurred so abundantly in Vietnam, it is somehow spent and can no longer recur. This 
strategy creates separate realities that fall under their own set of rules, and yet that belong 
to a greater, overwhelming logic and causality. “Because trauma occurred, it cannot 
reoccur. That experience is separate.” The strategy also leaves him vulnerable, however, 
when he is at last confronted again with the possibility of death and loss. 
The possibility of unforeseen death outside of Vietnam rears its head on a trip that 






spend all of their time stoned on marijuana, and as a result of their impaired thinking and 
perceptions, they accidentally drive off, leaving four-year-old Jessica in a grocery store 
surrounded by strangers. The initial realization that his daughter is missing from the car 
forcibly confronts Billy not only with the possibility that his children could die, but also 
with the possibility that he himself could be at fault for their death as a result of his 
irresponsible behavior. The barriers that Billy has created to compartmentalize conflicted 
experience are forcibly breeched – both in terms of the quarantine placed around these 
aspects of subjective identity associated with his future, and in terms of the quarantine 
placed around sudden death-experience. Billy is faced with the influx of conflicted, 
undesirable and traumatic awareness that he has been able to hold at bay through a kind 
of denial. His ability to function with the assumption of relative safety is superceded by a 
renewed awareness of the real ongoing potential of sudden loss. The field of meaning that 
has formed around traumatic experience has come to dominate as Idiolect. As Billy 
describes it: 
[…] all I had to go by was what had happened to me in Vietnam 
when I was a nineteen-year-old kid, and by some necessary logic, I 
believed that because terrible things had happened to me then and 
there, that it was impossible for them to happen here and now. I 
did not want to give up that logic; it was like my childhood: if I 
admitted that my daughter had been kidnapped or had fallen from 
the car or had simply been lost in a foreign country, then the whole 






Although this episode in Jamaica represents a near tragedy rather than an actual 
tragedy, it is profoundly significant in terms of Billy’s experience of his own true 
character as opposed to his self-characterization. While Billy takes refuge in the notion 
that he is not an irresponsible man like his father, (making him a better father than his 
own father had been), the episode in Jamaica demonstrates that he does indeed possess 
the same character traits he despises in his father. Both his response to the near loss of his 
daughter, and his description of the event in his “testimony” years later illustrate his 
effort to sanitize and hold at bay traumatic experience and to deny his own involvement 
and responsibility. Even his perception of the purpose for the trip is skewed. Billy claims 
that he was providing his wife, Lydia and his two young children a wonderful family 
vacation, however in truth, they have gone there for the availability of ganja – a powerful 
type of marijuana, which Billy confesses is the couple’s “recreational drug of choice” 
(45). The children’s feelings and needs literally take an unattended back seat to what 
Billy and Lydia desire, as the couple stay stoned day and night. The children, Billy 
recalls, were bored, lonely, and anxious; something he attributes to a “developmental 
phase,” or a supernatural awareness of future tragedy: 
They were lonely in Jamaica, and being the only white children in 
the village, or so it must have seemed to them, they were a little 
tense and frightened. All their routines were broken, and they were 
not used to being without TV, and they were not accustomed to 
receiving so much daytime attention from us. The twins were at a 






before I or she herself did, that their mother was sick. Also, they 
weren’t able, as Lydia and I were, to get stoned every day and 
night. (48) 
It is only in retrospect that Billy realizes how unhappy his children had been on 
that trip, and even in looking back, he does not appear to recognize his own culpability in 
that unhappiness or the great risk in which he placed his family. Rather than expressing 
regret that he endangered his children or made them so miserable, he remarks that he 
feels sorry for them – as though he were a detached observer and not the author of the 
situation: 
Looking back, I feel very sorry for them. Then, I thought that we 
were all having the time of our lives, which made it easier for me 
to accept the high level of anxiety that the time of our life extracted 
as payment. We were surrounded by black people, people who 
carried machetes and sold drugs openly and talked a foreign-
sounding English in loud voices, who pointed at us because of our 
skin color and made ugly noises with their lips at my wife or 
smiled and lied and tried to take our money. But here we are on 
vacation in Jamaica, I thought. Isn’t that just the greatest thing an 
American dad can do for his family? I think I’ll celebrate and 
reward myself by getting blasted on this terrific ganja that I bought 







Billy’s detachment from his responsibility towards his four-year-old children is 
remarkable even in the retelling years later, after the death of the twins in the school bus 
accident. As Billy describes the twin’s experiences at Westgate, the very grocery store at 
which he and Lydia will accidentally leave Jessica, we see both the threat to the 
children’s well being and safety, as well as the bizarre detachment with which Billy 
regards the situation: 
The last time we had come here [Westgate], Jessica and Mason had 
been hassled in the parking lot by a bunch of local kids attracted to 
them by their whiteness and the fact that they were twins, which 
seemed to have an unusual fascination for people down there, even 
though they were not identical twins. It was harmless enough, but 
because there hadn’t been any adults to control the Jamaican kids, 
the episode had scared Jessica and Mason. They were only four 
years old and did not have much interest in other cultures. (47-48) 
Here, Billy’s compartmentalization emerges on multiple levels, including in his attempt 
to rationalize the mobbing of Jessica and Mason by the Jamaican children because they 
are fraternal twins (although it is impossible to say how the local children guessed that 
they were twins), and the obtuse observation that, as four-year-olds, Jessica and Mason 
lacked the requisite curiosity about “other cultures” to appreciate the situation. Most 
remarkable, however, is Billy’s remote observation that the episode had been frightening 
to the twins because “there hadn’t been any adults to control the Jamaican kids,” as 






Having left the grocery, it is only after they are well underway that Billy first 
notices that Jessica is not with them. His delayed realization is mimicked by the manner 
in which he shapes the narrative, first observing that the twins are not sleeping as he 
expected, then obtusely noting what Mason was doing before concluding that Jessica was 
missing: 
Halfway up the first long hill, I turned back to smile at the twins in 
back. They had been silent since Westgate, and I expected them to 
be asleep, curled up in each other’s arms like litter mates, like 
puppies or kittens, which was their inclination then, […]. But they 
were not sleeping. Mason stared absently out the window; he was 
alone in the back seat. Jessica was gone. (50) 
Again, Billy responds to this very real crisis by denying the reality if the situation, 
immediately compartmentalizing it. This strategy allows him to hold tragedy at bay, at 
least in his mind. Rather than stopping the car immediately and going back, and rather 
than saying anything to his wife about the absence of their daughter, Billy continues to 
drive: 
I said nothing, kept driving the overheated Escort up the curving 
narrow road, and with a sideways glance checked the rear doors, 
for perhaps one had opened and – too horrible to believe, maybe, 
but not too horrible to imagine, not for me – she had fallen from 






her twin brother, seated next to her. Both doors were shut tight. 
(50-51) 
The possibility is too horrible to believe as long as the Idiolectic domain remains 
compartmentalized, quarantined from experience that is incommensurate. Sudden 
traumatic loss is a part of experience held in a Narrative domain – the domain where 
imagination occurs – including the loss of his father and losses suffered in Vietnam. That 
manner of experience is not accommodated in Idiolect – Billy’s apprehension of 
“reality.” Consequently, he carries on driving until he arrives at home, wasting precious 
time during which he could return and get his daughter before something truly does 
happen to her. As he continues with his strategy of compartmentalization, refusing to 
articulate his loss in order to prevent it becoming real (i.e. manifested in Idiolect), he 
inexplicably places the burden of responsibility for Jessica’s absence on her four-year-old 
brother, Mason: 
It was almost evening, time to cook supper. Where was our 
daughter? How had she been taken from us? 
 I kept driving straight on towards what we called home and 
could not say aloud the words that were thrashing me, as if 
somehow remaining silent I could keep the terrible thing from 
having occurred. Finally, when we passed through the gate and 
drew up in front of the house, I said, without turning back to him, 






Billy’s behavior in response to this emergency situation and Billy’s expectations 
of Mason are bizarre and inappropriate. In the panic of his impending crisis however (a 
panic that is compounded by the drugs in his system), Billy perceives Mason’s matter-of-
fact explanation of what has occurred to be bizarre: 
Mason’s response was very strange – or at least that’s how I 
remember it. Of course, you have to keep in mind that Lydia and I 
were pretty much stoned all the time […]. Mason answered, “You 
left her in the store.” Straight out, as if he were slightly pleased by 
my having abandoned his twin sister and somewhat annoyed by his 
having to remind me. (52) 
There is no expression of relief that Jessica has not fallen out of the moving car and no 
rush to turn around and return for her, but instead, Billy continues to push responsibility 
for his own negligent error on his young son: 
I started to holler. “Jesus, Mason! I left her at the store? Why the 
hell didn’t you say something?” (52) 
In this exchange between Billy and his son, there is a reversal of their respective roles, as 
though Mason had been responsible for ensuring that he and his sister remained safe. 
Billy chastises Mason for the failure to act (i.e. to tell Billy that Jessica has been left 
behind), although in truth, it is his own failure to respond to Jessica’s absence, going so 
far as to drive all the way home before addressing her absence, that is both 






safety ad well-being onto Mason immediately casts him in the role of his father, who 
ceded his responsibility for his family to Billy. 
This episode, while not tragic in its ultimate outcome, gives us a sound 
understanding of Billy’s later rejection of the way in which many other residents of Sam 
Dent deal with the school bus accident; in particular, those who seek to blame someone 
for the accident. His later insistence that assigning culpability can provide only a false 
understanding of events reflects a legitimate comprehension of how complex the 
precipitating factors in such a tragedy can be, but it also demonstrates his own reflexive 
tendency to compartmentalize his own guilt and responsibility for unfortunate events. 
Billy’s insistence that the school bus accident was just that – an accident – reiterates his 
tendency to avoid culpability so plainly demonstrated in Jamaica five or more years 
before. He distinguishes, in this sense, between purposeful malefaction, and personal 
failure that comes about through a momentary lapse in attention and a concatenation of 
contributing factors: 
 “My God! How could we do that?” Lydia cried. “How could 
we have left her there?” 
[…] 
 “What the hell did I do? I didn’t do anything wrong, it was a 
goddamn accident,” I said. 
 “No one’s to blame, we’re both to blame, we’re all to blame, 
even she is, so let’s just get back there and pray she’s alright. That 






 “She’ll be fine,” I said. “No one’ll hurt her. These people, they 
love children.” I said it, but I didn’t believe it. How could my four-
year-old daughter be safe among people that I myself felt 
frightened of? (52-53) 
The degree to which Billy is willing to deny culpability or even causality rests on his 
investment in safeguarding current identity from “infiltration” by the “irresponsible” 
character traits associated with his father, as well as on his ability to banish 
incommensurate experience to a safely contained, separate symbolized domain. Thus 
compartmentalized, he need not seek an explanation for tragic loss (or near-loss) in 
causality. Indeed to do so would mean the integration of that experience within the terms 
and logical relations of Idiolect – something he will not, or cannot do. Billy’s concluding 
thought on culpability is perplexing. He does eventually recognize that he can blame no 
one for his daughter’s misery but himself (if not for leaving her behind, which Lydia 
ought to have noticed as well, then for continuing to drive all the way home when he 
realized that she was missing). At the same time, he all too readily accepts Lydia’s 
statement that it was not his fault, which represents more an effort to put an end to Billy’s 
protests and to spurn him into action than to exonerate him: 
The image of flaxen-haired Jessica searching the aisles of the store 
for us, wide-eyed, fighting tears, lower lip trembling as she starts 
to call for us, “Mommy? Daddy? Where are you?” – the thought 
made me tremble with rage, and because I could not blame my 






alone, and because, as Lydia had said, I could not blame myself 
alone, I blamed love. (53) 
From a psychological perspective, it is true that Billy is unable to blame himself, 
as this is prohibited by his inability to tolerate irresponsibility, recklessness or inaction in 
his own subjectivity – characteristics he ascribes to his father and that he has banned. An 
admission of culpability in leaving Jessica behind at Westgate would constitute an 
admission that, like his father, he is irresponsible enough to “leave his children behind,” 
and such an admission would annul the compartmentalization of that original trauma. It is 
even possible that an admission of culpability in his role as father could damage the 
compartmentalization of his traumatic experiences in Vietnam, where his men’s lives 
were dependant upon his capabilities as a leader and where an error or moment of 
inattention could cost them their lives. 
By shifting the blame away from himself and by instead blaming “love,” Billy 
ultimately declares the tragedy to be not the near-loss, or potential loss of his daughter, 
but the trauma and suffering that would follow such a loss. His own vulnerability, in 
other words, which arises from his love for his family, is to blame for the misery that he 
feels during the episode. This gives us a sense of Billy’s underlying, possibly defensive 
selfishness and focus on his own suffering rather than that of his family – a selfishness 
and self-interest that is made vivid in Billy’s absurd willingness to give up his daughter: 
There was a single strange thought leading me into the store: I will 
make this one last try to save her, and then I will give it up. I must 






need all my strength just to survive that fact, so I had decided 
ahead of time not to waste any of my strength trying to save what 
was already lost. (54) 
The near loss of his daughter represents another step in the progressive invasion of death 
into life that began in Vietnam, if not with the loss (although not death) of his own father. 
The quarantine he has placed around his experiences in the war (a kind of “lightning-
never-strikes-twice” mentality) is breeched, and as Billy describes it, Vietnam invades his 
ordinary life: 
This was the beginning of what I have come to think of as the 
permanent end of my childhood and adolescence. The 
Vietnamization of my domestic life. Which is why I am telling you 
this. What had been an exception was now possibly the rule. (53) 
The progressive advance of death on Billy’s consciousness is furthered by his 
next experience of traumatic loss only a year after the trip to Jamaica, when his wife, 
Lydia, dies of cancer. In the same way that Billy seemed prepared to prematurely accept 
the loss or death of his daughter, he seems prepared to prematurely accept the death of 
Lydia, purging their home of her presence even before she has died: 
I remember one night shortly after my wife, Lydia, went into the 
hospital to stay, I gathered up all of her clothing and spread it out 
across our bed – dresses, blouses and skirts. Jeans and shirts, 
nightgowns, her underwear, even – and folded everything neatly 






have a storage room in the back. I don’t know why I did that; she 
hadn’t died yet, although I knew of course that in a few weeks at 
most she would be dead from cancer. But I could not bear to look 
at her clothes hanging in our closet or see them whenever I opened 
a dresser drawer; I could not bear even to walk past the closet or 
dresser and know that her clothes were inside, hanging or neatly 
folded in darkness like some foolish hope for her eventual return. 
(42) 
Billy’s perspective of death clearly is that it is unstoppable – an inevitability. By packing 
Lydia’s clothes and belongings before she is even dead, however, Billy is doing more 
than merely ceding to what he perceives to be inevitable. In effect, he compartmentalizes 
symbolized meaning and identity (the structure of Idiolect) that he is about to loose, 
insulating it from symbolized meaning that will succeed it in the wake of the tragic event. 
By not attempting to “make sense” of an event, and instead, by embracing a new 
symbolized order even before it is demanded, Billy is able to avoid merging those two 
orders. This serves the dual purpose deferring the traumatic suffering that results from 
being caught between competing Idiolects and trying to reconcile their differences, while 
at the same time preserving the integrity of those competing Idiolectic domains. In the 
wake of the tragedy, he willingly takes up a kind of existential residence in the space 
between competing fields of meaning, focusing on action and avoiding reflection or 
discussion that might force him to integrate past with present meaning and identity. This 






succumbing to the disorganization of cognition and subjectivity that traumatic crisis 
(disruption of the semiotic current) generates: 
For a long time, though, that was my whole life. There was no way 
I could let myself think about anything that did not lie directly 
before me – the death of my wife, the physical and emotional 
needs of my children, and my business. It was as if during that 
period I were crossing a crevasse on a high wire, and if I once 
looked down at the ground or off to the side or even ahead of me 
or behind, I’d fall, and I’d take down with me anyone holding on 
to me, meaning my children. (59-60) 
By maintaining competing fields of meaning (and therefore, competing symbolized 
identities) without merging them, Billy is able to preserve what is lost, moving between 
incommensurate symbolized domains as though within a topography. Billy himself is 
aware of the dichotomy that this creates. He explicitly articulates the bifurcation of 
meaning and subjectivity when he describes Wendell Walker, the husband of Risa 
Walker, with whom he was having an affair at the time of the bus accident: 
Wendell is like the rest of us, a person whose life has two 
meanings, one before the accident and one after. I doubt, however, 
that he worries much about connecting the two meanings, as the 
rest of us do, but that’s Wendell Walker. (58) 
Billy becomes involved with Risa Walker after the death of Lydia, but before the 






Risa and Wendell’s Bide-a-While Motel. Even within the context of having “moved on 
which his life,” Billy continues to compartmentalize conflicted experience. He vacillates 
between competing realities, taking the opportunity to abide in his previous life and prior 
meaning when Risa is unable to get away to meet him. The room becomes a covalent 
space in which, as in a suspended reality, Billy may enjoy Risa’s company, or in which 
he may indulge in a quiet recollection of meaning and identity that had their validity in an 
earlier time. The room number itself, like the occurrence of the doubled letters, ‘ll’ in the 
names of each of the primary characters), serves as a graphemic expression of the duality 
experienced by Billy and all of the traumatized individuals.) 
Many nights Risa could not get away to room 11, and I sat there by 
myself in the wicker chair beside the bed for an hour or so, 
smoking cigarettes and thinking and remembering my life before 
Lydia dies […]. (40-41) 
Billy manages to unite divided subjectivity in an uneasy alliance within the 
context of his relationship with Risa Walker. Risa is the first woman in whom Billy 
develops an interest after the death of his wife, Lydia. Plagued by fears that showing an 
interest in a woman, even in fantasy, might constitute a kind of infidelity, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that the woman he chooses is married, and therefore ultimately unavailable. 
The relationship with Risa is self-limiting then, ensuring that she will remain no more 






she was alive).7 Simultaneously, that relationship is with a woman who is better suited as 
a wife than as a casual sexual dalliance. Billy’s choice to pursue a relationship with Risa 
is predicated on the kind of woman that she is. Far from a merely sexual attraction, Risa’s 
casual and down-to-earth nature and manner of dress appeals to Billy precisely because 
she is not a traditional “bombshell” about which men often fantasize (60). As Billy 
describes her: 
She is the kind of woman who makes a man think of his favorite 
sister, if he has one, or his best friend’s sister, if he doesn’t. Not a 
likely candidate for an erotic fantasy. (62) 
The relationship with Risa enables Billy to merge both rejected subjectivity and 
his chosen identity of the “silent hero.” (As will be the case with all of the novel’s 
primary characters, the etymology of Billy’s name echoes his role in the community. 
Billy Ansel’s name means ‘warrior’ and ‘anvil’ – a reflection of the silent, strong and 
unyielding hero identity he presents to the community.) The nature of the relationship 
itself safeguards his identity as Lydia’s husband by restricting the relationship to a few 
regular, clandestine meetings. At the same time, the fact that Risa is more like someone’s 
wife or sister than a woman with whom one might have a causal sexual encounter gives 
the affair some of the qualities of a more permanent type of relationship. The capacity of 
this relationship to integrate divided subjectivity is evident even in the earliest stages of 
                                                 
7 “Technically I was faithful to Lydia from beginning to end. There were a couple of occasions while we 
were married when, drunk or stoned or just inattentive, I slipped into what might be called compromising 
positions with a few local women, who shall remain nameless, but I got out before any damage was done 
and was even able to come home feeling virtuous. And there were a few sexual encounters with bar girls 
and prostitutes when I was in the service, Stateside and in Vietnam and once in Honolulu. Sowing wild 






the relationship. As he begins to flirt with Risa, he himself witnesses, with some 
discomfiture, the mingling of his “silent hero” identity with those traits he associates with 
his father that he so despises – traits that nevertheless include a seductive charm best 
suited for establishing the kind of relationship that he desires with Risa: 
Anyhow, when I began trying to seduce Risa Walker, I found 
myself behaving like my father, which embarrassed me and made 
me feel incompetent as well. I felt his phony smile on my face, 
heard his glib words coming from my mouth, and it made me 
cringe. (64) 
Initially Billy is unable to reconcile the emergence of these characteristics in his 
behavior with his primary identity. Horrified to hear his father’s voice coming from his 
own mouth, Billy is repeatedly compelled to break off his flirtation and return to his more 
taciturn, self-contained self. The result is an abrupt oscillation between divided and 
competing manifestations of subjectivity dissociated long ago at the trauma of being 
abandoned by his father: 
I’d smile and smile and yammer on, playing a part. Then suddenly 
I’d switch roles. I’d have somehow become a member of the 
audience, and I’d hear myself yammering on, and it would be my 
father, and I’d see myself wink and grin and see my father, so I’d 
break off in the middle and freeze Risa out completely, leaving her 






As it begins to develop, Billy’s clandestine relationship with Risa allows not only 
the dissociated identity of the suave (but perhaps insubstantial and irresponsible) charmer 
to emerge, but it also enables and supports his chosen identity as silent hero and man of 
action. That identity functions best, and indeed may only function at all, within the 
context of an interpersonal relationship – that is, within a relationship in which being 
self-contained does not constitute a total social withdraw, and in which silent courage 
serves a shared, social goal. Clearly a part of the appeal of the relationship comes from 
the fact that within that relationship, Billy can experience himself as embodying that 
desired identity: 
[…] that night it appeared to me that Risa alone made it possible 
for me to be, once again, not my father but myself, the strong, 
silent type of man I admired and had grown used to being, and I 
was deeply relieved and immensely grateful to her. (66) 
Ultimately the affair allows for a covalent bond between the two identities where 
those identities are neither merged, nor separable from one another, but exist 
simultaneously and each in its own right. At the same time, Billy can experience the 
relationship itself as a covalent bonding of technical fidelity to Lydia on the one hand, 
and the satisfaction of a clearly delimited relationship on the other. That covalent 
suspension between eigenstates is made possible by the privacy of their relationship, 
which establishes a very closed discursive community: 
Our love affair seemed to be permanently suspended halfway 






open-ended; it was like a movie with no beginning and no ending, 
and it remained that way because we did nothing to make our 
relationship public, to involve other people, a process that would 
have been started if Risa had ever confided to someone or if I had 
revealed it to someone. That would have objectified it somehow, 
taken it outside our heads, and no doubt would have led Risa to 
choose between me and Wendell, or would have led me to demand 
it. (66-67) 
It is the absence of an interjected, third discourse – the prescriptive mirroring of the 
Communicative domain made up of a larger discursive community – Billy and Risa are 
able to create precisely what they need out of the affair. By making their apprehension of 
that experience private and by not limiting one another’s perceptions of the affair, that 
affair can exist in that twilight state between reality and fantasy without being called to 
conformity by shared signification: 
Risa has always assured me that no one knew we were in love; she 
insisted that during the nearly three years we were involved she 
confided in no one. Consequently, she had her private version of 
the love affair, and I had mine, and there was no third version to 
correct them. (66) 
The relationship with Risa provides a temporary solution for divided subjectivity, 
however the death of Billy’s children in the bus accident disrupts the compensatory 






that tragedy. To begin with, the relationship with Risa is tied to the accident itself. Billy 
had been daydreaming on the morning of the accident – fantasizing about having sex with 
Risa when the bus went through the guardrail and onto the ice: 
Just to show you how far I was from predicting the accident or 
suspecting that it could occur – even though, except for Dolores 
Driscoll, who drove the bus, I was surely the person in town 
closest to the event, the only eyewitness, you might say – at the 
moment it occurred I was thinking about fucking Risa Walker. My 
truck was right behind the bus when it went over, and my body 
was driving my truck, and one hand was waving at Jessica and 
Mason, who were aboard the bus and waving back at me from the 
rear window – but my eyes were looking at Risa Walker’s breasts 
and belly and hips […]. (37) 
The moment of schism, in which the abrupt interjection of heterogeneous experience 
generated by the accident calls for a dramatic revision of Idiolect, occurs during the midst 
of this fantasy. This schism juxtaposes Billy’s lack of awareness of his immediate 
surroundings (the absence of an awareness that might possibly have allowed him to see 
the accident coming) with the inescapable detail of the accident itself: 
So I don’t know anything of what immediately preceded the 
accident, although once it happened, of course, I saw it all, every 







Billy denies feeling guilty about having been daydreaming about sex with Risa at 
the time of the accident, however it is not clear that this assertion is true. Certainly it 
prevents Billy from talking about a part of his traumatic experience, since that affair must 
remain clandestine. In this sense, the secretive nature of the affair prevents him from 
speaking about a critical aspect of his traumatic experience, and it is likely that he regrets 
at least the illicit nature of the affair in that context. The fact that Billy mentions guilt in 
relation to that fantasy several times throughout the narrative, as well as the unfortunate 
juxtaposition of that fantasy with the accident and the subsequent abrupt end of Billy’s 
interest in Risa after the disaster seems to attest that he does indeed feel some degree of 
guilt, even if he desires it: 
I feel guilty for it, of course – for conducting the affair, I mean, not 
for having a fantasy about sex with her at that awful moment in my 
life, in her life, in the life of everybody in this town, practically. 
(39) 
It is not without irony that it is precisely Risa’s assertion that she saw the accident 
coming that Billy claims “turned him off,” since his preoccupation with her and with 
their affair prevents him from “seeing it coming,” even though he was driving right 
behind the bus. In that sense, the accident echoes the earlier trauma of nearly loosing his 
daughter, since once again his focus was elsewhere, rather than on his children, even as 
he was actively waving to them. What is certain is that, as Billy leaves the scene of the 






Risa’s son, Sean, the fantasy about Risa forms the terminal end of one symbolized field 
of meaning and identity (his life before the accident), and the beginning of a new one: 
[…] finally I was alone, plodding along the side of the road, 
moving uphill, back the way barely two hours earlier the school 
bus had come and then right behind it I had come with my pickup, 
idly daydreaming of sleeping with Risa Walker. (72) 
Unlike Dolores Driscoll’s testimony, which places little focus on the accident 
itself, Billy Ansel’s testimony gives us a very detailed account, particularly of the 
immediate aftermath of the accident. Billy’s description demonstrates many of the classic 
responses to trauma, including an array of dissociative phenomena. His very ability to 
remain on the scene and to help in recovering the children’s bodies out of the freezing 
water depends upon Billy’s extraordinary degree of dissociation and capacity to 
compartmentalize. Billy takes refuge in his identity as emotionally remote, self-contained 
hero, which allows him to defer reflection: 
Later I learned that people thought I was being courageous. Not so. 
There were selfish reasons for my behavior. I shoved everyone 
away and kept more or less to myself, silent, stone-faced, although 
continuing nonetheless to help the other men, as we received one 
child after another from the divers and wrapped them in blankets 
and dispatched them in stretchers up the steep slope to the road and 
the waiting ambulances, as if by doing that I could somehow 






I knew would be the inescapable and endless reality of it. No one 
spoke. Somehow, at bottom, I did not want this awful work to end. 
That’s not courage. (70) 
Devoid of reflection, devoid of emotion, and ensconced in the safety of a silent identity 
that need neither reflect nor communicate, Billy perceives himself as wholly divorced 
from the scene in which he takes part. That identity in which he seeks refuge is itself be 
derived from a dissociative process that arises in response to prior trauma: 
 “[…] a few others, like Risa, just stood among friends and 
relatives and stared silently at the ground, their minds emptied of 
thought and feeling. 
 I guess I was one of these, although at first I had tried to keep 
on working down below alongside the other men, as if my own 
children had not been on the bus, as if this had happened to 
someone else and not me.” (70) 
Billy himself recognizes this reaction as a return to a dissociative, emotionless state he 
experienced in the midst of earlier traumata such as the death of his wife (cited above), 
and most particularly, his tour of duty in Vietnam: 
Jimbo Gagne called from the garage, and as usual, it was like we 
were both in Vietnam again – I was playing the lieutenant and he 
the corporal. We were all logistics. What did I want him to do with 
my truck? Leave it at the garage; I’d drive my car in tomorrow. 






garage, and keep people away from it, because there was sure to be 
an investigation. (77) 
The level of dissociation that Billy experiences is very profound, in particular in 
the first few hours after the accident. Although “every mind-numbing detail” (37) of the 
accident is burned in memory (e.g. held in the Epistemic domain as somatosensory 
experience), Billy is simultaneously unable to order those details and experiences 
logically using symbolized terms and relations – what Janet would call narrative 
memory. In this way, although he perceives that the wrecker has raced to the scene to 
drag the bus out of the water, he is unable to make the connection that he, himself, called 
for the wrecker (somatosensory experience is passed incorrectly to the Ethical domain as 
Other, rather than as Self). Only later, as experience begins to find accommodation in the 
symbolized terms of Idiolect or a Narrative domain does he make the connection: 
Jimbo and Bud from the garage […] had raced out at once with the 
wrecker when they heard in the CB that there had been an accident 
(a message that in fact I myself had called in, although I don’t 
know how I managed that; I don’t even remember it), […]. (70) 
With the abrupt interjection of heterogeneous experience – the death of his 
children in an accident that he himself witnessed – Billy finds himself lost in a gap that 
has opened up between a field of symbolized meaning that has been suddenly invalidated, 
and a new field that has yet to be fully constituted around that heterogeneous experience. 
That field will have to signify his children as no longer existent and his role as father no 






changes are so central to meaning and identity, however, that it will be inevitable that all 
instances of signification will be called into question as their position in a newly 
constituted Idiolect is established – in relation to these principal changes. In the 
immediate moment when this gap opens up between invalidated and nascent symbolized 
meaning, the crisis of lost meaning has not yet emerged. As long as Billy can take refuge 
in action, thereby deferring reflection and the inevitable comparison of those competing 
symbolized fields of meaning, he can defer his crisis. 
Traumatic crisis itself will only arise once reflection becomes possible, which is 
to say, as a new symbolized domain is negotiated and begins to take shape. As a new 
Idiolect emerges, it must restructure all of the various existent instances of symbolized 
meaning in relation to novel experience. At the same time, the abrupt demand for those 
changes disrupts the gradual temporal evolution of meaning that is needed to maintain the 
perception that symbolized meaning is an accurate reflection of a stable, external reality. 
This gradual emergence of a revised symbolized order through cognitive reflection 
accounts for the delay in the manifestation of traumatic symptoms that is often observed, 
in particular after “catastrophic events.” It is only when one begins to negotiate a 
symbolized apprehension of an experience (i.e. experience us passed to a symbolized 
domain) and the need to restructure Idiolect emerges that the full disruption of the 
semiotic current emerges. 
In the absence of an adequately constituted symbolized domain (a revised 
Idiolect), and experiencing disruption in those domains that precede the symbolized terms 






meaningful way. The terms of Idiolect as they have been defined before the accident are 
not adequate to formulate a narrative (i.e. narrative memory) of the actual loss of his 
children, although he had, by contrast, been able to consider and signify that loss as a 
hypothetical possibility: 
Before you loose your children, you can talk about it – as a 
possibility, I mean. You can imagine it, like I did that time in 
Jamaica, years ago, and then later you can remember the moment 
when you first imagined it, and you can describe that moment 
coherently to people and with ease. But when the thing that you 
only imagined actually happens, you quickly discover that you can 
barely speak of it. Your story is jumbled and mumbled, out of sync 
and unfocused. At least that’s how it has been for me. (78) 
Expressed as a hypothetical possibility, signification of that loss occurred in a Narrative 
domain that did not disrupt Idiolect – a Narrative domain being a domain in which 
hypothesis, fantasy, creative activity and dream are generated, held and structured. It is 
an altogether more difficult matter to enact the permanent modification of one’s baseline 
apprehension of reality in Idiolect. 
With the abrupt demand for a newly constituted apprehension of “reality” brought 
about by the accident, meaning and identity as Billy knows them continue to occupy 
Idiolect only for as long as Billy refuses to believe the reality of what has happened 
(dissociation as described above). When that denial becomes impossible, his previously 






trauma Idiolect remains vaguely formed around the experience or experiences that impel 
its formation and ascendance over prior experience, leaving the Narrative domain (prior 
Idiolect) invalidated, but nevertheless the more fulfilling and more fully formed domain. 
This invalidated field of meaning will remain the more compelling, fully formed 
apprehension of “reality,” interjecting itself into awareness until prior experience 
contained within it can be reanalyzed (through reflection) and arranged within a new 
apprehension of meaning and identity – one that now forms around heterogeneous 
experience (i.e. traumatic experience).8 The semiotic current must move between two 
articulations of identity until the reanalysis of prior symbolized terms and their 
subsequent accommodation in a newly constituted Idiolect can be achieved. The 
phenomenon of “double speak” and divided subjectivity observed in traumatic crisis (see 
section 1.3) therefore represents a natural part of the process by which novel experience 
is accommodated within symbolized meaning, not a pathology as previously assumed. 
The accident assails the existent structure of Idiolect at a very basic and essential 
level, violating core beliefs and expectations that have helped to structure both meaning 
                                                 
8 The theory that I am presenting here addresses the manner in which heterogeneous experience is 
integrated into the existent structures of the organizational domains, and the effect of such experience on 
the semiotic current (i.e., subjectivity). Although my focus is on “traumatic” experience, the same 
mechanism is at play when novel experiences are accommodated that are subjectively perceived to be 
positive in nature. A great deal of this study has examined the dissociative phenomena that underlie 
traumatic crisis, however here it becomes necessary to appeal to Freud’s notion of repression. Certain 
heterogeneous experiences such as sudden fame, moving to a new country, marriage, etc., may represent 
dramatically novel experience for the individual. These kinds of experiences, which may be judged 
subjectively to be positive experiences, nevertheless do disrupt the semiotic current in the manner described 
by this study, even producing a degree of dysphoria and the disruption of subjective identity and of the 
semiotic current. Being judged positive, however, will mean that such experiences may be more readily 
integrated into Idiolect, or that a new Idiolect can form more easily around such experiences. Experience 
that is judged to be traumatic, on the other hand, is likely to be evaluated as abhorrent in existent Idiolect, 
and a difficulty may arise for the individual attempting to restructure Idiolect around an experience that (in 
the existent symbolized field of meaning) is regarded as undesired, socially unacceptable, or even ethically 
abhorrent. Such a judgment will delay the restructuring of the organizational domains, and prolong the 






and identity. The accident, in other words, violates Billy’s fundamental expectations of 
the world including the presumption that, as the father of Jessica and Mason, he would 
never have to witness their deaths, but as their elder, would die first. This belief that, in 
the natural order of things, a parent should die before his children has lent Billy a degree 
of security, delimiting the degree of anxiety he felt about the potential for such loss: 
It’s almost beyond belief or comprehension that the children 
should die before the adults. It flies in the face of biology, it 
contradicts history, it denies cause and effect, it violates basic 
physics, even. It’s the final contrary. A town that loses its children 
loses its meaning. (78) 
The only biological exigency that supports the notion that a parent must die before his/her 
child is their relative age, assuming that both live a full, natural lifespan without suffering 
accident or disease beforehand. The death of a child before the parent does not actually 
fly in the face of history, which is replete with examples of the contrary, nor do “cause 
and effect” or basic physics play any role in controlling the order in which parent and 
child perish. Here, Billy appeals to natural laws in general as a way of experiencing the 
inviolability he had attributed to the belief that the parent should die before the child. 
That belief, however, is based on nothing more than the desire to see it so, and the desire 
to feel secure against such tragic loss. 
Billy’s prior trauma has not prepared him for this moment of loss. Although the 
abandonment by his father and, most particularly, his experience in combat in Vietnam 






symbolized such loss in a particular way. An acceptance that soldiers may die in combat 
does not extend to a firm conviction that one’s children may die. Billy’s expectations of 
the scene of the disaster are prefigured by the specifics of combat, and the scene of the 
bus accident violates expectations that Billy has derives from his previous exposure to 
sudden and meaningless death. This new experience of sudden death is, in the most literal 
sense, signified incorrectly: 
Of course, I thought of Vietnam, but nothing I had seen or felt in 
Vietnam had prepared me for this. There was no fire and smoke or 
explosive noise, no wild shouts and frightened screams; instead, 
there was silence, broken ice, snow, and men and women moving 
with abject slowness: there was death, and it was everywhere on 
the planet and it was natural and forever; not just dying, perversely 
here and merely now. (67) 
If symbolized meaning can be said to be shared even among the various parents in 
the town, each of whom ostensibly shares in this tragedy of loosing his or her children in 
the same bus accident, then what is shared is nothing more than the total breakdown of 
meaning. None of the townspeople are able to negotiate the abrupt invalidation of 
meaning. This is poignantly illustrated as outsiders (first reporters, and later, litigators) 
demand a discourse of them: 
There was even a TV camera crew from the NBC affiliate in 
Plattsburgh on the scene, headed by a blond woman in tights and 






microphone at people’s gray faces, asking them what they were 
feeling. As if they could say. (67) 
That scanty experience of mutual speechlessness is not enough to bind one tragedy victim 
to another. The traumatic experience evoked by the bus accident and the death of their 
children is unique to each individual involved, as we have seen illustrated in the highly 
individualized accounts first by Dolores Driscoll, and now of Billy Ansel. The 
differences among the individual testimonies shows the impossibility of defining trauma 
by the event and that it is the experience, not the event, that shapes that crisis. That 
experience itself will be shaped by prior experience and the formation of the 
organizational domains in response to that prior experience. Although the accident as a 
significant event ostensibly ‘shared’ by many individuals, the comprehensive revision of 
Idiolect in response to traumatic experience undermines the basis for shared 
communication, severing the linguistic bond that had existed prior to the accident. Billy 
finds it impossible to communicate even with Risa, with whom he had shared a prior, 
intimate connection, and who, like Billy himself, has lost her child in the accident: 
We tried for a few moments to talk the way we used to, the way 
people who live each other are supposed to talk – intimately, more 
or less honestly, about their feelings for one another and for other 
people as well. We tried to talk not as if nothing had happened, of 
course, but with the accident and the loss of the children as a 
context. It was useless. I couldn’t say anything true about how I 






Billy is consciously aware that the precipitating event – the school bus crash – has 
alienated the citizens of Sam Dent from one another. Absorbed by the traumatic 
experience around which a new symbolized domain will form, and essentially expelled 
from prior symbolized meaning, Billy finds even Risa strange and unrecognizable, frozen 
in that single traumatic experience held in the nascent Idiolect as though in a newsreel of 
the event. His familiarity with her, held in a symbolized domain that is now inadequate, is 
as invalid as any other expression of meaning in invalidated Idiolect: 
And when I saw Risa Walker standing among the others up there 
by the road, it was as if I were seeing her for the first time in my 
life – as if seeing her on newsreel footage, a woman from the 
village who had lost her son, a mother who had lost her only child. 
She was like a stranger to me then, a stranger whose life had just 
been made utterly meaningless. I know this because I felt the same 
way. Meaning had gone wholly and in one clot out of my life too, 
and as a result I’m sure I was like a stranger to her as well. Our 
individual pain was so great that we could not recognize any other. 
(68) 
Prior Idiolect is relegated to a Narrative domain, where it is no more or less valid 
than other Idiolectic domains invalidated by prior traumatic experience. This equilateral 
placement of various Narrative domains (including former articulations of Idiolect) 
creates a potential for slippage among them. As Billy walks away from the site of the 






accident – a domain in which a part of his subjective identity was his role as Risa’s 
clandestine lover. Instead, he returns to that symbolized domain that was displaced at the 
death of his wife, Lydia – a domain in which subjectivity included his role as the husband 
of the woman who would most closely share his experience of loss – the mother of his 
children. No fully formed, dominant Idiolect exists as yet that can constrain his return to 
that much earlier symbolized domain, and Billy goes back to that domain with the 
intention of integrating the accident into it: 
I don’t know where I was going, whom I was looking for. Yes, I 
do know. Lydia. I was looking for Lydia – to tell her that our 
children were dead, and that I had not been able to save them, and 
that finally we were all four of us together again. (69) 
That Idiolectic domain that was supplanted at Lydia’s death can no more 
accommodate the heterogeneous experience of the accident than can the Idiolect as it 
existed just prior to the accident. In the void that is created when current Idiolect is 
invalidated and no new Idiolect is as yet adequately formed to replace it, however, the 
only meaning available to Billy or any of the citizens of Sam Dent affected by the 
accident will be in an individually held Narrative domain, unshared among them. Each of 
the individuals affected, in essence, disappears into his or her own reality – whatever 
Narrative domain is available, whether it be the Idiolectic domain just invalidated and 







The snow continued to fall, and from the perspective of Risa and 
the others back at the accident site, I must have disappeared into it, 
just walked straight out of their reality into my own. In a few 
moments I was utterly alone in the cold snowy world, walking 
steadily away from everyone else, moving as fast as I could, 
towards my children and my wife. (72) 
Meaning is perceived to be lost or annulled when Idiolect cannot be modified to 
accommodate heterogeneous experience rapidly enough, or when such experience is so 
extrinsic to Idiolect that a wholly new and reconstituted field of symbolized meaning 
must be created. Idiolect supports the essential agenda of maintaining a perception that 
symbolized meaning correlates with an extrinsic, objective “reality.” It does so by 
preventing the unconstrained and abrupt modification of its terms and relations. This 
conservatism regarding modification of Idiolect derives from by the necessity that the 
individual’s apprehension of reality should remain, to a large degree, comprehensible to 
others in the domain of shared signification – the Communicative domain. An experience 
becomes traumatic when it demands a modification of Idiolect (and accordingly, of the 
other organizational domains) that is either so abrupt, or so essential to the core of those 
domains’ structure that it disrupts the perception of an adequate correlation between 
external “reality” and the individual’s apprehension of reality. Meaning, in other words, 
is not derived from the terms of symbolized meaning, but rather, from the deictic bond 






The loss of meaning that follows traumatic crisis does not occur because a term or 
terms are lacking in Idiolect, but because the deictic bond between signified and signifier 
is severed (as we saw in Traumnovelle). Traumatic experience is experience that 
generates an acute conscious awareness that the signifier is arbitrary, determined by prior 
experience and not by its reflection of a stable, external reality. Once the assumption has 
been destroyed that one’s apprehension of reality and a stable and external reality are 
equivalent, the stability of symbolized cognition is lost, and all meaning and identity are 
called into question. That disruption does not affect Idiolect alone, however, but carries 
back to the preceding domains, in particular the Ethical domain with its separation of Self 
from Other. The Communicative domain, too, will be implicated as the individual’s 
apprehension of meaning can no longer be adequately mirrored by shared signification. 
Eventually, shared signification itself may even be modified by the heterogeneous 
experience of the individual if that individual can be successfully assert that experience in 
the Communicative domain and if a social consensus can be reached in that collectively 
authored domain. 
In the case of the bus accident and the death of Billy’s children, instability in the 
Ethical domain – the distinction between Self and Other – is manifested as the invasion 
of death into life. Death being profoundly Other in human experience, as well as one of 
the most basic distinction that defines the boundaries of Self, ambiguity in the distinction 
between life and death demonstrates the enormous degree of change demanded of the 
semiotic current by the accident. Subjectivity that had been defined in its relationship 






Mason – can only be retained if the death of those individuals is denied (i.e. if they are 
signified as being alive), or if Self is defined as being dead (i.e., what was Other becomes 
Self, and what was Self becomes Other). Billy retains subjectivity that has been 
invalidated by the children’s deaths, holding it in a Narrative domain. He is subsequently 
able to dwell in that Narrative only by perceiving himself to occupy the same ontological 
category as his children – that is, by perceiving himself to be likewise dead, sharing the 
same existential condition as his children: 
For a long time that’s how it was for me; perhaps it still is. The 
only way I could go on living was to believe that I was not living. I 
can’t explain it; I can only tell you how it felt. (72) 
As Billy and the other townspeople each struggle to reconstitute an adequate 
apprehension of symbolized meaning – a new Idiolect formed around the changes 
brought about by the accident – they occupy that gap between symbolized fields, a 
“purgatory” (see also 2.1) in which it is easier to reside in the invalidated symbolized 
domain as Other (dead), than it is to inhabit the skeletal beginnings of nascent meaning as 
Self (alive): 
[…] for us there was life, true life, real life, no matter how bad it 
had seemed, before the accident, and nothing that came after the 
accident resembled it in any important way. So for us, it was as if 
we, too, had died when the bus went over the embankment, and 
now we were lodged temporarily in a kind of purgatory, waiting to 






It is simply easier to accommodate the semiotic current in such a way that somatosensory 
experience in the Epistemic is passed to the Ethical by reversing Self and Other. The 
semiotic current is then passed from that falsified apprehension of Self, to a Narrative 
domain that only a short time before had been an adequate apprehension of meaning and 
into which all prior experience has been ordered. In that domain, those who are dead still 
exist, together with subjective identity which, for logical purposes, is also defined as 
dead, i.e. as inhabiting the same ontological plain as loved ones who have perished. 
Newly forming Idiolect cannot accommodate that current until experience has been 
adequately symbolized by negotiating the relationship of all other instances of 
symbolized meaning to the accident and the “reality” that follows it. Until that occurs, 
nascent Idiolect, while apparently more valid, remains experientially less real: 
For a moment I stood at the side of the bus, looking up at the 
windows; and then I heard the children inside. Their voices were 
faint, but I could hear them clearly. They were alive and happy, 
going to school, and Dolores was moving through the gears, 
driving the bus up hill and down, cheerfully doing her duty; and I 
longed to join them, felt a deep aching desire to be with them, the 
first clear emotion I had felt since the accident; […] I wanted to be 
with them in death, with my own children, yes, but with all of 
them, for they seemed at that moment so much more believable 






A newly formed apprehension of “reality” – Idiolect – will assert its ascendancy 
primarily in the wake of undeniable fact (i.e. the subsequent absence of the children), but 
will also be supported and fostered by the Communicative domain. The accident as an 
element belonging to an objective, external “reality” will be established by the consensus 
of the larger discursive community. The first social entities to do so will include members 
of the press, and those not centrally affected by the precipitating event: 
[…] several troopers wearing fluorescent orange jackets stood out 
in the middle of the road directing traffic, hurrying onlookers – 
skiers mostly, up for the weekend, delighted by the new snow, 
slowed suddenly and properly sobered by the sight of our town’s 
disaster, memorizing as much of it as they could, so as to confirm 
it to their friends later, when it appeared in the newspapers and on 
television – past the scene and on to their weekend. (71) 
These individuals, who do not have to modify their apprehension of subjective identity to 
accommodate a personal tragic loss, will be the first to form a symbolized apprehension 
of the accident, thereby establishing its symbolized value in the larger Communicative 
domain that exists outside of the town itself. The town, in turn, as a discursive 
community unto itself, will form an apprehension of symbolized meaning in response to 
the tragedy that is distinct from that larger discourse, creating a collective response to 
their loss. That response will serve the needs of a community more closely affected by 
the tragedy. I will examine the various collective responses to trauma in the next chapter 






There are various means of coping with traumatic experience and managing the 
purgatorial gap that open up when the field of symbolized meaning is in transition. We 
saw Dolores Driscoll’s efforts to manage the succession of symbolized meaning in 
relation to the trauma of loosing her connection to her sons (in essence, “loosing” her 
children), as well as in the way she manages to hold on to dissociated subjectivity using 
projection (i.e. her use of Abbott’s incomprehensible speech to smuggle in her own 
“wise” voice). Projection is a means of integrating prior meaning into current Idiolect by 
expressing conflicted aspects of subjectivity as belonging to an entity that is ontologically 
distinct from oneself. Billy, on the other hand, tends to compartmentalize conflicted 
meaning, rejecting the integration of prior meaning into current Idiolect for extended 
periods of time and moving among conflicted symbolized domains as within a 
topography. Billy deals with the loss of meaning in the wake of the accident by holding 
onto competing symbolized domains in their entirety, and within them, invalidated 
(foreclosed) identities that articulate valid subjectivity. He neither merges nor separates 
those symbolized domains, unable to let go of what the accident has annulled: 
Nights now I can sit in my living room alone, looking at the glass 
of the picture window, with the reflection of my body and the 
drink in my hand and the chair and lamp beside me glaring flat and 
white back at me, and I am in no way as real in that room as I am 
in my memories of my wife and children. Sometimes it’s not as if 
they have died so much as that I myself have died and have 






is a way of keeping my family alive, but it’s not: it’s a way of 
keeping myself alive. Just as you might think my drinking is a way 
to numb the pain; it’s not; it’s a way to feel the pain. (43) 
His use of alcohol now and his use of marijuana both during and after Vietnam (until that 
use nearly causes the loss of his daughter), enables him to occupy the middle space 
between invalidated and newly formed meaning and identity. That manipulation of 
consciousness allows invalidated meaning to be raised to a level of a concurrent reality 
that can compete with Idiolect: 
With marijuana, your inner life and outer life merge and comfort 
each other. With alcohol, too, they merge, but they tend to beat up 
on you instead, and I didn’t particularly like getting beat up on. 
(46) 
Billy’s need to preserve competing symbolized domains as neither merged with 
nor separated from one another brings him into conflict with other members of his 
discursive community, effectively isolating him. He actively rejects the means by which 
others attempt to integrate prior meaning with meaning after the accident. One of those 
methods – what Billy terms the “Christian view” – endeavors to unify life and death with 
one another by nullifying the validity of death, placing life and death within a single 
continuum in which life leads, not to death, but to life everlasting. Those townspeople 
who embrace this Christian solution recover the most quickly from their traumatic crisis, 






however. Having been abandoned by his father, Billy perceives his ability to trust in an 
all-powerful and protective father to have been fundamentally damaged: 
 We didn’t have available to us the various means that many of 
our neighbors and relatives had for easing the blow. At least I 
didn’t. The Christians’ talk about God’s will and all – that only 
made me angry, although I suppose I am glad that they were able 
to comfort themselves with such talk. […]It was enough to have 
listened to Reverend Dreiser at the twins’ funeral. He wanted us all 
to believe that God was like a father who had taken our children 
for himself. Some father. 
 The only father I had known was the one who had abandoned 
his children to others. (73) 
Billy’s later experiences in Vietnam, where death was all pervasive, random and 
seemingly inescapable, do not allow him to deny what he sees as being the reality of 
death in the face of Christian denial: 
But when I was nineteen and went to Vietnam, I was still young 
enough to learn something new, and the new thing was all this 
dying that I saw going on around me. Consequently, when I came 
home from Vietnam, I couldn’t take the Christian line seriously 
enough even to bother arguing with it. (79) 
Ultimately, the death of his children places him in diametric opposition to the “Christian 






death (his father, Vietnam, his wife, and finally his children) lead him to believe only in 
an endless continuum of death: 
[After Lydia’s death] I still believed in life, however – that it goes 
on, in spite of death. I had my children, after all, and Risa. But four 
years later, when my son and daughter and so many other children 
of this town were killed in the accident, I could no longer believe 
even in life. Which meant that I had come to be the reverse, the 
opposite, of a Christian. For me, the only reality was death. (80) 
Even more abhorrent in Billy’s eyes than the “Christian view” of the accident is 
the attempt to juristically establish blame as a means of dealing with trauma. If religion 
represents, for him, a desperate attempt to give meaning to the meaningless, the juristic 
approach represents the “sly” approach – a disingenuous effort to restore causality, and 
with it, predictability and the capacity to limit or at least predict tragedy: 
Desperately, we struggled to arrange the event in our minds so that 
it made sense. Each of us in his own way went to the bottom and 
top of his understanding in search of a believable explanation, 
trying to escape this huge black nothingness that threatened to 
swallow our world whole. I guess the Christians in town, and there 
are a lot of them, got there first, […] To me, the religious 
explanation was just another sly denial of the facts. Not as sly, 






that someone – Dolores, the town, the state, someone – had caused 
it; but a denial nonetheless. (79) 
By establishing blame, the perpetrator can be expelled from the community, thereby 
creating a perception that such tragedy can be prevented from reoccurring in the future. A 
cause for the tragedy can be established (whether that cause be inattentiveness, reckless 
driving habits, or even a pernicious disregard for safety in the face of greater profits). 
This juristic approach – which need not take the form of legal prosecution, but instead 
may simply be formulated as an ethical judgment – serves the common interest as much, 
if not more, than the interests of the individual by enlisting the traumatic experience of 
the individual or individuals to strengthen the boundaries of social identity. 
In a social discourse on trauma, the perpetrator(s), as the assumed cause of the 
traumatic experience, can be expelled using some form of social sanctioning. In this way, 
the Self of the community (i.e. social identity) can be “protected from the cause of 
heterogeneous experience. That expulsion may entail incarceration or pecuniary 
sanctions, and/or it may take the form of social exclusion such as that which Dolores 
suffers. Such sanctions define the perpetrator or cause of the tragedy to be “bad,” “evil,” 
“not human like us,” or in some other way Other – outside the defined boundaries of that 
which conforms with social identity. This expulsion according to ethical criteria serves 
the greater social objective of ensuring the cohesion of shared social identity, which by 
its very nature is a reductive identity. Social identity is a collective identity that is 
delimited by what is perceived to be most strongly shared by the participants of the 






therefore, is to promote that which strengthens the social bond, and prohibit that which 
weakens it, whereby the very act of prohibiting that which is heterogeneous strengthens 
shared, social identity. 
The integrity of social identity is not only threatened by the actions of the 
perpetrator (such as one exists). It is threatened by the individual nature of experience 
and the unique contribution of each of that community’s participants, which introduces 
heterogeneous discourse into that Communicative domain, and which therefore acts 
centrifugally on social identity, driving that identity apart. Heterogeneous discourse is 
countered in the discursive community by discourse that emphasizes centripetal 
contributions, which help to strengthen that identity. Such centripetal discourse includes 
an ethical treatment of trauma, which emphasizes causality, and which optimally 
identifies a perpetrator or perpetrator class among society, thereby allowing the expulsion 
or sanction of that perpetrator. This treatment of trauma, (an ethical and even juristic 
treatment) proposes to eliminate the “cause” of heterogeneous discourse, making trauma 
something that did happen, but that should not happen, and that therefore that will not 
happen in the future. 
An ethical treatment of traumatic crisis aids in the maintenance of social identity, 
thereby managing and reducing social trauma. (This social benefit to addressing the 
ethical aspects of traumatic experience accounts for the widespread focus in both in the 
treatment, and in the theoretical understanding of trauma. These approaches tend to 
emphasize the traumatic crisis that affects not only the victim, but the researcher and 






epistemological approach – is not without benefit to the individual, since every individual 
is a social being as well as an experiencing being. In particular, that approach facilitates 
the reconstitution of an adequate Idiolect, which is governed by predicate logic, and 
which therefore looks for causality as a means of ordering its contents. In order to appeal 
to causality and an ethical resolution to trauma, however, the individual must sacrifice his 
or her individual experience of the meaninglessness of the traumatic experience (i.e. the 
way in which that experience nullifies all meaning as the basis for trauma). This 
simplifying, juristic solution is an anathema to Billy Ansel, whose own natural tendency 
is to compartmentalize conflicted meaning, thereby preserving it intact. Billy’s strategy 
of compartmentalization represents an individual, epistemic approach to trauma aimed 
more at accommodating all somatosensory experience, however contradictory, than in 
reinforcing the social bond. (I will examine the ethical approach to trauma in greater 
detail in the next chapter.) 
Billy is as yet unaware of how he should resolve his traumatic crisis however he rejects 
the notion that what is needed is a legal judgment, a negligence suit, or representation by 
a lawyer. In addition, he also rejects those who claim prescience of the accident. Claims 
of prescience represent an attempt to pre-signify the accident by revising prior Idiolect, 
identifying the presence of heterogeneous experience (the accident) in the prior, now 
invalidated symbolized domain as having been present, if unrecognized. This attempt to 
claim, in retrospect, that one had known a tragedy was about to occur or that one had 






into the existent symbolized domain, not by affixing blame necessarily, but by denying 
that it violated expectation. As Billy observes: 
It’s a way of living with a tragedy, I guess, to claim after it happens that 
you saw it coming, as if somehow you had already made the necessary 
adjustments beforehand. I could understand that. But it irritated me to hear 
it, especially with so many journalists poking a microphone in people’s 
faces and with all the downstate lawyers crawling across looking for 
someone to blame, so I want to say right out front that I was the person 
closest to the accident and I never saw it coming. (38-39) 
This version of events does not satisfy Billy, whose traumatic experience is 
focused precisely on the unpredictability and the meaninglessness of the tragedy. It is 
here that we can see how Billy and Risa’s conception of reality are fundamentally 
different after the accident, and this is what ultimately droves them apart. Naturally 
unable to recognize the artifice in his own compensatory mechanisms, Billy is able to 
readily identifies Risa’s falsifying attempt to invest her prior, unrelated misery in the 
accident as though that misery were merely an extension of the tragedy. (This 
reinterpretation of already existent unhappiness may also represent an attempt to purge 
that unhappiness by attaching it to an event that is now complete): 
 That’s how Risa thinks, however, and she believes it, poor 
woman – she actually believes that she saw it all coming. Before 
the accident, for several years, mainly due to her collapsed 
marriage and numerous financial problems, she was merely a 






as prescience. Which is like writing history backwards, if you ask 
me, fixing the past to fit the present. Hindsight made over into 
foresight. 
 “Oh, I knew it, Billy,” she told me after the accident, when we 
finally could speak of it to each other. “I knew for the longest time, 
I knew something terrible was coming down. When I heard the 
sirens and the alarm from the firehouse, nobody had to tell me that 
something terrible had happened, that something unimaginable had 
been visited on me and Wendell, and on you, too, and on the entire 
town. I knew it instantly, because I had known for months that it 
was coming. That was why all those months, all the time we were 
meeting each other, in fact, I was so unhappy and turbulent in my 
emotions.” (56) 
Billy’s rejection not only of Risa’s claim of prescience, but also ultimately of Risa 
herself, serves a pragmatic function. It essentially allows him to continue to hold 
conflicted symbolized domains intact and compartmentalized just as he had done with 
conflicted meaning and identity in response to later traumata. Billy chooses a “solution” 
that asserts an individual, epistemic view that individual experience exceeds what can be 
expressed symbolically and shared in a single field of symbolized meaning. He rejects all 
ethical arguments that attempt to rehabilitate meaning and restore the social bond. 






himself socially, using alcohol to allow him to move between various symbolized 
domains – i.e. various, competing realities. 
Billy’s relationship with Risa comes to an end when he realizes that they no 
longer share a viable apprehension of meaning. That relationship had also served to 
create a space in which Billy could cautiously allow conflicted identity and meaning to 
unite, coexisting in an uneasy alliance (see above). With the renewed imperative to 
preserve prior symbolized meaning unmingled with new, heterogeneous experience, Billy 
retreats into a more compartmentalized existence, as he did after Vietnam and after the 
death of his wife. (We witnessed this retreat into compartmentalization in the vehement 
return of the “self-contained and courageous hero” at the scene of the accident and 
afterwards). Conflicted both by the proximity of the relationship to the actual moment of 
the accident (via his fantasy as he drove behind the bus), and with the 
compartmentalization of meaning and identity that is threatened by Risa’s claims of 
prescience and her engagement of a lawyer (an attempt at integration), Billy rejects Risa. 
In so doing, he effectively dissolves the discursive community established by that 
relationship: 
Risa actually said that to me [that she saw the accident coming]. 
And when it did, it turned me off, but there was a time when that 
particular cast to her mind, the superstitious part of it, you might 
say, made her appear wonderfully attractive to me. After the 
accident, however, it made her seem stupid and weak, and it 






He goes farther than simply breaking off that relationship, no longer interested in 
the integrative function it had served. He even denies the prior validity of that 
relationship in retrospect. In this way, he invalidates the relationship from the symbolized 
domain he seeks to preserve intact (Idiolect invalidated by the accident), and at the same 
time, purges the awareness that conflicted meaning and identity can be integrated, as they 
were in that relationship. 
But it was a lie, and I think we both knew it. I surely did. I still 
loved my wife, Lydia, and I don’t think Risa loved anyone except 
her son, Sean. (40) 
This rejection of prior meaning resembles, in some respects, Risa’s own attempts to 
compensate for the traumatic disruption of meaning by reinterpreting prior meaning, 
using “hindsight made into foresight” (56). Like Risa, Billy alters prior signification 
using hindsight, but he does so by claiming the opposite of prescience. Instead, he claims 
an inability to see the future, or even to accurately perceive the present: 
I have the benefit of hindsight now, of course, and at the time 
maybe I half believe the tender words I whispered in her ear after 
we had made love […]. (40) 
Ultimately, Billy simply cannot share a symbolized apprehension of meaning and identity 
with Risa Walker. Their individual tragedies, which we might expect to represent an 
overwhelmingly significant part of what they “share,” are instead shaped by their own 






“different people,” as Billy describes it, no longer members of a common discursive 
community: 
I closed the door on her and walked away. We spoke again, of 
course, on numerous occasions, but always with other people 
surrounding us; we managed not to meet again in a room alone, 
however, or to speak face-to-face, and so it was as if we never saw 
each other after that, never saw the people we had once been, Risa 
Walker and Billy Ansel. From then on, we were simply different 
people. Not new people, different. (88) 
Billy’s rejection of Risa, and his rejection of the various “explanations” for the 
accident (whether religious, juristic, or the belated invocation of “prescience”) constitutes 
a rejection of all efforts to integrate the prior symbolized field of meaning with the field 
evoked by heterogeneous experience. In so doing, he maintains competing fields of 
symbolized meaning (i.e. apprehensions of reality and identity) – an expression of trauma 
as an epistemic crisis. The individual experience of trauma is an epistemic crisis. For the 
individual, who builds his apprehension of reality (Idiolect) on unmediated 
somatosensory experience and the epistemic construction of Self in the Ethical domain, it 
is possible to reinterpret prior experience using a later formation of Idiolect, as we 
witness in those who later claim prescience. It is not possible, however, to modify the 
experience itself as it is held in an earlier temporal succession of Idiolect. This inability to 
modify experience inevitably leads to some degree of fragmentation of identity. Billy’s 






identity will persevere for an extended period of time, was made invalid by Lydia’s 
death. By preserving that prior articulation of Idiolect, he is able to re-experience that 
expression of reality and identity by returning to that intact, symbolized domain (through 
the use of alcohol, marijuana, or merely through morbid rumination) that he has resisted 
integrating into Idiolect formed after her death. Likewise, the death of Jessica and Mason 
invalidates his identity as a father and violates the expectation that, in the natural order of 
things, he should die before his children. 
Billy’s resistance to the various means of integrating competing identity and 
competing symbolized domains dooms Billy to continually relive the pain of traumatic 
rupture and the loss of meaning that arises when competing apprehensions of reality are 
juxtaposed. This point of troubled intersection between preclusive “realities” where the 
silence of lost meaning occurs (the silence of trauma) is the point at which traumatic 
suffering first arises. Billy acknowledges this when he recognizes that it is not his 
children’s lifeless bodies that cause grief, but the memory of them while alive: 
I had seen them myself, I looked straight down into their peaceful 
ice-blue faces, and then quickly drew the blankets over them again, 
turned and walked away alone, numb and solid as stone, and 
climbed slowly, on legs that weighed like lead, the steep side of the 
frozen embankment to the road. Photographs of them alive and 
smiling would have made me cry and fall down and beat the earth 







Traumatic experience leads to traumatic crisis only after reflection, when the individual 
attempts to pass that experience to Idiolect (narrative memory) and comes to realize that 
neither apprehension of symbolized meaning and identity can be fully an accurate 
reflection of external reality. This accounts for the delay in the emergence of traumatic 
symptoms. Billy’s recognition that competing realities are the origin of that suffering 
allows him to actually embrace that suffering, and he declares that he seeks it out. 
Alcohol, he explains, as a means of bringing together his inner life (invalidated meaning 
and identity) and outer life (meaning and identity after traumatic experience), provides 
him a way to remember, rather than a way to forget. As long as Billy feels the pain of that 
loss, prior symbolized meaning is preserved, and with it, his children and his active 
identity as their father. 
Billy’s compensatory strategy of maintaining previously invalidated fields of 
symbolized meaning is an expression of individual, epistemic trauma alone. He rejects all 
forms of ethical discourse in order to prevent the merging of competing Idiolects. An 
ethical approach to trauma attempts to establish causality, as well as transgression, while 
simultaneously seeking to exercise control over the transgressor and restore the integrity 
of symbolized meaning as shared signification. Such an approach leaves no room for the 
individual’s experience of competing meaning and identity, which rests on an experience 
of ambiguity in the terms of symbolized meaning together with a fluctuation of Self and 
Other. As such, the ethical approach fulfills the social agenda of limiting heterogeneous 






each individual can see themselves in part, and which preserves the community with a 
common linguistic bond. 
Ethics, by its very nature, creates a basis for social identity, for mutual interaction, 
and for establishing whether the individual legitimately belongs (or does not belong) to 
the discursive community. Ethics, in other words, forms the inside/outside distinction of 
Self and Other for collective social identity. By declaring that basis to originate from a 
“universal” epoché beyond human cognition or human experience (i.e. outside the current 
of semiotic activity), prescriptive ethics establishes a common ground that allows the 
individual to compromise by denying or suppressing heterogeneous experience, and 
permitting the social agenda (which perforce is the agenda of the individual as social 
being) to assert itself against the imperative to accommodate his or her own individual 
experience. 
The individual must fulfill two imperatives – the individual imperative to 
adequately accommodate all experience (an epistemic imperative driven by the 
unmediated nature of individual experience), and the social imperative to maintain the 
common social bond (an ethical imperative driven by the collective, and hence reductive, 
nature of shared signification and the need to maintain the linguistic bond of the 
communicative domain). These essentially competing traumatic processes (the first that 
strives to expand symbolized meaning and the second that strives to limit such 
expansion) work against one another as the individual is impelled to signify 
heterogeneous experience, but simultaneously impelled to preserve the common basis for 






words, opposes the ethical discourse, even as both discourses validly express traumatic 
crisis as it is articulated in distinct domains within the same current of semiotic activity. 
By working against one another, these two traumatic processes and their opposing 
demands play the greatest role in making trauma difficult to resolve, since we are both 
experiencing individual and social being. It makes the process of expressing trauma in 
language difficult, in other words, since the traumatized individual is impelled both to 
redefine what can be expressed, and to limit such redefinition. At the same time, that 
opposition serves the function of preserving language as both an expression of individual 
experience and the primary medium of social communication. The opposition of 
traumatic process – individual and social – does so by preventing an uncontrolled 
proliferation of discordant apprehensions of reality in the Idiolects of various individuals 
(a proliferation that would make social interaction impossible). Those opposing traumatic 
processes ensure that shared signification remains dynamic, potentially being altered by 
the individual if the “pressure of suffering” (Leidensdruck) created by heterogeneous 
experience is great enough to successfully challenge shared signification. 
Billy is primarily driven by the individual imperative, expressing his trauma as an 
epistemic crisis that divides meaning and identity. He does so, however, at the cost of his 
active participation in the discursive community, preferring to withdraw from social 
contact rather than having to formulate an integrated apprehension of reality and identity 
that can be shared. In the remaining testimonies – those of Mitchell Stephens, Nicole 
Burnell, and ultimately, the second testimony of Dolores Driscoll (indirectly the 






attempts to come to terms with traumatic crisis, and in particular, with the competing 






Chapter 5: Russell Banks’s The Sweet Hereafter: Individual 
Trauma and Collective Trauma 
 
 
I could nearly witness the lurching of his brain. He needed words. He’d 
forgotten they existed. He had to energize his atmospheres and let words form, 





In the preceding chapter, I began examining Russell Banks’s The Sweet 
Hereafter, a novel that depicts various reactions to a single “traumatic event.” There, I 
looked at the first two of five individual accounts of that event, a fatal school bus 
accident, in order to demonstrate that the event itself does not determine the individual’s 
traumatic crisis, but instead, serves as a precipitating factor for that crisis. The precise 
crisis suffered by each of the two individuals, Dolores Driscoll and Billy Ansel, is 
predicated on their underlying dispositions, their manner of involvement in the 
precipitating event, and their previous experiences, in particular, the kinds of traumatic 
experiences they have had. (Those previous traumatic experiences establish 
vulnerabilities in the structure of the organizational domains that shape the way in which 
the semiotic current is disrupted by renewed traumatic experience. In this way, although 
the school bus accident is at the heart of each individual narrative or “testimony,” the 
traumatic crisis suffered by each of the novel’s characters constitutes a traumatic 
experience that is unique to each.  That experience is heterogeneous to the structure of 
each individual’s organizational domains, and as it calls for a reanalysis of symbolized 
                                                 






meaning and identity, traumatic experience disrupts the semiotic current within the 
domains intrinsic to individual cognition – that is, the Epistemic, Ethical, Idiolectic and 
Narrative domains. 
The narratives or accounts of traumatic experience that I will examine in this 
chapter will provide a glimpse into two more individual reactions to the accident, 
specifically, that of the negligence lawyer, Mitchell Stephens, and an eighth grader who 
survived the crash, Nicole Burnell. Finally, I will return to Dolores Driscoll’s second 
narrative in which she presents the resolution she has achieved for her own traumatic 
crisis. Most significantly, however, Dolores Driscoll will offer a view of the overall 
strategy taken by the people of her town – the inhabitants of Sam Dent – to resolve the 
collective, social trauma brought about by the deaths of fourteen of the town’s children. 
In a narrative style that differs markedly from her first testimony, Dolores will present an 
analysis of the way in which the social fabric is mended and the discursive community 
restored through the subtle shift in various townspeople’s social roles, including 
Dolores’s own. 
While I will continue to address the individual trauma depicted in the remaining 
narratives (those of Mitchell Stephens, Nicole Burnell, and Dolores Driscoll), my 
analysis of those narratives will also focus on the negotiation of meaning in the last 
organizational domain – the Communicative domain. As the domain of social discourse, 
the Communicative domain that is unique both in that it arises through the collective 
agency of all participants in any given discursive community, and in that it is neither held 






arises through the interactions between individuals and, more specifically, their mirroring 
of one another – mirroring that serves to reflect the perceived adequacy or inadequacy of 
each individual’s apprehension of meaning and identity. In this chapter, I will examine 
the tension between individual trauma – a disruption of meaning and identity that occurs 
when subjectivity and experience cannot be passed along via the semiotic current – and 
collective trauma – a disruption that occurs when individuals attempt to pass 
heterogeneous experience to the Communicative domain, thereby disrupting shared social 
identity and the basis for mutual communication. 
Those two traumatic processes that fragment identity, the individual traumatic 
process that demands the expansion what can be expressed, the social traumatic process 
that demands the restriction of what can be expressed, are diametrically opposed to one 
another, each blocking the other’s attempts at resolution. At the same time, since each 
individual is both an experiencing being and a social being, she will have to find some 
way to mediate between both the individual traumatic process and the social traumatic 
process. Ultimately, the difficulty of negotiating and balancing the objectives of these 
two competing traumatic processes such that both are adequately satisfied that makes 
“traumatic crisis” so resistant to resolution. The term, “traumatic crisis” itself is actually a 
catch-all phrase designating these two unique crises. The stalemate between the desire to 
renegotiate meaning and the need to preserve shared meaning may carry on for an 
extended period of time, delaying the process of signification. As a result, sub-processes 
that make up the larger process of signification may be attenuated, giving rise to what are 






however, traumatic crisis provides the impetus that pushes the individual to challenge 
core aspects of shared signification, overcoming the inertia of the collectively defined 
Communicative domain. It is this crisis-driven capacity to challenge “meaning” in shared 
discourse that ensures that meaning will continue to evolve and that semiotic current (a 
current that itself is subjectivity) will endure. 
 
5.1 Expectation and the Formation of Meaning: Ethics and Experience 
The account given by Mitchell Stephens Esq. constitutes the only narrative in 
which the perspective is that of an outsider to the town of Sam Dent. Mitchell Stephens is 
a negligence lawyer – an “ambulance chaser” in common parlance – who comes from 
New York City having never visited as remote a location in upstate New York. Acting on 
leads that he finds in the news, Mitchell Stephens travels to the scene for accidents like 
the school bus crash in Sam Dent hoping to instigate a suit on behalf of the victims and 
their families with, as we will see, no real interest in actual culpability, and with no real 
concern for the victims. As such, Mitchell Stephens is not only an outsider to the tragedy 
in Sam Dent, he is a particularly callous outsider, jaded by repeated exposure to such 
disasters. His focus is exclusively on manipulating the law, the emotionally vulnerable 
victims, and the stricken communities in order to achieve his own self-serving ends, 
which are both pecuniary and personal. 
Mitchell Stephens’s interest in the school bus accident is not philanthropic and 
yet, his relationship to that and similar events is indeed determined by his own prior 






Mitchell too has lost his child, a daughter named Zoe, who has become firmly entrenched 
in a self-destructive lifestyle of drugs, prostitution, and petty crime. Like those previous 
testimonies as well, Mitchell’s testimony focuses to a large extent in an underlying 
traumatic fissure that drives his behavior; most particularly his behavior as a litigation 
lawyer who prosecutes negligence suits. Mitchell transfers the rage, helplessness and 
frustration he feels in his private life to this kind of litigation, specifically seeking out 
accidents that involve the deaths of children. In so doing, he is able to act out the 
“solution” he fruitlessly seeks for his conflicted relationship with his daughter, as well as 
for her deteriorating condition, by seeking “retribution” for the loss that he has suffered. 
His career, in other words, has taken a form that acts as a compensatory mechanism for 
his own trauma: 
But anytime I hear about a case like that school bus disaster up 
there, I turn into a heat seeking missile, homing in on a target that I 
know in my bones is going to turn out to be some bungling corrupt 
state agency or some multinational corporation that’s cost-
accounted the difference between a ten-cent bolt and a million-
dollar out-of-court settlement and has decided to sacrifice a few 
lives for the difference. (91) 
Mitchell’s pursuit of such “negligence” litigation serves as a “socially acceptable” outlet 
for his rage –one that he hopes will alleviate the pressure created by his frustration over 






to prosecute these cases; unabashedly acknowledging the absence of any philanthropic 
impulse: 
 But the truth is, the good ones, we’d make the same moves for 
a single shekel as for a ten-million-dollar settlement. Because it’s 
anger that drives us and delivers us. It’s not any kind of love, either 
– love for the underdog or the victim, or whatever you want to call 
them. Some litigators like to claim that. The losers. 
 No, what it is, we’re permanently pissed off, the winners, and 
practicing law is a way to be socially useful at the same time, that’s 
all. It’s like a discipline; it organizes and controls us; probably 
keeps us from being homicidal. (90) 
In order to understand Mitchell Stephens’s involvement in the tragedy in Sam 
Dent, it is first necessary to understand the situation with his daughter. Unlike the 
tragedies over which he instigates litigation, the tragedy with which Mitchell must come 
to terms – the loss of his daughter – has not yet really occurred. Whatever he does on 
Zoe’s behalf in an effort to save her, those efforts come to naught, and Mitchell is left 
with an ever increasing sense of helplessness, his untried options dwindling: 
I’ve done everything the loving father of a whacked-out drug-
addicted child is supposed to do. I’ve even done a Rambo and 
kicked a few doors off their jambs and dragged Zoe out of filthy 
rat-infested apartments, garbage heaps with satanic altars lit by 






rehab hospitals, halfway houses and the Michigan farms of 
understanding relatives. Two weeks later, she’s back on the streets. 
New York, Pittsburg, Seattle, L.A. The next time I hear from her, 
it’s a phone call scamming for money, money supposedly for 
school or a new kind of therapist who specializes in macrobiotic 
drug treatment or, sobbing with shame and need, a plane ticket 
home (that’s usually the one that gets me). I send money, 
hundreds, thousands of dollars; and she’s gone again. A month or 
two later, she’s calling from Santa Fe – same scam, same format, 
[…]. By now, of course, I realize that if I don’t send money, she’ll 
raise it some other way, dealing drugs or pornography or even 
hooking. It’s like I’m in the position of having to buy her clean 
needles to protect her against AIDS. Forget protecting her against 
the drugs. Forget healing her mind. (100-101) 
Mitchell anticipates a tragic outcome to Zoe’s gradual but unstoppable decline however 
the onset of disaster is so protracted – extending over many years – that he cannot even 
begin the process of coming to terms with his trauma. If we were to compare his tragedy 
with that of the school bus crash, it is as though Mitchell were trapped in the moment 
when the bus went off of the road, but is still waiting endlessly for the crash that has yet 
to come. His efforts to accept the inevitable are repeatedly annulled and he goes through 







 “Daddy, it’s me!” she said. Her voice was full of the usual 
phony enthusiasm, but it was dead, dead as the kids in their 
caskets. 
 “Zoe! Jesus!” I’d been shaving, and I snapped off my electric 
razor and sat down on the bed. It was like getting a call from a 
ghost. Every time I think my period of mourning is over, she calls 
to remind me that I haven’t really started yet. (140) 
There is a tragic ambivalence and in Mitchell’s reaction to those calls, since he is 
at once relieved that she is still alive, and at the same time grieved both by the 
inevitability of her self-destruction and his inability to put his grief behind him. Thus, in 
an echo of Billy Ansel’s assertion that he “blamed love” for his family’s suffering (i.e. 
his own), Mitchell is himself trapped by his love of his daughter and his inability to let go 
of what he sees as his responsibility as Zoe’s father: 
I’ve told my story -- it’s a compulsion, I guess – to friends and 
strangers and even to shrinks, all of whom feel sorry for me, if you 
can believe that, which is a way of feeling sorry for themselves, 
I’ve learned; I’ve attended Al-Anon meetings and ToughLove 
workshops for parents and spouses of addicts, where they promote 
a kind of spiritual triage (“Mitch, chill out, man, you’ve got to 
learn to separate from your child,” they say, while you watch her 






In this sense, part of Mitchell Stephens’s attraction to those tragic accidents in which 
children perish may be derived from a desire to act out the revenge for the child’s loss, 
but equally reflects what must seem the almost enviable conclusion of the tragedies over 
which he instigates litigation. In those cases, the full horror of the outcome has been 
revealed and all that is left is the process of coming to terms with the event and healing 
from the traumatic experience. For Mitchell Stephens, a significant part of his traumatic 
experience is the expectation of an abrupt rupture in meaning and identity, in which his 
active role and responsibility as father will be annulled, while at the same time, the 
inability to begin adjusting to those changes until the actual event of Zoe’s death occurs. 
The Narrative domain in which that presumably inevitable event is pre-signified and held 
(as imagination) disrupts the asymmetry that preserves Idiolect’s dominance, that 
Mitchell is aware, in other words, that this Narrative domain holds his future reality and 
identity (future Idiolect). Mitchell’s deferred identity is not identity that is threatened 
with foreclosure, but instead it is identity that threatens to foreclose upon dominant, 
Idiolect-based identity. Knowing that this is the case does not prepare Mitchell for that 
moment of rupture, however. As Billy Ansel noted however, imagining your child’s 
death does not truly adequately prepare one for that child’s actual death. 
Mitchell’s relationship with Zoe is ambivalent for a number of reasons besides the 
incompletion of her tragic loss, and Mitchell’s apprehension of both his and Zoe’s 
identity is divided. On the one hand, Zoe remains, for him, the loving and trusting 
daughter she once was – an identity that emerges, albeit as a falsified persona, when Zoe 






perpetrator in his eyes, playing on his love of her to manipulate him, trapping him in the 
endless suffering of a tragedy that has announced its eminent coming, but that is 
endlessly deferred: 
Five years of doing this, and what happens? You get pissed off – 
believe me, enough rage and helplessness, your love turns to 
steamy piss. Of course, long before Zoe dropped out of boarding 
school and hit the streets, I was pissed off – it’s in my genes, 
practically – but she’s succeeded in providing me with a nice sharp 
focus on it, so that, except when I’m burning myself out on 
something like the Sam Dent school bus case, I’m dizzy and 
incoherent, boiling over, obsessed, useless – mad. I’d rather be a 
cinder than a madman. But there’s no way I’ll let myself become a 
victim. (101-102) 
In dealing with Zoe’s intermittent calls, her crises and demands, Mitchell is plunged into 
his own world of horror and impending disaster. Between those calls, however, he 
occupies a reality in which he acts as a litigation lawyer – a reality in which he is 
uniquely capable of disimpassioned rationality and, ironically, able to slip in and out of 
various kinds of character as he, like Zoe, manipulates both others and the truth to 
achieve his own objectives. The phone calls represent moments in which the existence of 
that deferred but immanent post-traumatic modification of identity and meaning is thrust 
upon Mitchell’s awareness, but from which he is able to recover, putting it out of his 






What do you do when this sort of thing happens? I’ll tell you what 
you do. You sit still and count slowly to ten, or a hundred, or a 
thousand, however long it takes for your heart to stop pounding, 
and then you resume doing whatever it was you were doing when 
the telephone first rang. (141) 
Mitchell Stephens’s subjectivity is divided in a way that replicates Zoe’s division 
– that is, he is both seductive and mercenary, placating his clients and, more significantly, 
Zoe, while he attempts to manipulate the situation to his own advantage. In he manages 
to seduce and hold both his clients and of his daughter, Zoe, with promises of money. In 
the case of his clients, he also seduces them with promises of that which he seeks for 
himself, revenge. The pecuniary rewards of pursuing such litigation, also works to 
Mitchell’s benefit in terms of his own, personal objectives. He would not have the 
opportunity to try and help her, or the time to work out a lasting solution to prevent her 
self-destruction if he did not provide her with money. While he regrets the uses to which 
she puts the money he sends her, the fact that he has what she desires and needs allows 
him to maintain a connection with her, guaranteeing that more calls (both reassuring and 
terrible) will come. 
Mitchell and his daughter are locked in a relationship of reciprocal seduction and 
manipulation – a relationship that has a certain “cut-throat,” exploitive quality to it. Zoe 
attempts to seduce her father into giving her the money she needs for drugs, and Mitchell 
attempts to seduce his daughter with money in order to control her and keep her 






was established early in Zoe’s life, and it is exemplified by a critical incident that 
occurred while Zoe was still a toddler. While vacationing in a cottage in the remote Outer 
Banks, Zoe was bitten by an insect and suffered an acute, life-threatening allergic 
reaction. Miles from the nearest medical facility and with the only local physician 
unavailable, Mitchell watched in horror as Zoe’s condition precipitously deteriorated: 
But when I saw her I was horrified – she was standing in the rented 
Portacrib; her red face sweating and swollen like a melon with a 
pathetic froglike smile sliced across it. I touched her bare shoulder 
gingerly: she was feverish, her skin as hot as I’d ever felt it. (121-
122) 
Calling the hospital in Elizabeth City, the physician on call was able to deduce the cause 
of the reaction and he provided Mitchell instructions on how to deal with the emergency 
as he and his family drove the forty miles inland to the hospital: 
Instantly, he surmised that there was a nest of baby black widow 
spiders in the crib mattress. “They have to be little babies, or else 
with her body weight she’d be dead,” he said. […] “There is a 
good chance you can get her to me before her throat closes, and 
then we can control the swelling with insulin,” he said. But keep 
her calm, he told me, don’t excite her. (122) 
There are two things that Mitchell must do to save Zoe’s life as his wife, Klara, 
drives the car. He must keep Zoe calm in order to prevent the poison from spreading, 






fine. The second thing that Mitchell must be prepared to do, is to perform an emergency 
tracheotomy on his daughter should the swelling progress to the point that her breathing 
becomes completely obstructed. The doctor prepares Mitchell to perform the procedure 
as best he can over the phone: 
“Use the small blade,” he said, and then he explained how to 
perform an emergency tracheotomy, told me how to cut into my 
daughter’s throat and windpipe without causing her to bleed to 
death. “There will be a whole lot of blood, you understand. A 
whole lot.” (123) 
The dichotomy in Mitchell’s role in this incident neatly sets up the dichotomous 
relationship that will bind Zoe and Mitchell later in life, although it almost certainly does 
not create it. Holding Zoe and singing to her about the “jolly sixpence” he has, he seduces 
the child into a calm and trusting state, while in his hand he conceals the knife with which 
he will perform the tracheotomy should it prove necessary: 
Throughout, I was neatly divided into two people – I was the 
sweetly easy daddy singing, “I’ve got sixpence, jolly, jolly 
sixpence, I’ve got sixpence to last me all my life,” and I was the 
icy surgeon, one hand in his pocket holding the knife, blade open 
and ready, the decision to cut unquestioned now, irreversible, 
while I waited merely for the second that Zoe’s breath stopped to 






The scene is chilling, and the experience was most certainly frightening – even 
traumatic – to Mitchell at the time it occurred; a time in his life before he knew how 
badly things would turn out for his little family, and in particular, for Zoe. In retrospect, 
however, with Zoe’s gradual downward spiral into total self-destruction, Mitchell looks 
back on that experience with a feeling of exhilaration and power that he associates with 
the legal cases he prosecutes like the one in Sam Dent. The experience, in other words, is 
one in which there is a clear-cut solution, and in which the bifurcation of subjective 
identity is not only rational, it is reasonable. This incident prefigures Mitchell’s later 
trauma, however it also precedes it. Unlike his present relationship with his daughter, in 
which he can seduce her with his “shiny sixpence” but in which there is no incisive action 
that can save her life, that earlier incident, together with his work as a lawyer, make him 
feel clear-headed, powerful, competent, and most importantly, in control of the ultimate 
outcome. He need only be prepared to act, and to go as far as necessary to ensure a 
positive outcome: 
I can’t tell you why I connect that terrifying drive to Elizabeth City 
over two decades ago to this case in Sam Dent now, where 
children actually died, fourteen of them, but there is a powerful 
equivalence. With my knife in my hand and my child lying in my 
lap, smiling up at me, trusting me utterly, with her face swelling 
like a painted balloon, progressively distorting her features into 
grotesque versions of themselves, I felt the same clearheaded 






was taking off. I felt no ambivalence, did no second-guessing, had 
no mistrusted motives – I knew what I did and what I would do 
next and why, and Lord, it felt wonderful! It always feels that way. 
Which is why I go on doing it. (124) 
Mitchell finds it appealing to be in a position of controlling others using subtle 
manipulation as he orchestrates the outcome of disaster, particularly in contrast to the 
helplessness he feels with Zoe now that she is an adult. His work as a negligence lawyer 
– work that has literally made him into a “cut-throat lawyer” – functions, in this sense, as 
a compensatory mechanism. It allows Mitchell to act decisively, competently, holding his 
clients under his control and playing one against the other as he scripts the outcome of 
their disaster. In contrast to the tragedy of a daughter who is gradually destroying herself, 
and who is therefore both perpetrator and victim, negligence litigation allows Mitchell to 
assign culpability, “punishing” the “wrongdoers,” and fabricating a fallacious belief that 
by doing so, they are preventing the recurrence of such tragedy. Mitchell places himself 
in the position of creating the social apprehension of the tragedies over which he sues – 
an act of nomothesis. At an even more subtle level, his role as lawyer allows Mitchell to 
feel he has averted disaster by his very decisiveness, frequently bringing his cases to a 
positive conclusion before they need go to trial (a long, drawn-out situation with an 
uncertain outcome much like that which he experiences in his relationship with Zoe 
now): 
In the case of the drive to Elizabeth City, as in so many of the suits 






as I was prepared to go. But this is only because I was indeed 
prepared to go all the way. I was at peace with myself and the 
world, and consequently Zoe, too, stayed calm and placid, her tiny 
heart beating slowly, normally, […]. (124) 
Zoe’s behavior replicates Mitchell’s behavior in a number of crucial ways that 
ultimately brings their basic characters into conflict with one another. It is as though in 
raising her, he had also trained Zoe to be his most skilled opponent – the one who might 
cause him to fail in his manufacture of the “truth.” Just as Mitchell is driven to pursue 
negligence litigation by his own rage and need – motivations that he conceals under a 
suave and pleasing manner – so too does Zoe attempt to disguise her rage and anger 
beneath a patina of daughterly affection, using the father – daughter relationship as a 
façade for her manipulation: 
“Oh, Dad, hi. Hey, listen, I’m sorry about this morning, I was 
really bumming, and this damned phone is all fucked up…,” blah 
blah blah, in a soft, accommodating voice that was all surface, a lid 
of sweetness and light over a cauldron of rage and need. (153) 
Mitchell is aware of this deception, but he is not immune to it. Like his potential clients 
and witnesses, who are seduced by Mitchell’s manipulation and the subtle alteration of 
his persona, Mitchell is fully cognoscente of his daughter’s duplicity, however a part of 
him yields to that manipulation when she says what he wishes to hear. She, like Mitchell, 






At the most obvious level of course, Zoe’s core subjectivity is divided by her drug 
use. When she is high on drugs, her behavior is very different than it is when she is sober. 
Mitchell himself must then alter his own behavior in response to this variability, feeling 
that he cannot even know how to act unless he knows what state Zoe is in – whether high 
or sober: 
 “Well, to be perfectly honest, right now I want to know if 
you’re high.” 
“You mean, Daddy, am I stoned? Do I have a needle dangling 
from my arm? Am I nodding in a phone booth? Did I score this 
morning, get whacked, Daddy, and call you for money?” 
 Trees, snow, mountains, ice. I could hear sirens, street traffic, a 
radio or TV newscaster in the background. I imagined some 
boyfriend behind her, sick and dying, smoking a cigarette, waiting 
for her to raise some money from her rich father. Who was I 
talking to? The living or the dead? How should I behave? 
 “God,” she said. “I don’t fucking believe it.” 
 “I’m sorry. I just need to know, if that’s possible. So I can 
know how to talk to you. So I can know how to act.” (140-141) 
Zoe’s level of sobriety creates a very real schism in her subjectivity as the degree 
of her cognitive impairment affects the terms and categories of rational thought (Idiolect). 
Mitchell’s adjustment to accommodate fluctuations in Zoe’s level of cognitive 






be the expression of a projected persona, a manipulation of self-identity formed in a 
Narrative domain as a deliberate fabrication. On the other hand, Mitchell must deal with 
another division of his daughter’s identity that exists within his own perceptions, 
touching on something deeper, and evoking articulations of subjectivity (both his own 
and Zoe’s) that were annulled when his daughter became an adult and ceased to trust him. 
Together with an apprehension of his daughter’s identity as a “whacked-out drug-
addicted child” (100), Mitchell remembers his daughter as an innocent, trusting and 
loving child. That child, or the memory of that child – in essence the Zoe he seeks to save 
–exists side by side with the current “child” she has become; held in a field of meaning 
that had once been Idiolect, but that is now (partially) relegated, through traumatic 
experience, to a Narrative domain: 
Now in my dreams if her, and I dream of her frequently, Zoe is still 
that child in my lap, trusting me utterly – even though I am the 
man who secretly held in his hand the knife that he had decided to 
use to cut into her throat, and thus I am in no way the man she sees 
smiling down at her, singing ditties and rondelets and telling 
stories of owls and pussycats. (125) 
This memory of his child as she once was establishes an emotional tie to the 
people he represents in the negligence suits he prosecutes, connecting him to them 
through his projected recognition of himself. In this way, those people also come to 
“represent” him. Although Mitchell professes that he has a stronger affinity with those 






drives him to pursue these cases – in the twilight moment of awakening he sometimes 
sees himself in the “defeated” parents who simply grieve. Those parents, whose reaction 
to tragic loss is exemplified by Billy Ansel’s reaction to the accident, still occupy a field 
of symbolized meaning in which they are still with their children; an Idiolect that has 
been invalidated, but that preceded the tragedy that took the child and that simultaneously 
destroyed meaning and identity: 
And sometimes when I wake, for a few moments I’m like Risa 
Walker and Hartley Otto and Billy Ansel and all those other 
parents whose children have died and who have been unable to 
react with rage – the dreamed child is the real one, the dead child 
simply does not exist. We waken and say, “I can’t believe she 
exists.” It’s the other child, the dreamed baby, the remembered 
one, that for a few lovely moments we think exists. For those few 
moments, the first child, the real baby, the dead one, is not gone; 
she simply never was. (125-126) 
Mitchell’s attempt to represent the bereaved parents in Sam Dent is a part of his 
own compensatory mechanism that allows him to deal with his own trauma, bringing him 
into contact with communities that express his divided self – as both the victim who has 
suffered the loss of a child and who cannot let go of past meaning and identity, and as the 
enraged man of action capable of working against the insidious cause of that loss. In 
these communites of traumatized individuals, he finds examples of both; he finds victims 






Hartley and the Walkers, however it is this later group that are useful to Mitchell in his 
litigation, and with whom he consciously relates. The rage that he lauds in them acts as a 
shield, allowing him to ward off the much more painful state he declares a sense of 
“victimization,” but that is perhaps more accurately, described as a sense of useless loss: 
And I don’t burn myself out with these awful cases because it 
somehow makes me a better person. No, I admit it, I’m on a 
personal vendetta; what the hell, it’s obvious. And I don’t need a 
shrink to tell me it’s because I myself have lost a child and now 
identify with chumps like Risa and Wendell Walker and that poor 
sap Billy Ansel, and Wanda and Hartley Otto. The victims. Listen, 
identify with the victims and you become one yourself. Victims 
make lousy litigators. […] Simply, I do it because I’m pissed off, 
and that’s what you get when you mix conviction with rage. It’s a 
very special kind of anger, let’s say. So I’m no victim. Victims get 
depressed and live in the there and then. I live in the here and now. 
(98-99) 
The rage that Mitchell feels lends the tragedy of loosing a child a kind of purpose (a 
tragedy that he experiences by proxy as an articulation of his own loss, or the loss that he 
will eventually suffer when Zoe finally succumbs to her lifestyle). As Mitchell claims, it 
is both a means of taking revenge for the lost child on behalf of the bereaved parent, as 
well as a way of creating a future. The emphasis that Mitchell places on this perception 






is a trauma in which the permanent loss of his daughter through her death has not yet 
occurred, and one in which he cannot allow himself to fall into grief like the parents who 
become “victims.” Rather, he must continue to fight, however futile that effort might 
seem: 
And the best we can do for them, and for ourselves, is rage against 
what took them. Even if we can’t know what it’ll be like when the 
smoke clears, we do know that rage, for better or worse, generates 
a future. The victims are the ones who’ve given up on the future. 
Instead, they’ve joined the dead. And the rest, look at them: unless 
they’re enraged and acting on it, they’re useless, unconscious; 
they’re dead themselves and don’t even know it. (99-100) 
Despite his obstinate clinging to the role of enraged “avenger” – the role of 
action, rather than helpless grief – Mitchell does indeed identify with the “victims” who 
remain in a twilight state of grief by clinging to meaning and identity that have been 
annulled by their tragic loss. That sense of identification occurs not only in those 
occasional first moments upon awakening, to which he admits. Rather, they occur 
suddenly and without prior warning, as when he stands outside of Billy Ansel’s house at 
night, and sees Billy through the picture window, standing with a drink in his hand and 
lost in his memories of “before.” Unsure whether Billy has seen him, Mitchell remains, 
caught in a moment of mutual recognition: 
Suddenly, he stood up and turned and faced out the window, 






stared back at him. Nothing else to do. I remember that for several 
seconds we seemed to be gazing at one another, me in the 
moonlight at the side of the road, him in the soft light of his 
kitchen a hundred feet away, neither of us moving a muscle. We 
were like mirror images of each other, […]. It was a weird 
moment, though. As if we were long-lost brothers, separated early 
and passing by accident decades later, not quite recognizing each 
other, but then, for a second or two, something – something – 
clicks. (132-133) 
The “encounter”, of which only Mitchell is aware, is significant, since it is Billy Ansel 
that he sees as embodying the epitome of the defeated and victimized reaction of a parent 
to tragic loss, (a reaction that Mitchell will eventually come to bank on for his suit): 
Then I recognized it: I’ve seen it a hundred times, but it still 
surprises and scares me. It’s the opaque black-glass look of a man 
who has recently learned of the death of his child. It’s the face of a 
person who’s gone to the other side of life and is no longer even 
looking back at us. It always has the same history, that look: at the 
moment of the child’s dying, the man follows his child into 
darkness, as if he’s making a last attempt to save it; then, in panic, 
to be sure that he himself has not died as well, the man turns 
momentarily back towards us, maybe he even laughs then or says 






has returned to where his child first disappeared, fixing onto one of 
the bright apparitions that linger there. It’s downright spooky. 
(104) 
Seeing that reaction in Billy, Mitchell is made uneasy, in part because of the enormity of 
Billy’s grief, but more particularly, because it is an expression of grief that Mitchell 
cannot allow himself if he is ever to save his daughter. Mitchell quite rightly perceives 
that that grieved state in which a person holds on to past meaning and identity is 
prohibitive of decisive action. Indeed, in seeking potential clients, Mitchell specifically 
rejects those parents who have fallen into a state of helpless grief, instead seeking out 
those who, like him, are driven to action by their rage: 
Usually, that’s all you need. The angry partner carries the defeated 
partner, who hasn’t the energy to argue against the idea of a suit, 
let alone the actuality, which of course, once it’s underway, 
provides its own momentum. You do need one of them fueled by 
anger, however, especially in the beginning; two defeated parties 
tend to reinforce each other’s lassitude and make lousy litigants. 
The attorney often ends up fighting his won clients, especially near 
the end, when it gets down to dealing out the last cards, and the 
out-of-court settlement offers get made and refused. (113) 
Mitchell sublimates his anger, using it to generate the focus and forcefulness he 
will need to prosecute his case. Once he begins to pursue a case, the compensatory 






out of control – in particular during the ride to the hospital in Elizabeth City with his 
trusting young daughter. Consequently, that experience, which had been so frightening at 
the time, takes on a halcyon quality that he seeks to replicate again and again: 
Nothing else provides me with the rush that I get from cases like 
this. There is a brilliant hard-edged clarity that comes over me 
when I take on a suit for the Ottos and the Walkers of the world, an 
intensity and focus that makes me feel more alive than at any other 
time. […] When I think about it, the only other event in my life 
that I can remember even coming close to giving me the same 
rush, the same hard hit of formalized intelligence, happened nearly 
twenty years ago, on the coast of North Carolina, when Zoe was 
two years old and we were renting a summer place way out on the 
Outer Banks. (120 - 121) 
The choice to act out his traumatic crisis as a negligence litigator does more than 
make Mitchell feel capable. As I stated in the previous chapter when I examined Billy 
Ansel’s reaction to the various means of coming to terms with tragedy, resolution can be 
sought by seeking culpability for a tragedy. That juristic, essentially ethical approach 
helps to formulate meaning in the wake of traumatic experience in a number of ways. It 
restores causality – a logical relationship that is undermined when apparently 
meaningless and unpredictable events such as the school bus accident occur. At the same 
time, it enables the community to exclude the assumed perpetrator from among their 






guilty party(s) restore the community’s shaken sense of security by allowing its members 
to deal with the experience as something that will not be repeated in the future. If one 
conceives of a traumatic experience as a fluke or accident – an accident in which there is 
no clear causality and no perpetrator to be expelled – then Idiolect may have to be 
reconstructed in such a way that such an accident is a real possibility in the future, neither 
preventable, nor predictable. 
It is disturbing to some of the members of the Community of Sam Dent, to have 
to view a tragic loss as having been purely an accident, or as having arisen from the 
unhappy intersection of any of a number of factors that cannot be precisely controlled. 
Such fortunate but accidental circumstances are significantly more disturbing for Mitchell 
Stephens, however, who still holds out a hope that he will be able to think his way 
through his daughter’s dilemma and save her before it is too late. Instead, he vociferously 
denies not only that the school bus crash was an accident, but that, indeed, no such thing 
as an accident exists. 
I knew at once that it wasn’t an ‘accident’ at all. There are no 
accidents. I don’t even know what the word means, and I never 
trust anyone who says he does. I knew that somebody somewhere 
had made a decision to cut a corner in order to save a few pennies, 
and now the state or the manufacturer of the bus or the town, 
somebody, was busy lining up a troop of smoothies to negotiate 






displease the accountants. I packed a bag and headed north, like I 
said, pissed off. (91-92) 
Everything in Mitchell’s perception of the world is subject to a rigerous causality 
and everything falls under the sway of reason – a notion that is particularly appealing to 
him given that an enormous part of his self esteem and self-identity comes from his 
perception of himself as an exceptionally intelligent and rational man. (This self-
perception is substantiated time and time again by his success both in winning cases, and 
in his ability to manipulate the individuals involved in them.) In repudiating the 
possibility that a tragic disaster or loss might occur as the result of uncontrollable factors 
(i.e. it might be an accident), Mitchell takes refuge in expectation; the expectation that 
such a thing should not happen. This kind of subjunctive statement is characteristic of an 
ethical view of traumatic experience, and constitutes the rigid assertion of expectation in 
the face of heterogeneous experience that violates such expectation. Traumatic 
experience is, by its very nature, an experience that violates expectation (that is to say, it 
is heterogeneous to prior experience), punctuating the subjunctive assertion of 
expectation – this should not happen – with an indicative but it has. 
Mitchell stands form to the assertion this should not happen, however like the 
dreamlike symbolized field of meaning occupied by those defeated victims who cling to 
meaning prior to their loss; a symbolized field of meaning that has been invalidated. Prior 
to the tragedy, that statement would have been formulated in the indicative; this does not 
happen, or this will not happen. In the wake of evidence to the contrary, Mitchell, as well 






speaking from a Narrative domain – a field of symbolized meaning that is no longer 
valid, and that therefore, can only be expressed in a hypothetical statement as to what 
should or should not be. For those individuals, the accident has not violated natural law, 
as Billy claimed to have perceived it. Rather, it has violated ethical law. The anger that 
Mitchell and those parents then experience, articulates a kind of rejection (or in the 
Freudian terms, repression) of that which has violated the terms of symbolized meaning 
and identity. That reaction is a defense of meaning that has been annulled, and the 
mobilization to seek retribution is an effort to remove that which violated Idiolect, 
thereby restoring its validity. Anger arises as an overflow of the semiotic current, just as 
grief does, bringing with it somatosensory experiences and the overwhelming of the Self 
by the abject. While grief represents a response in which the individual occupies a now 
invalidated symbolized domain as a separate and private “reality” – an epistemic crisis – 
anger appeals to ethics, taking refuge in the prescriptive and delimiting terms of the 
Communicative domain to restore invalidated Idiolect to its primacy. 
Both reactions to tragic loss, that of defeated grief and that of enraged grief, 
originate when heterogeneous experience, in its nascent field of meaning, is juxtaposed 
with the prior symbolized meaning of deposed Idiolect, and the semiotic current begins to 
vacillate between competing channels of signification. That vacillation is complicated in 
Mitchell Stephens by the fact that his expectations are doubly violated. Not only does he 
suffer from the traumatic rupture created by the loss of the bond he had with his daughter 
when she was a child, (thereby juxtaposing competing experiences of her), but he must 






related to her lifestyle and unconstrained drug use. That expectation contradicts prior 
expectation that all should go well with his daughter and, as I stated earlier, from it 
springs the knowledge that yet another field of meaning will eventually emerge – one in 
which his daughter is gone forever and his active role as father annulled. Like Billy 
Ansel, Mitchell is lost among a number of symbolized fields of meaning, whether 
invalidated, on the verge of being invalidated, or on the verge of becoming valid, that 
conflict with one another and that prevent him from finding an adequate resolution for his 
traumatic crisis. 
Mitchell has not yet suffered his traumatic loss, and this fact plays a significant 
role in cultivating his attachment to an ethical discourse on trauma. Desperately hoping to 
defend against the loss of his daughter, Mitchell becomes trapped in the fruitless demand 
that the experience of loss has violated reality (i.e. this should not happen and will not 
happen in the future).His litigation represents both an effort to purge the “transgressor(s)” 
as the threat to “our children,” and an attempt to reinforce the symbolized domain in 
which his (and everyone’s) child is safe and protected. This is one of the seductions that 
he uses to tempt the angry parents to join with him in the negligence suit, promising to 
protect them from a reoccurrence of the event in future: 
“It is unlikely anyone will go to prison. He or his company will 
have to pay in other ways. But pay they will. And we must make 
them pay, Mrs. Otto, not to benefit you in a material way or to 
compensate you for the loss of your sin, Bear, which can’t be done, 






Understand, I’m not here to speak just for your anger. I’m here to 
speak for the future as well. What we’re talking about here is our 
ongoing relation to time.” (118) 
Certainly there are events and experiences that occur as the result of a culpable party, in 
which case, prosecution may indeed reduce (but not eliminate) the possibility that a 
tragedy may be repeated. This juristic process must be viewed as separate from the 
individual experience of trauma, however, in which causality and culpability may be 
sought even to absurd lengths in order to restore meaning. 
The legalistic, ethical solution with which Mitchell Stephens lures his potential 
litigants serves to alleviate collective trauma, either by eliminating those individuals from 
the discursive community who disrupt of the cohesion of social identity, or by giving the 
impression that this has been achieved. In terms of collective, social trauma, firmly 
asserting expectation in the face of factual events (this should not happen) reaffirms 
social identity by which membership in the discursive community can be determined. By 
asserting the limits on what is recognized in shared signification, such an ethical or 
juristic approach to trauma leaves individual trauma unaddressed, and may even 
compound it, as Mitchell himself observes: 
I’m under no delusions – I know that in the end a million-dollar 
settlement makes no real difference to them, that it probably only 
serves to sharpen their pain by constricting it with legal language 






and forces them to question the authenticity of their own suffering. 
I know all that; I’ve seen it a hundred times. (98) 
While an ethical discourse on trauma serves the objectives of collective trauma by 
reinforcing the boundaries of shared social identity, Mitchell Stephens’s pursuit of the 
negligence suit is essentially self-serving. Mitchell is not a member of the community of 
Sam Dent and his arrangement of the case does not contribute to the cohesion of that 
community. Indeed, Mitchell is not interested in the true causes of the accident or where 
culpability, if any, actually lies. His focus is, in part, on where the “deep pockets” are to 
be found, since his prosecution of the case depends upon his ability to seduce the litigants 
into participation with offers of substantial settlements: 
It seemed clear that the bus driver, Dolores Driscoll, was a dead 
end; she was probably only doing exactly what she had done for 
years, and besides, she herself had no real property or earning 
power to attach and was a popular woman in town to boot, a 
nondrinker with a crippled husband she supported. Not the kind of 
person you want to sue for negligence. The deep pockets, I knew, 
were going to be found in the pants worn by the state, the town, 
and the school board, or, more precisely, by their insurance 
companies. (106) 
Mitchell is also focused on what will “play” well in court, which witnesses or victims 
will best appeal to the jury’s emotions, and most significantly, what will undermine the 






Fine by me. I had my agenda too. In spite of the injuries, Nicole 
Burnell looked good, she talked good, and she had suffered 
immeasurably and would for the rest of her life. A beautiful 
articulate fourteen-year-old girl in a wheelchair. She was perfect. I 
could hardly wait to see the other side depose her. (103) 
Exhibiting the stereotypical behavior one expects of an “ambulance chasing” 
lawyer, Mitchell manipulates the truth, arranging the facts so that they will support his 
case and work against those who might be made to pay large sums in compensation. At 
the same time, those efforts exonerate those with “shallow pockets” such as Dolores 
Driscoll in order to maximize the ultimate payout: 
Unless I could establish that the driver of the bus, this Dolores 
Driscoll, had been safely under the speed limit when she came 
down the highway that morning, there was no way I’d be able to 
blame the town or the school district or the state or anyone else 
with deep pockets for negligence. To nail them, I’d have to defend 
her. I’d have to defend her even if the brakes or some part of the 
steering had failed. No matter what the immediate cause of the 
crash, I’d still have to establish that at the time it left the road the 
bus was being driven in a proper way and at a safe speed for the 
conditions. (128-129) 
Mitchell acts out his own crisis by displacing it onto the tragedies of strangers like 






the children or their bereaved parents, but on a vague, abstract sense of loss and 
impending doom: 
Besides, the people of Sam Dent are not unique. We’ve all lost our 
children. It’s like all the children of America are dead to us. Just 
look at them, for God’s sake – violent on the streets, comatose in 
the malls, narcotized in front of the TV. In my lifetime something 
terrible happened that took out children away from us. I don’t 
know if it was the Vietnam war, or the sexual colonization of kids 
by industry, or drugs, or TV, or divorce, or what the hell it was; I 
don’t know which are causes and which are effects; but the 
children are gone, that I know. So that trying to protect them is 
little more than an elaborate exercise in denial. (99) 
His approach to the school bus accident is callous, bent on establishing notions of “good” 
and “bad” according to the usefulness of those categories in achieving his ultimate aims, 
and that approach reflects his lack of interest in the town or its inhabitants. While the 
town’s citizens would claim that it was tragic that the guardrail was unable to arrest the 
forward impetus of the school bus, from Mitchell’s perspective this inability constitutes 
the guardrails greatest value: 
I saw where the bus had gone through the low three-cable guardrail 
and noted that it had been relatively new rail, properly installed. 
On the other side of the highway, the posts were rusted near the 






replaced. But, regretfully, Dolores Driscoll hadn’t gone through 
over there; she’d snapped off the new poles here on this side, half a 
dozen of them, dragging the cables with her. From my point of 
view, the best thing you could say about the new guardrail was that 
it was utterly incapable of stopping or even diverting the fast-
moving bus. (127) 
Mitchell’s exploitive purpose extends well beyond his personal use of the tragedy 
as an expression of his own, unrelated traumatic experience, or even the manipulation of 
the townspeople in order to ensure his own monetary gain. That exploitive purpose also 
serves a greater agenda in that it works to restore meaning and order for the world at 
large. Sam Dent constitutes one discursive community with its own innate shared 
symbolized field (its Communicative domain). Mitchell Stephens, however, is an outsider 
to that community without legitimate access to meaning as it is mutually constructed 
among the townspeople, and without any motivation to preserve meaning as they share it. 
Rather, he represents the view of a larger discursive community that exists outside of the 
tragedy’s direct sphere of influence, and he speaks for those individuals removed from 
the actual facts of the event. Those people, outsiders like those who “rubbernecked” at 
the scene of the accident on their way to go skiing, or like the reporters who arrived 
demanding an account of the townspeople’s experiences, desire only to feel that the risk 
to themselves and to their children has been reduced by the successful prosecution of 
whomever caused the accident. Like Mitchell, those individuals will be better served if 






more universal level. The children of the community at large likely ride on buses made 
by the same manufacturer, and if that manufacturer is then sanctioned, the larger 
community outside of Sam Dent can feel that the causes of such an event have been 
removed, thereby safeguarding against its repeated occurrence of the tragedy elsewhere. 
In his role as an outsider, Mitchell Stephens stands in as an embodiment of the 
collective response to trauma – a response that arises not from an unmediated experience 
of something that is traumatizing, but rather, a response that arises from the awareness 
that something could happen if it is not prevented. A judgment of culpability, 
compensation awarded, and the expulsion of the perpetrator all address this collective 
trauma – that belonging to the discursive community at large who, since not 
experientially affected (individual trauma) are traumatized by the trauma testimony itself. 
Those individuals can no longer say this does not happen, and are driven to assert this 
should not happen, seeking refuge in a prohibitive, prescriptive ethical discourse to 
prevent potential trauma from occurring. 
This relationship to trauma as a potential occurrence makes the social response to 
trauma – a purely ethical response – comprehensible. In the face of the potential 
invalidation of meaning and identity as testified to by the trauma survivor, the community 
at large (which does not share the traumatic experience) mobilizes to reinforce the terms 
and relations of existent meaning and identity. The aim of the social response is to reduce 
or eliminate the potential for others to share the traumatized individual’s experience. This 
response serves the individual’s needs as a social being, but more importantly, it prevents 






revise shared meaning in the Communicative domain. In this sense, the collective, social 
response to trauma is driven by the same crisis that drives the individual – the 
fragmentation of symbolized identity, although in the case of collective trauma, that 
fragmentation occurs in the Communicative domain, rather than in Idiolect. 
Mitchell Stephens’s narrative approaches a kind of metaphor for the interaction of 
the traumatized individual and her community with the greater discursive community that 
does not share the experience. The individual’s inescapable realization that this happens 
is silenced, reduced from an epistemic awareness of valid experience to the meager role 
of the victim who silently points to the perpetrator. With the legal expulsion of the 
perpetrator from the Self of social identity, the “compensated” victim with her 
heterogeneous discourse is silenced, and collective trauma is repaired. That juristic 
approach, driven by the reductive agenda of social identity, essentially exploits the 
traumatized individual(s) for whom meaning and identity have been annulled by 
heterogeneous experience (trauma as an epistemic crisis). It does so by imposing 
meaning in such a way that what is heterogeneous is expelled with the perpetrator, and by 
generating the perception that a future recurrence of the tragedy “prevented” or, at the 
very least, reduced. 
This exploitive use of the traumatized individuals and the traumatized community 
of Sam Dent is made palpable in the way in which Mitchell represents the town, in 
particular in its relationship with the greater community at large: 
Up here, though, the poor are kept out, and it’s the rich who stay 






Thule or someplace beyond the pale, and most of the people who 
live here year round are castoffs, tossed out into the back forty and 
made to forage in the woods for their sustenance and shelter, 
grubbing nuts and berries, while the rest of us snooze warmly 
inside the palisade, feet up on the old hassock, brandy by our side, 
Wall Street Journal unfolded on our lap, good dog Tighe curled up 
by the fire.” (95) 
Mitchell’s perceptions of his potential clients, betrays the same proprietary view, and a 
sense of innate superiority. His attitude towards the citizens of the town and his attitude 
towards views all of the people he seeks to represent, is that they are essentially “country 
bumpkins” (92) or inbred yokels, as is evidenced by his initial reaction to Wendell 
Walker: 
No answer; no response whatsoever. He just went on staring down 
at his lap, as if he didn’t or see hear me. One of those country 
simples, I thought. Inbreeding. Great. First local I get to talk to, 
and he turns out to be an alien. (104) 
Mitchell’s exploitive purposes are articulated even more brusquely as he compares his 
negotiations with Wanda Otto to the negotiations (ultimately reneged upon) of the white 
men with the Indians: 
The twig chairs and stumps didn’t look very comfortable anyhow. 
Besides, I wanted to get down near the floor, where she was, and 






making tea. We were going to deal, this lady and I, the Indian chief 
and the white man. (116) 
While Mitchell attempts to manipulate the community to fulfill his own private 
objectives and the objectives of a larger, more removed discursive community, the town 
itself has its own social response to collective trauma and ultimately, its own agenda. At 
times, that response coincides with Mitchell’s manipulation of the situation. Like 
Mitchell Stephens, the inhabitants of Sam Dent are reluctant to assign blame to Dolores 
Driscoll for the accident, although for wholly different reasons. For the inhabitants of the 
town – a town set apart, with a population that shares a traumatic event, if not a single 
traumatic experience – Dolores is one of their own, herself a victim: 
I damned sure did not want to go after Dolores Driscoll, and, for 
somewhat different reasons, neither did my clients. Never mind 
that her pockets weren’t an inch deep; she was well-liked, sober, 
hardworking, from an old respected Sam Dent family, sole 
supporter of a crippled husband, and she’d been driving the local 
kids to school safely for more than twenty years. Worse, the 
parents viewed her as having been victimized just as much as they 
were themselves, and a jury would agree with them. (129) 
Mitchell’s approach to selecting a “perpetrator” entails assigning full culpability 
or full exoneration to each individual caught in the wide net he casts looking for potential 
targets for his suit. The clear-cut nature of this kind of juristic/ethical approach seeks to 






Communicative domain (that which exists outside of Sam Dent alone). Individual 
trauma, on the other hand – that is, the experience of trauma as an epistemic crisis – seeks 
to come to terms with the imposition of awareness that meaning is arbitrary and not 
sufficient to express all possible experience. Individual trauma is characterized by the 
covalent vacillation between instances of signified meaning that can neither be merged 
nor separated – a vacillation that is experienced as a loss of meaning, the inadequacy or 
breakdown of language, as well as the division of subjectivity. The response of the 
traumatized residents of Sam dent to Dolores reflects that covalent, whereby Dolores is 
both innocent and guilty. 
It wasn’t too hard to see what the difficulty was – these people 
liked Dolores, she was one of them, and they felt profoundly sorry 
for her as for themselves; but they also could not help blaming her 
and wanting to cast her out. They would have preferred that she 
simply disappear from the town for a while, go and stay with her 
son in Plattsburgh or at least hide behind the door of her house 
with her husband up there on Bartlett Hill. They wanted her to 
stash her pain and guilt where they didn’t have to look at it. (143) 
The town’s response to its own collective trauma – that is, to the breakdown of 
the social fabric that held the town’s inhabitants together, each in his or her respective 
social role – is complicated by the ambiguities of the situation. As a discursive 
community comprised largely of individuals who have been directly affected by the 






causality and culpability on the experience. Rather, shared signification will have to be 
altered to accommodate the ambiguity of meaning experienced by so many of the 
townspeople. Here, the impetus generated by those individuals; epistemic crises will be 
sufficient to challenge and alter the structure of shared signification in the 
Communicative domain. In Sam Dent, epistemic crisis is sufficiently widespread to form 
its own consensus. The way in which shared signification is altered will need to 
adequately express the manifold individual experiences of the townspeople, however, and 
will require a significant amount of negotiation and compromise within that closed 
community. (We will see the compromise reached in the final chapter of the novel.) 
Dolores’s role in the community and her relationship to the accident poses a 
particular difficulty for the restoration of shared signification in Sam Dent. In the clear-
cut, juristic treatment of the situation by Mitchell, he declares Dolores not useful to the 
project of restoring meaning, and therefore not culpable. The resolution of her role in that 
greater discourse is clear-cut and simple. This is not true of the resolution of her social 
role in the discursive of the town itself. Dolores’s ambiguous relationship to the accident 
(both as the party responsible for driving the bus, and as a victim of the crash) impedes 
the resolution of the trauma within the discursive community of Sam Dent. As a member 
of that community, Dolores refuses to “disappear,” seeking a social judgment by her 
peers as to her guilt or innocence, both in terms of her own apprehension of herself as 







But she wasn’t having any of that. Silently, with her head bowed, 
Dolores was plunking herself down in the exact center of the 
town’s grief and rage, compelling them by her presence at these 
funerals to define her. Was she a victim of the tragedy, or was she 
the cause of it? She had placed herself on the scales of their 
judgment, but they did not want to judge her. To them, she was 
both, of course, victim and cause; just as to herself she was both. 
Like every parent when something terrible happens to his child, 
Dolores was innocent, and she was guilty. We knew which, in the 
eyes of God and our fellowman, we were, despite the fact that most 
of the time we felt like both; but she did not. Denial was 
impossible for her, so she wanted us to come forward and do the 
job for her. (143-144) 
The unique, bifurcated quality of Sam Dent’s crisis leaves that affected 
community with its own social needs, distinct from those of the social entity that Mitchell 
represents. Mitchell Stephens offers monetary compensation to many of the town’s 
residence as a means of seducing their participation in his suit. In Dolores’s case, 
however, he appeals to her desire to establish her own guilt or innocence – a judgment 
that the town itself withholds in the face of her ambiguous status. Approaching Dolores at 
the one of the local churches, where she is unobtrusively attending the funeral for one of 
the children who died, Mitchell promises to establish her guilt or innocence thereby 






 “I can tell you, I can tell you whether you are guilty or not.” I 
was out of breath; for her size, the woman moved pretty fast. 
 “Who are you? Who is it can do that? No one can do that. 
(144) 
In her own mind, Dolores is not certain of the facts that could prove her degree of 
culpability either way. When questioned by the police, she testified that she was driving 
within the speed limit, however in truth, she is only certain of the range within she might 
have been driving based on habit and probability: 
 “Me? Represent me? No,” she said. “You can’t. I only said I 
was doing fifty, fifty-five. To the police; to Captain Wyatt Pitney, 
from the state police. Because that’s how I remembered it. But the 
truth, mister, is that I might have been doing sixty miles and hour 
when the bus went over, or sixty-five. Not seventy, I’m sure. But 
sixty is possible. Sixty-five even. (145-146) 
There is no empirical evidence that can establish her guilt or innocence in juristic terms. 
The judgment that she anticipates is from the court of public opinion; the way in which 
her community will eventually choose to define her role in the accident, and her future 
role among her fellow citizens. 
In seducing Dolores, Mitchell appeals to her social self – her identity as a member 
of the community of Sam Dent, and the role of that community in establishing the 
parameters of what may be accepted as true. He attempts, in other words, to speak for the 






“It’s clear to me and many other people that you have suffered 
significantly from this event. And then, Dolores, Driscoll, your 
name, your very good name, will be cleared once and for all in this 
town. Everyone will know then that you, too, have suffered 
enormously, we’ll have established it legally, and then you will not 
have to bear any of the blame. (146) 
By promising to establish her innocence legally, he claims to be able to restore her place 
within the boundaries of shared social identity, however the social entity and discursive 
community that Mitchell Stephens represents is that larger community. As an outsider, he 
cannot speak for the intimate discursive community of which Dolores is a part. Revealing 
the wisdom she habitually hides and projects onto Abbott (as described in the previous 
chapter), Dolores interprets Abbott’s garbled protest of Mitchell’s proposition with the 
observation that she must be judged by her peers; the people of her town. Dolores 
recognizes the hollow promise that Mitchell makes to her as he attempts to enlist her help 
in prosecuting his case. His objective, however, is to use her to formulate a traumatic 
discourse that serves his own interests, and that of a “community” outside of Sam Dent – 
a discourse that addresses the fear of potential trauma, not trauma that has already 
occurred. It is for the citizens of Sam Dent alone to determine the shape that symbolized 
meaning will take within the discursive community that they share. 
Mitchell’s observes that the town has begun to make a formalized response to the 
tragedy, organizing memorial events and collections for the victims (largely superfluous) 






sponsored and the activities undertaken are not so much pragmatically oriented as they 
are oriented towards alleviating the community’s sense of helplessness in the face of the 
senseless accident. These efforts include the donation of money to the victims’ families, 
but also stuffed animals and other items that articulate the desire to offer comfort, 
however impractical the gift might ultimately be. The majority of these activities, 
however, including the memorial service held by both state representatives and various 
local clergy, and the erection of fourteen crosses at the site of the crash, represent the 
need to memorialize the event – that is, to give it a symbolized representation by 
invoking a unifying authority, both governmental and religious. The appeal to religion, in 
particular, expresses the community’s desire to find a suitable explanation for the disaster 
since as Dolores noted, religion is “the main way the unexplainable gets explained. God’s 
will and all” (26): 
The town was beginning to formalize its response to the tragedy. 
There had appeared one morning fourteen tiny crosses out at the 
crash site, which turned out to be the work of schoolchildren, at the 
instigation of the school board. So much for the separation of 
church and state. A memorial service for the victims, announced in 
the local weekly newspaper, was scheduled to be held in the 
following week in the school auditorium, where the state 
representative from the district, the school principal, and half a 
dozen area clergymen would intone. Money was being collected, 






around the country were sending contributions – money, clothing, 
canned food, stuffed animals, crucifixes, and potted plants […]. 
(138 - 139) 
These formalized responses takes place where the community of Sam Dent and 
the community at large (represented by Mitchell Stephens) intersect, each with their own 
distinct needs. The collective trauma for which Mitchell speaks is that of a discursive 
community not directly affected by the accident, and the resolution of that traumatic 
process takes the form of the sanitation of that which has blurred the boundaries of 
symbolized meaning and violated expectation. We observed this effort to sanitize 
meaning in the desire to isolate a perpetrator (or perpetrators), and to prosecute and 
censor those individuals. This objective is also apparent in Mitchell Stephens’s reaction 
to the town’s efforts to come to terms with its loss, however; efforts which Mitchell 
dismisses with the sarcastic observation: “So much for the separation of church and state” 
(138). The traumatized discursive community, like the traumatized individual, must 
recreate a field of symbolized meaning that has been ruptured by heterogeneous 
experience, doing so in this case by attempting to bind the mundane to the divine. 
Mitchell’s dismissal, on the other hand, not only overlooks the needs of the community, it 
also reflects his intention to restore the clean separation of terms and entities that 
traumatic experience demands be merged. 
The ethical interpretation of the event by the town of Sam dent will naturally 
differ from that of he greater social consensus outside of the town as represented by 






be potentially destructive both for the individual in crisis, and for the community of Sam 
Dent as well. In terms of opposing traumatic processes – that of individual traumatic 
crisis (epistemic and experiential) and that of social, collective trauma (ethical), – the 
novel gives us a gradation of responses, in which the wholly unique epistemic crisis of 
each citizen of Sam Dent must find adequate expression in the Communicative domain 
created by the discursive community of that town. Within that community, the sheer 
number of individuals directly affected by the precipitating event will, by default, 
generate the consensus needed to modify shared signification, thereby accommodating 
the traumatic crisis of its members to one degree or another. No such consensus can be 
reached in the second discursive community represented here; the community that 
extends beyond the borders of the town into the world at large and that includes the 
journalists who come to report on the tragedy, the therapist sent in from Plattsburgh to 
counsel the surviving children, and Mitchell Stephens himself. 
That greater community, which does not share the unmediated experience of loss, 
opposes not only the discourse of the individual, traumatized citizens of Sam Dent, but 
the social discourse of the community itself. Sam Dent’s efforts to create meaning out of 
tragedy will result in a discursive community that is set apart from the larger community 
by the pervasive effect of their common bereavement and the necessary change in shared 
signification. The title of the novel, The Sweet Hereafter itself refers to this separation of 
the town from the greater discursive consensus, alluding to Robert Browning’s Pied 
Piper of Hamlin  in which the children are seduced, lured away to punish the residents of 






however, but to the residence of the town’s inhabitants in a dreamlike “Sweet Hereafter” 
as a world that the inhabitants share with their lost children, beyond the grasp of reason 
or reality. The unique reality and ethics of the town, now a place apart, more succinctly 
expressed in Atom Egoyan’s film of the same name than in the novel itself, which never 
explicitly provides an explanation for its title. In the final scene of that film, the character, 
Nicole Burnell describes the separation of the town and its inhabitants from the greater 
social domain. That separation is created by the townspeople’s experience of life 
intermingled with death, and Nichole ends that description with a fitting citation from 
Browning’s poem itself: 
As you see her [Dolores] two years later, I wonder if you realize 
something? I wonder of you understand that all of us, Dolores, me, 
the children who survived, the children who didn’t – that we’re all 
citizens of a different town. A place with its own special rules and 
its own special laws; a town of people living in the Sweet 
Hereafter: “Where waters gushed and fruit trees grew, and flowers 
put forth a fair hue, and everything was fair and new.” Everything 
was fair and new. 
Individual members of the community of Sam Dent are forced to seek a common 
apprehension of the accident that will allow them to once again interact as a unified 
discursive community with a shared field of symbolized meaning. This necessity renders 
them vulnerable to Mitchell Stephens’s seductive promises that he can restore causality 






town’s residents that Mitchell’s “ethical” solution speaks for a discursive community 
outside of their town, not for the town of Sam Dent itself, nor for its citizens. (The 
novel’s primary characters, Billy Ansel, Dolores Driscoll and Nicole Burnell, however, 
all reject this invasive manipulation of their loss and, as we will see, Nicole Burnell will 
prevent the imposition of this outside apprehension of meaning on her town, thereby 
“saving” it.) A significant portion of the town’s citizens – the Walkers, Ottos and others – 
fall prey to the seduction of a simple and clear-cut answer promised by Mitchell 
Stephens, who claims the accident was simply the result of someone’s callous decision to 
“sacrifice a few lives” in the interest of greater profits: 
And it’s up to people like me to make it cheaper to build the bus 
with that extra bolt, or add the extra yard of guardrail, or drain the 
quarry. That’s the only check you’ve got against them. That’s the 
only way you can ensure moral responsibility in this society. Make 
it cheaper. (91) 
Those who are angered by their loss, expressing their outrage with the rigid 
assertion this should not happen in the face of the reality that this does and has happened, 
are seduced by Mitchell’s promise to exact revenge. Some are made doubly vulnerable by 
being both enraged by a sense of having been cheated, as well as being simply greedy. 
Those individuals, such as the Walkers and Nicole Burnell’s parents, are the most easily 
manipulated and, once they become attached to the promise of monetary compensation, 







This was a happy start for me, a lucky break. The Walkers were 
classically pissed off. Both of them. They wanted revenge, which 
was useless to them, of course – they weren’t going to get it, but 
they didn’t know that yet. And as I later learned, they wanted 
money, not as a compensation but because they had been broke for 
so long and had always wanted it. (105-106) 
Others are not motivated by greed, but instead use Mitchell to exact the revenge they 
desire, in a sense counter-manipulating the situation to meet their own needs at Mitchell’s 
instigation: 
The Walkers had seemed more muddled in their motives. The 
money promised by the lawsuit meant a lot to them, of course, but 
in a greedy childish way, and certainly more than they were willing 
to admit to themselves or reveal openly to me. The Walkers were 
poor and in debt, and their poverty had bugged them for years, and 
it seemed even more unfair to them now, with their child gone, 
than before. But Wanda Otto, and her husband too, never struck 
me as having any selfish interest in the money; they cared only 
about its handy capacity to function as punishment and prohibition. 
(118-119) 
In order to successfully prosecute his case, Mitchell decides that he must 
exonerate Dolores, whose pockets are notably “shallow,” and against whom none of the 






witness who observed the accident, who had no direct part in the accident, and 
significantly, who is not involved in any of the litigation surrounding the case; either that 
instigated by Mitchell Stephens, or by any of the other lawyers who have flocked to the 
town in search of litigants. Billy Ansel is the natural choice, since he was driving behind 
the bus, and is therefore the “perfect witness” from Mitchell’s point of view: 
It was Wendell who mentioned Billy Ansel. Risa kept silent, and I 
figured he was the guy she was having an affair with. That could 
be trouble, so I put an asterisk next to his name; but otherwise he 
was almost too good to be true. Ansel was a widower, much 
admired in the town, a Vietnam vet, a war hero, practically. And he 
had lost his two children, who were twins. Also, he had actually 
witnessed the event; he’d been following the bus in his truck on his 
way to work that morning and had helped remove the victims. 
He’d know, by God, that his kids were dead. No denial there. (109) 
In addition to an “uninvolved witness,” Mitchell also needs to ensure the jury’s 
emotional involvement in the case, thereby making it more likely that they will award 
substantial damages. Mitchell needs a living victim, since a jury is reluctant to 
compensate the dead, and for this purpose, he chooses Nicole Burnell as the centerpiece 
of his case. Nicole Burnell survived the bus accident with a broken back, and as a result 
of her injury, is confined to a wheelchair, paralyzed from the waist down: 
And there was the girl Nicole Burnell, who survived the wreck; she 






beauty queen whose life was ruined by her injuries and by the 
trauma of having survived such an ordeal. A living victim is more 
effective with a jury than a dead one; you can’t compensate the 
dead, they feel. That’s how I planned to present her; luckily, it was 
how her parents viewed the event too. She was their destiny, their 
glory: for their future, they had nothing but her future, and since it 
had been taken away from her, it had all been taken, as they saw it, 
from them as well: so now they were out for blood. One way or the 
other, they were going to continue to use her to get what they 
thought was their due. (102-103) 
Nichole is attractive as a witness for a number of reasons. Not only does she present the 
jury with a living image of tragic loss, but her parents are among the town’s inhabitants 
who take a proprietary view of their daughter, and who are essentially driven by 
overwhelming greed. In addition, the family’s standing in the community is quite good 
and they are well respected. One of the contingencies that Mitchell places on his potential 
clients is that they be people who “[come] across as sensitive, loving parents, people with 
a solid family life, with no criminal background or history of trouble in town. Good 
neighbors I wanted, decent hardworking people […]” (107). The Burnells are ideal to 
take the lead in Mitchell’s suit: 
Risa, as if relieved not to be talking about Billy Ansel any longer, 
rattled off the names of half a dozen families, including the 






eighth grade, president of the class, queen of last fall’s Harvest 
Ball. “A potential Miss Essex County, or even a Miss New York,” 
Risa said wistfully. “I’m serious.” Nichole was in the hospital in 
Lake Placid with a broken back, still unconscious, as far as they 
knew. Her parents, they agreed, were poor but honest, churchgoers. 
Pillars of the community, Wendell noted sarcastically. Her father, 
Sam, was a plumber; her mother sang in the choir. Nichole had 
been everybody’s favorite babysitter. (110) 
Ultimately, Mitchell’s attempt to impose a falsely constructed ethical 
interpretation on the tragic loss and on the town’s loss will fail, brought down by the 
efforts of townspeople like Billy Ansel and Dolores Driscoll, who refuse to testify, and 
Nicole Burnell, who lies at her deposition, effectively killing the case. Those individuals 
recognize that Mitchell’s solution for the town is not their solution. The town of Sam 
Dent, as the discursive community that most closely binds the victims of that tragedy, 
will need to form its own response to the tragedy as separate and unique from the 
dominant discourse of society at large. 
 
5.2 Nichole Burnell: Covalence and the Resolution of Traumatic Crisis 
The individual accounts presented thus far have each dealt with a specific period 
of time in relation to the school bus accident, with each period being defined by the 
dominant crisis of the individual involved. Dolores Driscoll’s “testimony” focused on the 






went out onto the ice. Billy Ansel, who had been driving behind the bus, speaks largely 
of the accident itself and the immediate aftermath during which the bodies are recovered 
and the bus towed away. Mitchell Stephens was not present when the accident occurred, 
and speaks instead of the town’s immediate reaction to the tragedy as he arranges a class 
negligence suit in which Nichole Burnell is to appear as his star victim. Nichole, who 
provides with the last individual account before we return to Dolores Driscoll will 
address the events leading up to her deposition in the case, and what will ultimately be its 
premature conclusion. 
Like all of the other characters in the novel, Nichole’s traumatic experience is 
unique, shaped by the specifics of her involvement in the actual accident, and by 
traumatic experience that precedes this precipitating event. Like the others, existent 
traumatic schisms play a role in the way in which Nichole responds to the accident. What 
has the most immediate impact, however, is the fact that Nichole survived the accident, 
but was permanently disabled by it. That status of having survived but having also been 
crippled creates a shifting line of demarcation between lucky and unlucky (each a res 
nulla). Some of the children like Nichole’s sister Jennie, “survived” the accident by 
having been kept home on that day, while others, like Nichole’s two brothers, had been 
sitting at the very front of the bus, and therefore survived uninjured. Nichole, on the other 
had, had been sitting at the mid-way point between total escape and death, and she is the 
only child who both survived, but who suffered lasting injury and a resulting handicap. 






front of the bus (the survivors) but the luckiest of the children sitting near the back of the 
bus (all of whom died). 
Nichole suffers a post-traumatic loss of memory, which is also considered to be 
good fortune. When Nichole awakens from the accident in the hospital, she is unable to 
remember the accident itself. Termed anamnesis in trauma theory, Nichole experiences a 
lacuna in her memory that she describes as though her experiences before the accident 
were held in a room separate from her experiences afterwards, with the two conjoined by 
a door – a gap that contains nothing, but that nevertheless divides discrete domains or 
“realities”: 
I’m lucky, they all say, because I can’t remember the accident. 
Lucky that it’s like a door between rooms, and there was one room 
on the far side, and that room I remember fine, and another on the 
near side, and I remember it too. I’m still in it. But I don’t 
remember the accident, and that’s counted lucky by everyone. 
(159) 
Nichole herself does not characterize this anamnesis as being fortunate, but rather, it is 
others who tell her that it is so. This holds true for the other ways in which she is judged 
to be “lucky” – in particular for having survived the accident at all. From Nichole’s own 
internal perspective, of course, that “luckiness” is mitigated by the harsh reality of her 
disability, and the realization that she will spend the rest of her life in a wheelchair. She 






excel, will now be required simply to prevent the further deterioration of her paralyzed 
lower body: 
By then I knew I was as well as I would ever be again, and Dr. 
Robeson had told me that just to stay like this I would have to 
work very hard. So shut up, Mom, go to hell. To live like a slug, I 
was going to have to work like someone trying to become an 
Olympic ski jumper. (160) 
Nichole cannot remember the accident, however she is gradually able to piece 
together the facts of what happened from media reports and from what people reluctantly 
reveal to her. The domain of what constitutes good fortune emerges as a domain that does 
not appear to explicitly include those who remained wholly unaffected by the accident in 
a direct way, but instead, is focused on Nichole – the one individual who most narrowly 
escaped death: 
I did not remember the accident, maybe, but I definitely knew what 
had happened. I could read the newspapers, and of course I had 
asked people, and eventually people had told me, although they 
had not wanted to. Everyone had come to the hospital to visit and 
tell me how lucky I was, to touch me on the hands and shoulders 
and top of my head like I was some kind of rabbit’s foot, so when I 
asked them about the other kids, what happened to the other kids 
who were on the bus that morning, at first no one was willing to 






The distinction of lucky and unlucky is enlisted to define the thin line between total 
disaster and near disaster, for which Nichole serves the unique purpose of representing 
not only the person who survived, but the person who came the closest to perishing but 
did not. That estimation of good fortune, based upon the outcome of the accident, comes 
to supercede the ordinary expectation that anyone involved in the accident, in particular 
someone who is severely injured, has suffered a great misfortune. In a sense, the accident 
has created a unique evaluation of what constitutes luck, essentially assigning it a new 
signified value: 
Slowly people let me know. One by one. That’s how I came to 
understand what they meant by lucky. Rudy and Skip, they were 
especially lucky; they had been up front in the bus and had been 
almost the first to be removed from it, with barely a scratch on 
either of them. Jennie had stayed home sick that day. There were a 
bunch like that. Close calls. Because I was regarded as one myself, 
people liked standing around in the hospital room talking to me 
and each other about all the close calls. (170) 
The collective apprehension of “good luck” establishes Nichole as fortunate in the 
most profound and disturbing way – that is, as having passed the closest to death while 
still escaping it. (We saw a similar perception of the transcendent quality lent by a near-
death experience in Dolores’s description of Abbott, whom she believes has acquired a 
profound wisdom as a result of having “passed so near to death” (3). Nichole’s estimation 






fortunate compared with her schoolmates who perished. Compared with her own brothers 
and sisters, however, all of whom came through the accident physically unscathed for one 
reason or another, she is most unfortunate. More importantly to Nichole’s appreciation of 
her own identity, she is the unfortunate when compared with who she had been before the 
accident. Predictably, Nichole’s sense of being “lucky” is tempered by the simultaneous 
awareness of how “unlucky” she has also been. The tone she uses when she evokes the 
notion of her good luck is sarcastic, and slightly bitter: 
Sean Walker had been in front, like me, but when the bus flipped 
over he’d fractured his skull and died from it before they got him 
out of the bus, and I’d only broken my back. So I was lucky, right? 
(170) 
A sense of good fortune is evoked in the greater comparison with others who died in the 
accident, and exists only as long as the memory of their loss overshadows the awareness 
of how Nichole’s own life is now changed. Her good fortune is derived, in other words, 
from her existence as a social being in a community that has suffered an even greater loss 
in the deaths of fourteen of its children. In terms of individual trauma and an experience 
of personal loss, however, that good fortune has less meaning. As Nichole notes: 
“You can feel lucky that you didn’t die in the accident for only so 
long,” I said. “And then you start to feel unlucky.” (183) 
The intersection of comparative good fortune (i.e. Nichole did not die) and 
comparative misfortune (i.e. she was crippled in the accident), set the stage is set for 






states of being. In feeling wholly fortunate, Nichol cannot grieve the loss of the ability to 
walk or the death of her schoolmates, and yet, if she feels unlucky as a result of what she 
has been through, then she cannot feel pure gratitude at having survived. Guilt then arises 
towards those who were even less fortunate – those who died in the accident – when her 
own grief and trauma prevent her from feeling entirely fortunate. The distinction between 
lucky and unlucky correlates in this sense, with the distinction of grateful and ungrateful 
as a distinction that defines an appropriate response to traumatic crisis. Thus, to feel less 
than completely grateful for one’s survival constitutes ingratitude, but to be completely 
grateful is to deny the trauma that one has oneself suffered. Unable to resign herself to 
her mother’s religious explanation in which luck, good or bad, plays no role in the events 
of life, and unable to repress her emotions as her father does, Nichole experiences her 
ambivalent emotions as a failure to respond appropriately, and therefore as an occasion 
for guilt: 
I felt guilty for having so much emotion about the subject. When 
you live with people like my mother, who thinks Jesus takes care 
of everything except your weight, and my father, who goes around 
whistling and hammering and sawing all the time, you tend to feel 
guilty for your emotions. At least I did. (188) 
Survivor guilt is not, of course, something that affects Nichole alone, although her 
role in the community as the person “who must nearly died but did not” forces her to deal 
with it most overtly. (It closely resembles Dolores’s dilemma as to whether or not she is a 






division exists for those who were injured compared with those who were not; those who 
were on the bus that day, and those who were not; between those who did not have 
children on the bus, and those who did; and between those within the affected community 
of Sam Dent, and outsiders like Mitchell or the reporters who covered the story. We see 
evidence of just such an ambiguous distinction in the uncomfortable tension between 
Nichole and her brothers after she returns home from the accident: 
Rudy and Skip came down from their bedroom and said hi and all, 
looking self-conscious and like they wished they weren’t there, as 
if I was some old relative they had to be polite to. (162) 
An ambivalent line between good and ill fortune and a potential for survivor guilt (albeit 
in a much diminished form) even exists for those people outside the community who 
were indirectly traumatized by the realization that what happened in Sam Dent could 
potentially happened to them, and who therefore suffered a loss in their sense of security. 
Ultimately, the only truly fortunate people, and therefore the only people not vulnerable 
to some degree of guilt, are those who remain completely unaffected by the event, either 
because they were not emotionally touched by the news, or because they never heard 
about it. The truly lucky then, are those who never realize that they should feel fortunate. 
The accident clearly has a powerful impact on Nichole, as well as on her quality 
of life. At the same time, there are other divisions in her subjectivity that play a crucial 
role in her response to the accident, and just as significantly, that are pushed to crisis by 
that precipitating event. In Nichole’s case, one such division is the distinction between 






in part because she finds herself in the midst of adolescence. Much like Fridolin in 
Traumnovelle (see Chapter 3), who found himself in an awkward stage of life between 
being young and being old (middle age), Nichole finds herself in that awkward period of 
life that straddles childhood and adulthood. Just as Nichole’s life is divided into a life that 
existed before the accident, and a life that existed after it, her life is about to be divided 
with childhood in her past and adulthood in her present. As she begins to present her 
account, however, she occupies that poorly defined domain in between the two. Her 
ambivalent identity emerges in her interactions with her doctor, whom she calls Dr. 
Frankenstein in a childish expression of despair and frustration, but whom she resents for 
reacting to her as though she were a child, and not as a person with a fully formed 
understanding of her predicament: 
I was sick of Dr. Robeson and had started calling him Dr. 
Frankenstein, even to his face, which of course he thought was 
cute. It wasn’t cute; I did it because I felt like a monster and Dr. 
Robeson had created me out of all these different body parts. I 
couldn’t walk as good as Frankenstein’s monster, I couldn’t walk 
at all, though I could talk fine; but I felt ugly like him and out of it, 
different from everyone else. (161) 
The fact that Nichole is an adolescent establishes a naturally-occurring but 
difficult division of subjectivity and identity that just happens to coincide with the bus 
accident and with the divisive crisis that this accident engenders. Adolescence, however, 






ambivalent distinction between childhood and adulthood is further exacerbated for 
Nichole however, by ongoing sexual abuse by her father. Incest is traumatic to a child for 
a broad variety of reasons, including the violation of basic trust to a person who 
safeguards the child’s wellbeing and survival, and guilt that the child might feel for 
“participating” in an activity that the child may not yet recognize is fully coerced. The 
sexual abuse by Nichole’s father also blurs the line between childhood and adulthood, 
whereby Nichole interacts with Sam as his child, but takes on the adult role of a sexual 
partner in certain instances – at Sam’s instigation. 
Nichole occupies two “realities” or symbolized domains, the first of which she 
shares with her entire family, and the second, which she shares with her father alone. Her 
movement between these symbolized domains is entirely controlled by her father. 
Without the verification of this clandestine symbolized domain by a larger discursive 
community, and with verification of that domain withheld by the father often for long 
periods of time between episodes of abuse, it is not surprising that Nichole’s 
apprehension of the sexual abuse often relegates that experience to the insubstantiality of 
a dream: 
Those times when he left me alone, I thought maybe I had dreamed 
the whole thing up, dreams are like that, or had imagined it, 
because even when I was a little kid like Jennie, before Daddy 
started touching me that way, I had imagined some things that had 
made me ashamed, sexual things, sort of. Everybody does that. So 






start to forget that it had actually happened, and then I’d feel guilty 
for having been so upset and confused. (173-174) 
Nichole cannot apprehend the sexual abuse in the way she would apprehend a rape – by 
coming to terms with it as a part of a new Idiolectic domain – since between these 
episodes of abuse she must continue to function within the family as though the incest 
had never occurred. Not only would the integration of that abuse in Idiolect make such 
split functioning difficult, but the revelation of what is occurring could jeopardize the 
integrity of the family unit (the most essential discursive community to which Nichole 
belongs). In addition, any attempt to directly address the abuse could result in her 
discrediting and exclusion from the family, since the reality of that abuse is shared with 
the father alone, and is unlikely to be validated by him. Finally, since the abuse is 
signified in a reality that can only be validated by the father, damaging her connection 
with the father would eliminate the only discursive community in which the incest is 
acknowledged, even intermittently. (This sharing of an otherwise unknown symbolized 
“reality” forms a significant basis of Stockholm Syndrome; an otherwise seemingly 
incomprehensible identification of the victim with the perpetrator.) 
The fact of this sexual abuse complicates the division of Nichole’s identity. Like 
the distinction between lucky and unlucky, the distinction between childhood and 
adulthood is fundamentally muddled. Nichole wishes to see her role as a child in her 
family restored; a role that is determined by the kind of relationship she has with her 
parents rather than by age, and a role in which she should be unavailable to her father as a 






vulnerable to abuse. As a child, Nichole is powerless as compared with adults. Her words 
carry less weight, as we saw in Dr. Robeson’s failure to validate her traumatic sense of 
fragmentation when she called him Dr. Frankenstein. By claiming adulthood, Nichole can 
also claim an adult’s power, ironically, to escape the precocious role as her father’s 
sexual partner. In so doing, however, she risks destroying the family to which she seeks 
to return as a child. The conundrum she faces, is to exercise an adult’s power to 
determine her own limits and boundaries, putting an end to the incest, while at the same 
time avoiding the revelation of that abuse so that she can return to her role as nothing 
more (and nothing else) than the daughter of Sam and Mary Burnell. 
The division of subjectivity into someone who is fortunate and someone who is a 
victim, and in particular the public perception of Nichole as fortunate in the face of her 
private realization of her loss mirrors a prior division created by the incest. The public 
opinion of the Burnell family is that they are “pillars of the community” (110), and 
Nichole herself is known as someone who is exceptionally fortunate, the prom queen and 
a teen beauty pageant winner. Behind this public persona of someone who is not only 
fortunate, but also as an object of desire lies Nichole’s private realization of her own 
victimization, and of her parents proprietary attitude towards her, both sexually (in the 
case of her father), but also as a “victim” who can garner them a substantial monetary 
settlement over the accident. 
This split between being a victim and being an object of desire touches on a 
sensitive point in the incest that occurs between Sam and Nichole. Although it is clearly 






clear that Sam has manipulated Nichole by appealing to what she desires to be. In the 
novel, Sam helps Nichole to become a beauty queen, while in the film he helps her to 
become a folk-rock star, even promising to build her a stage of her own, in both cases 
essentially preying on her desires for herself in order to seduce her. In this way, the 
reality that Sam and Nichole share includes not only the devastating knowledge of the 
sexual abuse that has occurred, but it also includes desired aspects of identity that are not 
otherwise articulated. On Sam’s instigation, he and Nichole create a mutual fantasy – one 
in which she becomes the beauty queen/ movie star she dreams of being, while Sam 
creates the “movie star” he fantasizes about. The ambiguity of that mutual fantasy is 
expressed perhaps the most concisely in the film, both in the casting of Sam, and in his 
interaction with Nichole, which makes him appear at first to be perhaps an older 
boyfriend until Nichole refers to him as “Daddy.” 
The ambiguity in Nichole’s relationship with her father and in particular, her 
investment in the mutual fantasy that they create does not make her mutually responsible 
for the incest, of course, but it does point to the vulnerability that Sam exploits in order to 
manipulate Nichole. The simultaneously positive and negative aspect of their incestuous 
relationship only complicates the matter, making it more difficult for Nichole to protect 
herself against her father’s advances. The sexual abuse has a profoundly negative impact 
on Nichole’s sense of self and her emotional security, even pushing her to thoughts of 
suicide as a way to escape it: 
When we got home I would run into the house from the car and go 






sound in my ears. It was awful. I lay in bed in the darkness with 
my clothes still on and listened to him lock up below and walk 
slowly up the stairs and go into his and Mom’s room and shut the 
door. […] I lay awake trying to think up ways to kill myself that 
wouldn’t upset Jennie too much. Usually, I decided on sleeping 
pills and Daddy’s vodka in the kitchen cupboard. Like Marilyn 
Monroe. But I didn’t know how to get hold of any sleeping pills, 
so the next day I always gave it up and instead tried to make what 
had happened in the car coming home from the Ansels’s seem like 
I only dreamed it. (174-175) 
At a subtle, emotional level, the abuse negates Nichole’s identity as a child in the 
Burnell family. At the same time, the end of the abuse also entails the loss of the 
“identity” that existed only in the symbolized domain created by and shared within the 
private discursive community that the two comprise. Indeed, after the accident and 
Nichole’s reliance on a wheelchair for mobility, it becomes difficult or even impossible 
for Sam to continue his fantasy. As one of the few positive outcomes in the immediate 
aftermath of the accident, he appears to have lost all interest in Nichole: 
Things with Daddy were different now too. I had become a 
wheelchair girl, and I think that scared him, like it does most 
people. You see them on the street staring at you and then looking 
away, as if you were a freak. To Daddy, it was like I was made of 






Probably I wasn’t pretty to him anymore, either, and he couldn’t 
pretend that I was like some beautiful movie star, the way he used 
to. (179) 
There is a hint of hurt feelings and a sense of being rejected in this observation, as though 
perhaps her beauty is diminished by her disability. She expressed this fear when she 
began referring to her physician as Dr. Frankenstein, envisioning herself as a monster 
cobbled together out of the shattered remains of a body. That fear is then reinforced by 
Sam’s sudden loss of interest in her, however unwanted that interest might otherwise 
have been. 
The “mutual secret” that Nichole shares with her father stresses another 
opposition in her daily life and identity. On the one hand, she experiences the inclusion of 
being the center of her father’s undivided attention. At the same time, she has a profound 
experience of marginalization, both within the family (because of her secret), and by her 
father, whose interest in her evaporates when he is not sexually exploiting her. She notes 
that her efforts to imagine that the abuse had never really happened, is made easier by 
Sam’s fluctuating interest in her: 
I didn’t have to try very hard, because Daddy, except when he 
wanted to do those things with me, the rest of the time treated me 
normally, like nothing wrong had happened. Always, the next 
morning at breakfast he was just the same old Daddy, grumpy and 
distracted, bossing the boys and me and Jennie around, ignoring 






food at the rest of us and as usual worrying over her diet. She 
never eats anything in front of anybody but keeps getting fatter and 
fatter all the time. She’s not a blimp, but she is fat. (175) 
The secret that Nichole keeps separates her from others in her family, just as that secret 
essentially separates Sam from the others. Before the accident, their mutual silence 
allows them to maintain the appearance of a normally integrated family life. After the 
accident, however, with each family member responding to the accident in a different 
way, Nichole finds that her sense of fragmentation in the family is even more pronounced 
– “fission in the nuclear family” (121) as Mitchell expresses it. Nichole’s prior awareness 
of how a secret can separate one within one’s own private reality enables her to perceive 
that later disintegration as the product of secret knowledge that cannot be shared: 
It had started back when Daddy started touching me and making 
me keep his secret, but he and I were the only ones who knew 
about that, so we had all gone on afterwards as if we were still a 
normal family, with everyone needing and trusting one another, 
just like you’re supposed to. But now it was like everyone, not just 
me and Daddy had their secrets, and Jennie and I had ours, and 
Rudy and Skip had theirs, and we each had our own lonely secrets 
that we shared with no one. (198) 
For Nichole, the sense of separation is more dramatically pronounced, both 
because of the incest that she had had to conceal, but also because of her special status as 






must come to terms. Her separation from her immediate family finds a corporeal 
expression in her new room – a remodeled sun room downstairs, away from the 
bedrooms occupied by the rest of the family. Nichole’s first response to being moved out 
of the room she had previously shared with Jennie is one of anxiety, and she reflexively 
fears that this change is intended to make her more available, and hence more vulnerable 
to her father’s inappropriate attentions. That fear is so immediately present, that she at 
first completely forgets the realistic barrier of the stairs: 
“My new room? What’s wrong with the old one?” I knew what 
was wrong with it – it was upstairs, will all the other bedrooms and 
the big bathroom, and I couldn’t get to it anymore. But it was 
mine, mine and Jennie’s since she was a baby, and we were safe 
there, because there were two of us, and he never dared to come in 
there. Nothing bad had ever happened in that dark little room with 
the bunk beds and the clutter of all our clothes and her toys and my 
school stuff and pictures and posters on the walls. (163) 
The new room, which Sam has renovated himself, is decorated like a princess’ 
chamber, emphasizing Nichole’s role as child in the family and expressing Sam’s guilt 
over the incest. His awkward efforts to prepare the home for her all seem to represent an 
attempt to make amends as he now ceases to abuse Nichole. His daughter’s disability has 
become an opportunity for him to reclaim the role of the “good father” that he forfeited 






The first thing I noticed, when Daddy opened the car door and 
pushed the wheelchair up next to it, was the ramp he’d built. It was 
made of wood and way too wide and sloped from the ground up to 
the front porch beside the regular people’s steps. My very own 
entrance, like for a circus elephant. I pictured Daddy out there 
evenings after work, whistling like he does when he’s got himself a 
new carpentry project, hammering and sawing in porchlight, 
feeling proud of himself – a good daddy. (161) 
The awkwardness in his behavior, especially around Nichole, betrays his own 
vulnerability – a vulnerability that will become important when Nichole eventually 
extracts herself from his perfidious influence: 
“I had to widen a few doors too. You’ll see,” he said proudly, and 
he pushed me up his ramp and into the living room, like I was a 
new piece of furniture. Then he didn’t know what to do with me, 
where to park me. Put me by the window, I wanted to tell him, 
next to the plants. But I said nothing. He was confused, and I guess 
I felt sorry for him. (162) 
The physical separation of Nichole’s room and her private ramp into the house 
intensifies her sense of being excluded from the family. She feels rage at her father for 
the abuse, rage at her mother for failing to recognize the abuse, and even rage at her two 






as boys, to their father’s attentions. In fact, the only sense of connection she can claim to 
feel is with her younger sister, Jennie: 
The room made me feel like I was suddenly a tenant, like I had 
been eased out of the family somehow. I wanted that, though. In a 
way, being a tenant was perfect. Except for Jennie, I didn’t want to 
be a member of the same family as the rest of them, and I was glad 
that we could never go back to being the family we had been 
before the accident. Glad; not happy. (165) 
The connection with Jennie is motivated both by identification (as a daughter of that 
family), but also, perhaps, by a measure of guilt, since the end of her fathers interest in 
her will certainly mean the beginning of his interest in Jennie. She encourages Jennie to 
stay in her room downstairs, after ensuring that a lock is placed on the door: 
 I wheeled my chair into the room and looked at the back of the 
door. “It needs a lock on the door,” I said. 
 “It does. Sure it does. A girl needs her privacy and all, right? 
I’ll fix that up now,” he said briskly, and he left the room to get his 
tools and a lock from his shop in the basement. (165) 
Nichole also ensures that Jennie gets the lock she wanted on her own room – the room 
they formerly shared – “to keep the boys out,” as Jennie articulates it, meaning their two 






 “You got to keep the boys out,” Jennie said. “I need a lock too. 
Mommy says I don’t need one because I’m only six. But the boys 
are always barging in when I’m undressing and stuff.” 
 “That’s right. A girl needs her privacy,” I said. “Don’t worry, 
I’ll get Daddy to do it for you,” I said, and she grinned and pinched 
me on the cheek like she was the grownup and I was the baby. 
(165-166) 
As the family returns to its normal routine, Nichole takes refuge in her room, 
establishing it as a world apart by remaining ensconced in it even when the rest of the 
family is away at work and at school. The arrangement appears to be comfortable for 
Sam as well, and he buys her a television so that she need not even join the family to 
watch television with them in the evening: 
During the days, I pretty much had the whole house to myself, but 
I still stayed in my room. One night Daddy brought home a 
portable black-and-white TV for me that he had bought used in 
Ausable Forks, and he tied it into the regular cable, so I was able to 
watch TV then without leaving my room. (179) 
The stark contrast of being the center of attention and then abruptly marginalized within 
the family is replicated in the community. Nichole has no outside routine and no outside 
contacts except at physical therapy since the accident, and by mutual agreement with the 
school principal, she completes the eighth grade with home study. This arrangement is 






obvious reminder to the other children of the accident and cause the renewal of their 
traumatic symptoms. Nichole’s role in the community has become that of a symbol or a 
living monument to the accident, rather than that of an active participant: 
Anyhow, I don’t think Mr. Dillinger wanted me wheeling around 
school reminding everyone of the accident and the kids who had 
died in it. They’d hired some woman from Plattsburgh, I heard, 
and arranged all these special group therapy meetings and 
assemblies for the kids after the accident, and things had more or 
less returned to normal now. (177) 
The arrangement also suits Nichole, who fears the awkward silences and 
ostracizing reactions of her classmates if she returned to school in her wheelchair. Her 
ambivalent sense of being both lucky and unlucky emerges here as survivor guilt, since 
she occupies the mediating position between the less fortunate children who perished, 
and the more fortunate children who were not permanently injured. At the same time, 
Nichole will certainly enflame the survivor guilt of those children who must look at her 
and feel that they are “fortunate,” giving her fear that they will react in a rejecting manner 
a solid basis in reality: 
I didn’t want them to stop what they were doing or saying when I 
rolled up in my wheelchair, “Hi, guys, what’s up?” I knew what 
I’d look like to them, how they’d all go silent for a minute when 
the dweeb arrived and then change the subject not to embarrass her 






she couldn’t do, like dancing or sports or just hanging out. Poor 
Nichol, the cripple. That’s the best I’d get from them – pity. And 
no matter how many of those group therapy sessions they’d been 
to, everyone would see me and instantly think of the kids who 
weren’t there anymore, the kids who had not been lucky like me, 
and maybe they would hate me for it. And I wouldn’t blame them. 
(177) 
Nichole has already experienced this loss of a mutually shared apprehension of reality in 
the dwindling visits from her former friends. Ultimately, these awkward visits cease 
altogether in the awareness that not only do Nichole and her former friends occupy 
different realities, but the mutual interest in one another is thereby diminished. Nichole 
herself expresses no desire to try and return to her former identity and role in the 
community: 
[…] it was always self-conscious and embarrassing, especially 
with the kids my age, my friends, so called, and I knew they could 
hardly wait to leave, and I was glad myself when they did. Then 
only my best friend, Jody Plante, and one or two others, when they 
could get someone to drive them over, came to visit, and that was 
okay. But by the time I left the hospital to come home, I had pretty 
much run out of things to talk about with them. We were living in 
different worlds now, and they couldn’t know about mine, and I 






Each of the divisions of Nichole’s subjectivity that I have mentioned – whether 
lucky or unlucky, whether the object of abuse or the object of desire, or whether the 
center of attention or marginalized – finds expression in a single opposition; whether 
Nichole is a helpless victim, or a nomothete who authors shared symbolic meaning. 
Nichole’s family has a stake in her identity as helpless victim who, necessarily, is 
completely malleable to their will and who allows herself to be manipulated. The most 
obvious way in which this is demanded of her is in Sam’s expectation that she will 
tolerate his inappropriate attentions without acting to put a stop to them, in particular by 
telling someone about the abuse. In taking the risk he does, which could destroy his 
family and even lead to criminal prosecution, Sam bargains with Nichole’s compliance 
and her willingness to view herself as a helpless victim. 
It is not only Sam who expects Nichole to take on the role of the helpless victim, 
but rather, both parents take a somewhat exploitive and proprietary view of Nichole. 
Before the accident, Sam and Mary basked in the praise of the community for Nichole’s 
achievements, and they lived, in a sense, vicariously through her, promoting her in order 
to obtain the social admiration they desire for themselves. This kind of self-serving 
interest might be difficult to distinguish from ordinary parental support and the desire to 
see one’s children do well. After the accident, they readjust themselves and exploit the 
community’s perception of Nichole as a tragic victim to create an almost beatified image 
of their own identity. Unlike their previous use of her, this form of exploitation is a bit 






about the founder of the town as a salutatorian speech at graduation, on the condition that 
she sanitize the essay to make it more laudatory: 
I had written a research paper for English on Sam Dent, the man 
the town was named after, and had received an A+ for it, and Mr. 
Dillinger and Mrs. Crosby, the English teacher, said that with a 
little revising it would make a perfect salutatorian’s speech. The 
way they wanted me to revise it, I knew without their even saying, 
was to turn Sam Dent into an example for the kids who were 
graduating, which meant that I’d have to cut out all the bad things 
he’d done like cheating the Indians out of their land and buying his 
way out of the Civil War things that lots of people did in those 
days but that were just as bad as they would be now. (188-189) 
The hypocrisy of this request is uncomfortably echoed in the parents’ request that she 
should attend the graduation and give the speech. Certainly, they had not insisted that she 
actually return to school and attend with her classmates, and Nichole accurately 
recognizes that her parents’ motivation is that they themselves will be the center of 
attention: 
 “C’mon, Babes,” Dad said. “You’ll be the star of the show.” 
 “Some star,” I said. “What you mean is, you and Mom’ll be the 







While in the past, Nichole had tolerated their manipulative exploitation of her, 
making her the center of attention as a way of thrusting themselves into the limelight as 
well, Nichole finds that she is no longer willing to participate in their use of her. The 
crisis created by the accident and having to come to terms with her disability gives 
Nichole the positive impetus to question her helplessness in other arenas of life. In 
consequence, she resolves to begin acting on her own motivation for her own benefit: 
No, the reason I was dead set on avoiding the graduation 
ceremonies was because Mom and Daddy were so dead set on 
getting me to do it and because they wanted it for themselves, not 
me. They didn’t realize that, of course, but I did. Sometimes I 
almost felt sorry for them, the way they desperately needed me to 
be a star, and that’s why in the past, before the accident, I had 
always given in to them. But no more. Now I only did what I 
wanted to do, for my reasons. (189) 
It is at the moment of her refusal to participate in her parents’ exploitive use of her that 
Sam and Mary Burnell show the full measure of their selfish motivation, by stating their 
intention to attend Nichole’s graduation without her, even going as far as to get dressed 
up for the event before finally abandoning their plan. They are too unaware of their own 
distorted motivations to realize how embarrassing it should be for them to attend their 
daughter’s graduation without her. As she explains to them, it would make them look 






 At the last minute, Mom and Daddy almost went to the 
graduation ceremonies without me, just the two of them, all 
dressed up, but I talked them out of it. It was a stupid idea, but 
typical of them. They couldn’t bear being kept out of the limelight. 
 “It’s not the same as going to church every Sunday without 
me,” I explained, “where people feel sorry for me and proud of 
you. People at school will just think you’re dumb and will feel 
sorry for you instead of me,” I said. (199) 
The most crass instance of Sam and Mary’s proprietary use of Nichole is, of 
course, the class negligence suit itself, in which Nichole is to appear as Mitchell 
Stephens’s star witness. The parent’s interest in the suit is first and foremost in the money 
they will receive from a settlement, essentially placing a gross, monetary value on their 
daughter’s anatomy and on what they perceive that they have lost in reflected glory with 
the loss of her ability to walk: 
[…] I sat there for a minute, looking at my dumb worthless legs 
reflected in the window glass. They looked like they belonged to 
someone else. How much had they been worth a year ago, I 
wondered. Or last fall, at the Keene Valley game and the Harvest 
Ball afterwards, when Bucky Waters and I, with crowns on our 
heads, danced in the gym in front of the whole school? And to 






everything then and nothing now. But to Mom and Daddy, nothing 
then and a couple of million dollars now. (187) 
This sudden emphasis on Nichole’s great misfortune and on the enormity of her tragic 
role conflicts with her parents’ prior assertions of how lucky she is, in particular when 
compared with the fourteen children who died. The manipulation of her status as victim, 
the rehearsed quality of her parents’ lines, and the incongruity of her experience of the 
trauma compared with the “ethical” address of it in the suit is at once apparent to 
Nichole, who has developed a keen ability to spot hypocrisy: 
 I hate these kinds of conversations, like everyone but me 
knows the lines and has been rehearsing the scene without me. 
 Daddy sighed. “It’s because of the accident,” he said. “A lot of 
people in the town whose kids were on the bus have got lawyers, 
because of the accident. Thank god we didn’t lose you, but a lot of 
people… well, you know. People in town are very, very angry,” he 
said. “Us included. There’s been a lot of grief here. People lost 
their children, Babes.” 
 “Yeah, but you didn’t lose me!” 
 “No, honey,” Mom said. “And we will thank the Lord for that 
every day and night for the rest of our lives. But you… you almost 
died, and you were badly injured, and you won’t be… you 
can’t…” 






 “Well, that’s… that’s a terrible loss,” Daddy said. “To you, 
especially,’ he said. ‘But to all of us.” (168) 
Unlike Mitchell or her parents, Nichole is not satisfied with an “ethical” narrative 
of the trauma that is useful, and that will result in pecuniary rewards, and instead, she 
desires a narrative that reflects the truth of her experience. The narrative that Mitchell 
constructs for the case is not motivated by the experience of trauma or by epistemic crisis 
that disrupts identity. It is a utilitarian narrative in which it is more important that it be 
believable, than that it be true. (Traumatic experience, by its very nature, violates the 
structures of symbolized meaning and therefore a true and accurate expression of trauma 
is likely to be less believable to those outside the experience than the “ethical narrative” 
imposed upon it.) From Nichole’s perspective, the “ethical narrative” of the accident 
proposed by Mitchell is abhorrent, and her parents’ decision to sue violates the 
interpretation of her loss that they had previously proposed – namely, that she should 
view herself as being very fortunate both for having survived and for not remembering 
the accident. Nichole’s survival and loss of memory has become her parent’s good 
fortune in the amount of money an injured survivor can garner – in particular one who 
cannot remember enough to contradict the story cobbled together by their lawyer: 
It just wasn’t right – to be alive, to have had what people assured 
you was a close call, and then go out and hire a lawyer; it wasn’t 
right. And even if you were the mother and father of one of the 
kids who had died, like the Ottos or the Walkers, what good would 






accident, and then collect a bunch of money from the state – it was 
understandable, yet somehow it didn’t seem right, either. But to be 
the mother and father of one of the kids who had survived the 
accident, even a kid like me, who would spend the rest of her life 
as a cripple, and then to sue – I didn’t understand that at all, and I 
really knew it wasn’t right. Not if I was, like they said, truly lucky. 
(171) 
Although the legal suit frames its approach to the tragedy in ethical terms, that 
approach is inherently immoral. It is, in other words, a conscious manipulation of the 
truth surrounding the accident to create a social apprehension of the event, through which 
a few people benefit. Any collective address of trauma will naturally require a 
compromise that reaffirms the boundaries of the social entity. As I mentioned in the 
previous section, Mitchell Stephens construction of his apprehension of the accident 
serves the interests of outsiders like himself, who might benefit by the designation of a 
perpetrator such as the school bus manufacturer or state’s highway bureau. Sanctions 
against such a “perpetrator,” however unfounded, together with the promise that 
shortcomings will be rectified, in turn, increases the sense of security for those most 
peripherally affected by the tragedy – that is, whose who learn about it indirectly, and for 
whom the realization that such an accident could happen is unsettling. Mitchell finds a 
secondary satisfaction in the monetary rewards of such a case as well, and in his ability to 







Nichole, as both a survivor of the accident and as a member of the community of 
Sam Dent, is motivated by far different interests. Although it is not yet apparent to her 
what ramifications the suit will have for the community as a whole, it is clear that the suit 
will not address the truth that she, Dolores, and Billy perceive – that the crash was a 
terrible and random accident resulting from the unfortunate intersection of contributing 
factors that can neither be predicted, nor controlled: 
 […] Mr. Stephens was going on about how tough it would be 
for me to answer some of the questions those other lawyers would 
ask. “They work for the people we’re trying to sue, you 
understand, and their job is to try to minimize the damages. Our 
job, Nichole, is to try to maximize the damages,’ he explained. ‘If 
you think of it that way, as people doing their jobs, no good guys 
and no bad guys, just our side and the other side, then it’ll go easier 
for you.” 
 No one was interested in the truth, was what he was saying. 
Because the truth was that it was an accident, that’s all, and no one 
was to blame. “I won’t lie,” I told him. (185-186) 
Nichole’s refusal to allow herself to be manipulated and her refusal to lie for her parents’ 
or Mr. Mitchell’s sake brings together the trauma of the bus accident and the trauma of 
incest, in which she has also been forced to allow herself to be manipulated and required 






and repeats her refusal, letting him know that she can no longer be used to serve his 
personal objectives: 
“No matter what they ask me,” I said, “I’ll tell the truth,” and I 
looked straight at Daddy, who had taken a seat next to Mom on the 
sofa. He studied his tea when I said that, as if he had seen a fly in 
it. I knew what he was thinking, and he knew what I was thinking 
too. (186) 
The trauma of incest is brought to a point of crisis by the trauma that Nichole 
suffers in the bus accident and afterwards, as she comes to terms with her disability. The 
resolution she eventually works out for that more immediate trauma, in turn, will provide 
her with a resolution for the deeper trauma of the incest. Nichole’s experience with and 
bitterness over having been manipulated and used in the past makes her uniquely immune 
to Mitchell’s attempts to manipulate and seduce her. She recognizes it at once, although 
she does not immediately refuse to participate in the suit, feeling reassured that nothing 
she says will harm anyone on the community or result in anyone being blamed unfairly: 
Of course, he was also afraid that I would refuse to go along with 
their lawsuit. I still hadn’t agreed to do it, not in so many words, 
but in my mind I had decided to go ahead and say what they 
wanted me to say, which they insisted was only to answer Mr. 
Stephens’s and the other lawyer’s questions truthfully. That 
couldn’t hurt anything, I figured, because the truth was, I didn’t 






said could be used to blame anybody for it. It was an accident, 
that’s all. Accidents happen. (181) 
At the same time, Mitchell Stephens’s attempt to put Nichole on the witness stand places 
her in a position of unique power – a power she has never before had in her dealings with 
adults. For the first time in her life, Nichole has power over her father, who had so abused 
his power over her in the past. She has become the nomothete who apprehends a reality 
beyond shared symbolized meaning, and who therefore is separate from and able to 
create meaning, rather than merely adhering to it as a victim. She has, in a sense, acquired 
the power of the perpetrator who can transgress the law, and in so doing, demonstrates 
that he is more powerful than the law. The narrative of the accident that Nichole creates 
has the capacity to shape the community’s apprehension of that tragedy. Nichole has been 
given an opportunity to reject the failed morality of her parents, and to create a morality 
of her own, however difficult it might be to choose the “right” thing to do: 
The whole thing, even though I liked Mr. Stephens and trusted 
him, made me feel greedy and dishonest. I looked at my picture of 
Einstein. What would he have done, if he’d been in the accident 
and been lucky like me? (187) 
Nichole certainly cannot look to her parents for guidance in choosing the right 
thing to do. She finds someone, however, who represents the morality of the “good 
father” in Billy Ansel, for whom she had previously babysat, and whom she finds to be a 
truly laudable individual. Indeed, the comparison of Billy as the “good father” with Sam 






Nichole in the car when picking her up after babysitting at Billy’s. These two figures 
representing kinds of fathering are juxtaposed against one another again within the 
context of the law suit. The contrast between the two is made most apparent when Billy 
visits the Burnells, hoping to dissuade them from going through with the case. Despite 
her positive feelings for Billy, it is painful for Nichole to face him after the accident and 
the deaths of Jessica and Mason, whom she used to baby-sit. In light of the loss of his 
children, Nichole experiences a particularly strong sense of survivor guilt towards him, 
and hides in her room so that he won’t see her and be reminded of the accident, and the 
happier times before, when their common objective was the care of his children: 
In the last couple of years, after Billy’s wife died, I had become his 
kids’ regular baby-sitter, and now they were gone too. Maybe I 
was stuck in a wheelchair and all, but I sure wasn’t dead, like his 
twins, so the idea of him seeing me made me cringe with shame. I 
didn’t want to be seen by anyone whose kids had been killed in the 
accident, but especially not Billy Ansel. (191) 
Hidden in the doorway to her room, Nichole is able to hear the heated debate 
between Billy and her parents over the suit. There, she finally gets a true insight both into 
her parents true motivations, and into the devastating repercussions that the suit will have 
on the community in which she has grown up. The doubts she has entertained as to the 
morality of such a suit are given a voice by Billy, and therefore find validation in at least 






buy another adult to provide justification for their actions betray the lack of thought 
invested in the truth of what happened the morning the bus went off the road: 
 “Yeah, so? Lots of folks have got lawyers.” 
 “But yours is the one who’s gonna subpoena me, Sam. Force 
me to testify in court. He came by the garage this afternoon, real 
smooth and friendly.” 
 “Why would he do that?” Mom said. “You didn’t have 
anything to do with the accident.” She’s so out of it. Even I knew 
that Billy had been driving behind the bus that day, so he could 
wave at his kids, like he always did. That made him the only 
person not on the bus who’d actually witnessed the accident, which 
meant that he’d be the one to tell if Dolores had been driving 
safely. They naturally couldn’t sue anybody if Dolores was driving 
recklessly, and only Billy knew the truth about that. (193-194) 
The claim made by Mitchell Stephens and Nichole’s parents that the suit will not 
harm anyone in the town, is belied by Billy, who reveals how the various lawsuits led by 
different lawyers are tearing the community of Sam Dent apart, providing material gain 
to the few at the cost of the many. The integrity of the social fabric that binds them and 
that makes a community of the town is endangered. The suits being filed have led into the 







Billy said, “A couple of local folks I won’t bother to name – but 
you know them, Sam, they’re friends of yours – they’ve even 
started a suit against the school board, because they’re not happy 
with the way they decided to use the money that got collected 
around town last winter and the junk that people sent in from all 
over.” (195) 
The greed that has seized the townspeople knows almost no bounds. Some townspeople 
have even proposed suing the rescue squad, whose efforts saved the lives of many of the 
children, including Nichole, demonstrating that no good deed will go unpunished as long 
as there is gain to be had: 
“Yesterday,” he said, “I heard somebody wants to sue the rescue 
squad, for Christ’s sake. The rescue squad. Because they 
supposedly didn’t act fast enough.” (195) 
Like Nichole, Billy has two primary interests in the resolution of trauma as 
someone who was close enough to the accident to be directly affected (both in the death 
of his children and in the fact that he witnessed the tragedy). On the one hand, he must 
deal with the individual experience of trauma and the destruction of meaning brought 
about by the devastating loss of his children in an accident that defies the establishment 
of valid causality and culpability. On the other hand, his social interest is in the town and 
its preservation as an essential social entity. In approaching the Burnells, Billy appeals to 
their social sense and to the role they have played in the town as he asks them to help him 






shocks even Nichole, who is otherwise familiar with their lack of reflection and self-
serving motivations. 
 “If you two could make a smart shyster lawyer like Stephens 
pull out, then maybe the other people in town would start to see the 
light and people can get their mourning done properly and get on 
with their lives. This has become a hateful place to live, Sam. 
Hateful.” 
 “Not for us,” Daddy said. 
 “No, not for us,” Mom chimed in. 
 What a dumb thing for them to say. It shocked even me. (196) 
It is clear that Sam and Mary’s motivations are so selfish and self-serving, that 
they are either wholly unaware of the fragmentation of the community, or they do not 
care. The worst of their motivations – their greed together with their ability to put a 
monetary value on their daughter – comes to the fore as Sam claims that whatever the 
consequences to the community as a whole, their need for money takes precedence: 
“No, Billy. We can’t drop the lawsuit,” Daddy said. “I shouldn’t 
have to tell you, because I run a pretty good tab at your garage, but 
we need the money, Billy. For hospital bills and suchlike. Just for 
living.” (196) 
There is a stark disparity between this greedy attitude in which there is a sense that 
money can provide adequate compensation for the suffering of their child, and Billy’s 






powerful expression of what it means to be the “good father,” Billy even offers to pay 
Nichole’s hospital bills himself in order to placate the Burnell’s greed and safeguard the 
integrity of their community. Even this is not enough for Mary and Sam however. In that 
moment when Nichole realizes how little grief her parents experience – the way in which 
they are essentially failing to “know” what she suffers and using her for their own 
advancement – she also experiences a hatred of her parents. With that hatred, comes the 
separation she needs to realize a sense of what she, herself, believes is moral and right: 
At that moment, I hated my parents more than I ever had. I hated 
them for all that had gone before – Daddy for what he knew and 
had done, and Mom for what she didn’t know and hadn’t done – 
but I also hated them for this new thing, this awful lawsuit. The 
lawsuit was wrong. Purely and in God’s eyes, as Mom especially 
should know, it was wrong; but also it was making Billy Ansel 
sadder than life had already done on its own, and that seemed 
stupid and cruel; and now it looked like half the people in town 
were doing it too, making everyone around them crazy with pain, 
the same as Mom and Daddy were doing to Billy, so they didn’t 
have to face their own pain and get over it. (197) 
That moment of realization frees Nichole from acting to please her parents and 
will ultimately allow her to establish new boundaries in that relationship based on an 
adult’s awareness of self, rather than a child’s need to keep her parents well disposed 






growing, however, since her return from the hospital, as Nichole realizes the true 
criminality of her father’s actions and what he has taken from her: 
I looked at him, though, I looked right into him. I had changed 
since the accident, and not just in my body, and he knew it. His 
secret was mine, now; I owned it. It used to be like I shared it with 
him, but no more. Before, everything had been fluid and changing 
and confused, but me not knowing for sure what had happened or 
who was to blame. But now I saw him as a thief, just a sneaky little 
thief in the night who had robbed his own daughter of what was 
supposed to be permanently hers – like he had robbed me of my 
soul or something, whatever it was that Jennie still had and I 
didn’t. And then the accident robbed me of my body. (180) 
Nichole begins to understand that unshared knowledge can bring with it immense power. 
The pleasure that Sam has stolen from her – of which he deprived her, and upon which he 
lays an illegitimate claim – have come at a great cost to him. Nichole has become the 
repository not only of he own most terrible secret, but of her father’s most terrible secret 
as well. Indeed, in the wake of the accident, she has the impression that this secret is all 
that is left to her of value: 
No, the only truly valuable thing that I owned now happened to be 
Daddy’s worst secret, and I meant to hold onto it. It was like I 






hand and it made him afraid of me. Every time he saw me looking 
at him hard, he trembled. (180) 
The trauma of the bus accident is closely tied to Nichole’s situation with her 
father and her realization of the power that she possesses to create her family’s reality by 
either concealing or revealing the secret of her father’s abuse. She realizes in the first 
instance, that trauma separates people in their own separate apprehension of reality, 
turning one member of a family against another, and turning one member of a community 
against another: 
I knew it was all connected to what had happened between me and 
Daddy before the accident, and through that to the accident itself, 
which had changed me and my view of everyone else, and now 
from the accident to this lawsuit – which had set Mom and Daddy 
against me, although they didn’t know that yet, and me against 
everyone. (198) 
Nichole witnesses a manipulation of shared reality both in the incest and in the accident – 
by the suppression of certain facts or awareness, and the stressing of other facts or 
awareness. That manner of manipulation splits covalent traumatic experience so that it 
can be fit into the clear-cut categories of social discourse. That perception that she is 
“lucky” is arbitrarily inverted for the lawsuit, in which she must play the consummate 
victim. Similarly, she is expected to remain the silent victim of the sexual abuse between 
“incidents,” even as she is being asked to play an active role in co-authoring the fantasy 






the trauma (and of Nichole’s identity) is created to serve a specific social purpose not 
because it is true, but because it is mutually comprehensible and therefore believable. 
Both narratives of the accident – that Nichole is a fortunate survivor and an unfortunate 
victim – reflect a solution to shared, collective trauma that eliminates the ambivalence 
that characterizes the unmediated experience of trauma. Nichole’s experience is that her 
fortune is ambivalent – with good luck and bad luck linked in a covalent bond such that 
they can neither be merged, nor separated, as she realizes through her interaction with 
other traumatized individuals at the rehabilitation center. Her experience of trauma has 
given her a sublime understanding of how “ambiguous” experience is in the face of often 
falsifying and concretizing symbolized expressions of experience: 
[…] Mom had been carting me over to Lake Placid for physical 
therapy at the Olympic Center, where there were lots of kids and 
young people who were even worse off than I was, and some of 
them had made friends with me, so I was beginning to see myself 
in the world a little clearer by then. I didn’t feel so abnormal 
anymore, and I didn’t worry so much about whether I was lucky or 
unlucky. I was both, like most people. (189) 
At home, Nichole has the capacity to create a definitive narrative of her family’s 
life by revealing or concealing her father’s secret, thereby creating either a happy family 
or a divided family. This same capacity is mirrored in the legal suit. She alone among the 
survivors of the crash will be called to testify, and she alone has been given the power to 






power gives Nichole a dual benefit, since she can testify in such a way that she eliminates 
any basis for the suit, thereby preserving the integrity of the community’s social fabric (a 
moral decision that puts the common good above personal gain), and she can demonstrate 
to her father that she is both capable and willing to work against his interests in the 
pursuit of what is moral. Her father, as she wryly notes, will now precisely what this 
gesture means: 
 I suddenly realized that I myself – and not Daddy and Mom or 
the Walkers or the Ottos – could force Mr. Stephens to drop the 
lawsuit. I could force their big shot lawyer to walk away from the 
case. And Daddy would know that I did it. Which would give me a 
good laugh. And because of what I knew about him, he wouldn’t 
be able to do a thing about it afterwards. It wouldn’t really matter, 
but maybe then we could become a regular family again. Husband 
and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, all of us 
trusting one another, with no secrets. 
 Except the big one, of course. Which would always be there, 
no matter what I did, like a huge purple birthmark on my face, 
something that he alone would see whenever he looked at me, and 
I, whenever I looked in the mirror. (198 - 199) 
By utilizing the suit to place her father “on notice” in a manner of speaking, Nichole can 
ensure both her own and her sister Jennie’s safety, by tacitly allowing her father to 






The decision to thwart the suit is a mature decision, and an elegant solution both 
for her situation of abuse, and for the fragmentation of her community. In choosing her 
own morality, rejecting her parents hypocritical and essentially failed “ethics,” Nichole 
reaches adulthood – a transformation in her identity of which she herself is consciously 
aware: 
Those summer mornings and afternoons alone in the house with 
Jennie were, in a way, the last days of my childhood; that’s how it 
felt, even at the time it was happening to me. (201) 
Nichole is in a unique position to achieve such transformation precisely because, as an 
adolescent, she is at an age in life in which a dramatic alteration of subjectivity and the 
integration of a more evolved view of life are expected. The changes that she undergoes 
in response to her traumatic experience can be partially subsumed under the monumental 
changes that accompany the transition into adulthood. Having existed in a state of divided 
“reality” and identity that is deemed “natural” by society (i.e. adolescence), Nichole is 
perhaps better equipped to accept the fact that meaning and identity change with 
experience. 
Nichole carries out her plan with a calm resolution that causes even the jaded Mr. 
Stephens to later remark: “You’d make a great poker player, kid” (215). She arrives at the 
deposition by the opposing lawyers and finds that, as she anticipated, she has been 
summoned to appear as an essentially mute victim, rendered more a piece of evidence 






I guess I was Mr. Stephens’s choice witness, Exhibit A or 
something, and they figured there wasn’t much they could ask me 
that would help their case. They knew the facts already, and I was 
obviously exactly what I looked like, a poor teenaged kid in a 
wheelchair, a victim – and that served only Mr. Stephens’s 
purpose, and of course Mom’s and Daddy’s purpose, and the 
Walkers’ and the Ottos.’ (206) 
Completely blindsiding Mitchell Stephens, she claims that as she is deposed and as she 
talks, her memory is unexpectedly returning. With Nichole already in the midst of giving 
her deposition, there is essentially nothing that Mitchell can do to arrest the runaway 
course that his case has taken. He is reduced to voicing weak objections to his own 
witness’s testimony as Nichole single-handedly creates the dominant narrative of the 
accident: 
 “You remember that much,” he said. Like, How interesting. 
 “Yes. As I’m talking, I’m remembering more about it.” And I 
really was, which surprised me probably as much as it was 
surprising the lawyers. 
 Mr. Stephens looked worried. “Note my objection. She said, 
‘As I’m talking.’” (212) 
The way in which Nichole stops the suit closely resembles the way in which she 
stops the sexual abuse at home – by concealing the truth, and creating a narrative that 






to preserve the knowledge for herself that every individual is held in his or her own  
perception of reality, and that even her community is held in a social reality that differs 
from that of other social entities. Just as Nichole elects to keep Sam’s secret in exchange 
for being once again a “regular family,” Nichole keeps the truth of the accident to herself: 
“It was an accident, that’s all. Accidents happen” (181). In both instances, the truth will 
permanently destroy the discursive community (rather then disrupt), in the former case, 
that of Nichole’s family, and in the latter, that of her community, the town of Sam Dent. 
Instead of asserting her own truth, that the accident is not subject to rational 
understanding by taking refuge in causality and culpability, she creates a story that, like 
Mitchell’s case, is believable, if not absolutely true. It is a pragmatic story constructed 
not to obtain the greatest gain for anyone, but to do the least harm, by placing the blame 
on Dolores, whom it would be pointless to prosecute or sue. She sacrifices Dolores, in 
other words, for the sake of the larger community: 
 Mr. Schwartz went on, “Well, then, what else did you observe 
at that time? Before the actual accident, I mean.” 
 “I was scared.” 
 “You were scared? Of what? This is before the accident, I 
mean.” 
 “Yes, I understand. Dolores was driving too fast, and it scared 
me.” 







 “The speedometer. And it was downhill there.” 
 “You could see the speedometer?” 
 “Yes, I looked, because it was snowing so hard. And because it 
seemed to me that we were going very fast coming down the hill 
there. I was scared.” Mr. Stephens, I noticed, had gone silent. (213) 
The lie that Nichole tells is a lie that no one will contradict. Certainly Billy Ansel 
will not, since as Nichole is already aware, his interest too, is in the preservation of 
community. Nichole has found a transcendent solution to the problem of trauma, by 
realizing that trauma creates separate realities, and that those realities cannot be united. 
These were divided not by the accident, but by the secrets that each individual must keep, 
by his or her own traumatic experiences, and the divisions of subjectivity to which each 
individual is vulnerable. At the same time, public discourse must give the appearance that 
it arises out of a shared symbolized field of meaning to which all members more or less 
subscribe. The narrative of trauma in a discursive community must, above all, be 
believable to its participants, whatever their underlying apprehension of meaning (i.e. 
Idiolect). The solution that Nichole finds provides a narrative that serves the interests of 
her town, her own community. She nevertheless retains an awareness of the disparity of 
individual apprehensions of that narrative, just as she recognizes the disparity in the 
opposing lawyers’, her father’s, and in Mitchell Stephens’s apprehension of the narrative 
she produces in the deposition: 
 Daddy would have concluded by now that I had lied, however, 






doesn’t remember anything about the accident, she has no idea 
how fast Dolores was going. And Mr. Stephens would have to 
point out to him that, Sam, it doesn’t matter whether she was lying 
or not, the lawsuit is dead, everyone’s lawsuit is dead. Forget it. 
Tell the others to forget it. It’s over. Right now, Sam, the thing you 
got to worry about is why she lied. A kid who’d do that to her own 
father is not normal, Sam. 
 But Daddy knew why I had lied. He knew who was normal and 
who wasn’t. Mr. Stephens couldn’t ever know the truth, but Daddy 
always would. (216) 
This ability to comprehend the disparity between each individual’s apprehension of 
meaning and reality enables Nichole to live with what is heterogeneous in her own 
experience, while at the same time supporting a shared apprehension as a pragmatically 
based compromise. In so doing, she is able to mediate between individual traumatic crisis 
(her own) and collective traumatic crisis, thereby ending the stalemate between opposing 
traumatic process and finding a suitable resolution for her own traumatic crisis, both in 
response to the accident, and prior existing trauma. Unlike the perpetrator who 
transgresses against the law in order to exploit and destroy the social unity, Nichole, as 
the nomothete, is able to transgress against the ‘law’ (both juristically and in the sense of 
the loss of meaning – logos) in order to ensure that social unity. 
Nichole’s calculated move also resolves her father’s traumatic crisis, and restores 






protected from her father’s abuse by the ability to reveal the truth, she and her father 
construct a narrative of family unity in which Nichole is once again restored to her role as 
child – a role that, ironically, she is only able to reclaim by truly becoming an adult. What 
she and her father now share, aside from their terrible secrets, is nothing more than what 
is appropriate for a daughter and her father: 
 Finally, he reached forward and put the key into he ignition, 
and speaking slowly, he said in a strange half-dead voice, “Well, 
Nichole, what do you say we stop at Stewart’s for an ice cream? 
We haven’t done that for a long time,” he added. 
 “That sounds fine, Daddy. I’d really like it.” 
 He started the car up then and drove across the road to 
Stewart’s and brought each of us a huge pistachio cone, which is 
the kind we both like best but that no one else in the family likes. 
(217) 
In the secrets that they share, which includes both the incest and the lie that 
Nichole told at the deposition, Nichole and her father share something very profound – 
the truth about both traumas that had to be concealed in order to restore social unity. As 
they arrive home, they have one last, oblique exchange about these two secrets before 
reentering the family circle and taking up the “believable narrative” that will enable the 







 As we pulled into the yard, I said to Daddy, “Nothing will 
happen to Dolores will it?” 
 He shut off the engine, and we sat there for a moment in 
silence, listening to the dashboard clock tick. Finally, he said, “No. 
Nobody wants to sue Dolores. She’s one of us.” 
 “Will the police do anything to her now?” 
 “It’s too late for that. Dolores can’t drive the school bus 
anymore, anyhow; the school board saw to that right off. I doubt 
she even wants to. Everyone knows she’s suffered plenty.” 
 “But everyone will blame her now, won’t they?” 
 “Most will, yes. Those that don’t know the truth will blame 
Dolores. People have got to have somebody to blame, Nichole.” 
 “But we know the truth,’ I said. ‘Don’t we?” 
 “Yes,” he said, and for the first time since before the accident, 
he looked me straight in the face. “We know the truth, Nichole. 
You and I.” His large blue eyes had filled with sorrowful tears, and 
his whole face seemed to beg for forgiveness. (219-220) 
Here, Nichole’s account ends with the resolution of traumatic crisis worked out in 
private. How the town finds a resolution for shared, social trauma will be the focus of the 








5.3 Dolores Driscoll: The Resolution of Collective Trauma 
The final chapter of The Sweet Hereafter returns to Dolores Driscoll’s narrative, 
and covers the period of time shortly after Mitchell Stephens’s lawsuit has been brought 
to an abrupt halt, and with it, the lawsuits of everyone in town. The narrative does more 
than give us a sense of how Dolores ultimately comes to terms with her own traumatic 
crisis. Rather, it also provides us with a concise view both of how the town as a whole 
resolves its collective trauma, and of the balance that is struck between the individual 
trauma (which demands that heterogeneous experience be signified) and of collective 
trauma (which demands that the basis of shared signification be left intact). In this last 
chapter, the narrative focuses on a single event – a demolition derby at the Sam Dent 
County Fair – and stresses the reciprocal relationship between Dolores, who had been a 
lynchpin of the town’s social network before the accident, and Nichole Burnell, who 
becomes the center around which the discursive community reforms in the aftermath. 
The county fair and in particular, the demolition derby, marks the first time that 
Dolores has participated in a community event, with the sole exception of the children’s 
funerals, which Dolores discretely attended. Dolores’s attendance at those funerals was a 
part of her own private traumatic process; a last interaction with the children whom she 
has lost as she seeks closure: 
We were cheerful, though, Abbott and I; it was our first time out in 
public together since last winter. After the accident, I had attended 
the funerals, but alone, without even Abbott to accompany me; it 






myself, spoke to no one, and left immediately after the services. It 
was just something I had to do, something crucial between me and 
the children. (224) 
Dolores attended these funerals quietly, sitting at the back and leaving before the service 
was completed in order to avoid any personal encounter. The citizens of Sam Dent, in 
turn, ignored her presence, acknowledging her need and her right to attend those funerals, 
while at the same time grappling with their own confusion over how to perceive her new 
role in the community. As we learned from Mitchell Stephens’s narrative, the town, like 
Dolores, is unable to establish her relative guilt or innocence in the accident. Their 
avoidance of her is a necessary part of their own mourning process. 
Dolores’s own perception as to why she attended the funerals is that it had a 
personal significance; something shared with the children who, like her, make up the 
circle of individuals most immediately affected by the accident. Dolores’s trauma is 
wholly unique because of her unique involvement in that tragedy. She does not precisely 
share the same experience as the children on the bus, however unlike the adults in town 
who lost children, Dolores experienced the crash itself. In this sense, the people who 
share her experience are off limits to her, either because they died, or because Dolores no 
longer sees them. Attending the funerals is the closest she can come to being with and 
communing with someone who, like her, actually experienced the accident itself. At the 
same time, Mitchell correctly identified the difficult nature of Dolores post-accident 






constitutes Dolores’s tacit attempt to place herself in their midst, testing the judgment of 
the town as to her future identity in the community: 
But she wasn’t having any of that. Silently, with her head bowed, 
Dolores was plunking herself down in the exact center of the 
town’s grief and rage, compelling them by her presence at these 
funerals to define her. Was she a victim of the tragedy, or was she 
the cause of it? She had placed herself on the scales of their 
judgment, but they did not want to judge her. To them, she was 
both, of course, victim and cause; just as to herself she was both. 
Like every parent when something terrible happens to his child, 
Dolores was innocent, and she was guilty. We knew which, in the 
eyes of God and our fellowman, we were, despite the fact that most 
of the time we felt like both; but she did not. Denial was 
impossible for her, so she wanted us to come forward and do the 
job for her. (143-144) 
These quiet and unobtrusive forays into the community precede, but closely 
resemble her attendance now at the county fair, where Dolores will finally discover the 
role she is to play in Sam Dent. Although Dolores does not yet know it, the town’s 
collective ambivalence towards her was resolved after Nichole’s testimony, with the 
“news” quietly filtering through the social networks that Dolores “had been speeding” at 
the time of the accident, and that this “reckless behavior” had been the reason she had 






believable; in some ways, easier to accept and believe than the truth that there is no clear 
cause of the accident. The lie “saved the town” in that it provided a clear, “ethical” 
explanation for the tragedy that simultaneously resolved the question as to Dolores 
innocence or guilt. Ultimately for the town, it is the loss of meaning and not the loss of 
the children that creates crisis (as opposed to grief). (This is distinct from the grief that 
the childrens’ immediate families feel at the loss of their children.) 
The unresolved fluctuation of Dolores’s identity across a division that straddles an 
essential, ethical issue (what constitutes a victim and what constitutes a perpetrator) 
disrupts the semiotic current in all domains, including the Communicative domain. There, 
the inability to establish whether Dolores is at fault for the accident undermines the basis 
for shared signification, dissolving the discursive community. Indeed, the fragmentation 
created by collective trauma and exacerbated by the many lawsuits that were filed or 
proposed, has had a profound impact on the town. As Dolores notes, “significant pain 
isolates you.” In the period of time just following Nichole’s “revelation,” the town has 
not yet formed a collective response to the trauma: 
All over town there were empty houses and trailers for sale that 
last winter had been homes with families in them. A town needs its 
children, just as much and in the same way as a family does. It 
comes undone without them, turns a community into a windblown 
scattering of isolated individuals. Take the Ottos. With Bear gone, 
it was hard to imagine the two of them together. Significant pain 






you’ve got, and after great loss, you must use whatever’s left, even 
if it isolates you from everyone else. (236-237) 
Dolores has been isolated by the tragedy, in part because she, like everyone else 
in the town, needs a period of time in which to “process” the accident and her grief. That 
period of time represents the time needed to allow her personal experience of the tragedy 
to find its way through the organizational domains, and to come to terms with the 
changes to subjectivity that the experience demands. The accident violated expectation, 
being something that was extrinsic to prior experience. As a result, the semiotic current is 
altered (a current that itself is subjectivity), and accordingly, the structure of the 
organizational domains must be altered, as must identity as it is expressed in Idiolect. 
Dolores’s identity as she had previously known it has perished with the children: 
I was very lonely in those days, still in a kind of shock from the 
accident, I think, and Abbott was the only person I could 
communicate with. But soon winter passed over, and spring 
appeared and rolled on a few weeks later, and then it was summer, 
and now in late summer I had begun to feel more like my old self – 
although I knew, of course, that I would never be the same person 
again. You can’t raise the dead. I knew that. (226) 
Coming to terms with the changes in subjectivity as it is shaped in the Epistemic, 
Ethical, Idiolectic and Narrative domains is a large part of dealing with traumatic crisis. 
What remains, is to deal with changes as they must occur in the Communicative domain, 






defines Dolores’s identity. Those changes will necessarily be reflected in social mirroring 
– how her fellow townspeople react to her; as well as which aspects of the identity that 
she asserts they will validate and which they will censor. In whatever way she ultimately 
comes to terms with her own traumatic crisis, the matter of whether or not Dolores will 
be able to return as a part of that community will depend upon the compatibility of her 
perception of herself with the perception of her around which the community finally 
unites. In a very literal sense, Dolores has already experienced her own expulsion from 
the community in the loss of her job not only as the town’s bus driver (which she 
anticipated), but as a assistant mail carrier as well (which she did not expect): 
Naturally, I no longer drove the school bus; two weeks after the 
accident, the school board mailed me a certified letter saying my 
services were no longer required, but I had already made that 
decision for myself, thank you. And since Eden Schraft never 
called me, the way she usually did, about carrying mail in the 
summer months, I gave that up too; a bit more reluctantly, 
however, than I have up the bus, for I had no terrible associations 
with that particular job. (225) 
As the sole provider for her family, Dolores finds employment driving for the motels in 
Lake Placid. That employment comes about, however, as a result of Dolores’s own self-
imposed exile from the town after the accident, when she began shopping in Lake Placid 






connection with a new community by reading the Lake Placid news papers, where she 
finds new employment driving for the hotels. 
Despite this separation for her community, the town of Sam Dent, which comes 
about through mutual avoidance, Dolores interprets this distance as an integral part of the 
mourning process – both her own and that of the people of her town (collectively and 
individually). Having needed a certain amount of time to herself in order to heal from 
traumatic crisis, she assumes that others are going through this process as well, requiring 
their own time before they can overcome the intensity of their loss and accept her as one 
of their own again. Once the pain of the tragedy has diminished, however, she anticipates 
that she will be reintegrated into the community. Her attendance at the county fair is 
calculated to serve as that moment: 
[…] I figured that enough time had passed for people to have gone 
through their first tangled reactions to the accident and come out 
on the other side, just as I more or less had myself; I had pretty 
well stayed out of sight and, I hoped, mind, all these lonesome 
months, which was only proper; by now, I thought, people would 
have put their dark conflicted feelings about me behind them and 
would once again be free to act towards me and Abbott like the 
dear old friends and neighbors they had always been. Sam Dent 
was our permanent lifelong community. We belonged to this town, 
we always had, and they to us; nothing could change that, I 






Dolores and Abbott have always attended the fair, where Dolores prefers the quiet 
of the animal pavilions, but where Abbott prefers to be in the thick of things, in particular 
at the demolition derby, which he likes to view from the top of the grandstand. Being 
confined to a wheelchair by his stroke, Abbott and Dolores must rely on the assistance of 
their fellow townspeople to help Dolores carry Abbott, in his wheelchair, up the 
grandstand steps: 
It’s not the same for Abbott. He’s more at ease in the flash and 
bustle and noise of the midway and, as I said, the demolition 
derby, which he prefers to watch from high in the grandstand. 
‘You… need… perspective… to… experience… it,’ he explains. 
That’s a problem, of course, with his being confined to a wheel 
chair in recent years. Normally, what happens is that a couple of 
men from town spot us before we even get to the grandstand and 
meet us at the bottom of the steps and, one on each side, latch on 
and carry Abbott in his wheelchair to the top level, where he can 
set his brake and watch the whole thing to his heart’s delight, to the 
very end. Afterwards, usually the same fellows from town show up 
and carry him back to the parking lot. (222) 
This necessity makes Dolores’s attendance at the fair more than just a first appearance at 
a community event. It is also a test of the community’s willingness to actively reintegrate 






As Dolores and Abbott enter the fairgrounds, no one returns Dolores’s greetings, 
although as she herself remarks: “I’m pretty easy to recognize, even in twilight dark: I’m 
big and have red hair, and here I am pushing this small man in a wheelchair” (231). 
Almost all of the town is there in the grandstand, however they treat Dolores and Abbott 
as though they were not there, not even discriminating between Dolores, whom they 
blame for the accident, and Abbott, who has had nothing to do with it: 
[…] most of the town of Sam Dent comes out for the demolition 
derby – and saw them glance at us and then look quickly back 
towards the track and stage in front or nudge the person next to 
them, who would then take his turn casting a quick expressionless 
glance at us. No one said a word to me and Abbott or even 
acknowledged our presence. I knew it was not Abbott they were 
snubbing; it was me. But he was with me, so they ignored him too. 
That made me mad. (231-232) 
When no one comes to their immediate aid, Dolores is left to wrestle Abbott and his chair 
up the stairs alone. If help comes, Dolores observes, it will have to come from a stranger 
or tourist, someone outside the boundaries of the shared, social identity belonging to the 
traumatized community: 
I backed him around and drew the chair up backwards to the first 
step, thinking I’d try to lug him up one step at a time, thinking also 
that maybe someone kind would see me struggling and would 






even. I grunted and yanked, and the chair came along with a 
thump, and we were up one step. Then another. Then a third, until 
soon we had made the first landing. (232) 
Finally help does arrive in the form of Billy Ansel, who helps Dolores carry 
Abbott up the stairs to the uppermost landing. Billy’s appearance is frightening to 
Dolores, his behavior unusual, and she misinterprets his friendly overtures as a kind of 
mockery until she realizes that he is merely intoxicated. As was hinted in his own 
narrative, Billy takes refuge in the use of alcohol after the accident as he used to take 
refuge in Marijuana to help him deal with the trauma of Vietnam – both alcohol and 
marijuana providing a means to hold onto both the present and the past simultaneously 
(although in the case of alcohol, it does so in a painful way). Once a heroic figure, Billy 
has become slightly frightening, but to a much greater degree, simply sad: 
I didn’t know what to think of how Billy had changed since the 
accident. He scared me; but mostly he made me sad. He had been a 
noble man; and now he was ruined. The accident had ruined a lot 
of lives. Or, to be exact, it had busted apart the structures on which 
those lives had depended – depended, I guess, to a greater degree 
than we had originally believed. A town needs his children for a lot 
more than it thinks. (235-236) 
Among all of the novel’s primary characters, Billy has dealt with the tragedy in the least 
productive way, abandoning his loving, if illicit, relationship with Risa Walker and 






he is a man who now loves no one. He is accompanied by his new “girlfriend,” a slightly 
sleazy girl names Stacey Gale from outside of Sam Dent. Despite his self-isolation, it is 
not surprising that Billy should be the one to help Dolores, since among all of the people 
in Sam Dent, he is in the unique position of knowing the truth about the accident. He 
does not reject Dolores, because he recognizes the lie in Nichole’s claim that Dolores had 
been speeding, although he also recognizes and values the necessity of that lie. 
The sad ascent of Abbott in his wheel chair, flanked by Dolores, a drunken Billy 
Ansel, and his girlfriend Stacey, contrasts with earlier years in which Sam Dent’s 
community had proudly carried Abbott to the top of the grandstand. Once at the center of 
the social structure, Dolores and Abbott are now relegated to the furthermost margins of 
the community. That center is now occupied by Nichole, who arrives in her wheelchair 
and is carried aloft by the crowd “like a saint in a religious procession”: 
Everyone was smiling, and the folks nearest Nichole were reaching 
out as if to touch her. A few people had started to clap their hands, 
and more and more of them were picking it up, as Sam and his 
family, with Nichole in the lead, made their way from the gate 
straight to the bottom of the stairs at the far side of the grandstand. 
Nichole had a lovely sweet smile on her face – she’s a beautiful 
girl anyhow, a fourteen-year-old blessed with movie star looks, 
practically – and she waved one hand back and forth slowly, like a 
saint in a religious procession or something, while the people 






In a triumphant procession, Nichole is carried to the top of the grandstand just opposite 
Abbott. There, in a physical sense as well, she occupies the position habitually afforded 
Dolores and Abbott in the past: 
Several men, three or four of them, gathered around her wheelchair 
and lifted it, like it was a throne, and with her father, Sam, and the 
rest of her family falling in behind, they carried Nichole up the 
stairs in a stately way, while the applause grew, a steady respectful 
clapping, […]. (239) 
The reaction to Nichole is hyperbolic, to a large extent because like Dolores, this 
is Nichole’s first appearance in the community since the accident, and the community is 
establishing both Nichole’s and Dolores’s future roles in social life. A clear-cut ethical 
interpretation has been imposed upon the accident, to a large extent as a result of 
Nichole’s act of nomothesis. By making Dolores responsible for the accident, the 
ambiguity created by collective trauma is resolved including the degree of Dolores 
innocence and guilt (a relatively trivial matter in terms of collective, social identity). At a 
much more significant level, that resolution reduced the collective anxiety surrounding 
the accident by defining that accident within the ethical framework, establishing 
causality, culpability, and permitting the community to expel what they now perceive to 
have violated the normative bounds of collective identity – Dolores Driscoll. Here, the 
restoration of the symbolized field of meaning and its logical terms is more important to 
the community than the truth of the accident. The community makes Nichole’s role as 






point. By expelling Dolores and “beatifying” Nichole, the community is able to 
reestablish shared symbolized meaning by reestablishing the inside/outside of the 
community’s collective “Self.” 
Although she does not know what Nichole has testified at her deposition, Dolores 
nonetheless recognizes the reciprocal nature of their relationship, interpreting it at a deep, 
psychological level. It is not coincidence that both of these individuals who are utilized 
by the community to restore shared, symbolized meaning (Dolores as “perpetrator” and 
Nichole as “victim”) themselves occupy an uncomfortable space between symbolized 
entities. Dolores’s identity straddles the opposition between innocent and guilty, while 
Nichole’s identity straddles the distinction between victim and survivor (i.e. lucky and 
unlucky). Dolores is expelled because she blurs the distinctions necessary for an ethical 
evaluation of this tragedy, while Nichole is made the community’s touchstone because 
she destroys the categories if luck, thereby restoring the primacy of causality. 
 Part of it, I knew, was that Nichole Burnell had survived the 
accident and had suffered a terrible loss, loss made visible by the 
wheelchair, and now for the first time, after many months away 
from us, she was at last returning to us, returning in a kind of 
triumph. Part of it was that she was a beautiful young girl purified 
by her injury. I remember how I used to regard some of the 
Vietnam vets who worked for Billy Ansel. And part of it, I also 
knew, was me, Dolores Driscoll, the fact of my presence here 






not forgive me, they could at least celebrate Nichole, and then 
maybe they would not feel so bad that I, too, was one of them. 
(239) 
It is Billy who provides another, more superficial explanation for the crowd’s 
reaction to Nichole, as his new girlfriend wonders aloud what all the fuss over Nichole 
can be about: “‘That kid has saved this town from a hundred lawsuits. She kept us all out 
of court, when it looked like half the damned town wanted nothing else but to go to 
court’” (239). This explanation is more comprehensible to an outsider like Stacy, and it 
also addresses the surface manifestation of a town of individuals separated by traumatic 
experience, each demanding with their lawsuits their own ethical explanation they might 
share with others. Nichole’s testimony serves the good of the community, and in that 
sense, it also serves the interests of Dolores and Abbott. Billy’s revelation that Nichole 
has provided a resolving testimony takes them fully unaware however, as no one has 
revealed Nichole’s testimony to them. Until this point, Dolores had not heard that she has 
ultimately been blamed for the accident and that the ambiguous (e.g. sublime) 
apprehension of her identity as both innocent and guilty has been resolved to merely 
guilty, thereby permitting shared, social meaning to be restored. It is only after much 
evasion that Billy finally reveals the story of Nichole’s deposition to them: 
“[…] Their lawyer, this guy Mitchell Stephens, he couldn’t get 
Nichole to testify the way he wanted her to, that’s all. And then I 
guess he didn’t feel he had a strong negligence case anymore, so 






they’ve started having second thoughts themselves, and their 
lawyers, too, have started dropping out, one by one. So now it 
looks like we won’t be seeing any lawsuits, after all. Which is fast 
bringing this town back together,” he said. “The girl has done us 
all, every single person in town, a valuable service. Even you, 
Abbott. Even you, Dolores, believe it or not.” (244) 
The situation is awkward for Billy, who knows that Nichole has lied, and it is 
difficult for him to explain the significance of that false testimony. Even more difficult is 
explaining his part in the lie, since he had been driving behind the bus when it left the 
road and could have countered Nichole’s falsified testimony. The lie in which both Billy 
and Nichole play a role, whether actively fabricating facts, or passively suppressing the 
truth, restores the integrity of the discursive community. It was a necessary lie in that it 
was the lesser of all available evils, however Dolores will have to pay the price of that 
manipulated narrative. Ironically, although Nichole is celebrated as the community’s 
perfect victim, what she has suffered threatened to destroy the community. Dolores, the 
chosen “perpetrator” is actually the one who is sacrificed for the good of the community, 
being expelled or socially “killed” so that the community may survive. As the bearer of 
this bad news, Billy tries to distance himself from any responsibility, arguing that he 
could only have said what speed the bus was going based on the speed he usually drove. 
Nichole’s assertion that the bus had been going seventy-two miles an hour the time of the 






“What Nichole said she witnessed,” he said, “was the accident. She 
was sitting in the bus up front next to you, Dolores. I guess I was 
the only other witness, but I was driving a ways behind you, and 
not paying much attention, either. So what Nichole had to say 
counted a whole lot. […] All I knew was the speed that I myself 
usually drive up there. Fifty-five to sixty, is what I told them. 
Nichole, though, she was very certain. She said she remembered it 
clearly – she knew how fast you were going when the bus went off 
the road. That’s what she told them.” (245) 
Billy’s defense that he could only estimate his speed based on his habitual 
behavior is likely true, despite the fact that he knows that Nichole is lying. Dolores 
herself did the same, testifying that she had been within the speed limit, while later 
admitting to Mitchell Stephens that she herself only knew the speed at which she usually 
drove that stretch of road. Billy’s revelation finally puts to rest the uncertainty of 
Dolores’s role in the community. At long last she has been let in on the narrative that the 
community now holds to be the truth about the accident, and she realizes that there are 
two narratives – the truth as she knows it, and the narrative that holds the town together: 
Now, in addition to the truth, I knew what nearly everyone else in 
town knew and believed, and if they didn’t, they were learning and 
coming to believe it this very minute, probably, from the person 
standing or sitting next to them here at the fair – they were learning 






the terrible Sam Dent school bus accident last January. […] 
Dolores Driscoll was the reason why the bus had gone off the road 
and tumbled down the embankment and into the icy water-filled 
sandpit. Dolores Driscoll was the reason why the children of Sam 
Dent had died. (247) 
The resolution of individual trauma is incompatible with the resolution of 
collective trauma, and the resolution that serves the consensus silences Dolores in her 
personal account of traumatic experience – just as it silences the personal (heterogeneous) 
accounts of everyone else who experienced the tragedy. Dolores’s reaction is not one of 
anger, however, nor does she show a desire to set the record straight. Rather, she is 
merely relieved that the suspense of waiting for judgment is ended and her identity once 
again resolved: 
You’d expect me to feel angry, maybe, unjustly accused and all 
that. But I didn’t. Not at all. I felt relieved. And, therefore, grateful. 
Grateful to Billy Ansel, for revealing what Nichole had done, and 
grateful to Nichole for having done it. (248) 
It is extremely unlikely that a single individual could sway the consensus about a matter 
which the majority has not experienced firsthand, and Dolores realizes that this consensus 
has formed around a necessary lie. The news that the town now accepts her guilt 
completes Dolores’s separation from her community, and what becomes important to her 






experienced it is validated by Billy, the only other adult to witness the accident, and in 
that private recognition, these two individuals form their own discursive community: 
 “[…] I just figured you knew, like everybody else. I’m sorry, 
Dolores” he said. 
 “No, don’t be sorry to me, Billy. Not as long as you know the 
truth.” 
 “Well, yeah, I know the truth.” 
 “That’s two of us, then,” I said. There were three of us, of 
course, counting Nichole. Well, four, actually, counting Abbott. 
But Abbott knew the truth because he happened to believe me, and 
I only assumed that. […] Abbott wasn’t with me then; I was alone. 
(246-247) 
Just as Nichole dealt with her traumatic crisis by recognizing the existence of 
separate realities, Dolores realizes that she shares her truth with just two other people; 
Nichole and Billy, who were both at the scene of the accident, and who therefore shared 
her experience of the events as they unfolded on that day. The change that she has 
undergone through the integration of heterogeneous experience destroys the bonds of 
shared meaning that existed before the accident; even that which she shared with Abbott, 
who now may or may not believe the truth that Dolores is innocent, but who can never 
know it. The bond that she shared with Abbott, which was based on their common life 
together and that allowed her to “know” what he was saying, even when his words were 






aware of this loss of connection, noting that for the first time in her life she neither 
knows, nor cares what Abbott is thinking or feeling. The accident has enabled Dolores 
both to understand and to accept the essential isolation of each individual in her 
perceptions, emotions, and apprehension of meaning and that realization frees her to 
construct her own identity and her own reality. She is finally able to claim the self-
contained self-sufficiency she desired and that was always a part of her subjectivity, 
smuggled out and surreptitiously projected onto Abbott: 
And for once, possibly for the first time in our life together, I did 
not know what Abbott was thinking or feeling. Even more 
peculiar, I didn’t care, either. He might be angry, he might be 
resentful, he might even think I had lied to him. I didn’t care; it 
didn’t matter what Abbott thought. I felt myself singled out in a 
way that had not happened to me before, and although I have never 
experienced such solitude as that, I have also never felt quite so 
strong. (248) 
In the demolition derby that follows Billy’s revelation, the novel offers a last 
metaphor for the resolution of individual trauma and collective trauma, underscoring the 
essential difference between those crises. The individual is driven to integrate unmediated 
somatosensory experience in the field of symbolized meaning, expanding the range of 
what can be said in order to resolve the division of subjectivity that heterogeneous 
experience creates. The discursive community is driven to find a concensus that may or 






sense, but instead a believable narrative. Given that each individual is also a social being, 
this socially constructed narrative does indeed address a part of the individual crisis – an 
ethical crisis. 
Unlike the trauma depicted in Traumnovelle, in the case of a traumatic experience 
that affects a broad range of individuals such as the bus accident, each individual forms 
their own “truth” about their traumatic experience, with each creating a separate and 
distinct “reality” in Idiolect. Those individual realities separate the members of the 
discursive community from one another. The narrative that articulates collective 
traumatic crisis in the Communicative domain unifies those individuals again, although 
often at the cost of some portion of the individual’s own apprehension of reality. While 
each individual will form his or her own apprehension of shared signification in the 
Communicative domain and the trauma narrative articulated there, that narrative 
constrains individual discourse, thereby ensuring that communication will continue in the 
perception that reality is approximately shared. 
The demolition derby becomes the metaphor for the negotiation of meaning. 
Dolores’s old station wagon, which had once served as her first “school bus” so many 
years ago, has been entered in the derby by one of Billy Ansel’s mechanics, Jimbo 
Gagne. Usually the cars that are modified for the derby are unrecognizable, and Dolores 
anticipates that it will be difficult even for her, to recognize “Boomer,” as she and the 
children once named the car: 
[…] I kept peering around in search of my old station wagon, 






derby tonight, resurrected and driven by Jimbo Gagne. It would 
have been difficult to recognize it – they take out all the windows 
glass and lights, and you can barely tell what brand or model car it 
was originally, except by the shape of its fenders and grille and so 
on. Forget telling who owned the car originally. (228) 
In fact, “Boomer” is very easy to spot, as Jimbo has painted the name across the top of 
the station wagon. Dolores and everyone in the grandstand will be able to easily 
recognize her car, which in a sense, already isolates the car (and through it, her) as the 
center of focus among a field of anonymous cars: 
Suddenly, Abbott raised his left arm, his good one, and pointed. I 
followed his finger down to the arena and saw what he saw, old 
Boomer, my Dodge station wagon, number 57, it was. Jimbo 
Gagne had painted the car black and had written the number and 
his first name and a peace symbol across the hood in big yellow 
letters. Along the side was the name of the sponsor, not-quite-free 
advertising for Billy Ansel’s Sunoco station. And on the top of the 
wagon, in huge letters, he had painted the word BOOMER. (249) 
The ensuing battle galvanizes the crowd – the community of Sam Dent – and not 
surprisingly, the other cars “gang up” on Boomer. In a none-too-subtle gesture, the other 
drivers act out their rage, “punishing” Dolores by proxy as they attempt to destroy the car 






rises with the rest of the crowd to witness the spectacle of the town’s rage, made 
corporeal in the arena: 
My heart was pounding furiously. I was standing now, everyone 
was standing, and if he hadn’t been positioned at the top of the 
stairs, Abbott wouldn’t have been able to see. I hoped that Nichole, 
at the other side of the grandstand, could see this. Everyone wanted 
to see Boomer get hit, and again and again they got their wish, as 
Jimbo seemed unable to get free of the pack long enough to do any 
of the hitting himself. The other drivers were ganging up on 
Boomer, going around one another, abandoning good clear shots at 
nearby cars for a glancing shot at Boomer. (250-251) 
The entire community unites in a shared animosity towards Dolores and her car, and in 
the pleasure of smashing Boomer, certainly acting out their own inexpressible rage at the 
accident itself, as much as expressing their rage at Dolores: 
[…] every time Boomer got hit, no matter who hit it, the crowd 
roared with sheer pleasure. (250) 
The moment proves to be a moment of cathartic expression rather than a crude 
representation of total rejection, and eventually the crowd undergoes a change. Despite 
the number of assailants, Boomer proves to be resilient – just as Dolores herself has been 
resilient – and as cars slowly fall to the wayside, too damaged to continue, Boomer 
endures. Eventually, only Boomer and two other cars remain in the ring. Demonstrating 






in establishing “meaning” the crowd’s attitude suddenly and collectively changes. While 
the derby began as a brutal, straight-forward celebration of Boomer’s isolation and 
destruction, at once the car’s ability to endure thrusts it into the role of the tenacious 
underdog. The crowd now rallies behind Boomer, which now no longer represents what 
the community feels has threatened it, and instead, the car comes to represent the 
community’s own threatened self: 
The crowd erupted joyously, filling the night air with wild shouts 
and cries, and when Jimbo had Boomer lined up on the Eagle, with 
the rear bumper headed straight towards the right front end of the 
other car, the people hollered for him to do it! Do it! Do it! And 
when he smashed into the fender and wheel and tore the steering 
rods of the Eagle, stopping it dead where it stood, […] the crowd 
jumped up and down and yelled with delighted approval and 
slapped each other on the shoulders and backs. (252) 
“Truth” in shared signification is utilitarian, pragmatically determined as that 
which will preserve the unity and cohesion of that community. Within the social context, 
the purpose of each individual’s participation in the “game” of negotiating meaning is not 
to win, but instead, to ensure the continuation of the game. With its rage spent in the 
expression, and with the social affirmation of the “cause” of the accident (e.g. Dolores), 
the community turns to the symbolic expression of tenacity and a will to survive that 
Dolores also offers Sam Dent. The community is once again unified in an expression of 






Dolores’s rehabilitation” and reacceptance in the community (a sort of symbolic 
“resurrection” after a symbolic “sacrifice”) does not affect Dolores personally however. 
Her own separation from the community she had once regarded as her “family” is already 
complete, and the negotiation of shared meaning taking place below her is meaningless to 
her. The town is not her discursive community anymore: 
To tell the truth, up there in the stands, after Billy had revealed to 
me what everyone in the town now regarded as the truth, in the 
passage of but a few moments’ time I had come to feel utterly and 
permanently separated from the town of Sam Dent and all its 
people. There was no reason for me to want to stand up and cheer 
first to see a car once owned and driven by Dolores Driscoll get 
destroyed by a bunch of other cars and then join in when the very 
same people cheered to see it turn and destroy the others. This 
demolition derby was a thing that held meaning for other people, 
but not for me. (253-254) 
Even as she realizes that she is no longer a member of the community, Dolores is 
also aware that her lack of involvement itself is shared by those individual citizens of 
Sam Dent who have had to come to terms with the experience of the trauma. While Sam 
Dent has found a resolution for collective trauma that speaks for the community at large 
(a solution that differs sharply from the solution sought by outsiders to address collective 
trauma of an even larger discursive community), that solution has no impact on the 






trauma. That smaller circle of individuals within the greater community of Sam Dent, are 
unified by a single thing: the fact that they each exist in their own, separate reality. No 
narrative constructed by the town to make sense of the accident, and no use of the 
survivors by the town in achieving that aim, can have any lasting meaning for the actual 
survivors themselves. These efforts to memorialize, to cast blame, and to expel what is 
perceived as heterogeneous serves the common good, not the individual good, and this, 
Dolores recognizes, is exactly as it should be: 
 I do not believe that Nichole Burnell could have joined them, 
either; neither would any of the other children who had been riding 
on the bus with me that morning. All of us – Nichole, I, the 
children who survived the accident, and the children who did not – 
it was as if we were a town of solitaries living in a sweet hereafter, 
and no matter how the people of Sam Dent treated us, whether they 
memorialized us or despised us, whether they cheered our 
destruction or applauded our victory over adversity, they did it to 
meet their needs, not ours. Which, since it could be no other way, 
was exactly as it should be. 
 Nichole Burnell, Bear Otto, the Lamston kids, Sean Walker, 
Jessica and Mason Ansel, the Atwater and the Bilodeau kids, all 
the children who had been on the bus and had died and had not 
died, and I, Dolores Driscoll – we were absolutely alone, each of 






it. And even if we weren’t dead, in an important way which no 
longer puzzled or frightened me and which I therefore no longer 
resisted, we were as good as dead. (254) 
Dolores’s ability to transcend her trauma, like Nichole’s, comes not in the 
restoration of a single reality that can be perceived to be shared by everyone, but instead, 
it comes in the occult and sublime knowledge that reality and meaning are constructed, 
and that these essentially cannot ever be shared even among members of the same 
discursive community. Each individual holds her his or herself an Idiolectic apprehension 
of reality that is based on individual experience. Shared symbolized “meaning” in the 
Communicative domain is essentially nothing more than a social compact to behave as 
though meaning were shared, or even to believe it is so, in order that social and discursive 
interaction remain possible. With its collective response to the derby, the town of Sam 
Dent has once again achieved that consensus. As Dolores stands to take Abbott to the car, 
intending to leave the town forever, the community finally responds to her need, carrying 
Abbott “smoothly down the stairs.” Sam Dent is once again able to accept Dolores, now 
that a shared symbolized field of meaning has been reformed and the community’s unity 
restored: 
 Without waiting for an answer, I stepped behind his 
wheelchair, released the brake, and tipped it towards me on its rear 
wheels, preparing to thump it down the stairs, one step at a time. It 
would be a bumpy ride for him, but I knew he could take it. He’s 






 But as I rolled him to the edge of the landing, a young fellow 
seated in the row in front of me stood up and, to my surprise, 
turned to help. I recognized him but did not know him personally. 
[…]Another man suddenly appeared on my other side, an older 
man who looked like a summer person, grey-haired, trim, in 
sandals and Bermuda shorts and blue dress shirt. Then a third and a 
fourth man moved into place, and before I could say a word, they 
had lifted Abbott’s chair and were carrying him smoothly down the 
stairs. (254-255) 
As she leaves the grandstand, her progress is followed attentively by the crowd, and yet 
she notes how easily that crowd that had once been her community is able to turn its 
attention back to the fourth heat of the derby. Life goes on, Dolores concludes. The 
process of constructing meaning and identity, both individual and collective, is an 
ongoing process and once separated, Dolores’s path and the path of Sam Dent move 
resolutely apart: 
I followed along behind. The crowd had gone silent now, and it 
seemed that everyone had decided to watch us descended the 
stairs. I held my head up and tried to look like I didn’t notice. 
When I reached the ground, I said thanks to the four men, and took 
over Abbott’s wheelchair, and pushed him quickly through the 
gate. As I myself exited the grandstand, I glanced back and saw 






gotten itself attentive and noisy all over again. Even Billy Ansel. 
Life goes on, I might have said, if there had been anyone to hear 
me. Nichole Burnell I could not see from there. (255) 
Over the course of The Sweet Hereafter, the reader is led through the progression 
from individual crises, to the negotiation of shared meaning and collective crisis, and 
from that negotiation to the resolution of all crises in a compromise between individual 
perceptions of “reality,” and the compact that meaning is shared. The need both to signify 
unmediated, individual experience and to maintain the consensus of shared meaning that 
allows social interaction, pits opposing traumatic processes against one another. That 
conflict exists not only in the opposition of the individual and the social entity, but within 
the individual, who is both experiencing being and social being. Ultimately, for all of the 
complexities encountered when heterogeneous experience demands the reanalysis of the 
organizational domains, it is these opposing agendas of symbolized meaning – to express 
all experience, and to preserve the social bond – that generates traumatic crisis, and 









[…] I want to tell you this: twenty years ago I watched a man die on a trail 
near the village of My Khe. I did not kill him. But I was present, you see, and 
my presence was guilt enough. […] I remember feeling the burden of 
responsibility and grief. I blamed myself. And rightly so, because I was present. 
[…] I want you to feel what I felt. I want you to know why story-truth is truer 




The theoretical model developed in this study is first and foremost a cognitive 
model that is designed to account for the ongoing, dynamic process by which we 
apprehend ourselves and the world around us. That model, which I have based on existent 
notions of dynamic systems, can perhaps best be termed a confluent, dynamic model of 
cognition and subjectivity. I have consciously developed this model to span the 
boundaries that exist between theories of subjectivity, semiosis, cognition and social 
interaction, since it is my contention that, aside from any convenience that can be derived 
from separating these theoretical areas, they belong to a single process by which meaning 
and identity are generated. 
In developing this model, I have purposely availed myself of the kinds of terms 
and dynamic processes used to describe the neuro-physiological functioning of the brain. 
Although we may be many years away from uniting our understanding of the 
physiological functioning of the brain with our understanding of psychological, semiotic, 
or philosophical theory, it is clear that we will eventually need to do so. Existent 
cognitive theory already accounts for some aspects of psychological functioning 
including strong emotion as overflow (into the limbic system), the lateralized separation 
                                                 






of spatial from sequential cognitive ordering, and even differences in cognitive style and 
semiotic activity that are linked to innate differences in lateralization and cerebral 
dominance.2 It will have to remain for someone else more versed in neurophysiology to 
establish the somatic basis for consciousness and subjectivity however a model of 
cognition that is itself designed as a dynamic system of differentials, current, induction, 
impedance, and overflow will move us towards such a connection more quickly than 
psychologized models that define entities such as ego, superego and id, or that establish 
identity as a monolithic entity. 
Although my purpose has been to develop a more adequate model for 
understanding cognition and subjectivity, trauma has taken center stage as the primary 
object of my investigations. I have argued that trauma provides us with a unique 
opportunity to expand our understanding of subjectivity and the relationship between the 
individual and society. Rather than representing a breakdown of meaning and identity, 
trauma allows us to observe aspects of cognitive functioning that otherwise remain 
beneath the threshold of human awareness. This examination of trauma serves to help 
redefine subjectivity and cognition, while at the same time, rethinking existent notions of 
subjectivity and meaning allows us to bring together seemingly oppositional theoretical 
stances that have fragmented trauma theory, unifying them within a single theoretical 
model. This assimilative view of trauma reveals the active dynamic of subjectivity and 
                                                 
2 See Joseph E. LeDoux, “Emotion Circuits in the Brain,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 155-
184. Sally Springer and Georg Deutsch, Left Brain, Right Brain (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981). 
George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Thomas G. West, In the Mind’s Eye: Visual Thinkers, 
Gifted People with Dyslexia and Other Learning Difficulties, Computer Images, and the Ironies of 






the underlying differentials that drive this dynamic, and attempts to capture what is 
valuable in conflicted approaches to trauma, while at the same time acknowledging the 
inadequacy of each as a comprehensive model. 
I have used literary and filmic narratives to illustrate the way in which traumatic 
experience fragments meaning and identity, thereby revealing the vulnerability of our 
assumptions about any objective, external reality. Trauma, which must be defined by the 
individual’s own experience of fragmentation rather than by any innate quality of any 
particular event or experience, presents the traumatized individual with conflicted 
objectives. The individual must modify symbolized meaning in order to express 
heterogeneous experience, while at the same time safeguarding that meaning as the 
medium of mutually comprehensible, social communication. Thus we might say that the 
traumatized individual suffers from polylexia, both in the inadequacy of the existent field 
of symbolized meaning to express the totality of the experience, and in the demand that 
the individual balance the personal expression of experience with constraints upon that 
expression imposed by the social domain. This need to create an expression of traumatic 
experience that reflects this polylexia gives rise, in turn, to a unique narrative genre – the 
trauma narrative – that is focused on expressing ambiguity, and on essentially recreating 
the traumatic schism in the reader/viewer as a way of bringing that person into a newly 
constituted, and now shared, apprehension of reality. 
I call this a narrative genre, however, what I develop here is not a literary tool, nor 
is trauma narrative restricted to literary representations. That being said, I have 






have already stated, I wanted to avoid imposing my own interpretation of traumatic 
experience on the individual’s testimony of his or her own experience. This is a difficulty 
for which this model can provide no solution – and indeed, it is a difficulty that reflects 
an essential element in this model – the separation of individual cognition from the 
consensus of shared meaning. It is simply not possible for anyone to speak of another’s 
traumatic experience without interjecting his or her own interpretation and experience. 
(Indeed, it is not even possible to truly apprehend what is experienced by another being.) 
What we are able to do is to participate in the social renegotiation of meaning that 
trauma demands in order to reestablish the appearance and the concensus that meaning is 
shared, and that it binds us to one another as members of a common discursive 
community. Further, although polylexia can, and does emerge in first-person testimony, 
the artifice inherent in the production of literary and performance narratives (i.e., film and 
drama) is perhaps better suited to the objective of sharing the conflict of polylexia, since 
these modes of expression are mimetic, but also have greater access to means of aesthetic 
distortion. In this way, although a literary or performance narrative is not a spontaneous, 
first-person testimony, it is nevertheless well suited to the viral project by which 
polylexia may be recreated in the reader/viewer – thereby recreating the “silence” of 
trauma. 
Trauma narrative, as a genre defined in this study, is characterized by the 
narrative’s own innate structure – that is, by its ability to create multiple narrative 
“realities” that can neither be merged, nor separated from one another (covalent 






the reader/viewer’s inability to resolve that superfluity within existent meaning schemes, 
represents the narrative mechanism by which the silence of trauma is recreated. Defining 
trauma narrative in terms of its innate structure establishes a narrative genre that is not 
constrained by subject matter or narrative perspective (i.e., it need not represent a first-
person account of a so-called traumatic or catastrophic event). Neither is such narrative 
limited by language, culture, or time period. Indeed, this definition of trauma narrative 
specifically excludes some narratives that, in current trauma theory might otherwise be 
treated as trauma narrative. 
In selecting narratives to examine in this study, I looked for those that would best 
represent the broadest possible range of theoretical features being described, and that 
were likely to be familiar to the reader. Constrained by space in the number of narratives 
I could examine, I had to weigh the relative advantage of presenting a small number of 
very detailed analysis against the advantage of presenting a wide range of more 
superficial readings. Ultimately, I chose the former option in order to avoid having to 
reorient the reader to the narrative in question, while at the same time forcing that reader 
to complete the analyses that I had only cursorily carried out. Although I believe that a 
lesser number of in-depth analyses is the better choice, this narrow selection of narratives 
does not convey the capacity of the genre definition to transcend linguistic, cultural, and 
temporal barriers, nor does it allow me to show the full range of ways in which covalent 







An awareness of covalency in a narrative provides the reader or viewer with a 
means of identifying the polylexic experience of trauma, and the silence that such 
polylexia engenders. Ultimately, it is my hope that the model of subjectivity and 
cognition, together with the reinterpretation of trauma and trauma narrative that I present 
here will lead to an understanding of the origin of that polylexia – the inherent difficulty 
in negotiating meaning both at a personal level, and at the level of social interaction and 
the loss that such negotiation creates. Most importantly, we need to recognize and 
acknowledge that, in the negotiation of meaning surrounding traumatic experience, there 
are multiple traumatic processes at work. Each individual who participates in that 
discourse contributes his or her own apprehension of a given experience, and each 
individual is driven both to expand what can be said, and to limit what is acknowledged 
as “shared.” We will eventually need to move away from therapeutic methods that force 
the individual to “reform” his or her narrative of traumatic experience so that it fits with 
the existent social apprehension of meaning (i.e., that which the individual shares with his 
or her therapist), and towards methods that allow the individual to recognize the 
limitations of symbolized meaning and the need to behave as though meaning is shared, 
while at the same time allowing her to acknowledge the validity of experience that 
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